Khanna Traders vs Scholar Publishing House P. Ltd. & ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 1631 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                           Date of decision: 28th March, 2017.
+                               EX.P. No.75/2013.
       KHANNA TRADERS                                           ..... Decree Holder
                  Through:                    Ms. Biji Rajesh, Adv.
                                          Versus
    SCHOLAR PUBLISHING HOUSE P. LTD.
    & ORS                              ..... Judgement Debtors
                  Through: Mr. J.P. Sengh, Sr. Adv with Mr.
                           Chirag Jamwal, Mr. Ajay Upadhyay,
                           Ms. Sana Ansari and Ms. Manisha
                           Mehta, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
EA No.39/2014 (of DH u/O XXI R-41) & EA No.40/2014 (of DH u/O XXI
R-37 to 40).
1.

Execution as a decree is sought of an Arbitral Award dated 21st

December, 2006 of Mr. Ram Bhaj Mittal, sole Arbitrator, Paper Merchants

Association (Regd.), Delhi, of recovery of Rs.3,44,28,861/- with interest @

12% per annum from the date of the Award till the date of realisation, in

favour of Khanna Traders and against "Scholar Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.

and others".

2. In the execution petition, besides Scholar Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.,

Mr. Ramesh Ranade, Mr. Rajesh Ranade, Mr. Satish Ranade and Mr. Inderjit

Sharma have been impleaded as judgement debtors (JDs).

3. Notice of the execution petition was issued.

4. EA No.39/2014 has been filed by the decree holder (DH) Khanna

Traders under Order XXI Rule 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(CPC) seeking a direction to the JDs to file affidavits of their income tax,

assets, debts, bank lockers etc.

5. EA No.40/2014 has been filed by the DH for arrest of the JDs No.2

to 5.

6. These applications came up before the Court on 17th January, 2014

when inter alia the following order was passed:

"......

A perusal of the award shows that the same does not address the issue as to how judgment debtor nos.2 to 5 have been made personally liable. The judgment debtor no.1 is a private limited company. Liability cannot extend to the shareholders/directors of a company unless it is a case where the shareholders/directors have extended their personal guarantee or have personally made themselves liable.

Prima facie, it appears to me that it is open to judgment debtor nos.2 to 5 raise the aforesaid aspect even in these proceedings, as, to that extent, the award may be a nullity.

Learned counsel for the parties seeks further time to address the court on this particular aspect. Adjourned to 14.03.2014.

......."

7. The hearing was adjourned from time to time and in the meanwhile

execution against some of the assets / properties proceeded. However, the

decree still remains unsatisfied.

8. On 2nd September, 2016, the counsel for the DH and the senior

counsel for the five JDs were heard on the issue raised in the order dated 17 th

January, 2014 and orders thereon reserved.

9. On going through the file, no reply is found to have been filed by the

JDs No.2 to 5 to these applications. The JDs No.2 to 5 however in their reply

to the execution petition have pleaded (i) that the JDs No.2 to 5 are the

Directors of the JD No.1; (ii) that DH had business dealings with the JD

No.1; (iii) that disputes arose between DH and the JD No.1 regarding supply

of paper and recovery of payment; (iv) that DH initiated arbitration

proceedings before the sole Arbitrator against JD No.1 and its Directors JDs

No.2 to 5; (v) that the sole Arbitrator passed ex-parte Award not only against

JD No.1 but also against JDs No.2 to 5; (vi) that JD No.1 filed OMP

No.148/2007 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(Arbitration Act, 1996) for setting aside of the ex-parte Award dated 21st

