Gyan Chand Verma vs Veena Rani
2016 Latest Caselaw 6315 Del

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                      Judgment Reserved On: 21.07.2016
                                    Judgment Pronounced On: 30.09.2016


RFA 344/2014

GYAN CHAND VERMA                                   ..... Appellant
                                      Through:     Mr. Saroj Kumar Thakur,
                                                   Advocate
                          versus

VEENA RANI                                            ..... Respondent
                                      Through:      None

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL

                              JUDGMENT

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J (ORAL)

1. The present appeal assails the judgment and decree dated 26.03.2014,

passed by the Court of Ld. Additional District Judge (North-East)-01,

Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, whereby Suit No. 38/2008 titled as 'Gyan

Chand Verma v. Veena Rani', for declaration and permanent injunction, filed

by the appellant (Plaintiff therein), has been partly decreed in favour of the

appellant to the limited extent that the respondent has been restrained from

dispossessing the appellant from property bearing No. D-1/37 built on plot

measuring 67, out of Khasra No. 21, situated at village Mandoli in the abadi

of Gali No. 27, Harsh Vihar, Shahdara, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the

'property in question'), without adopting due process of law. The other reliefs

sought in the suit, being declaration qua the property in question and

permanent injunction against the respondent, were not granted vide the

judgment and decree dated 26.03.2014, impugned herein.

2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant is the father-

in-law of the respondent and it is alleged in the former's plaint that he is the

owner of, and in possession of the property in question, transfer of which

property, in favour of the respondent, has been assailed by the appellant in

the present appeal.

3. The averments made by the appellant in his plaint and facts alleged by

him while tendering evidence by way of an affidavit (Ex. PW-1/1) can be

summarised as hereinunder:

i. The appellant bought a property at Ashok Nagar, Delhi, out of his

earnings while he was working as a goldsmith, which was

subsequently sold and the property in question was purchased, from

one, Smt. Omwati on 25.01.1993, originally measuring 100 sq. yards.

ii. Out of the property in question, the appellant sold 25 sq. yards of the

same, to his son, Sh. A.K. Verma, after receiving consideration from

the latter.

iii. The appellant raised construction on the said plot (remaining 75 sq.

yards) from his own funds and thereafter his other sons started

pressurising him to transfer the property in question in their names.

iv. The respondent, being the wife of the other son of the appellant,

namely Sh. Pramod Kumar (DW-2), pressurised the appellant to

execute a General Power of Attorney dated 22.11.2006 (Ex.PW-1/A)

in her favour which was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar,

Nand Nagri, Delhi. The former also got executed on 22.11.2006,

certain documents of transfer of the property in question in her favour,

forcibly.

v. The appellant was living in the property in question alongwith his wife

and daughter at the time of execution of the said GPA dated

22.11.2006 (Ex.PW-1/A) and continued to reside at the property in

question after the execution of the said GPA and other documents of

transfer of the property in question.

vi. The sale consideration was not paid as per the market value of the

property in question which was stated to be Rs.15,00,000/- at the time

of the execution of the said GPA dated 22.11.2006 (Ex.PW-1/A), and

that the respondent alongwith her associate, one Mr. Rakesh Kumar,

threatened the appellant with dire consequences if the latter demanded

the consideration amount from the former.

vii. The appellant had borrowed Rs. 5,00,000/- from his friend and was

not being able to repay the same, since the respondent had not paid to

him the consideration amount, and the former suffered mental and

physical problems on this account.

viii. The respondent alongwith her associates entered the property in

question on various occasions and tried to dispossess the appellant and

his family from the property in question and threatened the appellant

with dire consequences if the property in question was not vacated.

The matter was reported to the police authorities but no action was

taken on the same.

ix. A complaint dated 13.06.2008 (Ex. PW-1/D) was made to the police

authorities, alleging that the respondent had got executed the GPA

dated 22.11.2006 (Ex.PW-1/A) by the appellant in her favour and

threatened to dispossess him from the property in question, but no

action was taken regarding the same by the police authorities.

x. A legal notice dated 08.11.2008 (Ex. PW-1/C) was sent to the

respondent which she did not receive, intentionally.

