Delhi High Court
M/S. Ogene Systems India Ltd. vs Technology Development Board on 25 September, 2017
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ FAO (OS) 95/2017
M/S. OGENE SYSTEMS INDIA LTD. ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Avijit Mani Tripathi
with Mr.Kumar Abhishek,
Advs.
versus
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT BOARD ....... Respondent
Through: Mr.Jeevesh Mehta with
Ms.Shivani Tandon, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR
ORDER
% 25.09.2017
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. We had, on 25th September 2017, dismissed this appeal,
stating that the reasons therefore would follow. This judgment
proceeds to record the reasons for our decision.
2. This appeal under Section 37(i) of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")
assails an order dated 10th January, 2017, passed by the learned
Single Judge, in a petition preferred before him, by the appellant,
under Section 34 of the Act.
3. To infuse some clarity in the prefatory recitation of facts
that follows, the appellant and respondent are referred to ,
hereinafter, as "Ogene" and "TDB" respectively.
4. The dispute between Ogene and TDB relates back to a
loan agreement, dated 31st March, 2010, whereunder, TDB
provided loan assistance of Rs.13.5 crores to Ogene, in four
installments of Rs.4.5 crores, Rs.4 crores, Rs.4 crores and Rs.1
crore. Whereas the principal amount was to be repaid, by the
Ogene, starting 01st October, 2011, interest thereon, was to be
paid starting 01st October, 2012 the latter in half yearly
instalments, on the amount of loan outstanding on the date of
payment, @ 5% per annum, assessed simply, commencing from
the first disbursement/payment of loan assistance. Payment of
accrued interest was to commence from 01st October, 2012.
5. Under a duly executed agreement dated 25th May, 2010,
Ogene pledged its shares, with TDB, as security for the loan.
Further, on 26th May, 2010, Ogene hypothecated its entire
movable property in favour of TDB, and also mortgaged its
immovable property, in the form of land located in Andhra
Pradesh, with TDB, by deposit of title deeds.
6. On 05th October, 2011, Ogene and TDB entered into a
supplementary loan agreement, rescheduling the repayment of
the loan.
7. On Ogene failing to liquidate its dues, under the
aforementioned loan agreement dated 31st March, 2010, notices
dated 05th February, 2013 and 17th May, 2013 were issued to it
by TDB. As matters stood, on 13th April, 2013, a total amount of
Rs.13,82,58,846/- was allegedly outstanding, by Ogene, to TDB.
8. The aforementioned notices dated 05th February, 2013 and
17th May, 2013 failing to elicit any response from Ogene, TDB
invoked the arbitral clause, contained in the loan agreement dated
31st March, 2010 (supra). Consequently, the aforementioned
dispute between the Ogene and TDB, were referred to the sole
arbitration of Justice Yogender Kumar Sangal, a retired Judge of
the High Court of Allahabad.
9. Ogene, and its Managing Director Dr. B.M. Chaudhary,
were Respondents 1 and 2, before the learned Sole Arbitrator,
whereas M/s Swine Finance & Trading Pvt Ltd was Respondent
No. 3.
10. Nine claims were filed, by TDB, before the learned Sole
Arbitrator, which stand enumerated in the award, dated 19th May,
2015, of the learned Sole Arbitrator, thus:-
(i) "Claim No. 1- Rs. 12,54,81,136/- Lacs from
the Respondent No. 1 to 3 jointly and
severally as balance principal amount
disbursed to the Respondent No. 1 from time
to time under the Loan Agreement dated 31st
March, 2010.
(ii) Claim No. 2- Rs.2,71,66,705/- as
accumulated interest from the Respondent
No. 1 to 3 jointly and severally which is
calculated from the date of disbursement of
loan assistance upto 30.06.2014 in terms of
the Loan Agreement dated 31st March, 2010.
(iii) Claim No. 3- Interest @ 10% p.a. as
additional interest on defaulted amount of
the above claim against Respondent No. 1 to
3 jointly and severally w.e.f. 01.07.2012 till
the filing of the present claim, in terms of the
Loan Agreement dated 31st March, 2010.