December, 2006; (vii) that vide order dated 29 th November, 2012, OMP

No.148/2007 was dismissed; (viii) that JD No.1 preferred FAO No.184/2013

which was also dismissed vide order dated 19 th July, 2013; (ix) that JD No.1

filed SLP (CC) No.2610/2014 before the Supreme Court and of which notice

was issued on 21st February, 2014; (x) that JD No.1 is distinct from the

members namely JDs No.2 to 5 of the JD No.1 company who are not liable

for the debts of JD No.1; (xi) that ex-parte Arbitral Award dated 21st

December, 2006 is prima facie illegal and null and void, as the dispute was

between DH and JD No.1 and JDs No.2 to 5 could not have been made liable

for the debts of JD No.1. Reliance in the said reply itself is placed on

Saraswat Trading Agency Vs. Union of India AIR 2004 Cal 267 to contend

that a decree which is a nullity in the eyes of law is no decree. Reference in

the reply itself is also made to Section 47(1) of CPC.

10. No rejoinder is found to have been filed to the reply aforesaid.

11. It was the contention of the senior counsel for JDs No.2 to 5, (a) that

the Arbitral Award as a decree is liable to be set aside on the ground of fraud

and collusion; (b) that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction against JDs No.2 to

5; (c) that reference also to arbitration was not sought against JDs No.2 to 5;

(d) attention was invited to the letter dated 28th July, 2006 of DH to the

General Secretary, Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) invoking arbitration

against JD No.1 only and in which no reference was made to JDs No.2 to 5;

(e) attention was similarly invited to the letter dated 29th July, 2006 of the

Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) to DH appointing Mr. Ram Bhaj Mittal

as the Arbitrator to settle the dispute; (f) that there was no basis before the

sole Arbitrator for passing the Award against JDs No.2 to 5 also who were

merely the Directors of JD No.1 against which reference to arbitration was

sought. The senior counsel for JDs No.2 to 5 referred to:

(I) Union of India Vs. M/s Jagat Ram Trehan and Sons AIR

1996 Delhi 191 where a Division Bench of this Court negatived the

contention that an Arbitral Award must be objected to in accordance

with the provisions of the Arbitration Act (in that case of the year

1940) and that it was not open to raise the question in execution

proceedings and held that Section 47 of CPC applies to execution

proceedings taken pursuant to a decree making an award a rule of

Court and it is open to the Executing Court under Section 47 to

declare that the award is passed without jurisdiction and therefore the

decree passed thereupon is null and void and not executable. Finding

that the award in that case was passed after the Arbitrator had

relinquished office as Arbitrator, the award was declared as null and

void in execution proceedings;

(II) Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh

(2000) 7 SCC 543 in which it was held that under Section 44 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a party can, in a collateral proceeding, set

up a defence that a decree or order obtained by the opposite party

against him was passed by a Court without jurisdiction or was

obtained by fraud or collusion and it is not necessary to bring an

independent suit for setting aside of the decree or order; and,

(III) Jagat Ram Trehan & Sons Vs. Union of India 2001 (3) Arb.

LR 41 (SC) dismissing the appeal preferred against Jagat Ram

Trehan and Sons supra.

12. Per contra, the counsel for DH filed copies of judgments in:

(A) Gurpreet Singh Vs. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 457 but

application whereof to the controversy herein is not understandable;

(B) Deepa Bhargava Vs. Mahesh Bhargava (2009) 2 SCC 294

where, while holding that the Executing Court cannot reduce the rate

of interest on the ground of the same being in the nature of penalty and

unreasonable, it was reasoned that Executing Court has no jurisdiction

to travel beyond the decree;

(C) Coal Linker Vs. Coal India Limited (2009) 9 SCC 491 holding

that where the Arbitrator has not granted interest for post award

period, the Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the award

to grant interest for the period for which it was not granted;

(D) Housing & Urban Development Corporation Ltd. Vs. Leela

Hotels Ltd. ILR (2010) I Delhi 76 which is also not found to be of any

relevance to the controversy at hand;

(E) State Bank of India Vs. M/s Indexport Registered (1992) 3

SCC 159 where, while holding that if the decree as per its tenor was

executable simultaneously against all the judgment debtors, the

Executing Court cannot interpret otherwise, it was observed that the

Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and the objection that

the decree was first liable to be executed against the principal debtor

ought to have been taken in the suit;

