S.K. Sehgal & Anr vs Delhi Administration And Anr
2016 Latest Caselaw 1816 Del

                *IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                                             Date of decision: 8th March, 2016

+                       W.P.(C) 4338/2015 & CM No.7855/2015 (for stay)

           S.K. SEHGAL & ANR                                  ..... Petitioners
                         Through:          Mr. Raj Kumar Sherawat, Adv.

                                     Versus

    DELHI ADMINISTRATION AND ANR              ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Aditya Vashisth, Adv. for R-1.

Ms. Renuka Arora, Adv. for DSIIDC.

CORAM:-

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW

1. The petition i) seeks de-sealing of industrial plot bearing No.92, Block

No.S, Functional Industrial Estate for Electronics, Okhla Industrial Area

Phase-II, New Delhi by quashing of the order dated 30th September, 2003 of

eviction with respect thereto, by declaring that Sh. C.B. Mehsram who as

Estate Officer passed the said order was not notified under Section 3 of the

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (PP Act)

and thus the order of eviction and consequential order dated 30 th October,

2009 of sealing are illegal and void; ii) impugns the order dated 24th January,

2014 of the respondents Delhi Administration and Delhi State Industrial &

Infrastructure Development Corporation (DSIIDC), and iii) seeks restoration

of the lease of the land underneath the aforesaid property in favour of the

petitioners.

2. The petition came up first before this court on 1 st May, 2015 when on

the counsel for the petitioners citing the order dated 31st October, 2012 in

W.P.(C) No.6832/2012 notice of the petition was issued. Thereafter on 16th

July, 2015 when the matter was listed, the following order was passed:

"1. After the counsel for the petitioners has been heard to an extent and after he is unable to satisfy this Court as to how this proceeding is not clearly an abuse of the process of the Court inasmuch as the petitioners have invoked writ jurisdiction after allowing the judgment in a suit with the same cause of action and grievance has attained finality, the counsel for the petitioners states that he is not prepared for arguments because on 1st May, 2015 notice of the petition was issued for today.

2. No such adjournment at this stage can be granted.

3. The counsel is at liberty to file written arguments by 20th July, 2015.

4. Now the counsel for the petitioner requests that the time for filing the written arguments be extended till 21st July, 2015.

5. Allowed.

6. The counsels for the respondents have also been heard.

7. Judgment reserved."

3. The counsel for the petitioners has filed written synopsis and which

has been perused.

4. The undisputed facts are:

(i) The President of India vide perpetual lease dated 19 th April,

1984 leased unto the petitioner No.2 Gulshan Lal, industrial

plot bearing No.92, ad-measuring 307 sq. yds. in the layout of

Functional Industrial Estate for Electronics, Okhla Industrial

Area Phase-II, New Delhi and on the terms and conditions

contained therein. One of the terms of the said lease deed was

that the lessee shall within a period of two years from 19 th

April, 1984 and which time was specified to be the essence of

the contract, after obtaining sanction to the building plan, at his

own expense, erect upon the industrial plot and complete in a

substantial workman like manner an industrial building for

carrying on the approved manufacturing process or industry

with the requisite and proper walls, sewers and drains and other

conveniences in accordance with the sanctioned building plan

and to the satisfaction of the municipal or other body;

(ii) The office of the Commissioner of Industries, Delhi

Administration vide order dated 24th February, 1992 cancelled

the allotment of the aforesaid plot of land in favour of the

petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal and determined the perpetual

lease in his favour and directed the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan

Lal to handover vacant possession of the plot within 30 days of

the order failing which he was threatened with proceedings

under the PP Act. It was recorded in the said order:

(a) That the aforesaid plot was leased in favour of the

petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal for manufacturing of

transistor, radio and P.A. equipments;

(b) As per the departmental Guidelines framed under the

provisions of Clause III of the perpetual lease deed,

construction of industrial building was to be completed

within maximum permissible period of seven years from

the date of execution of the lease deed on payment of

composition charges;

(c) That the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal was cautioned

from time to time for early completion of the factory

building but the petitioner no.2 Gulshan Lal tried to

mislead by stating that construction work had

commenced and was in progress;

(d) However on expiry of the maximum permissible period

of seven years, progress of construction was found to be

„NIL‟ except that the plot was found partially dug and

some "chick makers" were found doing the work of

"chick making";

(e) A show cause notice dated 9th July, 1991 was issued to

petitioner No.2 Gulshan Lal but he again tried to mislead;

(f) Another inspection was carried out which revealed that

no activity for construction had been commenced;

