Delhi High Court
Sunil Kumar & Anr. vs Delhi Development Authority ... on 31 January, 2018
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 31.01.2018
+ LPA 479/2013 & CM Nos. 10527/2013, 10528/2013, 20751/2013
SUNIL KUMAR & ANR. ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY THROUGH: VICE
CHAIRMAN ..... Respondent
+ LPA 481/2013 & CM Nos. 10532/2013, 10533/2013
DHARAMBIR SINGH SAINI AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 482/2013 & CM Nos. 10535/2013, 10536/2013
JAI CHAND AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 483/2013 & CM Nos. 10538/2013, 10539/2013
PRITAM SINGH SAINI AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 484/2013 & CM Nos. 10541/2013, 10542/2013
HARI CHAND SAINI & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 485/2013 & CM Nos. 10544/2013, 10545/2013
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 1 of 38
RAKESH KUMAR SAINI AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 488/2013 & CM Nos. 10557/2013, 10558/2013
RAJINDER SAINI AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 489/2013 & CM Nos. 10560/2013, 10561/2013, 10562/2013
MOOL CHAND AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 490/2013 & CM Nos. 10563/2013, 10564/2013
JYOTI SAINI AND ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 491/2013 & CM Nos. 10566/2013, 10567/2013
HARI CHAND SAINI & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 492/2013 & CM Nos. 10569/2013, 10570/2013
KRISHAN KUMAR SHARMA & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 555/2013 & CM No. 11893/2013
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 2 of 38
RAM PRATAP & ANR. ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 558/2013 & CM Nos. 11897/2013, 11898/2013
RAMU & ANR. ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 559/2013 & CM Nos. 11919/2013, 11920/2013
RAJESH KUMAR & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 560/2013 & CM Nos. 11921/2013, 11922/2013
OM PRAKASH & ANR ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 561/2013 & CM No. 11923/2013
SANJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 132/2016 & CM Nos. 7344/2016, 7345/2016
FAQIR CHAND (SINCE DECEASED) THR HIS LEGAL HEIR
MUKESH KUMAR & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 3 of 38
+ LPA 200/2015
LILA RAM ..... Appellant
versus
ESTATE OFFICER -II DDA & ANR ..... Respondents
+ LPA 75/2017 & CM Nos. 3683/2017, 3684/2017
RAMESH CHAND SAINI & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 668/2016 & CM Nos. 44900/2016, 44902/2016
NATHU SINGH & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 4/2017 & CM Nos. 56/2017, 57/2017, 58/2017
DINESH KUMAR & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 669/2016 & CM Nos. 44910/2016, 44912/2016
MAHESH KUMAR & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 5041/2014 & CM Nos. 10061/2014, 10062/2014,
10063/2014
RAJESH KUMAR & ANR ..... Petitioners
versus
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 4 of 38
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ W.P.(C) 5790/2016
CHHOTE LAL ..... Petitioner
versus
THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS...Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 5805/2016
TARA CHAND ..... Petitioner
versus
THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS
..... Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 5806/2016
NATHU RAM ..... Petitioner
versus
THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. Respondents
+ W.P.(C) 5808/2016
KISHAN LAL ..... Petitioner
versus
THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS. Respondents
(hereinafter referred to as Group 'A' cases)
+ LPA 2/2017 & CM Nos. 35/2017, 36/2017, 37/2017
RAJ PAL ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ LPA 3/2017 & CM Nos. 53/2017, 54/2017, 55/2017
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 5 of 38
BUDH RAM ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 5/2017 & CM Nos. 62/2017, 63/2017, 64/2017
GIAS RAM & ORS ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 7/2017 & CM Nos. 69/2017, 70/2017, 71/2017
LAXMI NARAYAN ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ LPA 8/2017 & CM Nos. 75/2017, 76/2017, 77/2017
KAILASH CHAND ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 10/2017 & CM Nos. 81/2017, 82/2017, 83/2017
SANJEEV CHAUHAN ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ LPA 11/2017 & CM Nos. 84/2017, 85/2017, 86/2017
CHHATAR SINGH ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ LPA 12/2017 & CM Nos. 146/2017, 147/2017, 148/2017
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 6 of 38
RAM SINGH SAINI & ANR ..... Appellants
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 65/2017 & CM Nos. 3159/2017, 3161/2017, 3162/2017
RAM BHOOLI ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 68/2017 & CM Nos. 3383/2017, 3385/2017, 3386/2017
CHIDDA RAM ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 70/2017 & CM Nos. 3389/2017, 3391/2017, 3392/2017
MOHAN LAL ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 71/2017 & CM Nos. 3393/2017, 3395/2017, 3396/2017
JAIPAL SINGH DECEASED THR LR ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
+ LPA 72/2017 & CM Nos. 3397/2017, 3399/2017, 3400/2017
DINESH CHAND ..... Appellant
versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..... Respondent
+ LPA 73/2017 & CM Nos. 3401/2017, 3403/2017, 3404/2017
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 7 of 38
ANOOP SINGH ..... Appellant
versus
DDA ..... Respondent
(hereinafter referred to as 'Group 'B' cases)
Present:
Mr. Amit Kumar with Mr. Kumar Abhishek, Advocates for Appellant
in LPA Nos. 479/2013, 481/2013, 482/2013, 483/2013, 484/2013,
485/2013, 488/2013, 489/2013, 490/2013, 491/2013, 492/2013,
132/2016, 668/2016, 669/2016, 2/2017, 3/2017, 4/2017, 5/2017,
7/2017, 8/2017, 10/2017, 11/2017, 12/2017, 65/2017, 68/2017,
70/2017, 71/2017, 72/2017, 73/2017, 75/2017 & WPC Nos.
5041/2014.
Mr S.N. Gupta, Adv. for appellants in LPA Nos. 555/2013, 558/2013,
559/2013, 560/2013 and 561/2013
Mr. A.K. Bhardwaj, Advocate along with Dheeraj Bhardwaj,
Advocate for Appellant in LPA No.200/2015.