4. The averments made by the respondent, on merits, in her written

statement and facts alleged while tendering evidence by way of an affidavit

(Ex. DW-1/A) are summarized hereinunder:

i. The appellant had sold a part of the property in question to the

his one son upon receiving consideration and that subsequently,

he sold the entire remaining property in question to the

respondent vide an irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated

22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-1/1) in the presence of two witnesses,

namely, Sh. Rakesh Kumar (DW-3) and Sh. Anil Kumar. The

former also executed other documents of title such as agreement

to sell (Ex. DW-1/2), possession letter (Ex.DW-1/3), receipt

(Ex. DW-1/4) and affidavit (EX. DW-1/5), all dated 22.11.2006

(hereinafter referred to as "said documents of title") in favour of

the latter, which were duly notarised with the Notary Public on

22.11.2009.

ii. After the purchase of the property in question, the respondent

permitted the appellant to reside, as a license holder, in one

room of the ground floor of the property in question alongwith

his wife and daughter, till they could purchase some other

property. She was in possession of the remaining portion of the

property in question.

iii. After receiving sale consideration from the respondent, the

appellant purchased another property measuring 46 sq. yards in

Faridabad, District Palwal, Haryana.

iv. When asked to vacate the property in question, the appellant

harassed the respondent and her family members.

v. It had been denied by the respondent that she was liable to pay

Rs.15,00,000/- being the market value of the property in

question to the appellant. It had been claimed that she purchased

the property in question against valuable consideration which

stood paid to the appellant and it was only thereafter that the

latter executed the said documents of transfer of property in

favour of the former.

vi. It has been denied by the respondent that she harassed or

coerced the appellant into executing the said documents of

transfer of property in her favour.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues had been framed by

the Ld. Judge:

"a) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for declaration

as prayed for in prayer A of the suit? OPP

b) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for permanent

injunction as prayed for in clause B of prayer in the suit?

                        OPP

                  c)    Relief."

6. The appellant had examined himself as PW-1 and deposed by way of

affidavit (Ex. PW-1/1) and tendered in evidence the following documents:

a) Irrevocable General Power of Attorney (Ex. PW-1/A).

b) Postal Receipts (Ex. PW-1/B).

c) Legal notice dated 08.11.2008 (Ex. PW-1/C).

d) Complaint to the Commissioner of Police dated 13.06.2008 (Ex.

PW-1/D).

e) Copy of complaint to Commissioner of Police received by DCP office (Ex. PW-1/E).

f) Complaint to the Commissioner of Police received in Police Post Harsh Vihar (Ex. PW-1/F).

g) Site Plan of the property in question (Ex.PW-1/G).

7. The respondent had examined herself as DW-1 and deposed by way of

affidavit (Ex. DW-1/1) and tendered in evidence the following documents:

a) Irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated 22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-

1/1).

b) Agreement to Sell dated 22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-1/2).

c) Possession Letter dated 22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-1/3).

d) Receipt dated 22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-1/4).

e) Affidavit dated 22.11.2006 (Ex. DW-1/5).

f) Copy of the sale deed of the property at Palwal, Faridabad, Haryana (Ex. DW-1/P1).

The respondent also examined Sh. Pramod Kumar (DW-2) and Sh. Rakesh Kumar Sharma (DW-3).

8. After hearing the parties on the issues so framed and appreciating the

evidence brought on record, the Ld. ADJ came to the conclusion that the

appellant is not entitled to the decree for declaration with respect to the

property in question and is also not entitled to a decree of permanent

injunction against the respondent and granted a limited relief to the

appellant, restraining the respondent from dispossessing the appellant from

the property in question without following the due process of law.

9. Mr. Saroj Kumar Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant would urge that there was no valid transfer of property that was

effected as the GPA dated 22.11.2006 and the remaining documents of

transfer of property were got executed under force, threat and coercion. To

buttress this argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, the learned

counsel would place reliance upon the complaint dated 13.06.08 addressed to

the Police (Ex. PW-1/D) regarding the said execution of documents of title

and transfer of property under coercion and force and that the said complaint

dated 13.06.08 (Ex. PW-1/D) was made at the instance of the appellant

immediately thereafter. It would be further urged on behalf of the appellant

that the said GPA dated 22.11.06 and other documents of title are forged and

fabricated documents and ought not to have been accepted to have

constituted a valid sale of the property in question. The third submission

urged on behalf of the appellant would be that the transfer of property was

not effected and the execution of the GPA and other documents of title

would not constitute a valid sale as no consideration was paid to the

appellant by the respondent, no negotiation or settlement took place with

regard to sale consideration and other terms and conditions between the

parties, with respect to the property in question. Lastly, it would be urged on

behalf of the appellant that the said GPA dated 22.11.2006 and other

documents of title would not amount to a valid sale in terms of the decision

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Ltd. v.

State of Haryana and Anr. reported as 2012 (1) SCC 656.

10. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the

evidence brought on record. Since none enters appearance on behalf of the

respondent, I, therefore, proceed to decide the present appeal ex-parte.

