Delhi High Court
Beena Arora vs Directorate Of Education & Anr. on 22 March, 2017
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No.4692/2015
% 22nd March, 2017
BEENA ARORA ..... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Urmila Kar Purkayastha,
Advocate.
versus
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Devesh Singh, ASC for
respondent No.1.
Ms. Karuna Chhatwal, Advocate
for respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, the petitioner and who is a teacher with the respondent
no.2/Sant Nirankari Public School, seeks the relief of being granted the
Child Care Leave. Respondent no.2/school is an unaided private
school. Petitioner however claims that since in government schools,
employees are entitled to Child Care Leave, therefore, by application
of Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as „the Act‟) Child Care Leave is also to be granted to
employees of private schools in Delhi, whether aided or unaided.
2. The issue in question is no longer res integra because of a
Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I. Hussain &
Anr. Vs. Director of Education & Anr. in LPA No.592/2013 decided
on 21.3.2014 and which judgment interprets the expression „prescribed
benefits‟ under Section 10 of the Act so as to mean only monetary
benefits. The relevant paras of the judgment in the case of M.I.
Hussain & Anr. (supra) are paras 13 to 15 and which paras read as
under:-
"13. A perusal of Section 10 would evidence that it embraces scales of
pay and allowances, medical facilities, pension, gratuity, provident fund and
other prescribed benefits of the employees of a recognized school and
prescribes that the same shall not be less than those of the employees of the
corresponding status in school run by the appropriate authority. The
appropriate authority would be as defined by Section 2(e), the authority
which grants recognition.
14. The rule of „ejusdem generis‟ guides us that where two or more
words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, a
noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They
take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more
general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. The
true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of general nature
following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to
things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one
which has to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. It is a rule
which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily
limit general and comprehensive words. If a broad based genus could
consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to
dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be. To invoke the
application of ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or
category. The specific words must apply not to the different objects of a
widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or
kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply. Unless there is
a category, there is no room for application of the ejusdem generis doctrine
and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning, they ought not to be
qualified on the ground of their association. Noscitur a sociis - is merely a
rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the
wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the
defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the
legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance
is doubtful or is otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can
be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words
of wider import is doubtful; but where the object of legislature in using
wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction cannot
be pressed into service.
15. The learned Single Judge has overlooked the applicability of the
Rule of ejusdem generis which embodies the Rule of noscitur a sociis. A
broad genus clearly discernable in Section 10 is of benefits having character
of money : (i) pay and allowance - money; (ii) medical facilities - money;
(iii) pension - money; (iv) gratuity - money; and (v) provident fund -
money. The five terms having common character of money are followed by
the general expression other prescribed benefits. The said wide expression
other prescribed benefits must take colour from the genus of the previous
i.e. such benefits which are capable of being converted into money, to wit:
bonus, leave encashment etc."
3. In the present case, it is not the case of the petitioner that
the Child Care Leave if not taken can be converted into monetary
benefits such as leave encashment etc. Therefore since Child Care
Leave cannot be converted into monetary benefits in view of the ratio
of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I.
Hussain & Anr. (supra), petitioner hence cannot claim benefit of
Child Care Leave by seeking application and benefit of Section 10 of
the Act.
4. In view of the above discussion, and because of the ratio
of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I.
Hussain & Anr. (supra) which interprets „prescribed benefits‟ under
Section 10 of the Act only to mean monetary benefits, and that since
Child Care Leave is not convertible into monetary benefits by
encashment thereof, this writ petition therefore is liable to be and is
accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
MARCH 22, 2017 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
Ne