(iv) Claim No. 4- To recover the total
outstanding due together with interest and
other charges by sale of all movable assets
hypothecated to it under Deed of
Hypothecation dated 26.05.2010.
(v) Claim No. 5- To recover the total
outstanding due together with interest and
other charges by sale of immovable property
mortgage to the Claimant Board in terms of
the Loan Agreement dated 31st March, 2010.
And supplementary agreement as above.
(vi) Claim No. 6- To recover the total
outstanding dues together with interest and
other charges by sale of movable and
immovable properties of the Respondent No.
1 to 3, the guarantors jointly and severally..
(vii) The Claimants claim and entitled to recover
the pendent-lite and future interest @ of
15% per annum in favour of the claimants
Board and against the Respondents jointly
and severally as per terms of the
agreements.
(viii) Claim No. 8- Costs incurred by them on
recovery proceedings against the
Respondents jointly and severally.
(ix) Claim No. 9- Costs incurred by them in the
arbitrary proceedings from the
Respondents".
11. The award notes that, though appearance was initially
entered, by counsel, on behalf of Ogene and Dr.B.M. Chaudhary
as well as on behalf of M/s. Swine Finance & Trading Pvt. Ltd.,
and that said counsel accepted a copy of the Statement of Claim
submitted by respondent and also sought time to file reply
thereto, Ogene & Dr. B.M. Chaudhary, thereafter, not only
stopped appearing in the proceedings, but also failed to intimate,
to the arbitrator, the reasons for not remaining present, either
personally or through counsel.
12. Consequently, vide order dated 22nd August, 2014, issued
under Section 25 of the Act, the learned Arbitrator proceeded
against Ogene and Dr. B.M. Chaudhary, ex parte. For ready
reference, Section 25 of the Act may be reproduced, thus:
"25. Default of a party-
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where,
without showing sufficient cause,-
(a) the claimant fails to communicate his
statement of claim in accordance with sub-section (1) of
section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the
proceedings;
(b) the respondent fails to communicate his
statement of defenece in accordance with sub-section (1)
of section 2l3, the arbitral tribunal shall continue the
proceedings without treating that failure in itself as an
admission of the allegations by the claimant and shall
have the direction to treat the right of the respondent to
file such statement of defence as having been forfeited.
(c) a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or
to produce documentary evidence, the arbitral tribunal
may continue the proceedings and make the arbitral
award on the evidence before it".
13. No application, challenging the said order, dated 22nd
August 2014, or seeking recall thereof, was moved, before the
learned Sole Arbitrator, by any of the respondents before him,
i.e. Ogene, Dr. B.M. Chaudhary or M/s. Swine Finance &
Trading Pvt. Ltd. The decision, of the Sole Arbitrator to proceed,
against Ogene before him ex parte, thereby attainted finality.
14. In its support, TDB filed, before learned Arbitrator,
evidence in the form of affidavits of their Assistant Legal
Officer, Mr.Rakesh Bhardwaj, as well as other documents.
15. The respondents before him (including Ogene) having
been set ex parte, the learned Arbitrator proceeded to hear
counsel appearing for TDB, and thereafter, returned the
following findings:
(i) The factum of a loan of Rs.1350 lakhs, having been
taken by Ogene, from TDB, vide loan agreement dated 31st
March, 2010, read with supplementary agreement dated 05th
October, 2011, stood proved by the oral evidence of Mr.Rakesh
Bhardwaj, as also the following documents:
(a) loan agreement dated 31st March, 2010 alongwith
NOC from the banks,
(b) board resolutions,
(c) supplementary agreement dated 05th October, 2011,
(d) personal guarantee agreement dated 25th May 2010
executed by M/s. Swine Finance & Trading Pvt.
Ltd., for the appellant,
(e) agreement for corporate guarantee dated 25th May,
2010,
(f) agreement for pledge of shares, dated 25th May,
2010,
(g) shortfall undertaking dated 25th May, 2010, executed
by the Ogene as well as M/s. Swine Finance &
Trading Pvt. Ltd.,
(h) undertaking for non-disposal of shares, dated 25th
May, 2010, executed by Dr. Chaudhary,
(i) undertaking for non-disposal of shares, dated 25th
May, 2010, executed by M/s. Swine Finance &
Trading Pvt. Ltd.,
(j) personal guarantee agreement, dated 25th May 2010,
by Dr.Chaudhary,
(k) deed of hypothecation, dated 26th May, 2010.