(F) Bhawarlal Bhandari Vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting

Enterprises (1999) 1 SCC 558 where, while holding that the objection

that the Arbitral Award was filed in the Court of Arbitrator four years

after being passed and was barred by limitation and thus a nullity,

having not been taken by way of Section 30 of the Arbitration Act,

1940, cannot be taken in execution of the award; it was again observed

that Executing Court cannot go behind the decree, unless it is shown

that it was passed by a Court inherently lacking jurisdiction and thus

was a nullity; it was also observed that if the decree was passed

beyond the period of limitation, it would be an error of law or at the

highest, a wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate

proceedings but not in execution;

(G) Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman

(1970) 1 SCC 670 laying down that an Executing Court cannot go

behind the decree and must take the decree according to its tenor and

cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or

on facts; however when the decree is made by a Court which has no

inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be

raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face

of the record: where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to

pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires

examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which

could have been but have not been raised, the Executing Court will

have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the

decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction; finding that the

question whether the Court of Small Causes had jurisdiction to

entertain the suit against the defendant therein depended upon the

interpretation of the terms of the agreement of lease and the user to

which the land was put at the date of the grant of the lease and which

required determination of facts, the objection was held to be not

entertainable in execution;

(H) Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Morepen

Laboratories Ltd. 2006 (91) DRJ 618 holding that the objection that

the rate of interest awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal was illegal and

which was not raised under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act could not

be taken by way of objections under Section 47 of CPC;

(I) Morepen Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Morgan Securities & Credits

Pvt. Ltd. 2008 (105) DRJ 408 (DB) dismissing the appeal preferred

against the former;

(J) S.S. Fasteners Vs. Satya Paul Verma AIR 2000 P&H 301

holding that the objection that the judgement debtors were protected

tenants and not licensees as held by the Arbitral Award could not be

taken in execution proceedings;

(K) Anil Mehra Vs. M/s East India Weaving Ltd. ILR (2001) I

Delhi 345, which is not found to have any relevance to the present

controversy;

(L) Fuerst Day Lawson Limited Vs. Jindal Exports Limited (2011)

8 SCC 333 which also is not found to have any relevance to the

present controversy;

(M) M/s. MSP Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. M.P. Road Devl. Corp. Ltd.

2014 SCC OnLine SC 1002 holding that though a party is entitled

under the law to raise an objection at any stage as to the absence of

jurisdiction of the Court which decided the matter since the order of

such a Court is a nullity but it must be remembered that this position

of law has been well settled in relation to civil disputes in Courts and

not in relation to arbitrations under the Arbitration Act, 1996;

Parliament has the undoubted power to enact a special rule of law to

deal with arbitrations and in fact, has done so; Parliament, in its

wisdom, must be deemed to have had knowledge of the entire existing

law on the subject and if it chose to enact a provision contrary to the

general law on the subject, its wisdom cannot be doubted; accordingly,

contention that a party to an arbitration proceedings is entitled to raise

objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 with regard

to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal, after the stage of

submission of the written statement, was rejected;

(N) Gas Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Keti Construction (I) Ltd.

(2007) 5 SCC 38, which is not found to have any relevance to the

present controversy;

(O) Bharti Cellular Limited Vs. Department of

Telecommunications (2012) 192 DLT 729 holding in the context of

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 that the lack of inherent

jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute has to

necessarily be pleaded specifically and that if all the grounds of

challenge are not taken to the impugned Award at the time of filing of

the objection under Section 34 and are permitted to be raised at any

time (during the pendency of Section 34 proceedings) and by way of

amendment thereof then the legislative intent behind prescribing a

maximum time of limitation under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996 would be defeated;

(P) M/s Chandermani Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Dawer Fabrics 2014 SCC

OnLine Del 1674, which is not found to have any relevance to the

present controversy;

(Q) Sushma Jain Vs. M/s Naveen Board Co. 2014 SCC OnLine

Del 905 which also is not found to have any relevance to the present

controversy.

