Citation : 2018 Latest Caselaw 5139 Del
Judgement Date : 29 August, 2018
#83
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: 29.08.2018
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
ASHA DEVI AND ANR. ..... Petitioners
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners : Mr. Pardeep Gupta, Mr. Parinav Gupta, Ms. Mansi Gupta, Mr. Wazir
Singh Malik and Mr. Moazzam Ali, Advocates.
For the Respondents : Ms. Jyoti Taneja, Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 & 4/GNCTD.
Mr. Ram Kumar, Standing Counsel along with Mr. Sushil Kumar,
Advocates for respondent Nos. 2, 4 & 5/NDMC.
Mr. Arjun Pant, Advocate for DDA.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
JUDGMENT
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J (ORAL)
1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
prays as follows:
"i) Respondents No. 1 & 2 be directed to make the payment/compensation in respect of the land which has been forcibly taken over by the respondents for construction/widening of road out of plot no. RZ-52, Sayed Nangloi, i.e. road Meera Bagh to GH-8, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
ii) Respondents may be directed not to interfere in the possession land of the land out of plot No. RZ 49 to RZ 52 including the land which has illegally been in default beyond the area earmarked by the respondent for development. Hence it may be declared that beside land already converted into road, rest of the land belong to the owner thereof and the respondent have no right over that; and
iii) to pass any other such or similar directions which court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
2. The petitioners' case is predicated on the circumstance that, the
Municipal Corporation of Delhi (for short 'MCD'), on the pretext of
widening the road, demolished a portion of the property bearing No. RZ-49
and RZ-52, Village Syed Nangloi, Delhi-110087 (hereinafter referred to as
'the subject property'). It is the petitioner's assertion that, in terms of the
mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, read with the proviso
to Article 31A thereof, the right to property is a constitutional right and that
consequently, the State cannot acquire their property without following due
process of law.
3. It is, therefore, prayed that, the official respondents having acquired
their property, contrary to the mandate of law, be directed to pay
compensation to them, in respect of the land forcibly acquired in the process
of widening of the road. It is further prayed that, the respondents be directed
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
not to interfere in the petitioners' possession of the subject land.
4. At the outset, it must be pointed out that, predicated on the same cause
of action, the petitioners had earlier instituted a proceeding on 8th March,
2016 in Civil Suit No. 03/2010, titled as "Jagpal Singh Yadav vs. Municipal
Corporation of Delhi", before the Court of competent jurisdiction. In that
proceeding, the petitioners had sought relief by way of a permanent
injunction to restrain the official respondents from interfering with the
reconstruction being carried out by them in the subject property.
5. The MCD in its written statement filed in the said proceedings had
categorically asserted that, the subject property was never recognized by any
Municipal Authority or any other Government Department and that, the
address thereof had been fictitiously created by the petitioners. It was further
stated that, the subject property existed within the area of encroachment that
was duly cleared by them, in accordance with law.
6. The learned Civil Judge observed that, the petitioners had failed to
challenge the act of demolition on the part of the MCD whilst, seeking the
relief of permanent injunction, and had thereby acquiesced and accepted the
demolition of the subject property as legal. It was also held by the learned
Civil Judge that, no order of injunction can be passed, which may have the
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
effect of disabling a statutory body from carrying out its functions. In view
of the foregoing findings, the learned Civil Judge dismissed the said suit as
being not maintainable for want of cause of action.
7. The petitioners carried the said order dated 8th March, 2016, rendered
in the said suit, in appeal. It is an admitted position that, the appeal instituted
on behalf of the petitioners has since been dismissed and the findings
returned by the learned Civil Judge have attained finality.
8. On a specific query from the Court, as to why the petitioners have not
instituted a civil suit seeking compensation for the alleged wrongful
dispossession from his property; it is urged that, the provisions of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (for short 'DMC Act'), and in particular,
the provisions of Sections 476 and 477 thereof, bar the institution of a civil
suit, for the said relief. It is further urged that, since the subject property has
been acquired by the official respondents, within the meaning of the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, no civil suit lies within the mandate
of the latter Act, as well. In other words, it has been asserted that, the
petitioners have no other remedy barring the present proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to seek the relief of compensation
for wrongful deprivation of property.
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
9. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I find
myself unable to agree with the contentions raised on behalf of the
petitioners. The assertion of the petitioners that, the subject property belongs
to them is disputed on behalf of the official respondents, as aforestated.
Therefore, what the petitioners seek, is a declaration of their title over the
subject property, as a precursor to the grant of compensation for deprivation
thereof. In this behalf, it is trite to state that, this Court in extraordinary
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot determine
title of a person to any property. That, needless to state, lies within the
exclusive domain of a Court of competent civil jurisdiction.
10. Furthermore, the grant of compensation, being contingent upon the
declaration of the petitioners' title cannot be granted in the present petition.
In this behalf, it is relevant to observe that, the findings of the learned Civil
Judge insofar as, the petitioners have accepted the demolition of the subject
property is concerned, the same has attained finality. That being so, the grant
of compensation is not tenable in relation to the subject property.
11. Insofar as, the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that, the
mandate of Article 300A and the proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution
of India, have not been followed whilst acquiring the subject property is
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
concerned, the same is held to be fallacious, inasmuch as, the official
respondents cannot acquire land that belongs to them, in the first place.
Therefore, the submission that, the acquisition is without following due
process of law, is devoid of any merit.
12. It is a settled law that what cannot be done directly, cannot be
permitted to be done indirectly. The provisions of law cannot be evaded by
contrivance. The writ jurisdiction of this court cannot be used to subvert the
provisions of a statute as that would defeat the objective of the same. In this
view of the matter, it is observed that, it was open to the petitioners to seek
compensation in the civil suit instituted by them before the Court of
competent jurisdiction. Having failed to do so, the petitioners cannot be
permitted to seek that relief in the present proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
13. Lastly, the submission made on behalf of the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioners to the effect that, the provisions of the
DMC Act and the Land Acquisition Act bar the institution of civil suits is
concerned, the same is completely misplaced in the facts and circumstances
elaborated hereinabove. A reference to the provisions of Section 478 of the
DMC Act, leaves no manner of doubt that, civil suits can be instituted
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
against the official respondents in respect of any act done, or purporting to
have been done, in pursuance of the DMC Act or any rule, regulation or bye-
law made thereunder subject, however, to the issuance of a two months'
notice in writing by the aggrieved party, in that behalf.
14. In my considered view, therefore, before a party can be permitted to
contest infringement of his constitutional right to hold property and seek
compensation for the deprivation thereof, he must establish that, he has the
title to the subject property and when his title itself is in dispute, he cannot
put forward any claim based on that title, unless and until, his right, title and
interest over the subject property has been determined by a Court of
competent jurisdiction, in accordance with law.
15. In view of the foregoing, the present writ petition is devoid of merits
and is accordingly dismissed.
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL (JUDGE)
AUGUST 29, 2018 RS
W.P.(C) 9094/2018
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