Delhi High Court
Kulachi Hansraj Model School & Anr vs Kirti Jain & Anr on 19 July, 2018
$~3
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 19th July, 2018
+ LPA 295/2017 and CM No. 16104/2017
KULACHI HANSRAJ MODEL SCHOOL & ANR ..... Appellants
Through: Ms Jyoti Singh, Sr. Adv with Tanuj
Khurana and Mr Jaskaran Singh, Advs
versus
KIRTI JAIN & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr Ashok Agarwal, Adv for R-1
Mr K.P. Tevathia, Legal Assistant,
DOE
Ms Jyoti Taneja, Adv for GNCTD
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
1. Aggrieved by the order dated 01.03.2017 passed by a learned Single
Judge of this Court in a writ petition filed by Ms Kirti Jain-respondent herein
has led to the filing of the present appeal.
2. For the sake of convenience, the appellant shall be referred to as the
„School‟, the respondent as „teacher‟ and the Kulachi Hansvatika shall be
referred to as the „day care centre‟.
3. The respondent-teacher had filed a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking a relief of being granted mandatory
emoluments in terms of the 6th Pay Commission report which became
applicable to schools in Delhi by virtue of an order passed by the Director of
Education (DEO) dated 11.02.2009.
4. It is the case of the teacher that she was appointed as a Nursery teacher
with the appellant-school in terms of an appointment letter dated 23.06.1997.
She was on probation for a period of one year and thereafter she was
confirmed in terms of communication dated 16.03.1999.
5. The submission of Ms Jyoti Singh, learned senior counsel, appearing
for the appellant is that the respondent-teacher did not possess the requisite
qualifications for being appointed to the appellant-school. Hence, she was
employed in the Day Care Centre which is evident upon reading the minutes
of meeting dated 19.06.1997. She further contended that it is also evident
from the fact that her confirmation letter dated 16.03.1999 refers to the
respondent having been confirmed at the Nursery Teacher Day Care. She
further submits that the respondent has also in her communications, which
have been extracted by the learned Single Judge, admitted that she was
teaching at "Hansvatika". Including in the first letter which has been
extracted at internal page 5 of the impugned judgment, she has also admitted
the aforementioned fact in her subsequent letter dated 08.08.2005 and in
another letter dated 29.06.2006 as well. Senior counsel contends that
respondent had submitted a form for deduction of provident fund, copy
whereof has already been filed wherein in the column name of school it is
mentioned as Kulachi Hansvatika Day Boarding. It is also contended by
learned senior counsel that salary slip of the month of June 2014 also shows
that salary was paid to her by Kulachi Hansvatika Day Boarding. In her
communication of 17.04.2003, she had also addressed the communication to
the Principal through Head Mistress, Kulachi Hansraj Model School Day
Boarding, copy of which has also been placed on record. She also draws the
attention of the Court to a communication dated 29.04.2003 again addressed
to the Head Mistress, Kulachi Hansraj Model School. Additionally, it is
contended that since from the very beginning and as per the tacit
understanding of the respondent she worked at the Day Boarding School
which is a non-recognised school and accordingly she would not be entitled
to the relief so prayed. Learned senior counsel also contends that the Day
Care Centre is not recognised under the Delhi School Education Act.
6. Mr Aggarwal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-teacher,
submits that the respondent had sought employment to the appellant-school.