13. I have considered the controversy.

14. As would immediately be evident from the judgments cited by

respective counsels, the legal position is that an objection that the Court

which passed the decree had no jurisdiction to pass the same can be taken

under Section 47 of CPC in execution proceedings provided the said

objection is evident on the face of the record and does not require any

determination of facts. Such an objection has been distinguished from

objections of other illegalities committed by the Court passing the decree

viz. of awarding a high rate of interest, not awarding interest without giving

any reasons therefor, not making the decree executable first against the

principal debtor and making it executable simultaneously against principal

debtor as well as guarantors etc., which cannot be taken in execution

proceedings. What further emerges from the aforesaid judgments is that an

objection that the Court which passed the decree had no jurisdiction to pass

the same can be taken in execution proceedings only if it appears on the face

of the record and does not require any determination of facts, not otherwise.

15. What has to however be adjudicated is, whether the said law applies to

proceedings for execution of arbitral awards also particularly in the light of

observations in MSP Infrastructure Ltd. and Bharti Cellular Ltd. supra

cited by the counsel for DH.

16. Though the observations in both judgments supra to the effect that

Parliament has enacted special rule of law to deal with arbitrations and

contrary to general law on the subject, the said rule does not entitle an

objection of jurisdiction to be taken at any time and that an objection as to

jurisdiction cannot be permitted to be taken beyond the time prescribed

therefor under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, are of a very wide

ambit but in my opinion are to be understood in the context of the facts in

which they were made. The context in MSP Infrastructure Ltd. was,

whether petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 on the ground

of lack of jurisdiction can be preferred, even before the Arbitral Award has

been announced and during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings and

immediately after such an objection has been raised before the Arbitral

Tribunal and in Bharti Cellular Ltd. was whether a plea of Arbitral Tribunal

not having jurisdiction can be taken after the time prescribed for filing a

petition under Section 34 and by way of amendment thereto. In both cases,

objection of lack of jurisdiction in Arbitral Tribunal was sought to be taken

in a manner in direct contravention of provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996

i.e. by seeking to prefer a Section 34 petition during pendency of arbitral

proceedings or by taking objection under Section 34 beyond the time

prescribed in the Arbitration Act, 1996 therefor.

17. Here, however we are not concerned with any proceedings under the

Arbitration Act. The proceedings under the Arbitration Act end on the

challenge if made to the Arbitral Award being dismissed or on the challenge

being not made within the prescribed time. Though under the Arbitration

Act, 1940, the Arbitral Award was required to be made a rule of the Court

and a decree but Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, after the said time

confers the Arbitral Award with a status of a decree to "be enforced in

accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court".

18. In my view, the observations MSP Infrastructure Ltd. and Bharti

Cellular Ltd. supra to the effect that the judgments of civil law would not

apply to a proceeding under special law as the Arbitration Act, apply to only

the proceedings provided for under the Arbitration Act and cannot be

extended to the proceedings for execution of an Arbitral Award, as if it were

a decree of the Court. Once the Arbitration Act, 1996 itself has conferred on

the Arbitral Award the status of a decree of the Civil Court and made the

same executable in accordance with the provisions of CPC, I see no reason

to apply the aforesaid observations made in an entirely different context i.e.

to execution proceedings. To interpret so would be a violation of the express

provision of Section 36(1) of enforcement of the Arbitral Award in

accordance with the provisions of the CPC in the same manner as if it were a

decree of the Civil Court. If the intent of the legislature while enacting the

Arbitration Act, 1996 had been to exclude objections of the nature permitted

to be taken under Section 47 of the CPC in execution proceedings in

execution of arbitral awards, for the reason of time limited for taking thereof

under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 or otherwise, it would have

provided so and which has not been done. In the absence of any prohibition,

the rights under the CPC cannot be taken away.