Mr. U.M. Tripathi, Advocate for Petitioner in WPC Nos. 5041/2014,
5790/2016, 5805/2016 & 5806/2016.
Ms. Shobhana Takiar, Advocate for respondent/DDA in LPA
Nos.479/2013, 481/2013, 482/2013, 483/2013, 484/2013, 485/2013,
488/2013, 489/2013, 490/2013, 491/2013, 492/2013, 555/2013,
558/2013, 559/2013, 560/2013, 561/2013, 200/2015, 132/2016,
668/2016, 669/2016, 2/2017, 3/2017, 4/2017, 5/2017, 7/2017, 8/2017,
10/2017, 11/2017, 12/2017, 65/2017, 68/2017, 70/2017, 71/2017,
72/2017, 73/2017, 75/2017 & WPC Nos. 5041/2014, 5790/2016,
5805/2016, 5806/2016 & 5808/2016.
Mr. Dhanesh Relan with Ms. Isha Garg, Advocates for
respondent/DDA in LPA Nos.200/2015, 132/2016., 668/2016,
LPA No.479/2013 and connected matters Page 8 of 38
669/2016, 2/2017, 4/2017, 5/2017, 7/2017, 8/2017, 68/2017, 72/2017
& 75/2017.
Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal with Mr. Hem Kumar, Advocates for
respondent/DDA in LPA No.668/2016.
Mr. Arun Birbal, Advocate for respondent/DDA in LPA Nos.2/2017,
5/2017, 7/2017, 8/2017, 10/2017, 12/2017, 65/2017 & 70/2017
Mr. Arjun Pant, Advocate for respondent/DDA in LPA Nos.4/2017 &
71/2017.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DEEPA SHARMA, J.
1. We propose to dispose of these 36 appeals and 5 writ petitions vide
this common order since in all these matters, the issues raised are identical.
2. The lands in dispute were leased out to two different Societies,
namely, Jheel Khuranja Cooperative Milk Producers Society Limited and
Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multipurpose Society Limited. All the matters
relating to land allotted to Jheel Khuranja Cooperative Milk Producers
Society Limited are grouped in Group „A‟ and the matters relating to land
allotted to Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multipurpose Society Limited are
grouped in Group „B‟.
Brief facts in Group 'A' Matters
3. An Agreement was executed by the Government of India in favour of
the Delhi Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as "the DIT") on
31.03.1937 with regard to administration of certain properties, which were
placed at the disposal of DIT, and was termed as the Nazul Estate. On
14.03.1950, Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation conveyed its
decision to the effect that all the plots in Jhil Khuranjia, which were
previously occupied by Muslim Ghosis and which were then lying vacant or
were unauthorisedly occupied, would be allotted by the DIT to the Jhil
Khuranjia Milk Producers Co-operative Society Ltd., for being allotted to
the displaced persons who are milk producers and who had enrolled
themselves as Members of the Society and those who agree to abide by the
conditions specified in the said communication. The terms of allotments of
plots to the Jhil Khuranjia Milk Producers Co-operative Society, inter alia,
provided that the plots would be given only for a lease for a period of 90
years. The Society had to pay to DIT an existent rent of Rs. 2/- per annum,
subject to the enhancement. It also provided that the period of lease for all
Nazul „grazing land‟ under the trust be leased for grazing & fodder; the first
instance would be 5 years with an option to the Society to renew the lease
for a further period of 10 years each.
4. Subsequently, on 22.03.1950, the DIT was called upon to take
immediate necessary action with regard to allotment of all vacant plots of
land in Jhil Khuranjia to the Jhil Khuranjia Milk Producers Co-operative
Society Ltd. on the terms and conditions contained in letter dated
14.03.1950. Request was also made to lease out Nazul grazing land under
the Trust (DIT) in and near Jhil Khuranjia, including, land belonging to U.P.
Canal Department so long as its management is with DIT.
5. The DIT passed the resolution on the subject of "Allotment of Land in
Jhil Khuranjia to Jhil Khuranjia Milk Producers Co-operative Society Ltd."
on 25.05.1950. This resolution contained the terms of allotment as were
contained in Government Notification dated 14.03.1950.
6. The Nazul land measuring 7938 Bigha 12 Biswa in Jheel Khuranja
and Chiragaha South was given on lease to Jheel Khuranja Cooperative Milk
Producers Society Limited by the DIT vide Resolution No.103 dated
25.05.1950. Land measuring 2660 Bigha 14 Biswa belonging to U.P.
Irrigation Department, was also allotted to the Society. On 20.04.1962,
possession of 2660 Bigha 14 Biswa was surrendered to the U.P. Irrigation
Department and, thereafter, only an area of a land comprising of 4380 Bigha
remained with the Society. This land was leased out to the Society for its
members, including the appellants and the writ petitioners. After the Delhi
Development Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the DD Act") came into
force, the land under the management of the DIT came to vest in the Delhi
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as "the DDA") by virtue of
Section 60(2)(d) of the DD Act and by virtue of Section 22 of the DD Act,
the Nazul lands, which were property of the Central Government, were
placed at the disposal of DDA for the purpose of development. DDA issued
two letters on 16.10.1967 to the Society, for handover the possession of the
land and also to deposit the arrears of land revenue amounting to
Rs.2,71,957.48. The Society filed a Suit No.326/1970 for declaration,
mandatory and perpetual injunction thereby seeking declaration that
termination of the lease was illegal, and also seeking injunction to restrain
the DDA from evicting it and claim arrears of rent. On 24.05.1971, the
Society gave up its relief of declaration and confined itself to the relief of
injunction. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the suit for injunction
alone was not maintainable after the relief for declaration was abandoned,
since the relief for injunction had emanated from the relief of declaration.
Against this order, the Society preferred an appeal which was registered as
RFA No.250/1971. During the hearing of the appeal, the DDA on
26.07.1977 gave an undertaking to the Court that it would not dispossess the
Society, except under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as „the PP Act‟).
This undertaking was accepted by the Society and the appeal was disposed
of on those terms.