The appointment letter which has been extracted by the learned Single Judge
dated 23.06.1997, would show that the respondent was granted employment
by the appellant school. He submits that as far as the minutes of meeting are
concerned, the respondent was neither a party to the same nor aware about
the same and, hence, the minutes would not bind the respondent in any
manner. Counsel further submits that as far as the respondent is concerned
she was employed by the appellant, paid salary by the appellant, leave was
granted by the appellant and thus for all practical purposes the appellant was
the employer of the respondent. He further submits that any internal
arrangement for directing the respondent to the day care centre cannot bind
the respondent and even otherwise the school was in a dominating position
and thus the teacher could not have refused, who was never in a position to
refuse, cannot be taken to the benefit of the appellant. The respondent
worked wherever she was called upon to work. He further submits that in
case the respondent lacked the minimum qualifications, either the appellant
management would have rejected her application or made a counter offer to
her that in the absence of her qualifications, she could only be offered a post
in their non-recognised Day Care Centre. He submits that as per the date of
appointment letter i.e., 23.06.1997 till dispute occurred between the parties,
no such communication was ever addressed to her. It was never pointed out
to her that she did not have the basic qualifications for being employed in the
recognised school. Mr Agarwal also submits that along with his rejoinder
filed before the learned Single Judge, he had submitted a chart along with the
supporting documents to show that a number of income tax deductions done
at source and Form-16 of TDS were issued by the appellant-school to the
respondent to enable her to fill income tax return each year. Five such
certificates were stated to have been filed along with the rejoinder. He
submits that although a copy of the rejoinder has been placed on the record
of this case but the documents have not been filed which ought to have been
filed. As an alternate argument Mr Agarwal submits that the appellant can
derive no benefit to say that the respondent was employed by an
unrecognised school and thus could not be granted benefit of the 6 th Pay
Commission as it has been held by another Division Bench of this Court that
there is no distinction for the applicability of the Delhi School Education Act
with respect to a school recognised or unrecognised, for which he relies upon
Samarth Shiksha Samiti (Regd.) & Anr vs Shakuntala Maggo & Ors. 229
(2016) DLT 1 (DB. The relevant paragraphs relied upon by learned counsel
are extracted herein below:-
"6. Mr. Satyakam, learned counsel for the Govt. of NCT of
Delhi and counsel appearing on behalf of the employees of the
school opposed the submissions of the appellant. They urged
that the entire scheme of the Act had been examined in Social
Jurist (supra), which had conclusively ruled that the statute
applied to both recognized and unrecognized schools. They
highlighted that the definition of "school" makes no distinction
between recognized ones and unrecognized ones- Section 2(u)
defines "school" as follows:
"school" includes a pre-primary, primary, middle and
higher secondary school, and also includes any other
institution which imparts education or training below the
degree level, but does not include an institution which
imparts technical education".
8. This Court does not propose to extract the provisions of the
Act and Rules; they have been dealt with elaborately in the
main judgment, in Social Jurist (supra). In that decision, the
Court, after extracting and analyzing relevant provisions, held
as follows:
"24. A plain reading of the above provisions
especially Section 3(1) supra would show that the
administrator has the power to regulate education in
all the schools in Delhi. The expression „all the
schools in Delhi‟ is significant and leaves no manner
of doubt that the Act is not limited in its application
only to recognized schools. The term „recognized
school‟ and „school‟ have been separately defined by
the Act in Section 2(t) and 2(u) in the following words
: 2(t) "recognized school" means a school recognised
by the appropriate authority; (u) "school" includes a
pre-primary, primary, middle and higher secondary
schools, and also includes any other institution which
imparts education or training below the degree level,
but does not include an institution which imparts
technical education.
25. The language employed in Section 3 and the
definition of the term „School‟ in 2(u) supra would
therefore make it manifest that the power of the
administrator to regulate education extends to not
only recognized but all schools whether the same are
recognized or unrecognized. We have therefore no
hesitation in rejecting the contention urged by Mr.
Sinha that the Act is confined in its application to only
recognized schools.
26. Coming then to the question of establishment of a
new school. The provisions of sub-section 3 to Section
3 make it clear that on and from the commencement of
the Act, the establishment of any new school or the
opening of a higher class in an existing school or the
closing down of any existing class in an existing
school can be subject to the provisions of the Act and
the Rules only. This implies that from the date of
commencement of the Act, while the existing schools
were deemed to be recognized and hence allowed to
continue subject to their fulfilling the requirements of
recognition, new schools could be established only in
accordance with the Act. The establishment of a new
School could in turn take place only with the
permission of the administrator. This is evident from
Section 3(2) of the Act which authorizes the
administrator to permit the establishment of any such
school. We may as well refer to Rule 44 of the Rules
framed under the Act which makes a provision
regarding the opening of new schools....