(l) declaration and undertaking regarding mortgage by
disposed of title deeds, dated 26th May, 2016,
(m) show cause notice, dated 5th February, 2013, issued
by TDB to Ogene,
(n) further notice, dated 17th May, 2013 issued by TDB
to Ogene,
(o) statements of accounts,
(p) letter of appointment of the Arbitrator dated 17th
February, 2014,
(q) NOC from banks and financial institutions dated
08th May, 2010, creating charge on the Ogene's
property,
(r) Board Resolution, dated 30th March 2010, of the
Ogene,
(s) Board Resolution, dated 28th March, 2010 of M/s.
Swine Finance & Trading Pvt. Ltd, and
(t) letter of slump sale agreement, dated 08th February,
2010.
(ii) The communications dated 15th March, 2014 and 19th
March, 2014 addressed by Dr. B.M. Chaudhary, Managing
Director of the appellant, revealed the following:
(a) The fact that Ogene had entered into loan
agreement, with TDB, which required Ogene to repay the loan
with interest, stood conceded.
(b) The execution of deeds, relating to the borrowing of
the loan and furnishing of security, were also undisputed.
(c) The said communications further stated that, due to
operational problems and serious financial liquidity constraints,
Ogene had not been able to generate sufficient cash flow for
repayment of loan as per the schedule stipulated in the loan
agreement. The factum of default, by Ogene, in fulfilling its
obligation under the loan agreement, also stood acknowledged
thereby.
(iii) The only request, in the communication from Dr.
Chaudhary to TDB, was, in fact, that further time be granted, to
the Ogene, to repay the loan with accrued interest.
(iv) The default, on the part of Ogene in repaying the loan
taken by it from TDB, also stood proved by the affidavit of Mr.
Rakesh Bhardwaj. The notice, dated 05th February, 2013, sent by
TDB to Ogene, calling for immediate payment, did not elicit any
result.
(v) In the circumstances, there was complete admission, on
the part of Ogene, regarding the availment by it, of loan from
TDB, as well as default on its part, in repaying the said loan. The
respondent, was therefore, in fact, entitled to an award, even
applied the principles contained in Order XII Rule 6 of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908, (hereinafter referred to "as the CPC").
16. Following on the above reasoning, the learned Arbitrator
allowed the claims of TDB against Ogene, for the principal
amount of Rs.12,54,81,136/- alongwith interest of
Rs.2,71,66,705/- and additional interest @ 10% per annum w.e.f.
01st July, 2010 till the filing of the claim petition, as well as
pendente lite and future interest @ 15% per annum.
17. The aforementioned award, dated 19th May, 2015 passed by
the learned Sole Arbitrator, was assailed, by Ogene, before the
learned Single Judge of this Court, under Section 34 of the Act,
vide OMP 497/2015.
18. One of the principal grievances, ventilated by Ogene before
the learned Single Judge, was that the learned Sole Arbitrator had
not afforded adequate opportunity, to Ogene, to participate and
defend itself in the arbitration proceedings. It was also, inter
alia, sought to be contended, in this regard, that Ogene was not
aware of its having been proceeded ex parte and that, in fact, it
had written, to its counsel, on 10th November 2014, to submit a
reply, to the learned Sole Arbitrator, on its behalf.
19. On this aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has
held thus:
"The Court is unable to agree with the
submissions made by learned counsel for the
Petitioner as regards the learned Arbitrator
having not afforded the Petitioner adequate
opportunity in the arbitration proceedings. The
extracted passage shows that the learned
Arbitrator granted sufficient number of
opportunities to the Petitioner to file a statement
of defence. However, the Petitioner's counsel
abruptly stopped appearing before the learned
Arbitrator. It was for the Petitioner to have
followed up with its counsel and made sure that it
is properly represented in the arbitral
proceedings. The order setting out the Petitioner
ex parte was passed by the learned Arbitrator on
22nd August, 2014. Even thereafter, hearings took
place as is apparent from para 11 of the
impugned Award. There was sufficient time for
the Petitioner to have diligently followed up the
matter with its counsel and ascertained the
progress of the arbitral proceedings.
