Delhi High Court
N C Gupta vs Punjab National Bank And Ors. on 8 October, 2018
$~36
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 8th October, 2018
+ W.P.(C) 10665/2018 & CM APPL. 41570/2018
N C GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Deepak Singh, Adv.
versus
PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Jagat Arora with Mr.Murad
Khan, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T (ORAL)
1. The Petitioner joined the services of the Respondent-Bank on
21st September, 1972. On 1st August 2008, he was suspended, which
was followed up by issuance, to him, of a charge-sheet on 21st
January, 2009 and a supplementary charge-sheet on 4th March, 2010.
2. The disciplinary proceedings that ensued, culminated in the
imposition, on the petitioner of a penalty of removal from service, vide
order dated 23rd March, 2011.
3. An appeal preferred by the petitioner thereagainst, was
dismissed on 30th December, 2011.
4. The petitioner approached this Court, vide WP(C) 2761/2012,
challenging the aforementioned penalty, imposed on him.
5. Rule was issued on the said writ petition, which is still pending
before this Court.
6. The petitioner's case is that, notwithstanding the penalty
imposed on him, he was entitled to be disbursed the encashment of the
leave, standing to his credit as on the date of his removal, i.e. 23 rd
March, 2011.
7. The writ petition avers that the petitioner addressed numerous
representations, to the respondent, on 7th January, 2014, 19th
September, 2016, 12th August, 2017, 9th December, 2017, 17th March,
2018 and 18th May, 2018, but of no avail.
8. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner approached this
court.
9. Mr. Arora, learned counsel for the respondent raises the
preliminary objection of laches, submitting that there is no
justification for this Court to interfere, at the behest of a petitioner
who has approached the Court seven years after the accrual of the
cause of action.
10. There is substance in the contention of Mr. Arora learned
counsel for the petitioner, on being queried, in this regard, has no
explanation except to state that the petitioner was not "sleeping", but
was following up the matter with the respondent, and was also waiting
for the disposal of WP(C) 2761/2012 (supra).
11. Neither of these contentions, in my view, can save the petitioner
from laches. The right to claim leave encashment, if any, accrued at
the time when the petitioner ceased to be in the service of the
respondent-Bank, i.e. in March, 2011. More than seven years have
passed since then.
12. Notably, the first representation, to which the writ petition
refers, was itself addressed almost three years after the said date, on 7th
March, 2014.
13. The submissions, advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, to the effect that the petitioner was waiting for the outcome
of WP(C) 2761/2012 (supra), finds no mention in the writ petition and
is clearly an argument of desperation. The argument is clearly bereft
of substance, as the entitlement claimed by the petitioner in this writ
petition is entirely independent of the relief claimed in WP(C)
2761/2012 (supra).
14. Law, it is trite, does not favour the indolent.
15. Inasmuch as the petitioner's plea of his having made making
repeated representation, is concerned, the Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court has, in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1989) 4 SCC 582, (in para 20 of the report)
"20. we are of the view that the cause of action shall be
taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order
but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a
statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or
representation is made and where no such order is made,
though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period
from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the
representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of
action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make
it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the
remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated
unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not
governed by this principle."
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. The same principle would apply where the petition is barred by
laches.
17. In view of the above, it is not possible for this Court to come to
the rescue of the petitioner at this belated stage.
18. The writ petition, being hit by delay and laches, is dismissed
with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J
OCTOBER 08, 2018
bh