7. Thereafter, DDA proceeded to take action under the PP Act against
the Society. Notices under Sections 4 and 7 of the PP Act in the year 1983-
84 were issued to the Society for vacation of the land. However, the
proceedings were dropped by DDA against the Society, when informed that
the Society was not in possession of the land.
8. Thereafter, notices under Section 4 of the PP Act were issued to
various occupants of the land. The Estate Officer issued the show-cause
notices to the occupants. The eviction orders were passed. The said eviction
orders dated 29.01.2002 were challenged before this Court in CWP
No.3364/2002 and the Court vide order dated 19.11.2004 directed the DDA
to implead the Society as a party to the eviction proceedings. After
impleadment of the Society, the Estate Officer passed the eviction orders
dated 01.08.2007 against the Society. It was challenged by way of an appeal
before the District and Sessions Judge. The learned District and Sessions
Judge vide order dated 01.09.2009 set aside the order passed by the Estate
Officer on the ground that the description of land was not mentioned in the
order.
9. The Estate Officers thereafter again passed the eviction orders dated
17.12.2012, 07.01.2013, 28.01.2013, 17.01.2013, 18.12.2012, 14.01.2013 in
all the cases subject matter of the above Letter Patent Appeals (LPA‟s) of
Group 'A'. The said orders were upheld by the District and Sessions Judge
on 23.02.2013, 07.03.2013, 23.03.2013 and 25.02.2013. These orders were
challenged before the learned Single Judge in the writ petitions bearing
W.P.(C) 1959/2013, W.P.(C) 1928/2013. W.P.(C) 2518/2013, W.P.(C)
1969/2013, W.P.(C) 1945/2013, W.P.(C) 2517/2013, W.P.(C) 2516/2013,
W.P.(C) 1979/2013, W.P.(C) 1948/2013, W.P.(C) 2519/2013, W.P.(C)
3015/2013, W.P.(C) 2792/2013, W.P.(C) 2953/2013, W.P.(C) 2965/2013,
W.P.(C) 3577/2013, W.P.(C) 8665/2014, W.P.(C)1598/2016, W.P.(C)
1637/2016, W.P.(C)1597/2016 and W.P.(C) 1758/2016. All the writ
petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by a common orders
dated 24.05.2013, 26.02.2016 and 29.02.2016. The said orders are impugned
before us in these LPA‟s. In the writ petition bearing W.P.(C) 5041/2014,
the order of District Judge dated 07.03.2013, whereby the learned District
Judge has upheld the order of the Estate Officer, is under challenge. In
W.P.(C) 5790/2016, W.P.(C) 5805/2016, W.P.(C) 5806/2016 and W.P.(C)
5808/2016, the writ petitioners have directly come before this Court against
the order of Estate Officer dated 17.01.2013, without availing of their right
to appeal before the District Judge under Section 9 of the PP Act.
Brief Facts in Group 'B' Cases
10. In Group „B‟ category of cases, the Government land in dispute was
allotted to Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multipurpose Society Limited by the
DIT.
11. The brief common facts as disclosed by the appellants in these cases
are that in 1949, the Society was allotted agricultural land measuring 13,344
bighas in village Patparganj Shamspur, Jatwara Kalan South, Gaonwala,
Mohammad Khan Wala, Jhilnmil Tahirpur South, Jhilmil Tahipur North and
Murgi Khana (hereinafter referred to as "the land"), on leasehold basis for a
period of 5 years by the DIT vide the lease executed between the Society
and the DIT. The Society allotted the said land to its members for
cultivation. The lease was extended in the year 1956 and again in 1961. In
respect of certain bighas of land, DDA - who is the successor of DIT,
sought cancellation of the lease deed on 06.10.1967 and 31.07.1967, and
asked the Society to handover the possession of the land. Thereafter, a
Resolution No.6 dated 30.04.1973 was passed by the DDA, whereby it
proposed to execute the lease deeds in favour of individual cultivators. The
Society was asked to clear its arrears and a demand letter to this effect was
issued. Thereafter, the Society alleges to have cleared all the arrears. Notices
under the PP Act were issued by the Estate Officer to the individual
cultivators and the eviction orders were passed in the year 1991-1992. The
orders were challenged in appeal before the District Judge. The matters were
remanded back to the Estate Officer. The eviction proceedings were again
started by the DDA in the year 2004, and eviction orders were passed on
01.08.2007 for vacation of the land. This order was challenged before the
Appellate Court of District Judge. The matter was again remanded back to
the Estate Officer. The final orders were passed by the Estate Officer on
31.01.2014, 03.02.2014, 06.02.2014, 07.02.2014, 18.02.2014, 03.04.2014,
24.03.2014, 04.04.2014 and 24.06.2014 respectively. Those orders were
challenged before the District Judge. The appeals were dismissed on
01.04.2014, 31.03.2014, 04.07.2014, 15.09.2014, 16.09.2014, 07.10.2014
and 14.10.2014. These orders of the District Judge were challenged before
the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.8307/2016,
9059/2016, 9063/2016, 9064/2016, 9065/2016, 9085/2016, 9086/2016,
9087/2016, 9105/2016, 9110/2016, 9111/2016, 9113/2016, 9117/2016,
9118/2016, 9119/2016, 9121/2016, 9122/2016, 9137/2016, 9139/2016,
9140/2016, 9143/2016. Vide common impugned order dated 21.10.2016, all
the writ petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge. This
impugned order has been challenged by the appellants before us on various
grounds.
12. Both the parties have argued the matter at length and have also
submitted their written submissions.
13. Learned Counsels in Group „A‟ and Group „B‟ cases have confined
their challenge to the impugned orders on two legal grounds and have not
disputed the findings of fact returned by the Estate Officer, which were
confirmed by the District Judge on their appeal, and subsequently by the
learned Single Judge in the writ petitions. The first ground raised is that the
learned Single Judges have failed to appreciate that appellants and the writ
petitioners are the tenants in respect of the portions of the lands in their
occupation and possession and, secondly, that the DDA cannot evict them
under the PP Act which is applicable only to the unauthorized occupants,
and they being tenants cannot be evicted under the PP Act which makes the
order of the Estate Officer void, having been passed without any authority
and jurisdiction.
