Delhi High Court
Sunny Verma @ Shalu vs State & Ors. on 22 September, 2017
$~33
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 22nd September, 2017
+ CRL.L.P. 552/2017
SUNNY VERMA @ SHALU ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Ravish Roshan and Mr.Kumar
Nikhil, Advocates.
versus
STATE & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Ms.Radhika Kolluru, APP for the
State.
Insp.Sanjeev Kumar and SI Samrat
Khatiyan, PS Harsh Vihar.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDER SHEKHAR
G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
CRL.L.P. 552/2017 & Crl.M.A. 15685/2017 (Condonation of Delay)
1. The present leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment dated
01.03.2016. Along with leave to appeal an application seeking
condonation of 504 days delay has been filed.
2. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the leave to appeal could not
be filed within the time allowed due to bona fide reasons and for
reasons beyond the control of the petitioner.
3. We have heard counsel for the petitioner. Before the submission of
the counsel for the petitioner can be examined, we deem it
appropriate to reproduce the application so filed by the petitioner.
The application reads as under:
"1. That the present application is being preferred by
the appellant seeking condonation of delay of 504 days in
filing the leave petition.
2. That Memo of Appeal may be read as part and
parcel of the present application which are not being
repeated herein for the sake of brevity.
3. That the present application is being moved in
bonafide in order to seek condonation of 504 days of
delay in filing the present leave to Appeal petition.
PRAYER :-
It is therefore, most humbly prayed that this
Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow the
present applicant and accordingly further be pleased to
condone the delay of 504 days in filing the present Leave
to Appeal, in the interest of justice.
Any other relief or reliefs which this Hon'ble
Court deems fit and proper may also be passed in favour
of appellant."
4. Article 114 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that
an appeal from an order of acquittal by the State will have to be filed
within a period of ninety days from the date of the order appealed
from. While inserting the provision the Legislature, of course, had
the internal administration of the State in mind. We may also notice
that previously the limitation period was 6 months, which was
consciously decreased to 3 months. The Law Commission of India
in its 3rd Report, on which the Limitation Act, 1963 was based and
introduced in Parliament, had observed that even this period is too
long. The relevant portion reads as under:
"166. Article 157 provided a period of 6 months limitation for
an appeal against an order of acquittal. The recent Act
amending the Criminal Procedure Code has substituted a
period of 3 months for 6 months. We do not propose any
alteration of that period though we think that even the
present period is too long to enable the State to make up its
mind to file or not to file an appeal against an order of
acquittal. ..."
(Emphasis Supplied)
5. We may also notice the following observations of the Apex Court in
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563:
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to ensure that
they perform their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for the government departments.
The law shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are
liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
(Emphasis Supplied)
6. The same rationale was extended to petitions seeking leave to appeal
by a coordinate bench of this Court, of which one of us (G.S. Sistani,
J.) was a member, in State v. Harihar, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 2354:
(2016) 230 DLT (CN A) 12 (DB) (paragraphs 5-9) while dismissing
a petition on the ground of delay as the reasons were mechanical and
stereotyped.
7. The Courts must also remember that the very purpose of the law of
limitation is exemplified in such appeals. Simply put, the statute of
limitation is a statute of repose, peace and justice. It enables the
sword of Damocles to be put to rest. The respondent in such appeals
has already faced the cumbrances of trial and been exonerated. The
presumption of innocence has been strengthened. His mind is put to
rest by the expiry of the period. Can the State be then allowed to
wake up from its slumber one day and file an appeal? We think not.
Unless the State is able to satisfactorily able to explain the delay, it
would not be proper for the Court to condone it.
8. The reading of the application would show that no ground much less
sufficient grounds have been shown seeking condonation of delay.
The application in our view has been prepared without any
application of mind. The same is bereft of any date, any reason and
has been made in a highly casual manner. Thus, we find no ground
to condone the delay.
9. We may also notice that we have carefully perused the grounds of
the leave petition on merits and find no infirmity or illegality or any
ground to interfere with the judgment dated 01.03.2016.
Accordingly, the application and the leave to appeal are dismissed.
G. S. SISTANI, J.
CHANDER SHEKHAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 22, 2017
rb