There is nothing stated about the date on which
the Petitioner contacted its counsel to find out
about the progress of the arbitration case. The
only date given is that the Petitioner had sent a
copy of the reply to its counsel on 10th November,
2014. Why it was not done earlier is also not
explained. The reasons given by the Petitioner
for not participating in the arbitration
proceedings is, therefore, not convincing at all. If
indeed to the knowledge of the Petitioner its
counsel stopped appearing, then the Petitioner
clearly did not decide to make any alternative
arrangement by engaging another counsel and
following up the arbitration proceedings.
In the circumstances, the Court is unable to
accept the submission that the impugned Award is
passed in violation of the principles of natural
justice or that the Learned Arbitrator denied the
Petitioner a full opportunity of presenting its
defence in the arbitration proceedings. The Court
does not find any violation of Section 18 of the
Act as is sought to be made out by the counsel for
the Petitioner".
(emphasis supplied)
20. The learned Single Judge also found in para 16, of the
impugned judgment, that, even after proceeding ex parte against
Ogene, the learned Sole Arbitrator had not allowed TDB's claim
mechanically, but had, in fact required evidence to be led by the
claimant, perused the affidavits in evidence, filed by TDB as
well as documents supporting TDB's claim. The award, it was
held, had been passed only after discussing holistically, the
evidence available before the learned Sole Arbitrator, and that,
therefore, no infraction of Sections 28 (3) or 31(3) of the Act
could, therefore, be said to have taken place.
21. Invoking Section 37 of the Act, the appellant has preferred
the present appeal before us.
22. We have heard Mr. Avijit Mani Tripathi, appearing for the
appellant, and Mr. Jeevesh Tandon, appearing for the respondent,
and have meticulously perused the record.
23. We may observe, at the outset, that our jurisdiction, under
Section 34, or Section 37 of the Act, would also appear to be
somewhat circumscribed by the following critical observations,
which find place in the order of the Supreme Court in Sachin
Gupta v K.S. Forge Metal (P) Ltd. (2013) 10 SCC 540.
"There was no necessity for the learned Single
Judge to convert itself into a court of first appeal. It
was certainly not necessary to examine the dispute
between the parties so minutely or to make such
strong remarks against any of the parties".
24. Neither could the learned Single Judge, exercising
jurisdiction under Section34 of the Act, have second guessed the
findings of the learned Sole Arbitrator, nor can we, in further
appeal therefroom, "third guess" the same. This principle may, in
our perception, be justifiably regarded as jurisprudentially
fossilized.
25. Keeping in mind the above caveat, and in view of the law
applicable to Sections 34 and 37 of the Act, that, by now, stands
crystallized, it is not necessary for us to delve deep into the
various grounds set out in the appeal, or urged by learned
Counsel at the bar. Suffice it to state that the appellant expresses
its dissatisfaction both at the manner in which the learned Sole
Arbitrator proceeded-which, in the appellant's submission,
infracts basis canons of natural justice-as well as at the merits of
the award ultimately rendered by him-which, learned Counsel
emphatically submits, suffers from fatal errors both of fact and
law.
26. This Bench has, in the recent past, had several occasions to
discuss the law relating to the scope of interference, with arbitral
awards, under Section 34 of the Act. On a panoramic
appreciation of the earlier existing judicial thought on the issue,
as manifested by decisions ranging from Renusagar Power
Company Ltd. v. General Electric Company 1994 Supp. (1)
SCC 644 to Associated Builders v. DDA (2015) 3 SCC 49, this
Court, in its decision in NHAI v. Hindustan Construction
Company Ltd. MANU/DE/2699/2017 delineated the following
propositions:-
(i) The four reasons motivating the legislation of the Act,
in 1996, were
(a) to provide for a fair and efficient arbitral
procedure,
(b) to provide for the passing of reasoned awards,
(c) to ensure that the arbitrator does not
transgress his jurisdiction, and
(d) to minimize supervision, by courts, in the
arbitral process.