14. It is argued that in Dr. Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd and its Estate Officer, 2014 (2) SCALE 223, the Supreme Court has
clearly held that the occupants of public premises, who are in occupation
prior to 16.09.1958, i.e. prior to the PP Act coming into force are not
governed by the PP Act, since the Act has no retrospective effect. The
Supreme Court has further held that the right available to the appellants
under a State Statute before 16.09.1958 (the date on which the PP Act was
enforced) does not get extinguished on passing of the PP Act. Such persons
cannot be evicted under the PP Act. It is argued that at the time when lease
was executed by the DIT, the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and
Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 were applicable to the lands
in Delhi by virtue of Delhi Laws Act, 1912, as amended in 1915. It is argued
that as per Section 4(5) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and Punjab
Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950, they are the tenants under those
Acts and can be evicted only in terms of the said Acts and not under the PP
Act. Reliance is placed on paras 59 and 64 of Dr. Shuhas H. Pophale
(supra), which are reproduced as under:-
―59....... All those persons falling within the definition of a
tenant occupying the premises prior thereto will not come under
the ambit of the Public Premises Act and cannot therefore, be
said to be persons in ―unauthorized occupation‖. Whatever
rights such prior tenants, members of their families or heirs of
such tenants or deemed tenants or all of those who fall within
the definition of a tenant under the Bombay Rent Act have, are
continued under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If
possession of their premises is required, that will have to be
resorted to by taking steps under the Bombay Rent Act or
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If person concerned has
come in occupation subsequent to such date, then of course the
Public Premises Act, 1971 will apply.
64. As far as the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public
premises is concerned, undoubtedly it is covered under the
Public Premises Act, but it is so covered from 16-9-1958, or
from the later date when the premises concerned become public
premises by virtue of the premises concerned vesting into a
government company or a corporation like LIC or the
nationalised banks or the general insurance companies like
Respondent. Thus there are two categories of occupants of
these public corporations who get excluded from the coverage
of the Act itself. Firstly, those who are in occupation since prior
to 16-9-1958 i.e. prior to the Act becoming applicable, are
clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly, those who
come in occupation, thereafter, but prior to the date of the
premises concerned belonging to a government corporation or
a company, and are covered under a protective provision of the
State Rent Act, like the appellant herein, also get excluded.
Until such date, the Bombay Rent Act and its successor
Maharashtra Rent Control Act will continue to govern the
relationship between the occupants of such premises on the one
hand, and such government companies and corporations on the
other. Hence, with respect to such occupants it will not be open
to such companies or corporations to issue notices, and to
proceed against such occupants under the Public Premises Act,
and such proceedings will be void and illegal. Similarly, it will
be open for such occupants of these premises to seek
declaration of their status, and other rights such as
transmission of the tenancy to the legal heirs, etc. under the
Bombay Rent Act or its successor Maharashtra Rent Control
Act, and also to seek protective reliefs in the nature of
injunctions against unjustified actions or orders of eviction if so
passed, by approaching the forum provided under the State Act
which alone will have the jurisdiction to entertain such
proceedings.‖
15. It is further argued that in Rama Nand vs. State of Haryana, AIR
1982, P&H 26, the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court has
also clearly held that the rights of a tenant created under Punjab Tenancy
Act, 1887 and Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950 do not get
extinguished on passing of Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and
Rent Recovery) Act, 1959, the provisions of which are pari materia with the
PP Act. It is argued that the same principle applies here, and the DDA could
not have sought eviction under the PP Act and eviction orders are thus
nullity. It is submitted that the same principles have been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in M/s Band Box Private Limited vs. Estate Officer, Punjab
and Sindh Bank, 2014 (16) SCC 321.
16. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr.
Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and Ors. v. Dir. Health Services, Haryana and
Ors., 2013 10 (SCC)136, particularly with reference to para 9 and 10 of the
said judgment, it is argued that once it is found that the forum which had
passed an order had no jurisdiction, the decision becomes irrelevant and
unenforceable/in-executable. It is further argued that a legal plea challenging
the jurisdiction of the authority to pass an order, can be raised at any stage
and the learned Single Judges have erred in holding that the plea regarding
non-applicability of the PP Act cannot be taken at a later stage. It is further
argued that since the appellants and writ petitioners are challenging the
applicability of the PP Act and, thus, challenging the jurisdiction and
authority of the Estate Officer to pass eviction orders under the PP Act,
which purely a legal issue, the same could be raised at any stage. It is argued
that in the case of Cantonment Board and Anr. vs. Church of North India,
(2012) 12 SCC 573, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the lack of
inherent jurisdiction is basic and fundamental, and the validity of an order
can be challenged at any stage on the ground of lack of inherent jurisdiction,
even in execution or collateral proceedings. It is argued that the eviction
orders being void-having been passed by an authority who had no
jurisdiction over the matter, are liable to be set aside.
17. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent/DDA
submits that the PP Act deals with the eviction of unauthorized occupants
from the properties belonging to the government. The claim of the
appellants/writ petitioners that they are protected under the Punjab Acts is
highly misplaced. The appellants and writ petitioners are not protected under
any State Laws on expiry of leases by efflux of time. On expiry of the said
leases, the appellants and writ petitioners remained neither statutory, nor
contractual tenants, thus, became unauthorized occupants.
18. Learned counsel submits that the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 has no
application to the present case. The land in dispute - occupied by the
appellants and writ petitioners is not governed by these Acts. The Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887, applies to the Union Territory of Delhi as described in
Schedule A of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912. As per this Schedule, the Union
Territory of Delhi comprises that portion of the District of Delhi, comprising
the Tehsil of Delhi and the Police Station of Mehrauli. Further, vide
Schedule - I of the Delhi Laws Act, 1915, 65 territories were included in the
Union Territory of Delhi. Learned counsel for the DDA draws our attention
to the aspect that the land in question falls in the Nazul estate as described in
the Nazul Agreement, and is not part of the 65 villages as described in
Schedule - I of the Delhi Laws Act, 1915. Thus, the Punjab Tenancy Act,
1887, does not apply to the Nazul estate. Learned counsel further submits
that Section 4(5)(d) of the Act defines a tenant as "a person who holds land
under another person, and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable
to pay rent for that land to that other person; but it does not include-:
........... (d) a person who takes from the [Government ] a lease of
unoccupied land for the purpose of subletting it". Thus, in light of the said
provision, the appellants and writ petitioners do not stand as tenants under
the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.