(g) Thereafter, the petitioner no.2 Gulshan Lal confirmed

that he could not start construction due to the disputes in

the family and lack of finances;

(h) Since the maximum permissible period had expired, in

exercise of powers under the perpetual lease deed, the

lease was being cancelled;

(iii) It appears that the petitioner No.2 Gulshan Lal did not handover

possession as was required vide notice dated 24th February,

1992 aforesaid. The Commissioner of Industries filed a petition

for eviction of the petitioner no.2 Gulshan Lal before the Estate

officer and show cause notices dated 30th November, 1998 and

21st May, 1999 were issued under the PP Act to the petitioner

no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal;

(iv) In response to the aforesaid show cause notices under the PP

Act, the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal appeared before the

Estate Officer and filed an application under Order I Rule 10 of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for impleadment in

the eviction proceedings claiming to have purchased the plot

from the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal vide Agreement to

Sell dated 24th August, 1994;

(v) The Estate Officer Sh. C.B. Meshram vide order dated 30th

September, 2003 (impugned in this petition) rejected the

application of the petitioner No.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal for

impleadment and in exercise of powers under Section 5(1) of

the PP Act directed all persons in occupation of the said

property to vacate the same and authorized the Joint Director of

Industries and other officers to evict all the persons in

occupation of the subject property after expiry of 15 days. It is

recorded in the said order:

(a) That the cancelation of allotment and determination of

perpetual lease was on the ground of non construction

within the maximum permissible period of seven years;

(b) This charge stood established from the documents

submitted by the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal himself;

(c) That the claim of the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal of

having purchased the property on Power of Attorney was

also in violation of the terms of the perpetual lease deed;

(vi) The petitioner No.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal acting through Smt.

Anjana Sehgal wife of petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal and

petitioner No.1 Shri S.K. Sehgal filed CS(OS) No.1837/2003 in

this Court for declaration that the order dated 24th February,

1994 supra of the Commissioner of Industries of cancellation of

perpetual lease and the consequent order dated 30 th September,

2003 of the Estate Officer under the PP Act of eviction are

illegal and void ab initio;

(vii) Vide interim order dated 30th October, 2003 confirmed on 11th

February, 2008 in the said suit, the respondents i.e. the Delhi

Administration and DSIIDC were restrained from taking over

possession of the property;

(viii) The aforesaid suit was dismissed as not maintainable and the

interim orders vacated on 31st August, 2009, recording:

(aa) that the defendants had questioned the maintainability of

the suit as the order dated 30th September, 2003 of the

Estate Officer was appealable before the District Judge;

(bb) Per contra, the petitioners herein who were the plaintiffs

therein had contended that PP Act was not applicable and

relied on Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of

India AIR 1986 SC 872;

(cc) That it was not in dispute that despite perpetual lease

deed dated 19th April, 1984 providing for construction to

be raised within two years, even for a period of seven

years thereafter there was no construction;

(dd) That the petitioner No.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal had been given

sufficient opportunity in this regard;

(ee) That the petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal was afforded a

final opportunity of hearing before the Hon‟ble the

Lieutenant Governor (LG) but did not avail of the same

and Hon‟ble the LG, Delhi affirmed the cancellation of

lease and which was communicated to petitioner no.2 Sh.

Gulshan Lal vide order dated 24th February, 1992;

(ff) The respondent no.2 Gulshan Lal did not challenge the

said cancellation communicated to him on 24 th February,

1992 and which has attained finality;

(gg) Once the order of cancellation of lease had attained

finality eleven years prior to the institution of the suit, the

same could not be challenged belatedly;

(hh) The order dated 30th September, 2003 was merely

consequential to the order dated 24th February, 1992 of

cancellation of lease;

(ii) The petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal and his wife Smt.

Anjana Sehgal do not have any locus standi to challenge

the order dated 30th September, 2003 of the Estate

officer;

(jj) The petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal and his wife Smt.

Anjana Sehgal claim title through documents dated 24th

August, 1994 but by which time the lease itself stood

cancelled;

(kk) The documents dated 24th August, 1994 in favour of the

petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal and his wife Smt. Anjana

Sehgal were also in teeth of Clause II(5)(a) of the

perpetual lease deed and thus illegal;

(ll) Admittedly no permission had been obtained for the sale;

(mm) It was not in dispute that the term of the lease requiring a

factory building to be erected thereupon within two years

or even within the permissible period of seven years had

not been complied with;

(nn) Thus the order of eviction of the Estate Officer dated 30 th

September, 2003 could not be found fault with;

(oo) In fact, the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal could not

maintain the suit challenging the order dated 30th

September, 2003;