(ii) The merits of the award are required to be
examined only in certain specified circumstances, for
examining whether the award is in conflict with the public
policy of India.
(iii) An award would be regarded as conflicting with
the public policy of India if
(a) it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian
law, or
(b) it is contrary to the interests of India,
(c) it is contrary to justice or morality,
(d) it is patently illegal, or
(e) it is so perverse, irrational, unfair or unreasonable
that it shocks the conscience of the court.
(iv) An award would be liable to be regarded as
contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, for
example, if
(a) it disregards orders passed by superior courts, or
the binding effect thereof, or
(b) it is patently violative of statutory provisions, or
(c) it is not in public interest, or
(d) the arbitrator has not adopted a "judicial
approach", i.e. has not acted a fair, reasonable and
objective approach, or has acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or whimsically, or
(e) the arbitrator has failed to draw an inference
which, on the face of the facts, ought to have been
drawn, or
(f) the arbitrator has drawn an inference, from the
facts, which, on the face of it, is unreasonable, or
(g) the principles of natural justice have been
violated.
(v) The "patent illegality" had to go to the root of the
matter. Trivial illegalities were inconsequential.
(vi) Additionally, an award could be set aside if
(a) either party was under some incapacity, or
(b) the arbitration agreement is invalid under the
law,
Or
(c) the applicant was not given proper notice of
appointment of the arbitrator, or of the arbitral
proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present his
case, or
(d) the award deals with a dispute not submitted to
arbitration, or decides issues outside the scope of the
dispute submitted to arbitration, or
(e) the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in
accordance with Part I of the Act, or
(f) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with
the agreement of the parties, or in accordance with
Part I of the Act, or
(g) the award contravenes the Act, or
(h) the award is contrary to the contract between the
parties.
(vii) "Perversity", as a ground for setting aside an
arbitral award, has to be examined on the touchstone
of the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. It
would include a case in which
(a) the findings, in the award, are based on no
evidence, or
(b) the Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision arrived at, or
(c) the Arbitral Tribunal ignores vital evidence in
arriving at its decision.
(viii) At the same time,
(a) a decision which is founded on some evidence,
which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious,
cannot be treated as "perverse",
(b) if the view adopted by the arbitrator is a plausible
view, it has to pass muster,
(c) neither quantity, nor quality, of evidence is open to
re-assessment in judicial review over the award.
(ix) "Morality" would imply enforceability, of the
agreement, given the prevailing mores of the day.
"Immorality", however, can constitute a ground for
interfering with an arbitral award only if it shocks the
judicial conscience.
(x) For examining the above aspects, the pleadings of
the parties and materials brought on record would be
relevant.
(x) The court cannot sit in appeal over an arbitration
award. Errors of fact cannot be corrected under
Section 34. The arbitrator is the last word on facts."
27. In our judgment, dated 18th September, 2017 in FAO (OS)
227/2017 (MTNL v. Finolex Cable Ltd)., after having noted the
above propositions applicable to Section 34 of the Act, we had
further observed, with respect to the appellate jurisdiction
conferred by Section 37 of the Act as under:-
"41. It is apparent, therefore, that, while interference
by court, with arbitral awards, is limited and
circumscribed, an award which is patently illegal, on
account of it being injudicious, contrary to the law
settled by the Supreme Court, or vitiated by an
apparently untenable interpretation of the terms of the
contract, requires to be eviscerated. In view thereof,
the decision of the ld. Single Judge that reasoning of
the arbitral award in this regard was based on no
material and was contrary to the contract, cannot be
said to be deserving of any interference at our hands
under Section 37 of the Act. In a pronouncement
reported at MANU/DE/0459/2015, MTNL v.
Fujitshu India Pvt. Ltd. (FAO(OS) No.63/2015), the
Division Bench of this court has held that "an appeal
under Section 37 is like a second appeal, the first
appeal being to the court by way of objections under
Section 34". Being in the nature of a second appeal,
this court would be hesitant to interfere, with the
decision of the learned Single Judge, unless it is
shown to be palpably erroneous on facts or in law, or
manifestly perverse."