11. Coming to the first argument addressed on behalf of the appellant that

the said GPA dated 22.11.2006 and other documents of title ought to be

declared null and void in view of the circumstance that the same were got

executed by the appellant under coercion and force, the Ld. counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellant has laid emphasis on the complaint

dated 13.06.08 (Ex. PW-1/D) addressed to the Police authorities.

12. A plain reading of the cross examination of the appellant brings to

light the fact that the appellant was neither aware as to who got prepared the

said complaint dated 13.06.08 (Ex. PW-1/D), nor did he remember the

contents of the same, whether he himself visited the office of the

Commissioner of Police or sent someone on his behalf.

13. Further, upon a perusal of the said complaint dated 13.06.2008 (Ex.

PW-1/D), it is revealed that the same was addressed to the police authorities

approximately two years after the execution of the GPA dated 22.11.2006

and the other documents of title, which contradicts the asseveration on behalf

of the appellant, that the complaint was addressed to the police authorities

immediately after the execution of the documents which was allegedly got

done under coercion and force.

14. Be that as it may, nothing has been brought on record on behalf of the

appellant to support his contention that the said GPA dated 22.11.06 and the

other documents of title were got executed by him in favour of the

respondent under coercion and force. Reliance upon the complaint dated

13.06.08 (Ex. PW-1/D) is wholly misplaced to support the argument

advanced on behalf of the appellant.

15. The said GPA dated 22.11.06 and other documents of title were

executed in the presence of the two attesting witnesses, one of them, Sh.

Rakesh Kumar Sharma (DW-3) was examined as a defence witness and he

deposed on the factum of execution of the said GPA dated 22.11.06 and

other documents of title, all dated 22.11.06, in favour of the respondent by

the appellant, before the Sub-Registrar, Nand Nagri, Delhi. Sh. Rakesh

Kumar Sharma (DW-3) further deposed in his cross examination that a sum

of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand) was paid to the appellant in

the former's presence.

16. A perusal of the impugned judgment dated 26.03.2014 reveals that

after the cross examination of the appellant was conducted, he had sought

opportunity to lead further evidence, whereas, despite having been granted

various opportunities to lead evidence by the Ld. ADJ, the former failed to

do so and eventually, his right to lead further evidence was closed. It is

relevant to note that, before this Court as well, no evidence was brought to

the attention of this Court in support of the contention raised on behalf of the

appellant in support of the argument that the GPA dated 22.11.06 and other

documents of title were got executed under force and coercion.

17. In view of the foregoing discussion and since no positive evidence has

been brought on record in support of the submission made on behalf of the

appellant, therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion, the first submission

made on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.

18. It has been further urged on behalf of the appellant that the said GPA

dated 22.11.06 and other documents of title are forged and fabricated

documents and ought not to have been accepted to have constituted a valid

sale of the property in question.

19. The GPA dated 22.11.06 is a registered document being executed

before the Sub-Registrar, Nand Nagri, Delhi. The remaining documents of

transfer of title [being agreement to sell (Ex. DW-1/2), possession letter

(Ex.DW-1/3), receipt (Ex. DW-1/4) and affidavit (EX. DW-1/5), all dated

22.11.2006] were also executed in the office of Sub-Registrar, Nand Nagri,

Delhi and were also notarised by the Notary Public on 22.11.09. The veracity

of the same cannot be called into question on behalf of the appellant by

making bald assertions without leading any positive evidence to support his

contentions in keeping with the provisions under section 114 read with the

illustration (e) to the provisions under section 114 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872. A statutory presumption by reference to section 114 [illustration

(e)] of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall arise to the effect that events

contained in the endorsements of registration, were regularly and duly

performed and are correctly recorded. [Ref: Bhagat Ram v. Suresh, reported

as (2003) 12 SCC 35]

20. The said provisions are reproduced hereinbelow:

"Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 114.

114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. --The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Illustrations The Court may presume--

*****

(e) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;

**** But the Court shall also have regard to such facts as the following, in considering whether such maxims do or do not apply to the particular case before it:--

As to illustration (e)--A judicial act, the regularity of which is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances; **** "

21. In this regard, the Ld ADJ made the following observations, which

this Court, invariably, is in agreement with. The relevant paragraphs of the

impugned judgment dated 26.03.14 are reproduced hereinbelow:

"24. In para 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff has himself pleaded that he executed a registered General Power of Attorney Ex DW-1/1 in favour of the defendant. In his cross examination, the plaintiff admitted that on 22.11.2006, he also executed agreement to sell, possession letter, receipt and affidavit in favour of the defendant. These documents are Ex. DW-2/2 to Ex. DW-2/5 respectively. There is therefore no dispute

regarding execution of these documents by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant.

