Citation : 2018 Latest Caselaw 6404 Del
Judgement Date : 23 October, 2018
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No. 365/2006
% 23rd October, 2018
M/S SIGMA EXPORTS
..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sandeep Garg, Advocate
(M. No.9811362403).
versus
STATE BANK OF PATIALA
..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Garva Dhyani, Advocate
(M. No.9910137827).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. This Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is filed by the plaintiff in the suit
impugning the Judgment of the Trial Court dated 15.02.2006 by which
the trial court has dismissed the suit for recovery of Rs. 4,33,061/-
filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the respondent/defendant/State
Bank of Patiala. The claim of the plaintiff was that the
respondent/defendant-bank, after more than three and half years of
giving a credit for an amount of Rs. 2,74,820/- on 27.05.1996, vide
letter dated 28.08.1999, claimed that the credit advice was given by
mistake. The credit/payment of Rs. 2,74,820/- equivalent to US$
7885.50 (at Rs.35/- per dollar) was the payment to be received by the
appellant/plaintiff as seller from the buyer M/s Jean Poppe, Belgium.
2. The facts of the case are that the appellant/plaintiff filed
the subject suit pleading that it is the manufacturer and exporter of
cotton home furnishing. The appellant/plaintiff maintained its current
account with the respondent/defendant-bank. In July, 1995, the
appellant/plaintiff shipped its consignment to Belgium for the buyer
M/s Jean Poppe, Belgium as per Invoice dated 18.06.1995. The
documents with respect to the shipment of goods were sent by the
appellant/plaintiff for collection of payment through the
respondent/defendant-bank. The appellant/plaintiff states that it
received a credit advice from the respondent/defendant-bank on
27.05.1996 with respect to the amount of Rs. 2,74,820/-, however, the
respondent/defendant-bank after about three and half years on
28.08.1999 claimed that by mistake the credit was made in the account
of the appellant/plaintiff because in fact no amount was received by
the respondent/defendant-bank from the foreign buyer through its
bank with respect to the subject shipment under Invoice dated
18.06.1995. Reference is made in the plaint, thereafter, to various
correspondence between the parties of the year 1999 and ultimately of
the appellant/plaintiff sent Legal Notice dated 25.04.2001 and
thereafter the subject suit was filed claiming the principal amount of
Rs. 2,74,820/- along-with the balance amount towards interest totaling
to Rs. 4,33,061/-.
3. The respondent/defendant-bank contested the suit and
pleaded that by a mistake, credit was given in the account of the
appellant/defendant, in view of the foreign department of the
respondent/defendant-bank sending the payment advice dated
23.10.1996, which was actually under a mistake of fact, because infact
no payment has been received by the respondent/defendant-bank..
This mistake was discovered while reconciling the bank's account in
August, 1999. Accordingly, the respondent/defendant-bank marked a
lien on the funds of the appellant/plaintiff lying with the
respondent/defendant-bank for the amount of Rs. 3,45,019/- on
account of the wrong credit given of Rs. 2,74,820/- to the
appellant/plaintiff on 27.05.1996. The respondent/defendant-bank
also pleaded that the original documents were already sent back to the
appellant/plaintiff by courier on 17.08.1996. Therefore, the Suit was
prayed to be dismissed.
4. After pleadings were complete, the trial court framed the
following issues:-
"1. Whether the suit has been filed by duly authorized person and hence, not liable to be dismissed? OPP
2. Whether the export bill of the plaintiff was inadvertently paid under mistake and it was credited to the plaintiff's account? OPD
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief claimed? OPP
4. Relief."
5. The crucial issue to be decided is issue no.2 as to whether
the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of the amount claimed
in the suit on account of the respondent/defendant-bank only
informing the appellant/plaintiff after three and half years of the credit
made on 27.05.1996 i.e. in terms of the Letter of the
respondent/defendant-bank dated 28.08.1999. The trial court has
decided this issue against the appellant/plaintiff by observing that the
witness of the respondent/defendant-bank DW-2, Sh. Naval Kishore,
proved and exhibited the courier receipt of the courier Speed Way
Courier as Ex.DW1/1 by which the original documents of shipment
were returned by respondent/defendant-bank to the appellant/plaintiff.