19. Moreover, the observations aforesaid in MSP Infrastructure Ltd. and

Bharti Cellular Ltd. have to be harmonised with Jagat Ram Trehan supra

which is a judgment on the proposition that a plea of lack of jurisdiction of

the Arbitral Tribunal even if not taken by way of opposition to making the

same rule of the Court, can be taken under Section 47 of the CPC in

proceedings for execution thereof.

20. I thus hold that the objection of the JDs No.2 to 5, if falls within the

confines of Section 47 of the CPC, is entitled to be considered in accordance

with the judgments cited by the senior counsel for the JDs No.2 to 5 and

Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi supra cited by the counsel for DH.

21. I find a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Bijendra Kumar Vs.

Pradeep Kumar MANU/DE/4013/2014 to have also held that if an arbitral

award is based on an illegal and void agreement, objection in that regard can

be taken in proceedings for execution thereof, if not decided in proceedings

under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 and if the Executing Court

finds merit therein, can dismiss the execution proceedings.

22. There appears to be a divergence of opinion in the High Court of

Bombay in this respect. While in I.T.C. Ltd. Vs. Hanuman Vitamin Food

Ltd. 1999 (2) LJ 345 and in Jaimal Shah Vs. Ila Pandya 2001 (2) Mh. LJ

297 it was held that such objections can be taken in proceedings for

execution of arbitral awards, in R.K. Textiles Vs. Sulabh Textiles Pvt. Ltd.

(2002) 4 Mh.L.J. 678 it was held that the plea that there was no arbitration

agreement, cannot be entertained in execution proceeding.

23. The next question to be considered is whether the objection of the JDs

No.2 to 5 of the Arbitral Tribunal not having jurisdiction against them owing

to (a) the dispute being between the DH and the JD No.1 only, (b) reference

to arbitration having been sought by DH against JD No.1 only, (c) reference

to arbitration by the institution agreed upon by the parties being Paper

Merchants Association (Regd.) having been made against JD No.1 only, is

apparent from the face of the record.

24. The Arbitral Award records (i) that DH had filed the "aforesaid" claim

petition with the Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) and the Arbitrator

was appointed as a sole Arbitrator to decide the disputes; (ii) that summons

were issued to both the parties but despite service of summons, none

appeared on behalf of the JDs who were proceeded against ex-parte; (iii) that

DH filed its evidence by way of affidavit; (iv) that it was the claim of the DH

that JDs had business dealings with DH and had been purchasing goods from

the DH on credit basis; (v) that there is a clause in the bills raised by the DH

on the JDs which reads "in case of any dispute including non-payment of this

bill the same shall be referred to the Paper Merchants Association for

arbitration and judgment given by the arbitrator shall be final and binding";

(vi) that DH had claimed that there is an outstanding balance of

Rs.3,17,04,615/- which had been confirmed by the JDs; (vi) that the DH had

also claimed interest @ 12% per annum; (vii) that the Arbitrator had seen the

books of accounts of the DH and the bills / invoices filed by the DH in

support of his claim petition and found that the bills / invoices clearly show

that there is an arbitration clause between the parties and that DH is the

member of the Paper Merchants Association (Regd.); (viii) that the bills /

invoices issued by DH had been duly received and acknowledged by the

JDs; (ix) that the rates and terms mentioned on all the bills / invoices had

been acknowledged and accepted by the JDs; (x) that the statement of

accounts had been "signed by the Director and confirmed by the

defendants"; and, (xi) that the JDs had never taken any objection with regard

to the bills / invoices.

25. DH has also filed before this Court the letters dated 28th July, 2006

and 29th July, 2006 which also bear out that the reference sought by the DH

to arbitration was against JD No.1 only and not JDs No.2 to 5 and the

reference made by Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) to sole arbitration

of Shri Ram Bhaj Mittal was of disputes of DH against JD No.1 only and not

against JDs No.2 to 5.