**** **** ****
**** **** ****
32. It is evident from a reading of the above provision
that the take-over of the Management of the Schools
whether recognized or not is also envisaged only in
cases where the Managing Committee or the Manager
has neglected to perform any of the duties imposed
upon it by or under the said Act or the Rules made
thereunder. The occasion to take over would also
arise only if the School was established with the
permission of the administrator. In the instant case,
unrecognized schools have been established without
the permission of the administrator required under
Section 3(2) of the Act. No notice of intention to open
the school in terms of Section 34 has ever been given
by these institutions nor have these institutions been
subjected to any inspection or evaluation to determine
whether they fulfill the bare minimum requirements
for running an institution in terms of Rules 50 and 51
of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. As a
matter of fact, for some inexplicable reason, the
Government and the Directorate of Education have
been under the impression that neither any permission
nor any intimation in terms of the provisions
mentioned above is necessary for starting a school
and that it is none of their business or responsibility to
regulate the setting up of such institutions or their
continuance in Delhi. That impression, as already
noticed earlier, is against the specific provisions of
the Act and the scheme underlying the same. The
result is that there is a total breakdown of the
machinery which the Act had envisaged for regulating
and organizing planned development of school
education in Delhi. The situation is not however
totally irremediable. While the schools may have, on
account of the inaction of the authorities, come up and
functioned all these years, there is no reason why the
same cannot be brought under the regulatory control
of the authorities under the Act. A direct and ruthless
approach to that issue may have called for a
mandamus to the authorities to shut down such
institutions. Keeping however in view the fact that a
very large number of students are admitted to such
institutions and are likely to get displaced by any such
direction, a more realistic and workable solution shall
have to be found out by which both the objectives,
namely, the establishment of the supremacy of the law
as enacted by the Parliament and the protection of the
interest of the students at large can be achieved. That
can, in our opinion, be done by giving to the
institutions established without due and proper
authority of the administrator an opportunity to make
such applications and seek recognition within a
specified period by fulfilling the requirements
stipulated under Section 4 of the Act read with Rules
50 and 51 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.
Such of the institutions as satisfy the requirements of
the said provisions could then be recognized upon a
proper evaluation of their infrastructure as stipulated
by the statutory provisions. Such of the others as do
not satisfy the requirements of the statute or fail even
to seek waiver of compliance with the said provisions
in terms of Rule 52 of the Rules could then be
identified and their cases referred to the local
authority concerned for taking appropriate action by
way of closure of the institutions in accordance with
the relevant statutory provisions having due regard to
the user prescribed for the premises from which they
are operating in terms of the Master Plan and the
requirements of safety measures stipulated for running
an educational institution of a public character."
9. Social Jurist (supra) was a public interest litigation. The
operative directions, towards enforcement of the Act, were
quoted in the later Division Bench in Shaheed Udham Singh
Smarak Shiksha Samiti (supra). However, the substantive
declaration quoted above, were not seen or considered. In
Social Jurist (supra), the Division Bench, by a later order
(dated 07.05.2015), reiterated its declaration of law, based on
interpretation of provisions of the Act:
"11. This Court, in judgment dated 8th February,
2008 in this petition, has held, (i) that the School Act
empowered the Administrator, Delhi to regulate
education in all the schools in Delhi; thus the
operation of the School Act is not limited to
recognized schools only; (ii) that a new school can be
established only with the permission of the
Administrator and subject to the fulfilment of the
requirements stipulated in the LPA 857/2015 & LPA
1/2016 Page 8 School Act and the Rules framed
thereunder; and, (iii) that the GNCTD had however
failed to enforce the provisions of the School Act
resulting in there being a larger number of
unrecognized and unauthorized schools in Delhi than
those that are authorized and recognized."
The fact remains that the latter portion, i.e existence of
unrecognized schools which are "unauthorized" by law, is a
reality. The question is does this "reality" blind the Court from
its duties to enforce the law as it sees it? Shaheed Udham Singh
Smarak Shiksha Samiti (supra) appears to suggest that; we,
however, respectfully disagree.
10. High Courts, and indeed all Courts, are tethered to
precedent which is essential to ensure consistency and stability
in the administration of law. The alternative, i.e. each Court
being left free to pursue its views regardless of previous
judgments of Courts of co-ordinate composition, or Benches of
greater numbers, in a hierarchal system, would result in chaos
and uncertainty about the law. Here, one recollects the caution
administered in Broom v. Casse II & Co., [1972] 1 AER 801
that:
"it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the
hierarchical system of courts which exists in this
country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including,
the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of
the higher tiers".