19. Learned counsel for the DDA further draws our attention to Section 3
of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act,
1959 wherein ―Un-authorised occupation of public premises‖ has been
explained as under:
―For the purposes of this Act - A person shall be deemed to be
in unauthorized occupation of any public premises.
(a) where he has whether before or after the commencement
of this Act entered into possession thereof otherwise than under
and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant;‖
(b) where he, being an allottee, lease or grantee, has, by
reason of the determination or cancellation of his allotment,
lease or grant in accordance with the terms in that behalf
therein contained, ceased, whether before or after the
commencement of this Act, to be entitled to occupy or hold
such public premises.
(c) where any person authorised to occupy any public premises
has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act--
(i) sublet in contravention of the terms of allotment, lease or
grant, without the permission of the State Government or of
any other authority competent to permit such sub-letting the
whole or any part of such public premises;
(ii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms,
express or implied, under which he is authorised to occupy
such public premises.
Explanation : For purposes of Clause (a), a person shall not
merely by reason of the fact that he has paid any rent be
deemed to have entered into possession as allottee, lessee or
grantee.‖
20. By virtue of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of the India, 1950, the
law made by Parliament on a subject prevails over the State laws. Thus, the
PP Act would override any other state enactment made in respect of the
lands of the Union of India. Thus, the appellants and writ petitioners are
unauthorized occupants within the meaning of section 2(g) of the PP Act on
the said Union government land since 1965 i.e. since the expiry of the lease.
21. Learned counsel submits that Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Anr. v.
Punjab National Bank & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 855, holds that when a
premises falls within the ambit of both - the PP Act and the Delhi Rent
Control Act (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act), the PP Act shall have
overriding effect vis-à-vis the DRC Act. Thus, learned counsel submits that
a person inducted as a tenant in respect of a public premise, whose tenancy
has expired, cannot invoke the protection of the State enactments viz. the
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and the Punjab Tenants Act, 1950. The PP Act
overrides the State Acts in relation to premises falling within the ambit of
both the enactments.
22. Learned counsel further submits that the plea that the appellants and
the writ petitioners are the tenants under the Punjab Acts was not taken at
any stage, and no evidence has been adduced by the appellants and writ
petitioners to prove that the land in their occupation was governed by the
Punjab Acts. The said issue is a mixed question of fact and law, and cannot
be raised for the first time at this stage. The submission that the appellants/
petitioners were tenants under the Punjab Acts is thus a fallacy.
23. Learned counsel for the DDA submits that the decision in Dr. Suhas
H. Pophale (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case, since the facts
in that case were entirely different. In Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (supra), the
property in dispute was a private property on which the Bombay Rent Act,
1947 was applicable. There was a valid tenancy within the meaning of
Bombay Rent Act, 1947, until the premises in question were converted into
public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the PP Act-which was
done by way of a merger. In this case, one Mr Eric Voller was a tenant of
Indian Mercantile Insurance Company. Mr Eric Voller executed a licensed
agreement in favour of the appellant therein, for a period of two years, and
put him in exclusive possession of the property concerned. The erstwhile
insurance company did not object to the said act and accepted the appellant
as a tenant for residential purposes and started accepting the rent directly
from the appellant. Subsequently, the said insurance company was merged
on 01.01.1974 in the Oriental Insurance Company-which is a Government
Company. The management of the Company was taken over by the Central
Government w.e.f. 13.05.1971 pending its nationalization. On these facts,
the Court had protected the rights of the tenant under the Bombay Rent Act,
and the Apex Court held that the rights created under the State enactments
cannot be destroyed by giving retrospective effect to the provisions of the
PP Act. However, in the present case, the disputed property has always been
the property of the Central Government. Thus, this decision is not applicable
to the facts of the present case.
24. It is further submitted that in RFA No.250/1971, the DDA had made a
categorical statement that the appellants would not be dispossessed, except
under the provisions of the PP Act, 1971 and in view of the said undertaking
given by the DDA, the appellants did not press their appeal which was then
disposed of in those terms. By corollary, the appellants and writ petitioners
had accepted that they could be dispossessed under the provisions of the PP
Act and, that is why, they had never raised this plea, and for the first time in
the present appeals, the appellants and writ petitioners are taking the plea
that they cannot be evicted under the PP Act. It is further argued that in an
earlier writ petition No.3797/1991, entitled as Smt. Dhan Kaur vs. DDA,
wherein the Jheel Khuranja Cooperative Milk Producers Society Limited
was respondent No.2 and the petition was filed by members of the Society,
the Court had negated the contention of Smt. Dhan Kaur that she had come
to use and occupy the land through the said Society, and had a right to
continue to occupy the same - being lessee of the Society, and it was held
that the Society did not have any subsisting right, title or interest and anyone
claiming through the Society cannot legally continue to be in use and
occupation, and they were rank trespassers and encroachers.
25. It is further argued that in the Group „B‟ cases, the appeal filed against
the eviction orders passed in respect of certain persons occupying the land
allotted to Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multipurpose Society Limited, was
dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
17.11.2015 in the case titled as Brij Pal & Ors. vs. DDA, LPA No. 810/2015.
It is submitted that these findings are binding on this Court on the principle
of constructive res judicata, since they are relating to the same lease
agreements, with the same Societies, through whom the appellants and the
petitioner in those two cases were claiming their rights, and through whom
the appellants and the writ petitioners before this Court are claiming their
rights.
