Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 6989 Del
Judgement Date : 18 November, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 18.11.2016
+ FAO(OS) 177/2016
AURA SYNERGY INDIA PVT LTD & ORS ... Appellants
versus
M/S NEW AGE FALSE CEILING
CO PVT LTD & ORS ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Appellants : Mr Sanjeev Sindhwani, Senior Advocate with
Mr Harsh Kaushik, Mr Abhay Chattopadhyay and
Gaurav Sharma
For the Respondents : Mr Saif Khan with Mr Manish Biala
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE JAYANT NATH
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL) CM 22329/2016(condonation of delay) The delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
The application stands disposed of.
FAO(OS) 177/2016 & CM 22330/2016 & CM 22331/2016
1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and/or order
dated 10.02.2016 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby
he has dismissed IA 23095/2015, being an application under Order 39
Rules 1 and 2 CPC, filed by the appellants/plaintiffs and allowed
IA 26213/2015 (under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC) which had been filed by the
respondents/defendants.
2. The entire battle is with regard to the trade mark 'AURA'. The
plaintiffs claimed exclusivity over the said trade mark in respect of
metallic false ceilings. The suit that has been filed is one of passing off in
which the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were passing off their
products as those of the plaintiffs/appellants by using the mark 'AURA'.
3. Initially, the learned Single Judge had granted an ex parte ad
interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the mark 'AURA'
in respect of metallic false ceilings. As mentioned above, the
respondents/defendants filed the application under Order 39 Rule 4 for
vacation of the ex parte ad interim injunction that had been granted. One
of the main grounds raised in the application for vacation of the injunction
was that the plaintiffs/appellants had not come to Court with clean hands
and, therefore, had disentitled themselves for the relief of injunction being
an equitable relief. In the first instance, it was contended that the plaintiffs
had not disclosed the earlier relationship between the plaintiffs/appellants
on the one hand and the defendants/respondents on the other, whereby the
plaintiffs/appellants, under an agreement dated 20.04.2012, functioned as
an agent of the defendants/respondents in respect of metallic false ceilings.
The plaintiffs/appellants have clearly marketed metallic false ceilings
manufactured by the defendants during the subsistence of the said
agreement dated 20.04.2012.
4. The learned Single Judge has examined the matter in great detail
and particularly on the allegation that the plaintiffs/appellants had
suppressed and/ or concealed material facts and based on such suppression
and concealment, the plaintiffs/appellants had approached this Court for
the ex parte ad interim injunction which it did get.
5. We have also heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and
have examined the papers before us. We are in full agreement with the
conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge with regard to
suppression and concealment. Insofar as the merits of the matter are
concerned, any findings in the impugned order are obviously only of a
prima facie nature and would be subject to the conclusions in the trial after
evidence is led.
6. Insofar as the present appeal is concerned, we have only to focus on
the issue of suppression and concealment. The learned counsel for the
appellants has placed before us two decisions of the Supreme Court :-
(i) S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Limited v. State Bank of Bihar and Others: (2004) 7 SCC 166; and
(ii) Mayar (H.K.) Limited and Others v. Owners and Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Others: (2006) 3 SCC 100
7. In S.J.S. Business Enterprises (supra), the Supreme Court had
observed that as a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant
disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. It was also observed
that the said rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a
litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. However, the
Court also noted that the suppressed fact must be a material one in the
sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the
merits of the case. The learned counsel for the appellants relies on this
latter observation of the Supreme Court to submit that the fact that the
agreement and the earlier relationship between the appellants and the
respondents was not mentioned, was not a material one and, therefore, this
could not have been regarded as a case of suppression/concealment.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants, as noted above, had also
placed reliance on Mayar (H.K.) Limited (supra), where, once again, the
Supreme Court noticed the provisions of Order 6 Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and observed that the expression 'material facts' though
not defined anywhere would mean those facts upon which a party relies
for his claim or defence. The Supreme Court also observed that which
particular fact would be a material fact that was required to be pleaded by
a party would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The Supreme Court in Mayar (H.K.) Limited (supra) also placed
reliance on its observations in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (supra), to
which we have already alluded above.
9. On going through the impugned judgment and/or order, it is evident
that the learned Single Judge felt that the suppression/non-disclosure of
the agreement and the earlier relationship between the appellants as agents
of the respondents would amount to a 'material fact' and would impinge
on the merits of the case. We agree with this conclusion of the learned
Single Judge. Had the appellants/plaintiffs mentioned the earlier
relationship between the parties, the ex parte ad interim order may have
been entirely different. We also note that the learned Single Judge has
examined other materials also which were not placed before the Court in
the first instance and after considering the entire documents and material
which were brought to the notice of the Court by the
defendants/respondents, the learned Single Judge, in his wisdom, has
arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs/appellants were guilty of
suppression and/or concealment of material facts. This by itself would
disentitle the appellants from any equitable relief including that of an
interim injunction.
10. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are not inclined to interfere
with the impugned judgment. The respondents/defendants shall be
permitted to withdraw the amount of Rs 2 lacs deposited with the
Registrar General of this Court pursuant to the order dated 02.06.2016.
11. We are making it clear, once again, that any observations or
findings contained in the impugned judgment and our order are only prima
facie in nature and are subject to the final conclusions that may be arrived
in the suit after trial.
The appeal is dismissed.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
JAYANT NATH, J NOVEMBER 18, 2016 SR
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