Delhi High Court
Madan Lal vs The State (Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi) & ... on 5 September, 2018
$~13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 5th September 2018
+ CRL.M.C. 4382/2016
MADAN LAL ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate
versus
THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) & ORS.
..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Ravi Nayak, APP for the State
with SI Bachchan Singh, PS Keshav
Puram
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
ORDER (ORAL)
1. The petitioner is facing criminal prosecution in the case
arising out of investigation into first information report (FIR)
no.310/2015 under Sections 285 and 304A of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) of police station Keshav Puram. The case
involves the death of Nagraj, aged 50 years, who had
succumbed to injuries suffered in an incident of fire in house
no. 4273, Gali no.4, Jai Mata Market, Tri Nagar, Delhi in the
evening of 07.05.2015. The case concerns the afore-mentioned
offences allegedly committed by the petitioner, he having used
the said property as a godown for stocking inflammable
material (PVC goods), the fire incident statedly having
occurred due to neglect by certain acts of commission or
omission on his part, the deceased having been housed inside
the said property at the relevant point of time and suffering
injuries which proved fatal.
2. By the present petition invoking the inherent power of
this Court under Section 482 Cr. PC, prayer is made for the
criminal case to be quashed on account of settlement with the
second to sixth respondents, who are legal heirs of the
deceased Nagraj.
3. The prayer in the petition is opposed strongly by the
State, it referring to the gravity of the offence involved
particularly the offence under Section 304A IPC, placing
reliance on Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, (2017) 9
SCC 641.
4. Per contra, the petitioner relies on Mahender Singh Vs.
State (GNCT of Delhi) & Ors., Crl. M.C. 512/2016, decided on
05.02.2016, a decision rendered by a learned single judge of
this Court in bringing to a close another prosecution under
Section 287 and 304A IPC.
5. In another similar petition concerning a case of death by
rash or negligent act (albeit by driving of a motor vehicle on a
public road) by an order passed today, while declining to
exercise the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to bring
an end to the criminal process, this Court taking note of the
rulings of the Supreme Court, inter alia, in Gian Singh vs.
State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Narinder Singh and Ors.
vs. State of Punjab and Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466; Parbatbhai
Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v.
State of Gujarat and Another, (2017) 9 SCC 641; State of
Karnataka v. Muralidhar (2009) 4 SCC 463 and certain others,
has held thus:-
"19. The offence of rash driving of a motor vehicle on
a public road is not directed against any specific
individual. It exposes other users of the road - citizens
in general - to wanton risk to their life, limb or
property. The rising fatalities on public roads bring
havoc to the victims, or their kith or kin, and create
additional burden on the State and the society at large.
Untimely loss of a precious human life not only brings
immeasurable pain and suffering to the family that is
left behind but, at times, loss of the bread earner
resultantly throwing those dependent on him virtually
on the road or at the mercy of doles of the civil society
or State. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of
Punjab vs. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182, "(s)uch
a crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of
many others around them". Recourse to the remedy of
accident claim under the law is no solace. After-all,
the legal process invariably takes time to deliver, such
litigation being long winding and, at times, uncertain,
particularly in cases where there is absence of valid
insurance cover against third party risk. If the victim
somehow survives with injuries, the trauma or
aftermath of hurt is also not fully compensatable in
terms of money.
20. We are a society wedded to the ethos of "rule
of law". The Constitution of India guarantees to every
person on this soil the fundamental right to protection
of life (Article 21). When a person moves on the public
road in exercise of his fundamental freedom to move,
he legitimately expects the State to ensure that all
others using the public space or way respect his right
to do so without he being put to harm. It is the
obligation of the State to ensure enforcement of strict
discipline of the law. If such rights are breached, there
is corresponding obligation on the court to ensure that
consequences flowing from law follow.
21. Unlike certain other jurisdictions, our
jurisprudence does not adopt the policy of Islamic law
principle of "blood money" (Diyat) as the answer to
every wrongdoing. On the contrary, the Supreme
Court has ruled that in striking the balance to take
care of the "cry of the society" in grave crimes,
"(m)oney cannot be the oasis" [Sumer Singh vs.
Surajbhan Singh (2014) 7 SCC 323]. Against the
reality that number of such cases of rash or negligent
acts causing mayhem like death or grievous hurt (or
permanent disability) have only been escalating over
the years, allowing a lid to be put on the criminal
prosecution on account of "settlement" into which the
victim is persuaded to enter, in his or her anxiety, to
receive some recompense, would erode the policy of
the court to maintain the "deterrent element", such
latitude being a result of "misplaced sympathy",
having the potency to convey the undesirable
impression that driving can be permitted to be a matter
of frivolous "frolic".
22. A case of such nature cannot be treated as
merely a private dispute between two individuals - not
the least for this court to exercise its inherent power to
inhibit further judicial process. The jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.PC, though couched in terms of
"power" is actually a responsibility which has to be
discharged carefully bearing in mind the guiding
principles and to "secure the ends of justice" in which
exercise societal interest must always be paramount.
The liberal attitude in quashing such cases as of death
or serious hurt due to rash or negligent acts would be,
borrowing the expression from Muralidhar (supra),
"result wise counter productive in the long run and
against societal interest" and be in the teeth of the
guidelines declared in Parbatbhai Aahir (supra).
6. Though the cause leading to the untimely death of the
individual, which is the subject matter of the case at hand is not
a motor vehicular accident but an incident of fire, the fact
remains that the acts of commission or omission which led to
the said incident stemmed prima facie, from culpable rashness
or negligence. Thus, the above principles would squarely
apply to the case of this nature as well inasmuch as it is the
society at large which is impacted.
7. The offence committed by the petitioner in the present
matter not only pertains to his acts of gross criminal negligence
against one private individual whose death was caused in the
consequence, but also to the interest of the society at large
since he was found to have been using a property as a godown
in a residential area for the purposes of storing highly
inflammable goods (such as PVC) in substantial quantity that
too, prima facie, without any safety measures in place and
consequently putting all the neighbouring residents at high risk.
8. The dispute, in view of this court, not being one in the
nature of "private" dispute between two individuals, in the
foregoing facts and circumstances and having regard to the
gravity of the offences involved cannot be closed on mutual
agreement. This court declines to bring an end to the criminal
process.
9. The petition is dismissed.
R.K.GAUBA, J.
SEPTEMBER 05, 2018
Yg/nk
