Delhi High Court
Deepak Chaudhary vs State & Anr on 6 July, 2018
$~11
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on:- 6th July, 2018
+ CRL. M.C. 3143/2018 & CRL.M.A. 11010/2018
DEEPAK CHAUDHARY ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Bhakti Pasrija Sethi with
Mr. Moksh Pasrija & Mr.
Abhishek, Advocates.
versus
STATE & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mukesh Kumar, APP for
State with ASI Kiran Sethi, P.S.
Ranjeet Nagar.
Mr. Ruchira Verma, Advocate
for-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
ORDER (ORAL)
1. On 10.09.2015, the second respondent made a complaint before
the Station House Officer (SHO) of Police Station Ranjit Nagar, New
Delhi. Since the said complaint disclosed commission of certain acts
constituting cognizable offences punishable under Sections
328/376/506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) within the meaning of
Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), First
Information Report (FIR) no. 596/2015 was registered thereupon. In
the said FIR, the petitioner herein was referred to as the perpetrator of
the said offences committed during the period 08.08.2006 to
24.11.2014, commencing from the time when the first informant (the
second respondent) was a girl aged 17 years. It appears that the
parties later entered into certain ceremonies of marriage but they
having fallen apart, they went ahead to dissolve the said marital union
by approaching the Family Court.
2. The petitioner has come up with the petition at hand invoking
the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to pray for
quashing of the FIR on the ground, inter alia, that the parties have
since settled all their disputes with each other.
3. The State has opposed the prayer for quashing, placing reliance
primarily on the judgment of the Supreme court in Parbatbhai Aahir
alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others v. State of Gujarat
and Another, (2017) 9 SCC 641.
4. Submissions of all sides have been heard against the backdrop
of the facts in the criminal case arising out of the afore-mentioned
FIR, charge-sheet statedly having already been filed.
5. In State of Karnataka Vs. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89, a
bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court had examined
the width and scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court for bringing
to an end a criminal action by quashing the case, inter alia, under
Section 482 Cr.P.C., in light of past precedents and observed that such
jurisdiction emanated from its inherent power to bring about justice,
explaining it thus:-
"6. ... It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give
effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends
of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down
any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from
express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by
law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the
section which merely recognises and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision,
as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).
While exercising powers under the section, the court does
not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent
jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of
process of the court to allow any action which would result
in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of
the powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice...."
(emphasis supplied)
5. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC
303, while dealing with identical issues, another bench of three
Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court observed thus :-
"55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial
obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice or to prevent continuation of
unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id
sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which
is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a
matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found
impossible to do that thing unless something else not
authorised in express terms be also done, may also be
done, then that something else will be supplied by
necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such
exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and
substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed
by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide
amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and
circumspection.
(emphasis supplied)
6. Pertinent to note, in Gian Singh (supra), the Supreme Court held
as under:-
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has
to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be
prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society.
(emphasis supplied)
7. In the fact situation at hand, the following observations of the
Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Madan Lal, (2015) 7
SCC 681, provide further guidance:-
"18. ... We would like to clearly state that in a case of rape
or attempt to rape, the conception of compromise under no
circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes
against the body of a woman which is her own temple.
These are the offences which suffocate the breath of life and
sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to emphasise,
is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No one
would allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is
defiled, the "purest treasure", is lost. Dignity of a woman is
a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one
should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a
compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour
which matters the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace
is given that the perpetrator of the crime has acceded to
enter into wedlock with her which is nothing but putting
pressure in an adroit manner; and we say with emphasis
that the courts are to remain absolutely away from this
subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any kind
of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment of
spectacular error. Or to put it differently, it would be in the
realm of a sanctuary of error."
(emphasis supplied)
8. In Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges
of the Supreme Court has reiterated the law laying down the broad
principles to the followed in petitions of this kind as under:-
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarised in the following
propositions :
16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
16.2 The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding
on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between
the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation
of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash
under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
16.3 In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding
or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether
the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
16.4 While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court.
16.5 The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that
the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6 In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the
victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute.
Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue
with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
element of public interest in punishing persons for serious
offences.
16.7 As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in
so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
16.8 Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9 In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
oppression and prejudice; and
16.10 There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic well-being of the state
have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would
be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud
or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained
of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance".
9. A similar view was taken by this Court in Rupesh Ranjan v.
State & Anr.in 2017 SCC Online Del 8543 decided on 23.05.2017.
10. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that having
regard to the nature of the offences involved, it would not be
appropriate to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings arising out of the afore-
mentioned FIR.
11. The petition and the pending application are dismissed.
R.K.GAUBA, J.
JULY6, 2018
srb