28. The following passages, from the judgment of a Division
Bench of this Court in State Trading Corpn of India Ltd. v.
Toepfer Int'l Asia Pte Ltd, 2014 (5) RAJ 301, also inform our
conclusions:
"6. ...A Section 34 proceeding, which in essence is the
remedy of annulment, cannot be used by one party to convert the
same into a remedy of appeal. In our view, mere
erroneous/wrong finding of fact by the Arbitral Tribunal or even
an erroneous interpretation off documents/evidence, is non-
interferable under Section 34 and if such interference is done by
the Court, the same will set at naught the whole purpose of
amendment of the Arbitration Act.
7. Arbitration is intended to be a faster and less expensive
alternative to the courts. If this is one's motivation and
expectation, then the finality of the arbitral award is very
important. The remedy provided in Section 34 against an
arbitral award is in no sense an appeal. The legislative intent in
Section 34 was to make the result of the annulment procedure
prescribed therein potentially different from that in an appeal. In
appeal, the decision under review not only may be confirmed, but
may also be modified. In annulment, on the other hand, the
decision under review may either be invalidated in whole or in
part or be left to stand if the plea for annulment is rejected.
Annulment operates to negate a decision, in whole or in part,
thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and
returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original
litigating positions. Annulment can void, while appeal can
modify. Section 34 is found to provide for annulment only on the
grounds affecting legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct
from substantive correctness of the contents of the decision. A
remedy of appeal focuses upon both legitimacy of the process of
decision and the substantive correctness of the decision and the
substantive correctness of the decision. Annulment, in the case
of arbitration focuses not on the correctness of decision but
rather more narrowly considers whether, regardless of errors in
application of law or determination of facts, the decision resulted
from a legitimate process.
8. In the case of arbitration, the parties through their
agreement create an entirely different situation because
regardless of how complex or simple a dispute resolution
mechanism they create, they almost always agree that the
resultant award will be final and binding upon them. In other
words, regardless of whether there are errors of application of
law or ascertainment of fact, the parties agree that the award
will be regarded as substantively correct. Yet, although the
content of the award is thus final, parties may still challenge the
legitimacy of the decision-making process leading to the award.
In essence, parties are always free to argue that they are not
bound by a given "award" because what was labeled an award
is the result of an illegitimate process of decision.
9. This is the core of the notion of annulment in arbitration.
In a sense, annulment is all that doctrinally survives the parties
"agreement to regard the award as final and binding. Given the
agreement of the parties, annulment requires a challenge to the
legitimacy of the process of decision, rather than the substantive
correctness of the award."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, we are
unable to discern any such infirmity, either in the award passed
by the learned Sole Arbitrator, or in the impugned judgment
dated 10th January, 2017 of the learned Single Judge, as would
fatally imperil either. The submission, of Ogene, that there had
been a violation of principles of natural justice, are obviously
without merit. It is also significant to reiterate, in this context,
that no challenge was laid, by Ogene or any of the other
respondents before the learned Sole Arbitrator, to the order, dated
22nd August, 2014, passed by him under Section 25 of the Act,
whereby the said respondents before him were proceeded ex
parte.
30. In so far as the merits of the case are concerned, the
evidence relied upon by the learned Sole Arbitrator cannot be
said to be immaterial, neither, consequently, can the reliance,
thereon by the learned Sole Arbitrator, be characterized as
misplaced.
31. The view taken by the learned Sole Arbitrator is, at the
very least, plausible. It cannot be said that the Arbitrator mis-
interpreted any clause in the work order between Ogene and
TDB, or exhibited perversity in appreciating the facts of the case,
the law applicable thereto, or the evidence available before him.
We, at least, are equally interdicted, by precedent and statue,
from re-appraising the same.
32. No infirmity can, therefore, be said to exist in the
impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, as would merit
any interference by us, under Section 37 of the Act.
33. The appeal of Ogene has, therefore, necessarily to fail. It
is, accordingly, dismissed without any order as to costs.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
September 25, 2017
neelam/nitin