26. It is further argued that the learned Single Judges have rightly
dismissed the writ petitions of the appellants, whereby they had challenged
the order of the District Court passed in appellate jurisdiction. A Writ Court
certainly does not sit as an Appellate Court, and exercises a limited
jurisdiction of judicial review while assessing the order of a Court below.
Reliance is placed on Rohtash Kumar v. DDA & Ors, 2003 VI AD (Delhi)
245, in this regard.
27. It is argued that the present appeals and writ petitions have no merit,
and the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality and the same are
liable to be dismissed. It is further submitted that the writ petitions - which
have been filed against the order of the Estate Officer, without first availing
the alternate remedy of filing an appeal, are also liable to the dismissed on
these grounds as well.
28. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions
and have perused the record and considered the decisions relied upon by the
learned counsels.
29. As aforesaid, learned counsels for the appellants and the writ
petitioners have confined their arguments only on two legal issues; firstly
that the appellants and writ petitioners were tenants since the inception of
the lease granted to the Societies by the DIT under the provisions of Punjab
Tenancy Act, 1887 and Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950,
which were applicable to the territories of Delhi, and hence their rights are
protected under these Acts and they cannot be evicted under the PP Act.
Secondly, the PP Act has no retrospective application.
30. The admitted and undisputed facts are that the leases were created in
favour of the Societies for its members and, therefore, the appellants and
writ petitioners can claim their right of occupation in respect of the land in
their possession and occupation, only through the Societies and, therefore,
the appellants and writ petitioners in Group „A‟ cases are bound by the order
of this Court in RFA No.250/1971 which was disposed of by this Court in
terms of undertaking of DDA to take action only as per the provisions of the
PP Act. It is pertinent that the Society agreed to the undertaking of DDA and
did not press its appeal. It cannot now turn around and challenge the action
of DDA under the PP Act while earlier they did not oppose the undertaking
of DDA to resort to the provisions of the PP Act for getting them evicted
from the land in their occupation. Alternatively, since the appellants/ writ
petitioners withdrew their RFA, and the original judgment was against them,
they are bound by the same. However, since the appellants and writ
petitioners have raised this plea, we propose to deal with it on merits as well.
31. It is an undisputed fact that the land in dispute was Government land
when leased out to the Societies. The appellants and writ petitioners have
relied on Section 4(5) of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and argued that the said
Act applies to Government land as well. The relevant Section reads as
under:-
―4. Definition - In this Act, unless there is something repugnant
in the subject or context-
(1) XXX XXX XXX
(2) XXX XXX XXX
(3) XXX XXX XXX
(4) XXX XXX XXX
(5) ―tenant‖ means a person who holds land under another
person, and is, or but for a special contract would be, liable to
pay rent for that land to that other person; but it does not
include-
(a) XXX XXX XXX
(b) XXX XXX XXX
(c) XXX XXX XXX
(d) a person who takes from the 2[Government] a lease of
unoccupied land for the purpose of subletting it"; (emphasis
supplied)
32. From reading the provision of Section 4(5)(d) of the Punjab Tenancy
Act, it is apparent that this Act is not applicable to the leases executed by the
Government relating to Government unoccupied lands, where the same has
been allotted for the purpose of sub-letting it. It is an undisputed fact that the
land in dispute was unoccupied land, leased out to the Societies for use of its
members and the Societies were precluded from sub-letting it.
33. Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 applies to that part of the Union Territory
of Delhi which has been specified in Schedule-A of Delhi Laws Act, 1912
which were Tehsil of Delhi and police station of Mehrauli and subsequently
65 more villages were added to this list. No evidence is produced to show
that lands in question formed part of the Tehsil of Delhi, or was part of
police station of Mehrauli, or were part of 65 villages which were
subsequently added to the list in Schedule-I by a proclamation issued in
1915. During arguments also our attention was not drawn by the appellants
and the writ petitioners to any document to show that lands in question,
which was property of Union Government, was brought into the ambit of
provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 and Punjab Tenants (Security of
Tenure) Act, 1950. The operation of this Act was extended to that part of
land of the Union Territory of Delhi which is mentioned in Schedule-A of
the Delhi Laws Act, 1912. Therefore, it is apparent that only the land which
was part of Schedule-A, was governed by the provisions of Punjab Tenancy
Act, 1887 and Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950. The
appellants and writ petitioners have failed to establish the fact that the
provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 was extended to the land in dispute,
which indisputably belongs to Government of India. The said issue being a
mixed question of fact and law could, and should have been agitated at the
original stage of the proceedings, which the appellants/ writ petitioners
failed to do. It is too late in the day for them to raise the same at this stage,
and they cannot be permitted to do so. The factual groundwork has not been
laid by the appellants/petitioners for them to urge that the lands in question
are covered by the aforesaid Punjab Act.
34. Turning to the applicability of the Punjab Tenants (Security of
Tenure) Act, 1950 (referred to as Punjab Tenants (ST) Act), we find that
even the said Act has no relevance to the present case. As per Section 1(3)
of the Punjab Tenants (ST) Act, it applies to "entire land held in Delhi by a
landowner except -
(i) the land held by an occupancy tenant;
(ii) the land reserved under the provisions of this Act; or
(iii) if such land, excluding the land held by an occupancy tenant, in
aggregate area, does not exceed the permissible limit".
35. The expression "landowner" as defined in Section 2(1) of Punjab
Tenants (ST) Act "means a person defined as such in the Punjab Land
Revenue Act, 1887, as applicable to Delhi.‖ The Punjab Land Revenue Act
defines "landowner" in Section 3(2) as:
―landowner does not include a tenant or an assignee of land
revenue, but does not include a person to whom a holding has
been transferred or an estate or holding has been let in farm,
under this Act for the recovery of an arrear of land revenue or
a sum recoverable as such an arrear and every other person
not herein before this clause mentioned who is in possession of
an estate or any share or portion thereof, or in the enjoyment of
any part of the profits of an estate.‖
36. Since the subject land belonging to the Government was leased out to
Societies indisputably, the Societies as per the said definition cannot be
termed as land owners of the subject property and the appellants and the writ
petitioners cannot be termed as tenants under Punjab Tenants (ST) Act.