25. Ex.DW-1/1 is the registered Irrevocable General Power of Attorney. Page 4 of this document Ex.DW1/1 recites that in consideration of Rs.75,000/- in full and final settlement, the plaintiff executed the same in favour of the defendant. Agreement to sell also recites payment of Rs.75,000/- having been made by the defendant to the plaintiff inconsideration of execution of the same. Ex.DW-1/1 is a registered document. Section 114 read with illustration (e) of the Indian Evidence Act provides that the Court may presume that official acts have been regularly performed. the said document were executed before the Sub Registrar by the plaintiff. The same recites payment of Rs.75,000/- by the defendant as consideration. Presumption therefore arises that the payment of Rs.75,000/- was made by the defendant to the plaintiff as consideration for execution of the said document. Although in his cross examination, the plaintiff deposed that he was not paid any amount by the defendant including Rs.75,000/-, but this is not the case set up by the plaintiff in his plaint. He has come to the Court averring that the sale consideration was Rs.15,00,000/- and the same was not paid by him."

22. The third submission on behalf of the appellant challenges the validity

of the transfer of property in question in view of the alleged circumstance

that no consideration was paid. It has been canvassed on behalf of the

appellant, before this Court as well as before the Court of the Ld. ADJ on a

specific query therein, that it is the case of the appellant that consideration to

the tune of Rs.15,00,000 (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) being the alleged market

value of the property in question was not paid to the appellant by the

respondent.

23. It has been canvassed on behalf of the appellant that since no

negotiation took place between the parties, prior to the execution of the said

GPA dated 22.11.06 and other documents of title, therefore inference can be

drawn to the effect that no sale consideration was paid to the appellant. This

argument is wholly fallacious and does not hold water in view of the recital

of the terms of GPA dated 22.11.06 (Ex.PW-1/A), which clearly shows that

Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand) as full and final settlement as

sale consideration already stood received by the appellant and in terms of the

Proviso (1) to section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The provisions

are reproduced hereinbelow:

"Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 92.

92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.-- When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:

Proviso (1).-- Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due

execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law:

**** "

24. A plain reading of the Proviso (1) to section 92 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872, makes it sufficiently clear that no evidence of any oral agreement

or statement shall be admitted once the terms of a contract, grant or other

disposition of property, reduced in writing stand proved as per section 91 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whereas, any fact such as want or failure of

consideration, may be proved which would invalidate any document or

which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto.

25. It is a settled position of law that if a man acknowledges that he has

received the whole of the amount of consideration from the person to whom

he transfers the property, he voluntarily arms the purchaser with the means

of dealing with the estate as the absolute legal right and equitable owner, free

from any encumbrance or adverse equity, and he can only be heard to say

that he has not received such consideration amount upon his leading

evidence to this effect. The provisions under section 92 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 are based on "best-evidence rule". It would be

inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on consideration,

and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of parties should

be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain

testimony of slippery memory. The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic

evidence are, one, to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior

would amount to nullifying the law, and two, when parties have deliberately

put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between

themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and

final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond

the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory. (Ref:

Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani reported as (2003) 6 SCC 595)

26. In the present case, the appellant has only made bald asseverations to

submit that the said GPA dated 22.11.06 was executed without payment of

consideration to the tune of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lacs), being the

alleged market value of the property at the relevant time i.e. the year 2006.

The appellant has failed to show, as to what the actual market value of the

property in question stood in the year 2006.

27. It has been borne out from the testimony of the respondent that after

the execution of the said GPA dated 22.11.06 and other documents of title,

the appellant had purchased an immovable property at Palwal District,

Haryana. With respect to the same, in his cross examination, the appellant

had identified his signatures on the sale deed of the property at Palwal

district, Haryana, at the point where the signatures of the purchaser are

obtained, admitted that the documents with respect to the said property at

Palwal, Haryana were executed in his favour but denied having purchased

the said property. Be that as it may, there is sufficient evidence on record to

establish that the sale consideration amount of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy

Five Thousand) was paid to the appellant by the respondent for the execution

of the said GPA dated 22.11.06.

28. A perusal of the testimonies of the respondent, Sh. Pramod Kumar

(DW-2) and of Sh. Rakesh Kumar (DW-3), brings to light the fact that

Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand) was, in fact, paid to the

appellant as full and final payment for the transfer of property in question, as

sale consideration. The statements of the respondent and the defence

witnesses have remained unshattered even during cross. The appellant has

failed to bring on record any evidence to buttress his asseveration that no

consideration to the tune of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) was paid

to him.