12. The Supreme Court, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. in
Ambika Prasad Misra v. State of U.P., 1980 (SLT Soft)
441=(1980) 3 SCC 719 : AIR 1980 SC 1762, explained that
even though a decision might be based on faulty reasoning or
might be unsatisfactorily argued, if it is of a higher Court and
consequently binding, it has to be necessarily followed. The
following observations in Salmond's „Jurisprudence‟, page 215
(11th edition) was referred to:
"A decision does not lose its authority merely
because it was badly argued, inadequately
considered and fallaciously reasoned."
13. This Court is of the opinion that Shaheed Udham Singh
Smarak Shiksha Samiti (supra) cannot be regarded as a binding
authority for more reasons than one. First, it did not examine,
closely - at least a reading of the judgment does not establish
so- the reasoning which led the previous Division Bench in
Social Jurist (supra) to hold that unrecognized schools too were
regulated by the Act. Apart from the definition of "schools",
Section 3, Section 52, Rule 44 and Rule 50, that judgment also
noted that the power of taking over management, applied
widely to all schools, regardless of recognition. This was a
clear pointer to the overarching State interest in ensuring that
schools secured recognition. Even the provision in Section 3 (6)
brings home this concern:
"(6) Every existing school shall be deemed to have
been recognised under this section and shall be
subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules
made thereunder".
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and given our
thoughtful consideration in the matter.
8. Since strong reliance has been placed by Mr Agarwal on the letter of
appointment dated 23.06.1997, we deem it appropriate to extract the
aforesaid letter.
"Ref. No.11183/97 Dated 23-6-97
To
Ms. Kirti Jain
B-27, Vandana Apartments,
Sec-13, Rohini, Delhi-85
Sub: APPOINTMENT OF TEACHING/NON-TEACHING
STAFF (FOR REGULAR APPOINTMENTS)
Dear Sir/Madam,
With reference to your application & consequent interview for the
post of Nsy. Teacher in Kulachi Hansraj Model School, Ashok
Vihar, Delhi, you are hereby informed that you have been selected
for the post of Nsy. Teacher on basic pay of Rs.1200/- in the pay-
scale of Rs.1200-2040 plus admissible allowance in the school
under the rules of D.A.V. College Managing Committee, New
Delhi.
This appointment is subject to the terms and conditions given
below:
1. PERIOD:
You will be on probation initially for a period of one year w.e.f. the
date of your joining the post. On completion of your probation you
will be considered for confirmation in case your work and conduct
are found to be satisfactory.
2. PROBATION:
Your probation period may be extended by one year and your
services may be terminated without assigning any reason
whatsoever during the probationary period or the extended
probationary period. During this period of probation, your
services may be terminated by giving one month notice or on
payment of one month salary in lieu of the notice period by either
the employer or the employee.
3. CONFIRMATION:
After confirming your services may be terminated by giving three
months notice or on payment of salary in lieu of notice period by
either side.
4. INCREMENT:
Your annual increment will fall due on completion of one year‟s
continuous and satisfactory service.
5. PROVIDENT FUND:
You will be allowed to contribute 10% of your pay plus allowances
to P.F. Trust of D.A.V. College Managing Committee and the
share of the Managing Committee will be made regularly in
accordance with P.F. rules of the said committee.
6. LEAVE:
You will be entitled to such leave only as is applicable to similar
employees of the Public Schools under the D.A.V. College
Managing Committee in accordance with the Rules framed by the
D.A.V. College Managing Committee.
7. SUPERANNUATION:
The age of superannuation shall be sixty years unless changed by
the D.A.V. College Managing Committee.
8. APPLICATION FOR OTHER EMPLOYMENT:
a) During the period of your employment with the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee, if you want to apply for a post
of elsewhere, you shall have to send your application through
the Manager/Regional Director.
b) Application for improvement in qualifications: If you wish to
appear for any public examination or any other examination
for improving qualifications, you shall apply for it through
the Principal/Regional Director and will have to abide by the
instructions issued by him from time to time.
9. TRANSFER OF SERVICE:
Your service is liable to be transferred to any D.A.V. Public/Model
School in any part of the country which may be existing or may
come into existence hereafter at the discretion of the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee.
10. GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SERVICE:
a) In the matter of other general conditions of service you will
be governed by the Rules and Regulations of the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee which will be read and
followed by you.
b) You shall execute loyally and faithfully the policies laid down
by the Management in-so-far as the school programme and
Administration is concerned and that you shall work under
the directions and instructions of the Manager/Regional
Director and the D.A.V. College Managing Committee.
c) As a whole time employee of the D.A.V. College Managing
Committee you shall have to carry out the instructions of the
said committee and devote your whole time to the service of
the institution where you are employed. You shall not engage
yourself in any private trade or undertake publication of
books or any other work which is likely to interfere with the
discharge of your normal duties without prior permission of
the D.A.V. College Managing Committee nor will you be
entitled to take up any private coaching or tuitions without
prior permission of the Manager/Regional Director.
d) During your service career, you shall not take part in the
politics nor indulge in activities prejudicial to the interest of
the school or the D.A.V. College Managing Committee or the
Government. You shall maintain cordial relations with all
members of the school community and also set highest
standard of discipline in the school.
11. ACCEPTANCE:
If you accept the terms and conditions of appointment, please sign
the duplicate copy in token of your acceptance and send the same
to this office immediately but not later than 10 days of the receipt
of this appointment letter, failing which it shall be deemed that you
are not interested in the post and it shall be offered to another
person. If any information given by you is found in-correct later on
at any stage of your service, your services are liable to be
terminated.
Sd/-
For & on behalf of the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee
I ACCEPT THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE AS
MENTIONED ABOVE AND I AM WILLING TO ACCEPT THE
POST.
COUNTERSIGNED
MANAGER FULL NAME AND SIGNATURE WITH
DATE. OF APPOINTMENT WITH DATE"
9. The subject of aforesaid letter would show that the appointment of the
respondent was a regular appointment. In the very first paragraph of this
communication, the appellant-school takes note of the application and
consequent interview for the post of Nsy. Teacher in the appellant-school
and informs the respondent of her being selected for the post in the school by
the Management Committee. We may also take note of the fact that the
minutes sought to be relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant
relate to a period prior to the appointment letter being dated 19.06.1997.
Ms.Jyoti Singh, learned senior counsel, has submitted that after the probation
period was over, the respondent was confirmed by confirmation letter of
16.03.1999 which was abundantly clear that she had been confirmed as a
nursery teacher in the Day Care. We also deem it appropriate to extract this
letter of 16.03.1999.
"Ref. No. 13036/99 DATE: 16-3-99
MS. KIRTI JAIN
NURSERY TEACHER (DAY CARE)
This is to inform you that you have been confirmed in your post
w.e.f. 4-7-98 as per approval of D.A.V. College Managing
Committee, New Delhi communicated vide their letter no.
KHRMS/ASHOK VIHAR/11795 dated 14-12-98.
Sd/-
PRINCIPAL"
10. The parties have placed various letters and documents on record in
support of their respective submissions. We deem it appropriate to refer to
them in the following manner:-
a. undated letter addressed by the respondent to the appellant but
admitting that she is currently teaching in Hansvatika, branch of the
appellant.
b. letter dated 08.08.2005 addressed to the Principal of the appellant
admitting that she is a nursery teacher at the Kulachi Day Care, G-
Block, Ashok Vihar.
c. letter dated 29.06.2006 again addressed to the Principal of
appellant-Kulachi Hansraj Model School admitting that she is a
nursery teacher at Hansvatika Kulachi Day Care, G-Block, Ashok
Vihar.
d. letter dated 17.04.2003 addressed to the Principal through Head
Mistress, Kulachi Hansraj Model School (appellant).
e. letter dated 17.04.2003 addressed to the Principal through Head
Mistress, Kulachi Hansraj Model School (Day Boarding).
f. letter dated 29.04.2003 addressed to the Head Mistress, Kulachi
Hansraj Model School Day Boarding.
g. letter dated 29.06.2006 addressed to the Principal, Kulachi Hansraj
Model School.
h. letter dated 08.08.2005 addressed to the Principal, Kulachi Hansraj
Model School.
i. salary slip for the month of June issued Hansvatika Day Boarding.
j. salary slips referred to by Mr Agarwal for the months April 2004
and September 2005.
