Delhi High Court
Rajiv Kumar Rai vs M/S Indian Agriculture Research ... on 3 October, 2018
$~57
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 3rd October, 2018
+ LPA. 557/2018
RAJIV KUMAR RAI ..... Appellant
Through Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Mr. Deepak
Sinha and Mr. Ashutosh Dixit,
Advocates
versus
M/S INDIAN AGRICULTURE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IARI) &
ANR. ..... Respondents
Through Mr. Gagan Mathur and Mr. Varun
Kumar, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SISTANI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
G.S. SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
CM.APPL40601/2018(Exemption)
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.
CM APPLs 40600/2018 (delay in filing) and 40602/2018 (delay in re-
filing) & LPA. 557/2018
3. The present appeal filed by the appellant is directed against the order
passed by the learned Single Judge dated 10.10.2013, by which the
writ petition has been allowed in part and a compensation awarded to
the tune of Rs.20,000/- has been increased to Rs.40,000/-. Along with
the appeal, an application (CM.APPL 40600/2018) has been filed
seeking condonation of 1572 days delay and another application
(CM.APPL 40602/2018) has been filed seeking condonation of 180
days in re-filing the present appeal.
4. The present appeal is opposed by the counsel for the respondents on
the ground that the appeal is blatantly barred by limitation. The
learned counsel for the appellant has, however, justified the delay on
the ground that the appellant was suffering from financial hardship
and he could not approach the Court to challenge the order of the
learned Single Judge. It has also been averred in the application that
the present counsel was approached in the first week of January, 2017,
who agreed to prefer the present appeal with negligible fees.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The application
seeking condonation of delay reads as under:
"2. That due to financial hardship the appellant could not
approach this Hon'ble Court within stipulated time in
order to challenge the impugned order passed by the Ld.
Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court.
3. That the appellant could approach the present counsel in
the first week of January, 2017 who agreed to prefer the
instant LPA with negligible fees.
4. That no prejudice would be caused if the present
application is allowed thereby this Hon'ble Court grants
condonation of delay of 1572 days in preferring the
present LPA. However, in the alternative the appellant
shall suffer irreparable loss and injury.
5. That the appellant has a good prima facie case and
balance of convenience is also in his favour.
PRAYER
It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may graciously be pleased to:
(a) Condone 1572 days of delay in filing the accompanying LPA;
(b) Pass any other order that is deemed fit and proper under the
facts and circumstances of the case."
6. The grounds raised in this application seeking condonation of delay is
financial hardship and, in fact, this is the only ground taken by the
appellant. Reading of the application would show that even after the
appellant had approached the present counsel in the first week of
January, 2017, the appeal was only filed in the month of February,
2018 and there is also delay in re-filing the present appeal.
7. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that the expression
"sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given a
liberal interpretation to advance substantial justice. It has also been
repeatedly held that length of delay is not to be considered provided
the explanation is genuine and the delay was caused for sufficient
reasons.
8. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
reported at AIR 2014 SC 1612, the Apex Court has held as under:
"11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach
in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the
court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction
between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an
inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for
condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that
when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is
not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court
cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.
9. In Basawaraj and Anr vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported
at (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Supreme Court in paras 9 to 15 held that
while dealing with an application seeking condonation of delay the
court must ensure that there is a sufficient cause, while condoning the
delay:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces
no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act
done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and
circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view
point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context,"sufficient cause" means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v.
Bhootnath Banerjee and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v.
A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti,
AIR 2011 SC 1150; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629.)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar MANU/SC/0013/1963 :
AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a
"good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every
"sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any
difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause
is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of "sufficient
cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v.
Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath
Sahu and Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao and Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" which means "the law is hard
but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The Statute of Limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:
"605. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes
of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a Defendant might have
lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons
with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own
inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property
v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar
Singh and Ors. v. Santa Singh and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and
Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium
Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).
14.In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC
1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of
limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
AIR 1992 SC 1701
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts
to showing utter disregard to the legislature.
10. Applying the settled law to the facts of the present case, we find that
the appellant has failed to either plead or establish sufficient cause for
the condonation of delay. The only ground raised by the appellant for
condonation of delay is that due to financial hardship, he could not
approach the Court within the stipulated time to challenge the
impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court.
There is no explanation rendered in the application as to how at this
stage the position of the appellant is any different than earlier. This, in
our view, is not a reason good enough to condone the delay. The
present application does not disclose justifiable and sufficient grounds
for condoning the delay of 1572 days in filing the present appeal.
Accordingly, we find no grounds to entertain the applications.
11. The applications are dismissed.
LPA.557/2018
12. Since the application seeking condonation of delay has been
dismissed, consequently the appeal is also dismissed.
G.S.SISTANI, J.
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J
OCTOBER 03, 2018
pst
