Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 1838 Del
Judgement Date : 8 March, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 4312/2015
Date of Decision: March 08th, 2016
DHRUV SHEORAN ... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Archit Upadhyay, Advocate
versus
STATE ( NCT OF DELHI) & ORS ... Respondent
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Chauhan, Additional
Public Prosecutor for the State with
Sub-Inspector Rampal, Police Station
Safdarjung Enclave, Delhi
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI
P.S.TEJI, J.
1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed
by the petitioner, namely, Sh. Dhruv Sheoran for quashing of FIR
No.649/2014 dated 13.08.2014, under Sections 279/338 IPC
registered at Police Station Safdarjung Enclave on the basis of the
memorandum of understanding (MOU) arrived at between the
petitioner and the respondent nos.2 & 3, namely, Smt. Brijesh and
Smt. Poonam, respectively on 27.07.2015.
2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State
submitted that the respondent Nos.2 & 3, present in the Court have
been identified to be the victims in the FIR in question by SI Rampal.
3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the complainant,
namely, HC Satender Kumar lodged the FIR in question on the
allegation that he received the DD No. 57 B dated 13.08.2014, that an
accident took place at Raj Nagar flyover, when the petitioner was
driving a white colour Maruti Ritz car, bearing No. PB 15 E 5007 and
was coming from Dhaula Kuan and was going towards the Safdarjung
hospital. When the petitioner reached the end of the bridge, the
petitioner had collusion with Brijesh w/o Prem and Poonam w/o
Bijender who were crossing the road. Due to the accident, both the
ladies got injured and they were admitted in the hospital by the
petitioner.
The charge sheet was filed by the police against the petitioner.
During the pendency of the investigation and after the filing of the
charge sheet, with the intervention of well-wishers etc., the parties
arrived at an amicable settlement.
4. Respondent Nos.2 & 3 present in the Court, submitted that the
dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the
MOU, it is agreed that the petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to
each of the respondent nos. 2 & 3 i.e. Rs. 10,000/- in toto for a full
and final settlement and after this payment there shall be no claims
and nothing shall be due from either sides in the future. It is also
agreed that the respondent nos.2 & 3 shall not file any claim(s) or/and
shall not file any complaint(s) or/and shall not lodge FIR or/and shall
not initiate any legal proceeding(s) against the petitioner in the future,
as the respondent nos. 2 & 3 have come to this conclusion that there
was no fault or carelessness or negligence(s) on the part of the
petitioner. It is also agreed that the petitioner was not driving rashly at
all. It is also agreed that both parties shall not misuse the MOU
against each other in the future. Respondent nos.2 & 3 affirmed the
contents of the aforesaid settlement and of their individual affidavits
dated 06.07.2015 supporting this petition. As per the affidavits filed
by the respondent nos. 2 & 3, it has been stated that all disputes with
the petitioner have been settled and that there exists no objection if the
FIR in question is quashed. All the disputes and differences have been
resolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitioner
survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be
brought to an end. Statements of respondent nos.2 & 3 have been
recorded in this regard in which they stated that they have entered into
a compromise with the petitioner and have settled all the disputes with
him. They further stated that they have no objection if the FIR in
question is quashed.
5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex
Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in
cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-
"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."
6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a
recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh
(Supra) are as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
7. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to
prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
Respondent nos.2 & 3 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question
and have stated that the matter has been settled out of their own free
will. As the matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so,
there would be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the
legal proceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is
of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process
of law and to secure the ends of justice.
8. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision
of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is
abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;
where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to
avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision
of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of
justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to
circumvent the express provisions of law.
9. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram
Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of
Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009
has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the
Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice
or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is
not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.
10. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced
that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not
affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of
such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace
and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.
In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in
entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is
compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.
Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675
the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not
compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of
securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,
section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of
quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the
proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts
and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-
compoundable.
In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that
notwithstanding the fact the offence under Section 279 IPC is a non-
compoundable offence, there should be no impediment in quashing
the FIR under this section, if the Court is otherwise satisfied that the
facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.
11. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of
statements made by the respondent nos.2 & 3, the FIR in question
warrants to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon
need to be quashed.
12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.649/2014
dated 13.08.2014, under Sections 279/338 IPC registered at Police
Station Safdarjung Enclave and the proceedings emanating therefrom
are quashed against the petitioner.
13. This petition is accordingly disposed of.
(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE MARCH 08, 2016 dd
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