11. The arguments of learned senior counsel for the appellant can be
summarised as under:-
i. the respondent did not have the requisite qualifications and was
hence employed in the Day Care Centre.
ii. Day Care Centre is not a recognised school and hence could not be
covered under Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act and
consequently, the respondent would not be entitled to the benefit of 6 th
Pay Commission.
iii. the respondent clearly admitted in all her correspondence that she
is employed at the Day Care Centre.
iv. confirmation letter was pertaining to the Day Care Centre.
12. The arguments of Mr Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent, can
be summarised as under:-
i. respondent applied with the appellant school.
ii. she was interviewed at the appellant school for employment as a
nursery teacher.
iii. appointment letter was issued by the appellant school.
iv. all material letters were addressed by the respondent to the
principal of the appellant-school for the purposes of grant of leave,
special leave, etc.
v. the salaries were partly issued by the appellant-school. TDS
certificates were provided by the appellant-school, copies of which
were placed on record by the respondent along with the rejoinder filed
before the learned Single Judge.
13. Upon careful examination of all the documents, placed on record, it
leaves no room for doubt that the respondent was appointed by the appellant
which is evident upon reading the appointment letter which we have
extracted in paragraphs aforegoing. What emerges upon careful examination
of the documents placed on record is that the respondent was asked to work
at the Hansvatika which is the Kulachi Day Care Centre which is attached to
the appellant institution. But for all practical purposes she addressed all her
communications to the Principal of the appellant. To say, that the
respondent was not employed by the appellant on account of her lack of
qualifications is not borne out from any communication or any document
placed by either of the party on record and thus it cannot be accepted. The
learned Single Judge has taken into account that it is a privilege of the
employer to see where the services of employee can be utilized but that
could not derogate the fact that the respondent was in fact appointed by the
appellant-school and was an employee of the appellant -school. We find no
infirmity with the view so taken by the learned Single Judge. No doubt the
form which has been filled up for the purposes of provident fund mentions
the name of the school as Kulachi Hansvatika Day Boarding, however, it is
for the employer to explain as to why such a form was made to be filled
when part of salary was being paid by the appellant. The appellant is unable
to explain as to why same salary slips are from the appellant while the others
are from Day Boarding. There is reference of the income tax deducted at
source certificates, the details of which have been given in the rejoinder,
which has been filed, which we extract herein below:-
"That a number of Income Tax deducted at source Certificate
Form 16 of TDS have been issued by Kulachi Hansraj Model
School, Ashok Vihar, Delhi-110052 to the petitioner for filing
the income tax returns each year. Copies of five of such
certificates are annexed herewith and marked annexure P-9.
The details are given as under:-
S. No. Annexure Certificate/ Period Employer Signed by
No. Form shown
1. Form no. 16 1st April 1998 to Kulachi Head
31st March 1999 Hansraj Model Mistress
School, Ashok
Vihar-I, H
Block, Delhi -
110052
2 Form no. 16 1st April 1999 to Kulachi Mrs. P.
31st March 2000 Hansraj Model Dutta
School, Ashok Principal
Vihar-I, H Kulachi
Block, Delhi - Han Raj
110052 Model
School,
Ashok
Vihar-III,
Delhi-52
3 Income 2002-2003 Kulachi Head
Certificate Hansraj Model
School, Ashok Mistress
Vihar, Delhi -
110052
4 Income 2002-2003 Kulachi Head
Certificate Hansraj Day
Boarding Mistress
School,G-
Block, Ashok
Vihar, Phase-
I, Delhi -
110052
5 Form 16 1st April 2003 to Kulachi Mrs. P.
31st March, 2004 Hansraj Model Dutta
School, Ashok Principal
Vihar-I, H Kulachi
Block, Delhi - Han Raj
110052 Model
School,
Ashok
Vihar-III,
Delhi-52
14. There is no explanation that if according to the appellant the
respondent had no connection whatsoever with the appellant, why tax was
deducted at source and Form 16 for deduction of TDS was provided to the
employee from the appellant-school. It is not necessary for this Court to go
into the internal arrangements of the appellant-school. Thus, we find no
infirmity in the order passed by the learned Single Judge which requires
interference.
15. The LPA, in our view, is without any merit and the same is,
accordingly, dismissed.
G.S.SISTANI, J
SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J
JULY 19, 2018
SU
