P.P. Sharma vs Honble The Chief Justice Of Delhi, ...
2018 Latest Caselaw 1824 Del

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                     Date of Decision: 19.03.2018

+   W.P.(C) 206/1988

    P.P. SHARMA                                         ..... Petitioner
                          Through:   None.

                          versus

    HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF DELHI, DELHI HIGH
    COURT                                    ..... Respondent

Through: Mr. K.K. Bhuchar, Adv.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. K. CHAWLA

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.(ORAL)

1. In these writ proceedings despite repeated adjournments since 1988, the most recent ones in the year 2018 being on 03.01.2018, 04.01.2018, 01.03.2018, 05.03.2018, 08.03.2018, 09.03.2018, 12.03.2018, 13.03.2018 and 14.03.2018, the counsel for the legal representatives of the petitioner have not appeared and assisted the Court.

2. The petitioner Shri P.P. Sharma challenges his dismissal from service, by the impugned order of 03.07.1987.

3. Petitioner joined the Rajasthan Judicial Services in 1961 and was later inducted to Delhi Judicial Services in 1971. He was constituted as a Presiding Officer, Motor Vehicles Accident Claims

Tribunal (MACT) in 1976 and later promoted to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service in 1978. He was later appointed as Registrar (Vigilance) and in 1980 appointed against the permanent post as the Registrar of Delhi High Court. He claims that his rapid progress in the service was not to the liking of his colleagues and his appointment as Registrar was challenged through the writ proceedings in 1981. It is also claimed that the petitioner's name was to be considered for appointment as Judge of the High Court in 1983. At that point of time, he alleges that a conspiracy was hatched between some of his ex-colleagues. The petitioner points out to one A.K. Srivastava and several other members of the service, who were apparently examined on behalf of the establishment in support of the charges.

4. The Disciplinary Enquiry (DE) that culminated in the petitioner's dismissal by the impugned order, began with a preliminary enquiry. That preliminary enquiry took note of statements made by several individuals who levelled allegations of interference with judicial proceedings, against the petitioner. The first challenge to the dismissal order ultimately made in this case is that the petitioner was not privy to the statements (recorded during the preliminary enquiry) which were done behind his back and that they initiated the process inasmuch as information was gathered resulting in the initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings and ultimately his dismissal. This Court is of the opinion that there is no merit on this ground, since the statements recorded in the course of a preliminary enquiry, are only for the

purpose of considering whether action is to be taken. In this regard, the authority of the Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (2006) 3 SCC 150 is decisive. So long as the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry are not produced or relied upon ipso facto and provided the individuals to participate in the preliminary enquiry, go on to depose in their disciplinary enquiry during which opportunity of cross- examination is provided, there is no infirmity.

5. The second ground of challenge is an omnibus one; the petitioner alleges that he was not given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. It is alleged that the examination-in-chief of some witnesses, deposing in favour of the charges was done behind his back and the reliance of documents by the enquiry authority did not confirm to the charge sheet (Annexure P-23 and P-24). It is also alleged that the closure of cross-examination of three vital witnesses including PW20 A.K. Srivastava, Shri R.L. Gupta and Shri B.S. Sherawat (on 19.03.1987 and 04.03.1987 respectively) was unfair. It is also stated that the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to adduce defence evidence which was closed. Furthermore, the petitioner alleges that the enquiry report drawn by the concerned enquiry authority was entirely conjectural and not based upon the materials recorded or materials that could be reasonably interfered with on the basis of cross-examination.

6. The last limb of challenge to the petitioner's dismissal is on the ground that the dismissal order impugned in this case was not preceded with the supply of a copy of the report. This ground of

challenge in this Court's opinion must fail in view of the larger Bench decision in Electronics Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727 where the Constitution Bench decisively held that all enquiries concluded prior to the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case AIR 1991 SC 471 (i.e. on or before 20.11.1991) were in order even if the dismissal orders passed prior to 20.11.1991 could not be challenged on the ground that the delinquent employee or official was not supplied with a copy of the enquiry report.

7. The substantial ground of challenge to the petitioner's dismissal thus is premised upon the ground of bias and materials, alleged to have been shown by the Enquiring Authority (E.A.) as a part of which it was stated that he was not given adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that cross examination of three witnesses was closed unfairly.

8. The materials on record show that some time in 1984, a Sitting Judge of this Court was authorized to draw up draft charges. This followed; the charges that found the basis of the charge sheet ultimately served upon the petitioner were approved by the Full Court on 17.12.1984.

9. The writ petition is replete with unsavoury allegations against individuals especially the Judges of this Court who had occasion to deal with the enquiry. The petitioner - spared no limbs and went to the extent of impleading two Judges of this Court. Later, upon the Court's insistence one of the Judges was deleted from the array of parties. However, the Hon'ble Judge who

presided over the disciplinary enquiry, continued to be arrayed as a respondent.

10. The enquiry report is a voluminous one and spans nearly 197 pages. The Court further notes that as far as the examination and deposition of the witnesses goes, nine witnesses were examined in support of the charges; they were cross-examined to great lengths. The cross-examination spans over 700 pages. In these circumstances, as far as the allegation with respect to closing of the cross-examination goes, the High Court Establishment explains - a matter that has gone over from the record, that the petitioner had in the interim approached the Court by filing a W.P.(C) No.1050/1987 as a consequence of which the Court left it to the discretion of the enquiry authority to permit cross-examination. The enquiry authority i.e. a Sitting Judge of this Court in fact granted the opportunity. However, the petitioner apparently did not avail of it which resulted in the closure of the further cross- examination of the said three witnesses. It is a matter of record that the cross-examination of the 3 witnesses had been conducted. The respondents explained that with respect to the opportunity of filing a written statement, the petitioner was required to file - within 15 days a statement of defence by order of 18.12.1984. However, he was ultimately granted three months. He was also granted inspection of the documents. Despite these opportunities, the petitioner apparently did not file a written statement of the defence, even as on May, 1985 when he was given yet another opportunity. It appears that from January, 1985 till January, 1987

the petitioner had not filed his complete written statement of defence - perhaps for the purpose of saying that the enquiry was prolonged. Even during the course of enquiry, the petitioner had serious and objectionable aspersions in relation to the Presiding Officer (i.e. the Sitting Judge). This led to an order on 19.12.1986 requiring the official to remove all "scandalous, villificatory and false allegations and withdraw the decisive version of the proceedings." A similar direction was repeated on 18.05.1987. However, the petitioner does not seem to have complied with this.

11. Having regard to these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that in view of the above analysis and having regard to the state of the record, the general allegations with respect to the unfairness of the procedure adopted or bias, have not been established.

The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit and is consequently dismissed.

S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J

A. K. CHAWLA, J MARCH 19, 2018 kks