Delhi High Court
Neeraj vs State Govt Of Nct Of Delhi on 10 August, 2018
$~R-24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.A. 364/2003
NEERAJ ..... Appellant
Through: None
versus
STATE GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. K. S. Ahuja, APP for State
CORAM:
JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
JUSTICE VINOD GOEL
JUDGMENT
% 10.08.2018
Dr. S. Muralidhar, J.:
1. This appeal is directed against an order dated 4th April, 2003 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No.81/2000
arising out of FIR No.416/2000 registered at Police Station („PS‟) Nangloi
convicting the Appellant for the offence under Section 302/34 IPC and
Section 25/27 of the Arms Act and the order on sentence dated 7 th April,
2003 whereby for the offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC he was
sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment („RI‟) for life along with a fine of
Rs.10,000/-, and in default of payment of fine to undergo further RI for ten
months; for the offence under Section 25 of the Arms Act to undergo RI for
one year along with a fine of Rs.1000/-, and in default of payment of fine to
undergo RI for one month; and under Section 27 of Arms Act RI for two
years along with a fine of Rs.2000/-, and in default in default of payment of
fine to undergo RI for two months.
2. At the outset, it requires to be noticed that the Appellant Neeraj (Accused
No.2: „A-2‟), was sent up for trial along with co-accused Sudesh Kumar
(A-1). By the impugned judgment and order of sentence, both of them were
convicted and sentenced in a similar fashion. Both of them were charged
with having committed the murder of one Ajit Singh (deceased) at 3.30 pm
on 24th May, 2000 at Laghu Udyog Nagar, Railway Crossing, Mundka in
Delhi with a country made pistol and were also, therefore, charged with the
offence punishable under Section 25/27/54/59 of the Arms Act.
3. While suspending the sentence of the present Appellant on 15 th February
2005, this Court noted the fact that on the date of commission of the offence
the present Appellant was below 18 years of age. It was pleaded before this
Court that the present Appellant would therefore be entitled to the beneficial
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 („JJ Act, 2000‟). In support of that submission, reliance was placed on
the decision of this Court in Charanjeet Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi
2004 (3) JCC 1620.
4. However, on the side of the Respondents, it was pointed out at the hearing
on 15th February 2005 that the aforementioned decision at that stage was
under challenge before the Supreme Court of India. What is significant is
that in the said order dated 15th February, 2005, this Court took note of the
fact that the Appellant had placed on record "a certificate from the school,
Vice Principal, Mundka, Delhi certifying the age of the Appellant". The
verification report regarding the age of the Appellant confirmed that he was
below 18 years on the date of the commission of the offence.
5. It may also be noted that on the date of suspension of the sentence of the
Appellant by this Court, the nominal roll produced before the Court showed
that he had already undergone over four years and eight months of
imprisonment.
6. Since then, the Supreme Court in Abdul Razzaq v. State of U.P. AIR
2015 SC 1770 has clarified that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2000 (which came
into effect from 1st April, 2001), can be extended to a person below 18 years
of age on the date of commission of the offence notwithstanding that such
date may be prior to 1st April 2001. The Supreme Court in the
aforementioned decision, discussed Sections 7A and 20 of the JJ Act 2000
as well as the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules 2007
(„JJ Rules‟) and concluded as under:
"The above provisions clearly show that even if a person was
not entitled to the benefit of juvenility under the 1986 Act or
the present Act prior to its amendment in 2006, such benefit is
available to a person undergoing sentence if he was below 18
on the date of the occurrence. Such relief can be claimed even if
a matter has been finally decided, as in the present case."
7. In Jitender Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11
SCC 193, the Supreme Court noted that different approaches have been
adopted by the Supreme Court while extending the benefit of the JJ Act,
2000 to those convicts who were below 18 years of age on the date of
commission of offence notwithstanding that such date may be prior to
1st April, 2001 i.e. the date on which the JJ Act, 2000 came into force. In
para 28 of the abovementioned decision the Supreme Court observed as
under:-
"28. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in
one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilty of the
crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone
virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the sentence
awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken the
view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately
punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some
period in detention. In the third set of cases, this Court has
remitted the entire case for consideration by the jurisdictional
Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the
juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if the juvenile is
found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court has examined
the case on merits and after having found the juvenile guilty of
the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile
Justice Board on the award of sentence."
8. Having regard to the efflux of time and the period of sentence already
undergone by the convict in the above case, the Supreme Court considered it
appropriate not to remand the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board („JJB‟)
for a fresh decision. This was also the approach by the Supreme Court in
Mahesh v. State of Rajasthan 2018 (2) RCR (Criminal) 687 where on
account of the efflux of time, the sentence awarded to the Appellant therein
to whom the benefit of the JJ Act, 2000 was extended was modified to the
period already undergone. The same approach was adopted by this Court
very recently in Rakesh v. State (decision dated 26th July, 2018 in
Crl.A.125/2003).
9. Consequently, in the present appeal as well, with there being no dispute
that the Appellant Neeraj was below 18 years of age on the date of
commission of the offence, he is extended the benefit of JJ Act, 2000.
Further, considering the fact that he has already undergone over four years
and ten months of incarceration, which is beyond the maximum sentence
that could be awarded to him under the JJ Act 2000, this Court is of the view
that no purpose will be served in remanding this case to the JJB for a fresh
adjudication. Following the approach of the Supreme Court in the above
decisions, while maintaining his conviction for the above offences, the
sentence awarded to the Appellant, inclusive of the default sentence for non-
payment of fine, is confined to the period already undergone by him.
10. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. The bail bond and surety
bond furnished by the Appellant stand discharged.
S. MURALIDHAR, J.
VINOD GOEL, J.
AUGUST 10, 2018
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