Delhi High Court
Laxmi Public School And Anr vs Ms. Nupur Mahajan And Anr. on 24 April, 2018
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: April 24, 2018
+ W.P.(C) 3819/2018 & CM 15147/2018
LAXMI PUBLIC SCHOOL AND ANR .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Pramod Gupta, Advocate
versus
MS. NUPUR MAHAJAN AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Jain, Advocate for
respondent No.1
Mr. Naushad Ahmed Khan, Advocate for
respondent No.2
Dr. Surya Kant Prasad, DEO, Zone-01
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
JUDGMENT
1. Vide order of 31st March, 2016 (Annexure P-6), first respondent
has been relieved of her designation of Vice Principal w.e.f. 31st March,
2016, with clarification that the aforesaid relieving will not have any
financial implication and first respondent shall continue to work as PGT
(English) in petitioner-School. However, the aforesaid order was revised
by way of Office Order of 1st April, 2016 (Annexure P-7) by petitioner-
School. Aforesaid Office Order of 1st April, 2016 states that first
respondent has been relieved from the post of Vice Principal w.e.f. 31st
March, 2016 upon abolition of said post and she has been promoted and
appointed as PGT (English) and there shall be no reduction in the present
emoluments drawn by her.
2. Aforesaid orders of 31st March, 2016 and 1st April, 2016 were
challenged by first respondent before the Delhi School Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as „the Tribunal‟). Vide impugned order of 28th
November, 2017, aforesaid orders of 31st March, 2016 and 1st April, 2016
have been set aside being in contravention of provisions of the Delhi
School Education Act and Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as „the
DSEAR, 1973‟). While taking note of the strained relations between the
Chairman of petitioner-School and first respondent, the Tribunal has
opined that the orders of 31st March, 2016 and 1st April, 2016 have been
maliciously passed without following the provisions of the DSEAR, 1973.
It is observed in impugned order that if first respondent was appointed as
Vice Principal without following the norms or if she was not having the
requisite qualification, then why first respondent was appointed on the
post of Vice Principal. Petitioner-School before the Tribunal had relied
upon the consent letter of first respondent and by way of an application
had sought an interrogatory in respect of the consent letter of 31st March,
2016, which stands declined by the Tribunal vide separate order of 28th
November, 2017.
3. The facts are already noted in the opening paragraphs of main
order of 28th November, 2017 and so, need no reproduction. The precise
challenge to main order by learned counsel for petitioners is on the
ground that first respondent was not duly appointed as Vice Principal of
petitioner-School because no meeting of Departmental Promotion
Committee was held nor was seniority list or ACRs of first respondent
considered and so, holding of an inquiry by resort to Rules 118 and 120
of the DSEAR, 1973 is not required. To submit so, reliance is placed upon
decision of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (C) 3264/2012 titled
Managing Committee & Anr. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors., rendered
on 19th July, 2013 and decision of Supreme Court in Shesh Mani Shukla
v. District Inspector of Schools, Deoria and Others, (2009) 15 SCC 436.
4. On the contrary, learned counsel for first respondent supports the
impugned order and submits that first respondent was duly promoted on
the post of Vice Principal and the relieving order amounts to demotion,
which is major penalty as per Section 117 of the DSEAR, 1973, and thus,
the procedure for imposing major penalty as provided under Rule 120 of
the DSEAR, 1973 has to be mandatorily followed and since it has not
been done, therefore, impugned order cannot be faulted with.
5. Upon hearing and on perusal of impugned orders, material on
record and the decisions cited, I find that the Tribunal has summarily
concluded that impugned orders have been maliciously passed. There is
no basis to reach to such a conclusion. The crucial aspect of first
respondent not having requisite qualification or of the procedure being
not followed while appointing her on the post of Vice Principal, has been
arbitrarily brushed aside by putting the blame on petitioner. That is to say,
impugned order questions petitioner as to why first respondent was
appointed as Vice Principal without following the norms. Such an
approach smacks of arbitrariness, which renders impugned order illegal.
However, reliance placed upon consent letter of 31st March, 2016 giving
no objection for being relieved from the post of Vice Principal in
petitioner-School, is of no consequence because the relieving order of 31st
March, 2016 (Annexure P-5) bears a note given by the Manager of
petitioner-School to the effect that first respondent has refused to accept
the relieving order and therefore, it has been sent by speed post. Had first
respondent given no objection, then there is no reason why petitioner
would have refused to accept the relieving order.
6. Pertinently, respondent-Directorate of Education in Reply
(Annexure P-11) before the Tribunal has asserted as under: -
"Abruptly abolishing a post of Vice Principal in the
running senior secondary school/Respondent No. 1 by the
Management/Respondent No. 2 transpires no confidence and
cannot be seen as justification for the reduction of the rank of
the Appellant."
7. Be that as it may. There is no bar to revise order of 31st March,
2016 vide which respondent was relieved from the post of Vice Principal.
The said order stands superseded by order of 1 st April, 2016, which
clearly states that upon abolition of post of Vice Principal, first
respondent has been relieved of her duties. So, it cannot be said that
instant case is of demotion and thus, resort to Rule 117 or 120 of the
DSEAR, 1973 is not required to be made. Learned Tribunal has erred in
holding so. Reliance placed upon decisions in Shesh Mani Shukla (supra)
and Managing Committee (supra) is of no assistance as in the said
decisions, the question of abolition of post did not arise, whereas in the
instant case, it does arise. Since the post of Vice Principal in petitioner-
School has been abolished, therefore, the relieving of first respondent
from the said post cannot be faulted with.
8. In view of aforesaid, impugned order of 28th November, 2017 is
hereby quashed and petitioner's order of 1st April, 2016 is hereby
restored. Before parting with this judgment, it is made clear that though it
is the prerogative of petitioner-School to abolish any post, but in view of
peculiar background of this case, it needs to be clarified as to under what
circumstances, such an unusual course was adopted. It needs to be spelt
out as to what were the administrative exigencies which necessitated
adoption of such a drastic measure. In the event of revival of post of Vice
Principal in petitioner-School, the case of first respondent be promptly
considered alongwith other aspirants in accordance with the applicable
rules and the norms.
9. The facts of instant case persuade this Court to permit first
respondent to have recourse to law if she is not satisfied with clarification
so provided by petitioner. To facilitate it, above clarification be provided
by petitioner to first respondent within four weeks from today. Regarding
the grievance of first respondent about arrears of salary, etc., it is deemed
appropriate to permit first respondent to make a Representation in this
regard to petitioner-School within a week from today and if it is so done,
then petitioner-School shall ensure that arrears of salary, etc., if any, are
promptly cleared. In case it is found that there are no arrears, then a
speaking order be passed in this regard, so that first respondent may avail
of the remedies as available in law, if need be.
10. With aforesaid directions, this petition and the application are
disposed of.
Copy of this order be given dasti to learned counsel for the parties.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
APRIL 24, 2018
s