26. DH has also filed before this Court the claim petition filed after the

appointment of the sole Arbitrator by the Paper Merchants Association

(Regd.) and in which besides JD No.1, JDs No.2 to 5 were impleaded as

respondents No.2 to 5. In the said claim petition, JD No.1 is described as a

private limited company in the business of publishing of school text books

and the DH is described as a sole proprietorship of Mr. Chiman Lal Khanna

carrying on business of supply of paper; a long business association has been

claimed of supply and sale of paper for publishing the books; reference is

also made to a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act, 1881 filed by DH against the "respondent"; there is no specific plea qua

JDs No.2 to 5 and it is not the case that JDs No.2 to 5 gave any personal

guarantee and there is no plea of piercing of the corporate veil.

27. The DH has also filed before this Court the affidavit by way of

evidence filed before the sole Arbitrator and in which the JD No.1 is

described as a private limited company and JDs No.2 to 5 as its Directors.

There is no evidence in the said affidavit also of entitlement of DH to award

against JDs No.2 to 5.

28. It is quite evident from the face of the record that the sale of paper

were made by the DH to JD No.1, the bills / invoices containing the

arbitration clause were in the name of JD No.1, the account in the books of

the DH was in the name of the JD No.1 and in accordance with the

arbitration clause on the bills / invoices, reference of disputes to arbitration

was sought by the DH from the Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) against

JD No.1 and the Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) made the reference of

dispute between DH and JD No.1 to Mr. Ram Bhaj Mittal aforesaid.

29. It is also evident on the face of record that DH, without seeking

reference of arbitration from Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) against

JDs No.2 to 5, in the claim petition filed before Mr. Ram Bhaj Mittal,

appointed as sole Arbitrator by Paper Merchants Association (Regd.),

impleaded JDs No.2 to 5 besides JD No.1 as respondents but in the claim

petition also did not disclose the basis of its claim against JDs No.2 to 5 or

any arbitration agreement with JDs 2 to 5.

30. The Arbitral Tribunal owes its jurisdiction to the arbitration

agreement. The arbitration agreement in the present case is contained on the

bills / invoices but which have been raised by DH on JD No.1. From the

arbitration clause contained on the said bills / invoices, JDs No.2 to 5, even

though Directors of JD No.1, did not become privy to the arbitration clause.

It has thus but to be held that Mr. Ram Bhaj Mittal, the sole Arbitrator

appointed by Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) was neither authorised by

Paper Merchants Association (Regd.) to adjudicate the disputes between DH

and the JDs No.2 to 5 nor under any agreement had such jurisdiction.

31. It is not the case of the DH that the question of jurisdiction of the

Arbitral Tribunal vis-a-vis the JDs No.2 to 5 was raised in the proceedings

under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 or in appeals thereagainst for it

to be held that though capable of being taken under Section 47 CPC, is

barred by res judicata.

32. I am thus of the view that the objection of the JDs No.2 to 5 in the

present case falls within the ambit of the judgments cited by the senior

counsel for the JDs No.2 to 5 as well as within the ambit of Vasudev

Dhanjibhai Modi supra cited by the counsel for DH, and is entitled to

succeed.

33. Accordingly, the execution petition, insofar as against JDs No.2 to 5,

is dismissed declaring the Arbitral Award against the JDs No.2 to 5 to be

without jurisdiction.

34. Resultantly, EAs No.39/2014 & 40/2014 of DH are dismissed.

EX.P. 75/2013 & EA No.975/2014 (u/O-XXI R-4), Crl.MA No.8650/2014 (of DH u/S 340 CrPC), EAs No.1103/2015 (u/O-XXI R-11(2) CPC), 1104/2015 (u/S 151 CPC), 1105/2015 (u/O XXI R-41 CPC), & 239/2016 (u/O XXI CPC)

35. List on 15th May, 2017 for further proceedings.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

MARCH 28, 2017 „bs‟