37. A perusal of the Punjab Land Revenue Act shows that the same is a
legislation which primarily seeks to provide for the making and maintenance
of record-of-rights in land, the assessment and collection of land revenue
and other matters relating to land and the liabilities incident thereto.
38. Section 48 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 is the charging
provision in respect of land revenue. The same provides that:
―All land, to whatever purpose applied and wherever situate is
liable to the payment of land-revenue of the Government except
such land as has been wholly exempted from that liability by
special contract with the Government or by the provisions of
any law for the time being in force and such land as is included
in the village site.
Explanation--For the purposes of this sub-section the
expression ‗Village site' shall have the same meaning as is
assigned to the expression ‗site of a village' in section 4.
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1) land
held by any person weather as a sole landowner or as a co-
landowner in one or more holdings, or as a sole landowner and
as a co-landowner in one or more holdings in any estate shall
be exempted from the liability to the payment of land revenue,
if-- ... ... ...‖
39. Land revenue is payable to the Government. It is payable by a land
owner. There would be no question of the Government paying land revenue
on its own land, to itself. Section 48 and other provisions of the Act leave
no manner of doubt that the Government cannot be considered as a land
owner for the purposes of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887.
Consequently, the Government cannot be considered as a land owner for the
purposes of the Punjab Tenants Act. Pertinently, the definition of the "land
owner" contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act excludes a tenant. The
appellants/ writ petitioners, at the highest, are claiming themselves to be
tenants since, admittedly, they are not the land owners. Thus, even
otherwise, they cannot be treated as land owners within the definition of the
said expression contained in Section 3(2) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act.
It is not even the case of the appellants/ writ petitioners that they were either
subjected to land revenue or that they every paid any land revenue. Thus,
the submission of the appellants/ writ petitioners that they are covered by the
Punjab Tenants (ST) Act has absolutely no merit. It is also pertinent to note
that the protection granted in respect of the tenancies covered by Section 5
of the Punjab Tenants (ST) Act is not available to a tenant, who fails to pay
rent regularly without sufficient cause. As aforesaid, no material has been
placed on record by the appellants/ writ petitioners to show as to what was
the rent that they were obliged to pay as tenants; whether they paid the same,
and; if so, when and how much. Thus, reliance placed by the appellants/
writ petitioners on the Punjab Tenants (ST) Act is misplaced and rejected.
40. The argument of the appellants and writ petitioners, that since the
Societies had sub-leased the property to its members, therefore, they were
the tenants of the Societies and their tenancy rights were protected under the
State law governing the tenancy rights, has no merit. From the facts on
record, it is apparent that the land was allotted to the Societies for its
members. If the rights of the Societies in question were not protected by the
said two Punjab Acts, the sub-lessees thereunder could obviously not claim
a higher or greater protection. The appellants/ writ petitioners derived their
rights only from the two Societies, and thus, their rights are subject to the
limitations which bound the said Societies. Pertinently, the appellants and
writ petitioners have even failed to produce any evidences on record at the
appropriate forum to prove that they were paying rent to the Societies, or
that they were the tenants of the Societies. Our attention is not drawn to any
document which was proved on record to sustain their contention that
individual tenancy rights were created in favour of the appellants and writ
petitioners by the DDA. The appellants and writ petitioners have failed in
their attempt to prove that they were tenants on the land in question.
41. Even the State law which protects the rights of the tenants, i.e., the
DRC Act does not give protection to them, since it too excludes government
properties, and does not, in any event, apply to open land.
42. Section 3(a) of the DRC Act, 1958 which came into force with effect
from 09.02.1959 exempts from its operation the premises belonging to the
Government. The same is reproduced as under:-
"3. Act not to apply to certain premises.--Nothing in this Act
shall apply--
(a) to any premises belonging to the Government
(b) to (d) XXX XXX XXX"
43. Although the appellants and the writ petitioners have failed to
establish their contention that they were the tenants, it is argued that in the
case of Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (supra), the Supreme Court has held that the
tenancy rights of a person protected under the State Law before the PP Act
was passed by the Parliament, do not get extinguished on passing of the PP
Act. It is also the argument of the appellants and writ petitioners that since
they were tenants, and not unauthorized occupants on 16.09.1958 when
Parliament enforced the PP Act, their rights as tenants do not get
extinguished and any action by the DDA under the said Act is illegal and
without jurisdiction.
44. Learned counsel for the DDA has countered the submission of the
appellants/ writ petitioners by placing reliance on Ashoka Marketing
(supra), wherein it has been held that in respect of Government properties,
the DRC Act has no application and the PP Act has overriding effect.
45. After DD Act came into force on 30.12.1957, all the properties
belonging to DIT, by virtue of Section 60 of DD Act, came to vest and
governed by the DDA. Therefore, in the year 1957 when the DD Act came
into force, the lands in question came to vest in DDA and the property
continued to be the Government property. As aforesaid, Section 3(a) of DRC
Act clearly exempts from the operation of DRC Act any property belonging
to the Government.
46. Section 2(e) of the PP Act defines the 'public premises' which reads
as under:-
―2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires--
(e) ―public premises‖ means--
(1) XXX XXX XXX
(2) XXX XXX XXX
(3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of Delhi],--
(i) XXX XXX XXX
(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority,
whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out
by, the said Authority;‖
47. Admittedly, the land in question was Government property from the
very beginning i.e. even at the time when the lease was created. The PP Act
became operative with effect from 16.09.1958. It empowers the owner of the
"public premises" to get the "unauthorized occupants" of the public
premises evicted through the special mechanism devised under the PP Act.
Section 2(g) of the PP Act defines ―unauthorized occupation‖ as under:-
―2(g) ―unauthorised occupation‖, in relation to any public
premises, means the occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such occupation, and includes
the continuance in occupation by any person of the public
premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any
other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy
the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason
whatsoever.