The bill of the courier was exhibited as Ex.DW1/2 and debit voucher
was exhibited as Ex.DW1/3. Accordingly, the trial court has held that
the appellant/plaintiff was well aware since August, 1996 of the goods
not having been accepted by the foreign buyer, as appellant/plaintiff
had received the original documents in August 1996, and since, the
foreign buyer in fact had not made payment, the appellant/plaintiff
was always aware of the fact that a wrong credit was given in its
account much later on 27.05.1996.
6(i) Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has argued that
the defendant no.2 cannot be said to have proved the courier receipt
Ex.DW1/1 as also the courier bill Ex.DW1/2 inasmuch as no one from
the courier company came to prove these documents.
(ii) This argument of the appellant/plaintiff is misconceived
because Section 47 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is not exhaustive of the
mode and manner of the proof of documents and once the documents
come from proper custody, courts are entitled to take as proved the
documents which come from proper custody. This is held by the
Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of Gulzar Ali & Ors. v.
State of H.P., (1998) 2 SCC 192. The relevant para of this judgment
is para 9 and which holds that Section 47 is not exhaustive of the
manner of proof of documents. This para 9 of the judgment in the
case of Gulzar Ali & Ors. (supra) reads as under:-
"9. It must be remembered that expert evidence regarding handwriting is not the only mode by which genuineness of a document can be established. The requirement in Section 67 of the Evidence Act is only that the handwriting must be proved to be that of the person concerned. In order to prove the identity of the handwriting any mode not forbidden by law can be resorted to. Of course, two modes are indicated by law in Sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act. The former permits expert opinion to be regarded as relevant evidence and the latter permits opinion of any person acquainted with such handwriting to be regarded as relevant evidence. Those and some other provisions are subsumed under the title "Opinion of third persons, when relevant". Opinions of third persons, other than those enumerated in the fasciculus of provisions, would have been irrelevant. Among the permitted opinions those mentioned in Sections 45 and 47 are also included. So it cannot be said that identity of handwriting of a document can be established only by resorting to one of those two sections. There can be other modes through which identity of the handwriting can be established. Citing an example, if a letter is seized from the possession of 'A and the letter contains the name of the sender as well as the name of the sender and if such sender happens to be 'A' himself, those circumstances even without resorting to the mode indicated in Sections 45 and 47 of the Evidence Act, would be sufficient to draw an inference that the author or even scribe of that letter is the sender and 'A' is the sendee of it."
7. Also, it is required to be noted that before
commencement of the cross-examination of the DW-2 on 22.04.2004,
no objection was raised to the exhibition of the documents Ex.DW1/1
to Ex.DW1/3 being the courier receipt, bill and the debit voucher and
once no objection is raised to the proof of the documents, before
commencement of cross-examination, then subsequently no objection
can be raised that documents are not validly proved. This is so held
by the Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of R.V.E.
Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple
and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 752. Therefore, this Court holds that it is
not open to the appellant/plaintiff to claim that the documents
Ex.DW1/1 to Ex.DW1/3 do not stand proved.
8(i) Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff then argued
that whereas the respondent/defendant-bank claimed that the
documents were returned in terms of Ex.DW1/1 dated 17.08.1996 and
with respect to which, a debit voucher was issued on 18.10.1996,
however, it is argued that the respondent/defendant-bank in its written
statement has claimed that the mistake was discovered in October,
1996 and the original documents were thereafter returned i.e. after
October, 1996 to the appellant/plaintiff i.e. not in August 1996, and it
is argued that it is clearly destructive of the case of the
respondent/defendant-bank that the documents were returned in
August, 1996. It is argued that documents could not have been
returned in August, 1996 once the case of the respondent/defendant-
bank was that they were returned after October, 1996.
(ii) This argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant
is nothing except making mountain out of a molehill. Mistake of
mentioning the dates/month of the factum of stating in written
statement of return of the documents after October, 1996, the same
cannot take away the factum of proof of courier receipt as Ex.DW1/1
and the bill of the courier as Ex.DW1/2, and these documents show
that the original title documents of the goods being the invoice, bill of
lading, etc. were sent back in original to the appellant/plaintiff in
terms of Ex.DW1/1 dated 17.08.1996, and with respect to which the
courier company had issued its bill Ex.DW1/2. It is also seen that
Ex.DW1/2 is a bill not with respect to the positive article but with
respect to which over 55 articles which were found to have been sent
by the courier company for the respondent/defendant-bank.
