Delhi High Court
Ajay Gulia vs University Of Delhi & Anr on 13 December, 2018
$~80
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th December, 2018
+ W.P.(C) 9307/2015
AJAY GULIA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anish Shrestha & Mr. Wangdi
Firoz Ahmed, Advocates
versus
UNIVERSITY OF DELHI & ANR ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber & Mr. Bhanu
Gupta, Advocates for DU
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T (ORAL)
% 13.12.2018
1. The petitioner, Ajay Gulia, appeared in the examination
conducted by the University of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the
University") for admission to the LL.B. Course conducted by the
Faculty of Law. He qualified in the said examination and was allotted
1183 rank.
2. On 4th August, 2015, the petitioner approached the University
for counselling but was allegedly denied admission on the ground that
he had already undertaken another LL.B. course in 2010, albeit from a
different university.
3. The writ petition admits that the petitioner had, in fact, acquired
an LL.B. Degree from Chaudhary Charan Singh University in 2010. It
is further stated, in the writ petition, that this fact was disclosed in the
admission form of the petitioner, whereby the petitioner had sought
admission to the LL.B. course conducted by the University contending
that there was no embargo in any rule, regulation or executive
instruction, debarring a student who had acquired an earlier LL.B.
qualification from another University, from applying.
4. The petitioner has filed this writ petition, seeking issuance of a
writ of mandamus to the respondent to revoke their decision to cancel
the petitioner's admission, and consequently, to admit the petitioner in
the LL.B. course for the academic year commencing 2015.
5. Vide order dated 16th October, 2015 passed in these
proceedings, the petitioner was permitted to take provisional
admission to the LL.B. course conducted by the Faculty of Law,
clarifying that the said benediction would not confer any equities on
the petitioner.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that except for one
paper, which he has repeated, the petitioner has completed the three
year LL.B. course with the Faculty of Law, during the pendency of
these proceedings. The University has, in its counter affidavit, relied
on clause (iv)(c) of the Conditions of Eligibility, as contained in the
Admission Bulletin of the University, which reads thus:-
"no candidate on the rolls of LL.B. or who is otherwise
ineligible to be admitted to LL.B. course shall be
allowed to appear in the Entrance Test 2013.
7. The counter affidavit also states that a decision had been taken
in a meeting, convened in the Faculty of Law, on 17 th November,
2014, to the effect that the candidates who had already passed under
any stream (3/5 year) from any University would not be given
admission to the first year LL.B. course in the Faculty of Law.
8. The petitioner has, in his rejoinder, pointed out that the
aforementioned clause, on which the respondent had relied, was
contained in the Admission Bulletin of the Faculty of Law for the
academic year 2013-2014 and for the academic year 2014-2015, for
which period, no such restriction existed.
9. Be that as it may, I am unable to see how the afore-extracted
clause can justify the decision of the University. The said clause states
that no candidate on the rolls of LL.B. and no candidate who is
otherwise ineligible to be admitted to the LL.B. course would be
allowed to appear in the LL.B. Entrance Test. My attention has not
been invited to any rule, regulation or executive instruction, which
makes a candidate, who has already secured a degree from any
University in the past, ineligible for admission to the LL.B. course in
the Faculty of Law.
10. In the absence of any such rule, or instruction, it is obvious that
the afore-extracted clause, on which the University relies, would have
no application.
11. In that view of the matter, the refusal of the respondent to allow
the petitioner to undergo counselling and secure admission in the
LL.B. course conducted by the University cannot sustain in law.
12. Besides, there is also substance in the petitioner's submission
that the aforementioned clause would have no application to his case,
as the academic year in which the petitioner had secured admission is
2015-2016 and not 2013-2014. The petitioner has placed on record the
admission prospectus for the year 2015-2016, which does not contain
any stipulation similar to the afore-extracted condition figuring in the
Admission Bulletin for the year 2013-2014.
13. Insofar as the decision stated to have been taken in the meeting
held on 17th November, 2015 in the Faculty of Law is concerned, the
petitioner has contended, rightly, that the said meeting took place and
a decision was taken thereon, after the filing of the present writ
petition by the petitioner. As such, the said decision can have no
application and cannot impinge, in any manner, the merits of the
petitioner's case in these proceedings. That apart, it is obvious that no
decision could have been taken in the aforesaid meeting in the
premises of the Faculty of Law, which was not sanctified by any
statute or executive instruction.
14. As I have already noted hereinabove, there is no rule, regulation
or executive instruction, debarring a candidate who already possessed
an LL.B. degree from another University, on the date when the
petitioner sought and secured admission to the LL.B. course from
another University, from securing such admission. In the absence of
any such provision, the decision taken in the aforementioned meeting
held in the Faculty of Law has no legal sanctity whatsoever and cannot
be enforced.
15. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The
decision, of the respondents, not to treat the petitioner as entitled to
admission to the LL.B. course in the Faculty of Law, is declared as
illegal and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The petitioner shall
be treated as having been validly admitted to the LL.B. course and
would also be entitled to consequential reliefs.
16. There shall be no order as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
DECEMBER 13, 2018
rd
