Delhi High Court
Prem Lal vs Dharam Bir Jain on 28 March, 2017
$~A-34
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 28.03.2017
+ RC.REV. 392/2016 and CM No. 29183/2016
PREM LAL ..... Petitioner
Through Mr.Javed Ahmad and Mr.Anis
Ahmad, Advocates
versus
DHARAM BIR JAIN ..... Respondent
Through Mr. Surendra Mishra and Mr.Sonal
Mishra, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH
JAYANT NATH, J. (Oral)
1. By the present petition filed under Section 25 B (8) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the DRC Act), the petitioner seeks to
impugn the eviction order dated 14.05.2016 passed by the Additional Rent
Controller (hereinafter referred to as the ARC) in the eviction petition filed
by the respondent/landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
2. The respondent/landlord filed the present eviction petition for
property being Shop No. 5981, Chhalani Market, Gali Matkewali, Sadar
Bazar, Delhi-110006. As per the eviction petition, it is stated that the
respondent is the owner of the tenanted shop and is a resident of Jallandhar,
Punjab. For his convenience, he has nominated and constituted his brother
Sh. Mahabir Jain as a special attorney for the purpose of filing the present
RC.REV. 392/2016 Page 1
eviction petition. The petitioner is said to be an old tenant with the rent of
Rs.2,500/- per month. It is further stated that the respondent seeks the
tenanted shop for himself to set up his own business and to earn a decent
livelihood as the shop is situated in the centre of Sadar Bazar which is more
suitable for doing business. It is further stated that the respondent has no
other place in Delhi and this is the only space the respondent has in Delhi.
Hence, the eviction petition.
3. The petitioner filed his leave to defend application. One of the pleas
taken in the same is that the respondent is a resident of Jallandhar, Punjab
and is doing business there and he is having sufficient space and
accommodation there. Hence, there is no bona fide requirement to shift to
Delhi to run the business from the present shop.
4. In the reply to the said application, the respondent has admitted that
he is staying in Jallandhar. However, no further elaboration is made as to
why the respondent seeks to shift from Jallandhar to Delhi. There is
complete absence of any material or averment to the effect as to why the
respondent who is a resident of Jallandhar would like to shift to Delhi and
requires the shop for his bona fide requirement. The nature of business being
done in Jallandhar is not stated.
5. The trial court by the impugned order does not deal with the present
issues raised by the petitioner. It only reproduces the averments of the
respondent in the eviction petition, namely, that the respondent seeks to set
up his own business to earn his livelihood from the shop in question.
6. In the present case the trial court declined to grant leave to defend to
the petitioner. The parameters for granting leave to defend are well known.
RC.REV. 392/2016 Page 2
7. The Supreme Court in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and
another vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 SC 1518 in para
22 held as follows:-
22. What then follows. The Controller has to confine himself
indisputably to the condition prescribed for exercise of
jurisdiction in Sub-section (5) of Section 25B. In other
words, he must confine himself to the affidavit filed by the
tenant. If the affidavit discloses such facts-no proof is needed
at the stage, which would disentitle the plaintiff from seeking
possession, the mere disclosure of such facts must be held
sufficient to grant 'leave because the statute says on
disclosure of such facts the Controller shall grant leave'. It is
difficult to be exhaustive as to what such facts could be but
ordinarily when an action is brought under Section 14(1)
proviso (e) of the Act whereby the landlord seeks to recover
possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement
if the tenant alleges such facts as that the landlord has other
accommodation in his possession; that the landlord has in his
possession accommodation which is sufficient for him; that
the conduct of the landlord discloses avarice for increasing
rent by threatening eviction; that the landlord has been
letting out some other premises at enhanced rent without any
attempt at occupying the same or using it for himself; that
the dependents of the landlord for whose benefit also
possession is sought are not persons to whom in eye of law
the landlord was bound to provide accommodation; that the
past conduct of the landlord is such as would disentitle him
to the relief of possession; that the landlord who claims
possession for his personal requirement has not cared to
approach the Court in person though he could have without
the slightest inconvenience approached in person and with a
view to shielding himself from cross-examination prosecutes
litigation through an agent called a constituted attorney.
These and several other relevant but inexhaustible facts
when disclosed should ordinarily be deemed to be sufficient
to grant leave."
RC.REV. 392/2016 Page 3
8. This court in Deepak Gupta vs. Sushma Aggarwal, 2013 202 DLT,
121 held as follows:-
"24.From the mere reading of the afore mentioned
illuminating observations of the Supreme Court in the case of
Precision Steels (supra), it is apparent that the Controller has a
statutory duty to grant the leave to defend if the affidavit
discloses the facts which could raise suspicion on the
genuineness of the need of the landlord which can in effect
disentitle the landlord from recovering the possession on the
ground of bonafide requirement. The likelihood of success or
the failure of the defence is not really determinative of the
question as to grant or not grant of the leave to defend but the
real question is tenability of the plea which may raise a
suspicion on the need of the landlord which may if proved can
also lead to disentitlement to the recovery of the possession.
Thus, the plea raising a doubt in the mind of the Controller is
sufficient to grant the leave. The Controller can also not
record the findings on disputed question of the facts by
preferring the one set of facts over and above the other. The
merits of the pleas raised are not to be gone into at the time of
the grant of the leave to defend by going into the complicated
questions of fact. For making the enquiry, the affidavit filed
by the tenant is helpful.
25. The views expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of
Charan Dass (supra) and Precision Steel (supra) are holding
the field and have been consistently followed by the Supreme
Court till recently and also by this court from time to time.
(kindly see the case of Inderjit Kaur vs. Nirpal Singh, : 2001
(1) R.C.R. 33 and Tarun Pahwa vs. Pradeep Makin, : 2013
(1) CLJ 801 Del.)"
9. In my opinion, the impugned order suffers from material errors and
illegality as it did not notice that a triable issue is stated. As per the
petitioner, the respondent is settled in Jalandhar and has no need for the
tenanted property. The respondent gives no facts or details as to why he
RC.REV. 392/2016 Page 4
wants to shift to Delhi. Clearly, the petitioner has disclosed facts which raise
suspicion on the genuineness of the need of the landlord. Accordingly, the
impugned order suffers from material illegality.
10. I quash the impugned order dated 14.05.2016. The parties are
relegated back to the ARC for adjudication of the eviction petition on merits.
The parties shall appear before the ARC on 01.5.2017.
11. On the next date of hearing before the ARC, the petitioner shall file
his written statement. The ARC is requested to expeditiously dispose of the
present eviction petition. Ordinarily unless there is an emergent situation, no
adjournment shall be given to the parties on the date fixed by the ARC.
12. The petition stands disposed of.
13. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
JAYANT NATH, J
MARCH 28, 2017
rb
RC.REV. 392/2016 Page 5