9. This Court may at this stage deal with and reject an
argument urged on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff that whereas in the
bill Ex. DW 1/2 for all other courier receipt numbers, no weight is
mentioned, but only in this courier receipt weight is mentioned,
because in my opinion this is not such a overwhelming aspect that on
this ground itself otherwise documents which are validly proved,
should be discarded by the Court. The documents which are the
courier receipt and the courier bill are filed in original and having
examined the same, I do not find any illegality or fabrication of these
documents. Also, it is not possible to believe that the State Bank of
Patiala would forge and fabricate documents just for one case and that
too when the amount in question is only Rs. 2,74,820/-. Therefore,
this argument of the appellant/plaintiff is rejected.
10(i) In my opinion, there are two very valid reasons why the
suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff was false to its knowledge. Firstly,
it is seen that admittedly the payment of Invoice dated 18.06.1995
drawn by the appellant/plaintiff upon the foreign buyer at Belgium
was payable within six months of drawing of the invoice, i.e. payment
was to be received by the appellant/plaintiff by 18.12.1995. It is not
disputed that the witness of the appellant/plaintiff who deposed as
PW1, namely Sh. Chakarabaraty Garg, the partner of the
appellant/plaintiff, stated in his cross examination that the period for
payment of the invoice is six months. The six month period from
18.06.1995 expired on 18.12.1995, and therefore, well before
18.12.1995 if the appellant/plaintiff was to receive payment of the
exported goods, but had not received that payment, the
appellant/plaintiff would have entered into
correspondence/communication with the Belgium buyer, however, not
a single document has been filed in around few weeks before or after
18.12.1995 of communication being sent by the appellant/plaintiff to
the foreign buyer to send the payment as the last date of payment was
or has expired on 18.12.1995.
(ii) In fact, the aforesaid aspect is compounded by the fact
that the credit advice in the bank of the appellant/plaintiff is much
later than 18.12.1995 i.e. on 27.05.1996. Even in this period from
18.12.1995 to 27.5.1996, there is no correspondence or
communication of the appellant/plaintiff with the foreign buyer that
why the foreign buyer is not releasing the payment despite having
received the goods. Clearly, therefore the appellant/plaintiff knew all
along that it had wrongly received a credit in its account of Rs.
2,74,820/- with respect to subject Invoice dated 18.06.1995 drawn
upon the foreign buyer in Belgium M/s Jean Poppe.
(iii) Another and second important aspect to be noted is that it
is not the case of the appellant/plaintiff that the goods which are the
subject matter of the Invoice dated 18.06.1995 have been purchased
and received possession of by the foreign buyer. A right of the seller
such as the appellant/plaintiff is only when the foreign buyer has
received the goods and then in such a case, payment of the goods has
to be made by the foreign buyer or at best the bank of the
appellant/plaintiff in case any mistake is made by the
respondent/defendant-bank. It is conceded by PW1 Sh. Chakarabaraty
Garg in his cross examination that in case goods were rejected by the
buyer then it was the appellant/plaintiff who had to take back the
goods and seek its return from the foreign buyer. PW1 in the cross
examination also conceded that ownership of the goods would only
pass to the foreign buyer when the foreign buyer received the goods.
Therefore, in the facts of the present case the title in the goods
continued to vest with the appellant/plaintiff, and in such a situation,
the appellant/plaintiff could not have any remedy for receiving the
price of the goods, much against the respondent/defendant-bank which
was only its agent, and who had by mistake given a credit advice on
27.05.1996 for the amount of Rs.2,74,820/-.
11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find that the
trial court has committed any error in dismissing the suit for recovery
filed by the appellant/plaintiff inasmuch as the appellant/plaintiff was
trying to take advantage of a wrong credit advice made in its account
and which credit advice the appellant/plaintiff was not entitled to
because respondent/defendant-bank did not receive any payment from
the foreign buyer/foreign buyer's bank with the fact that the title in the
goods sold by the appellant/plaintiff never passed on to the foreign
buyer.
12. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear
their own costs.
OCTOBER 23, 2018 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J Ne
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