48. On determination of the lease of a Government property, all of those
who are occupying it become unauthorized occupants. The Supreme Court
in Ashoka Marketing (supra), explained the meaning of unauthorized
occupation used in PP Act and held as under:-
―30. The definition of the expression 'unauthorised occupation'
contained in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act is in two
parts. In the first part the said expression has been defined to
mean the occupation by any person of the Public premises
without authority for such occupation. It implies occupation by
a person who has entered into occupation of any public
premises without lawful authority as well as occupation which
was permissive at the inception but has ceased to be so. The
second part of the definition is inclusive in nature and it
expressly covers continuance in occupation by any person of
the public premises after the authority (whether by way of
grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was
allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever. This part covers a case
where a person had entered into occupation legally under
valid authority but who continues in occupation after the
authority under which he was put in occupation has expired
or has been determined. The words "whether by way of grant
or any other mode of transfer" in this part of the definition are
wide in amplitude and would cover a lease because lease is a
mode of transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. The
definition of unauthorised occupation contained in Section
2(g) of the Public Premises Act would, therefore, cover a case
where a person has entered into occupation of the public
premises legally as a tenant under a lease but whose tenancy
has expired or has been determined in accordance with law.‖
(emphasis supplied)
49. Thus, the definition of unauthorized occupants includes any person
who had entered into the public premises under an authority given to him,
but the said authority either has expired or has been determined.
50. Thus, on determination of the lease by efflux of time, or otherwise,
the appellants and writ petitioners became unauthorized occupants
occupying the Government land. The Supreme Court Ashoka Marketing
case (supra) even went to the extent of holding that PP Act has overriding
effect in respect of Government lands over State laws dealing with tenancy
rights, such as the DRC Act.
51. Reliance placed by the appellants and writ petitioners on Dr. Suhas
H. Pophale (supra) is misplaced. In Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (supra), the
Supreme Court took note of the fact that the tenancy, at its inception, was
created by a private person in respect of private property, which property
was subsequently acquired by the Government. However, facts of these
cases show that subject properties were Government properties from the
inception, i.e. at the time of grant of lease to the Societies, and continued to
remain so. Dr. Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is, therefore, not relevant for this
reason.
52. There is no dispute to the fact that the lease in favour of the Societies
stood determined in the year 1967. The claim of the appellant‟s and the
writ petitioner‟s that they were tenants of the Societies, and were paying
rent to them was also rejected. The appellants and writ petitioners have also
failed to bring to the notice of this Court any evidence to prove their
contention that they were tenants under the Societies. The facts show that
the lease was created in favour of the Societies for the use of its members
only and, therefore, on determination of the lease, the Societies as well as
the persons claiming through the Societies became unauthorized occupants
of land.
53. The decision in the case Cantonment Board and Anr. (supra) also
does not help the appellants and writ petitioners. The Supreme Court in this
case has clearly held that the provisions of Section 106 and 107 of the
Transfer of Property Act are not applicable in the cases where the premises
are covered under the Special Act. The PP Act is Special Act.
54. The appellants and the writ petitioners have also relied on the decision
in the case of Rama Nand (supra). We have pursued the decision in the said
case. The question before the Court in that case was, whether the tenant in
respect of agricultural land, which was subsequently acquired by the State
Government after 01.02.1955, shall be governed by the provisions of Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, and can claim protection by virtue of
Section 16 read with Section 9 of the said Act and can avoid ejectment
under the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The Division Bench of
Punjab and Haryana High Court, on the facts of that case, held that the
rights of petitioners as tenants thereon would not be affected by virtue of
Section 16 of the Act. The Court had noted Section 16 of Punjab Security of
Land Tenures Act, 1953 which was a saving clause, and reads as under:-
―16. Saving of tenancies from effect of mala fide transfer.
Save in the case of land acquired by the State Government
under any law for the time being in force or by an heir by
inheritance, no transfer or other disposition of land effected
after the 1st February, 1955, shall affect the rights of the tenant
thereon under this Act.‖
It was on account of the saving clause, i.e. Section 16 of Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 - which protects the tenants, whose
tenancy was created before 01.02.1955, that the Court gave its decision. The
appellants and writ petitioners have failed to establish their rights as tenant
under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The subject property
was always Government property and the appellants/ writ petitioners are
unauthorized occupants of the subject land on determination of the lease of
the Societies.
55. The appellants and the writ petitioners have failed to establish that the
action of DDA under the PP Act for vacation of the land in their occupation
is illegal and the orders of the Estate Officer are without jurisdiction and
authority.
56. Admittedly, the eviction orders of Estate Officers under the PP Act
against some of the occupants of public premises claiming their rights
through Jheel Khuranja Cooperative Milk Producers Society Limited were
upheld by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. Dhan Kaur (supra).
Similarly, the eviction orders passed under the PP Act by Estate Officers
against some of the occupants of public premises, claiming their rights
through Delhi Peasants Cooperative Multipurpose Society Limited, were
upheld by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Brij Pal (supra) in LPA No.
810/2015, decided on 17.11.2015. These two orders of Coordinate Benches
of this Court - in respect of property allotted to Jheel Khuranja Cooperative
Milk Producers Society Limited and Delhi Peasants Cooperative
Multipurpose Society Limited relate to the same properties which were
allotted under the same agreements to these Societies, though were in
occupation of some other members of these Societies (other than the
appellants and the writ petitioners before us), are binding on us on the
principles of constructive res judicata and also on the principle that the
similarly placed persons should be treated alike. The appellants and the writ
petitioners before us are similarly placed persons and the earlier findings
given in respect of similarly placed persons are also binding on them.
57. Thus, we find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. The
appeals and the writ petitions have no merit and are hereby dismissed along
with the pending applications with no order as to costs.
58. Interim orders dated 23.12.2013 and 03.01.2017 stand vacated. The
appellants and the writ petitioners and any person claiming through them are
hereby directed to vacate the land in their occupation and deliver possession
within a period of two weeks from today. If they fail to do so, they can be
evicted by the respondents thereafter by resort to coercive methods.
DEEPA SHARMA
(JUDGE)
VIPIN SANGHI
(JUDGE)
JANUARY 31, 2018
BG