29. Normally, ownership and title to the property will pass to the

purchaser on registration of the sale deed with effect from the date of

execution of the sale deed. But this is not an invariable rule, as the true test

of passing of property is the intention of parties. Registration is prima facie

proof of an intention to transfer the property, though not being proof of an

operative transfer if payment of consideration is a condition precedent for

passing of the property. [Ref: Kaliaperumal v. Rajagopal, reported as (2009)

4 SCC 193] In the present case, a perusal of the said GPA dated 22.11.06

and other documents of title indicate that consideration already stood paid

and the receipt of consideration had been stated as a fact in the recital of the

terms of the said documents executed and registered before the Sub-

Registrar, Nand Nagri, Delhi. There is nothing on the record apart from

unsupported contentions on behalf of the appellant that the intention of the

appellant was contrary to the terms of the said documents of title and transfer

of property and that the said factum of receipt of consideration was in fact,

incorrectly recorded.

30. A mere assertion has been made on behalf of the appellant that he was

promised a sale consideration to the tune of Rs. 15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen

Lacs) being the market value of the property at the relevant time i.e. the year

2006, and that the same stood unpaid to him, whereas, there is nothing on

record in support of the same. Upon a conjoint reading of the defence

evidence and in view of the settled legal position with regard to the

provisions of Proviso (1) to section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as

discussed hereinabove, this submission urged on behalf of the appellant,

ought to be rejected.

31. Coming now to the last submission made on behalf of the appellant

that in view of the decision in Suraj Lamp (supra) the said GPA dated

22.11.06 and other documents of title cannot be regarded as valid and ought

to be declared null and void, is incorrect keeping in view the established

position of law. It is the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that

there cannot be a sale by execution of a power of attorney nor can there be a

transfer by execution of an agreement of sale and a power of attorney,

therefore the same do not convey any title nor create any interest in the

property in question, in favour of the respondent.

32. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its decision in Maya Devi v. Lalta

Prasad reported as (2015) 5 SCC 588 makes it amply clear that the decision

in Suraj Lamp (supra) is prospective in application. The relevant paragraphs

of the report are extracted hereinbelow:

"38. What has also escaped the attention of the executing court is that Suraj Lamp [Suraj Lamp and Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2009) 7 SCC 363 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 126] has prospective operation, thereby rendering it inapplicable to the subject

2006 transaction. Secondly, if the general power of attorney excuted in favour of the appellant Smt Maya Devi was bereft of legal efficacy, the ownership of Smt Nirmal Verma would also be invalid, and sequentially the property would have no connection whatsoever with the judgment-debtor since he had purportedly derived title only through a will."

(Emphasis supplied.)

33. The judgment in Suraj Lamp (supra) was delivered on 11.10.2011

and the date of execution of the documents of transfer of property in the

present case is 22.11.2006. Therefore, in view of the dictum of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Maya Devi's case (supra), the documents of transfer of

property i.e. GPA dated 22.11.06, agreement to sell (Ex. DW-1/2),

possession letter (Ex.DW-1/3), receipt (Ex. DW-1/4) and affidavit (EX. DW-

1/5), all dated 22.11.2006, in the present case constitute a valid transfer of

immovable property and effect a valid sale, complete with a sale

consideration of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand), thereby

creating rights as to ownership, title, possession and interest with respect to

the property in question, in favour of the respondent.

34. Trite to state that the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Suraj Lamp (supra) have not been intended to in any way affect the

validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine

transactions. The relevant paragraphs of the report are extracted

hereinbelow:

"27. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a power of attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding "SA/GPA/will transactions" are not intended to apply to such bona fide/genuine transactions."

(Emphasis supplied.)

35. Trite to state that it is a general rule that wherever written instruments

are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the

parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is

excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to

contradict or alter them. This is a matter both of principle and policy. It is of

principle because such instruments are in their own nature and origin,

entitled to a much higher degree of credit than parol evidence. It is of policy

because it would be attended with great mischief if those instruments, upon

which men's rights depended, were liable to be impeached by loose collateral

evidence. [Ref: Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (supra)]

36. In the present case, as is observed from the discussion hereinabove,

nothing has been borne out from the record on behalf of the appellant to

establish the refutal of payment and receipt of consideration to the tune of

Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lacs) for the transfer of property and to

successfully assail the veracity and validity of the said GPA dated 22.11.06

and other documents of title.

37. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no reason to differ with the

judgment passed by the Ld. ADJ. The present appeal is devoid of any merit

and is accordingly dismissed.

38. Trial court record be sent back.

SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 dn/sb