Delhi High Court
Ompal Singh Panwar vs Central Industrial Security ... on 14 November, 2017
$~51.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 10055/2017 and CM APPL. 41023/2017
OMPAL SINGH PANWAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vijay Kumar Singh and
Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Advocates
versus
CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE AND ORS
..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, CGSC for R-1 to
R-3. with SI Feroz Khan, CISF.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
ORDER
% 14.11.2017
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner praying inter alia
for setting aside an order dated 11/12.01.1994 passed by the Disciplinary
Authority, CISF, dismissing him from service on the ground of submitting a
fake birth certificate, which reflected his date of birth as 18.12.1957,
whereas his real date of birth was 18.12.1954.
2. The present case has a chequered history. Aggrieved by the dismissal
order dated 11/12.01.1994, passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the
petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, DIG,
CISF, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.06.1994. Instead of filing a
writ petition against the dismissal order, the petitioner elected to file a civil
suit for mandatory injunction against the respondents, which was taken to
trial and finally dismissed by the learned Civil Judge vide judgment dated
03.07.2009, holding inter alia that the petitioner had failed to make out a
case for reinstatement or for grant of mandatory injunction and that his
actual date of birth was 18.12.1954 and not 18.12.1957.
3. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the aforesaid judgment.
Vide order dated 07.11.2013, the said appeal was dismissed by the learned
ADJ, holding inter alia that there was no legal infirmity in the impugned
judgment. Not satisfied with the said decision, the petitioner filed a Regular
Second Appeal in the High Court against the judgment dated 07.11.2013
passed by the learned ADJ, registered as RSA 208/2014. The said appeal
was however sought to be withdrawn by the petitioner with liberty to file a
writ petition. Vide order dated 07.12.2016, the learned Single Judge
dismissed the aforesaid appeal preferred by the petitioner with liberty
granted to him to file a writ petition and explain therein the delay in filing
the said petition.
4. The present petition was initially filed by the petitioner on 24.07.2017
and was returned under objections on several occasions. Finally, the petition
has been listed before this Court today.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner assails the dismissal order passed
against the petitioner on the ground that even if his date of birth is taken as
18.12.1954, the petitioner would still be eligible for appointment in the CISF
as a Security Guard because as on 01.08.1980, the cut off date, his age was
not above 25 years and therefore, he was eligible for appointment.
6. It may be noted that right through the litigation initiated by the
petitioner spanning over more than two decades, the petitioner has not filed
his birth certificate. Instead, he has constantly been challenging his dismissal
on the ground that the complaint received by the respondents from a third
party to the effect that the petitioner had submitted a fabricated birth
certificate, could not be acted upon as the complainant, one Shri Sultan
Singh, was never produced by the respondent in the course of the
departmental proceedings. On enquiring from the counsel for the petitioner
as to whether the birth certificate of the petitioner has at least been filed in
the present proceedings, he again states that the birth certificate is not with
him and it is the duty of the respondents to have filed the same.
7. We don't find any merit in the aforesaid submission. It is quite
apparent from the record that the petitioner was unable to produce his birth
certificate, bearing the date, 18.12.1957 before the civil court. The
documents produced by the Department in the suit proceedings shows that a
departmental enquiry was duly conducted in the case and principles of
natural justice were followed inasmuch as the petitioner was granted ample
opportunity to defend himself. However, the petitioner miserably failed to
prove that he had not tampered with the birth certificate that he had
submitted to the respondents at the time of joining service. The position
remains the same till date. Instead of producing his birth certificate, which
could reflect his correct date of birth, the only plea taken by learned counsel
for the petitioner is that even if it is assumed that his date of birth was
18.12.1954 and not 18.12.1957, the petitioner was eligible as on the date of
his appointment for the reason that he was not over age as on 01.08.1980.
8. The ground for passing the dismissal order against the petitioner is
that he had tampered with his birth certificate at the time of recruitment and
thereby committed a fraud. This allegation has been proved by the
respondents in the course of the evidence led in the departmental
proceedings and before the learned civil court, that ultimately dismissed the
suit for permanent injunction instituted by the petitioner by a detailed
judgment dated 03.07.2009, duly affirmed by the Appellate Court vide
judgment dated 07.11.2013. In proceedings initiated under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, this Court is not expected to sit as an appellate court
and go behind the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion only because
two views are possible, as long as the view taken by the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority is a plausible view, based on the
evidence brought on record. The petitioner can therefore not be permitted to
urge fresh facts on merits and controvert the assertions of the respondents
duly supported by evidence before the trial court. The scope of the present
petition is limited to examining if there is any legal infirmity in the dismissal
order passed against the petitioner, or principles of natural justice were
given a go-by during the departmental proceedings. Nothing on this aspect
has been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner, for seeking
interference.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in the present petition,
which is accordingly dismissed in limine alongwith the pending application.
HIMA KOHLI, J
REKHA PALLI, J
NOVEMBER 14, 2017
rkb/na