(pp) The petitioner no.2 Sh. Gulshan Lal could have

challenged the order dated 30th September, 2003 only by

filing an appeal under the PP Act;

(qq) Since efficacious alternative remedy is available, the suit

was not maintainable at the instance of petitioner no.2

Sh. Gulshan Lal;

(rr) The petitioner no.1 S.K. Sehgal and his wife Smt. Anjana

Sehgal do not have the locus to file an appeal against the

order dated 30th September, 2003;

(ss) The judgment of the Supreme Court in Express

Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. supra was not applicable inasmuch

as in the present case the perpetual lease itself required

construction to be raised and which had not been done

and also because sale was effected without obtaining

prior permission;

(ix) The aforesaid order has attained finality;

(x) That soon after the dismissal of the suit on 31 st August, 2009,

the respondents issued the impugned notice dated 30 th October,

2009 and in pursuance whereto have on 3rd November, 2009

admittedly repossessed the property.

5. The petitioners after nearly three years, on 31st October, 2002 filed

W.P.(C) No.6832/2012 supra which was disposed of in limine vide order

dated 31st October, 2012 recording / observing i) that though the prayer in

the writ petition was to quash the order dated 24th February, 1992 of

cancellation of the perpetual lease deed and the eviction order dated 30 th

September, 2003 of the Estate Officer but what the petitioners were required

to challenge was the order dated 21st May, 2010 rejecting the representation

of the petitioners in pursuance to the order in an earlier writ petition filed by

the petitioners directing the respondents to dispose of the representation of

the petitioners; ii) however the Deputy Commissioner of Industries (Land)

instead of outrightly rejecting the representation of the petitioners ought to

have referred the case of the petitioners to Industrial Land Management

Advisory Committee, and iii) that the rejection of the representation was

thus not by a competent authority.

6. The petitioners have now after another nearly three years of the order

dated 31st October, 2012 in W.P.(C) No.6832/2012 have filed this petition

pleading:

(A) That the respondents did not comply with the order dated 31st

October, 2012;

(B) Though petitioners made representations dated 29th November,

2012, 7th January, 2013 and 18th February, 2013 but no action

was taken thereon;

(C) The petitioners have come across various other decisions of

restoration of the cancelled lease deeds in favour of subsequent

purchasers;

(D) That even the website of the respondent No.2 DSIIDC provides

that a plot can be restored after removal of cause of

cancellation;

(E) That the violation in the present case, of non construction was

removed in the year 1996 itself when the petitioners completed

the building and started industrial unit and also started paying

tax with Municipal Corporation of Delhi therefor;

(F) That the petitioners filed Contempt Petition (Civil)

No.581/2013 alleging non compliance of the order dated 31st

August, 2012 in W.P.(C) No.6832/2013 supra and the

respondents conveyed to the Court that Industrial Land

Management Advisory Committee (ILMAC) had considered

the case of the petitioners on 4th March, 2013 and

recommendation of the Committee had been forwarded to the

Lieutenant Governor (LG) and the decision was awaited and the

contempt petition was disposed of on 31st July, 2013 with a

direction to the competent authority to take necessary decision

within two months;

(G) Another Contempt Petition (Civil) No.968/2013 was filed by

the petitioners;

(H) During the pendency of the aforesaid contempt petition, the

petitioners also filed W.P.(C) No.6267/2013 seeking de-sealing

of the property; however the said writ petition was withdrawn

with liberty to file afresh as Contempt Case (Civil)

No.968/2013 was pending;

(I) During the pendency of the aforesaid contempt case, the

respondents on 18th September, 2014 handed over a copy of the

decision dated 24th January, 2014 of the approval by the LG of

recommendation of ILMAC;

(J) That the decision dated 24th January, 2014 has been taken

without application of mind and in violation of the principles of

natural justice;

            (K)         That the petitioners through replies to queries under the Right

                       to   Information    Act,   2005    have    learnt    that      at     the

contemporaneous time only one Sh. Prabhat Kumar and one Sh.

S.C. Batra of respondent no.2 DSIIDC were authorized to pass

eviction order and Mr. C.B. Meshram who passed the eviction

order 30th September, 2003 was not authorized to do so;

(L) That the order dated 31st October, 2012 in W.P.(C)

No.6832/2012 has not been complied with;

(M) That the petitioners have spent huge monies on the property;

(N) That once there is a provision for compounding / regularizing,

cancellation / eviction should not be resorted to.

7. The reason for the order dated 16th July, 2015 quoted hereinabove

would become obvious from the narration of the facts aforesaid.

