Delhi High Court
Bhagwant Singh Pabla & Ors. vs Current Advertising (P.) Ltd. & ... on 6 April, 2018
$~7
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on:- 6th April, 2018
+ CM (M) 433/2013
BHAGWANT SINGH PABLA & ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through: Ms. Sonali Malhotra, Advocate.
versus
CURRENT ADVERTISING (P.) LTD. & ANR..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul Nigam, Advocate for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
ORDER (ORAL)
1. The petitioners admittedly are the landlords qua the premises
described as third floor of property bearing No.4-E/7, Jhandewalan
Extension, New Delhi (subject premises), let out initially by a lease
deed (Ex.PW-1/R1) dated 27. 06.1979 in the name of a partnership
firm described as M/s. Current Advertising and Marketing in which
M.L. Aggarwal and R.P. Aggarwal were partners. It is not disputed
that tenancy had been created by Mr. Dial Singh Pabla, who having
died, the petitioners having stepped into his shoes as his successors-in-
interest. It is further an admitted fact that the said partnership firm was
converted into a private limited company in the name and style of M/s.
Current Advertising (P) Limited (the first respondent) in which the
said erstwhile partners - M.L. Aggarwal and R.P. Aggarwal - were the
only Directors, the entire shares of the company held by them. It is
further undisputed that the tenancy rights were transferred in the name
of the first respondent, it having been accepted as the tenancy qua the
subject premises with effect from 27.03.1990. It is admitted that the
said Directors of the first respondent company parted ways w.e.f
April, 1992 where after one of them, viz., M.L. Aggarwal took over
the said company, having shifted elsewhere, the other Director (R.P.
Aggarwal) continuing on the subject premises retaining its control.
The subject premises concededly came to be in use and occupation of
M/s. Censor Advertising Pvt. Ltd., (second respondent), a company in
which R.P. Aggarwal is a Director.
2. Against the above backdrop, the petitioners had instituted a case
for eviction (E.No.99/04/94) on 28.07.1994 on the grounds under
Section 14 (1)(a) and Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 alleging, inter alia, that the first respondent (the tenant) had sub-
let the subject premises to the second respondent without the previous
consent in writing of the landlord and further that the tenant had run
into arrears of rent which had not been paid in spite of demand. The
petition was contested by both the respondents through separate
written statements and was decided by the additional rent controller by
judgment dated 26.03.2012. The petition on the ground under Section
14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was disposed of with
observations that there was no outstanding rent on the date of
judgment, the interim order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958 having been complied with. The trial court,
however, was of the view that the petitioners had failed to prove the
ground of subletting and, thus, dismissed the petition on that ground.
3. The dismissal of the eviction case on the ground of subletting
was challenged by the petitioners in appeal (RCT Appeal No.29/2012)
before the rent control tribunal, the said having been dismissed by the
judgment dated 15.12.2012. The petition at hand was filed seeking to
assail the view of the two authorities below primarily on the ground
that the evidence has not been properly appreciated, the presence of a
stranger in the premises without the consent of the landlord having
been overlooked.
4. The first respondent has chosen not to appear to contest in spite
of notice. The second respondent, described by the petitioners as the
sub-lettee has appeared through counsel to resist the petition.
5. Arguments of the counsel for the petitioners and for the second
respondent were heard at length and with their assistance the record
perused.
6. In the considered view of the court, the additional rent
controller (ARC) and the rent control tribunal have misconstrued the
case totally, ignoring the crucial aspect, they having been swayed,
erroneously and improperly so, by clause no.(vi) of the lease deed
(Ex.PW-1/R1) dated 27.06.1979.
7. The clause referred to by the respondents in the lease deed dated
27.06.1979 reads thus:-
"(vi) That the lessee will not, without the previous
consent, of the lessor in writing, sublet, assign or
otherwise part with in any manner, transfer the
possession of the whole or any part of the demises
premises or its interests in the same to anybody
else, but the other firms, where the any of the
partner of above mention firm and their family
members can do the business."
8. The lease deed dated 27.06.1979 having been entered upon by
the landlord with the firm M/s. Current Advertising and Marketing, it
had served its purpose and exhausted itself when the firm was
dissolved and instead a company by the name of M/s. Current
Advertising (P) Ltd. (first respondent), established by its partners, was
accepted as the tenant by the landlord. The effect of the firm being
converted into a company and the company having been accepted as
the tenant w.e.f. 27.03.1990 would mean the tenancy in the name of
the erstwhile firm, or of its erstwhile partners, had come to an end.
Upon the first respondent company being accepted as the tenant w.e.f.
27.03.1990, it is the said company (a juristic person) with which the
landlord had the privity of contract. Having regard to the intent,
import and effect of the clause of the lease deed dated 27.06.1979, as
quoted above, it is vivid that its benefit would not inure in favour of
any third person connected with the company.
9. The abandonment of the premises by M.L. Aggarwal, one of the
erstwhile partners of the initial tenant (firm), he also being a Director
in the company which had been accepted as tenant w.e.f. 27.03.1990
and the retention of the premises by R.P. Aggarwal, the other Director
in the company were events which had no approval or consent of the
landlord. It is the second respondent, in which R.P.Aggarwal is a
Director, which has instead taken over the exclusive control of the
subject premises. The second respondent admittedly is a company and,
therefore, an independent juristic person. It is a stranger in the
premises whose presence is indisputably without the prior consent in
writing of the petitioner landlord. This constitutes unauthorized
assigning or subletting within the mischief of the provision contained
in Section 14 (1)(b) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. [See: M/s. Cox
& Kings Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Smt. Chander Malhotra, 65 (1997) DLT 412
(SC)].
10. Thus, the impugned orders of the additional rent controller and
the rent control tribunal rejecting the case of the petitioners for
eviction on the ground of subletting cannot be upheld. They are set
aside. The eviction petition of the petitioners on the said ground is
allowed. An eviction order in respect of subject premises is passed in
favour of the petitioners and against the respondents under Section 14
(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
11. The petition stands disposed of in above terms.
R.K.GAUBA, J
APRIL 06, 2018
vk