8. The counsel for the petitioners responding to the query in the order

dated 16th July, 2015, in his written submissions has contended i) that the

suit earlier filed by the petitioners was dismissed not on merits but on

account of lack of jurisdiction and though the petitioners had assailed the

order of the learned Single Judge of dismissal of a suit by filing a Regular

First Appeal but the same was withdrawn in view of the writ Court order;

ii) hence there was no finality to the decision in the suit; iii) though the

petitioners in W.P.(C) No.6832/2012 had disclosed of the previous

proceedings (the petitioners have not filed copy of this writ petition) but still

the Court granted an order in favour of the petitioners and which order

remains uncomplied; iv) that the issue in the suit and the issue in the present

writ petition are entirely different; v) the issue in this writ petition is whether

respondents / ILMAC has complied with the order dated 31 st October, 2012

and whether Sh. C.B. Meshram was empowered to act as an Estate Officer

and both of which issues were not subject matter of the suit; vi) reliance is

placed on Smt. Isabella Johnson Vs. M.A. Susai AIR 1991 SC 993 to

contend that the principles of res judicata do not apply to a pure question of

law; vii) reliance is placed on Rajendra Kumar Vs. District Judge, Jaunpur

AIR 1996 Allahabad 178 and The State of Haryana Vs. The Haryana Co-

operative Transport Ltd. AIR 1977 SC 237 to contend that res judicata is

not attracted if there is a wrong decision on point of jurisdiction; viii) that

the order dated 31st August, 2009 of dismissal of the suit is in ignorance of

the statutory provisions and thus cannot constitute res judicata.

9. I am afraid the contentions aforesaid of the petitioners are as

misconceived as the petition itself, which is also an abuse of the process of

the Court being by way of re-litigation.

10. The cancellation on 24th February, 1992 of the lease occurred more

than 23 years prior to the institution of the present petition. In fact, this

Court has as far back as on 31st August, 2009 while dismissing the suit

earlier filed by the petitioners held the challenge therein also to the said

cancellation of lease to be barred by time. It is not and it cannot be the

contention of the petitioners that this Court exercising Ordinary Original

Civil Jurisdiction, as this Court was in CS(OS) No.1837/2003, not entitled to

go into the challenge to the cancellation of the lease. The petitioners failed

in the said challenge and which order has attained finality. It is not

understandable as to how the petitioners after six years therefrom can again

rake up the same controversy. Not only is the challenge to the order of the

cancellation of the lease barred by laches, acquiescence and waiver but also

by way of re-litigation which in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N. Modi (1998) 3 SCC

573 has been held to be abuse of the process of the Court. As far as the

challenge to the order dated 30th September, 2003 of eviction under the PP

Act is concerned, the challenge thereto in this petition i.e. after nearly 12

years is again barred by laches, acquiescence and waiver. The challenge now

is on the ground of the order of officer who purporting to be the Estate

Officer, passed the said order having not been notified as the Estate Officer.

This Court in order dated 31st August, 2009 of dismissal of the suit has

already held that the order of eviction is merely consequential to the order

dated 24th February, 1992 of determination of lease. The same reasoning

holds good here also. Once the petitioners are not entitled to challenge the

order of cancellation of lease, it matters not whether the order of eviction

was passed by a duly authorized person or not inasmuch as the petitioners

upon cancellation of lease have been left with no right in the property.

Though undoubtedly the order of dismissal of suit has not gone into the

merits of the order of eviction but if the petitioners in the suit had also raised

the same challenge as made today, may be the suit would have been held to

be maintainable. The challenge on all grounds has to be made at the same

time and if it were to be held that challenge to the same provision or order

can be repeatedly made as long as it is on different grounds, it would not

allow any provision or order to attain finality and keep a dispute and lis alive

in perpetuity. Not only so, it is not open to a party / litigant to at his sweet

will make enquiries which may disclose a ground of challenge available to

him and to at any time on the basis of the said disclosure make a challenge.

The petitioners thus today after 12 years cannot be heard to say that the

Estate Officer who passed the order of eviction was not duly appointed.

11. As far back as in Devilal Modi, Proprietor, M/s. Daluram Pannalal

Modi Vs. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam AIR 1965 SC 1150 it was held that the

general principle underlying the doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based

on considerations of public policy; one important consideration of public

policy is that the decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction

should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities;

and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind

of litigation twice over, because such a process would be contrary to

considerations of fair play and justice. Considerations of public policy and

the principle of finality of judgments were held to be important constituents

of the rule of law which cannot be allowed to be violated just because a

citizen contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by an

impugned order and wants liberty to agitate the question about its validity by

filing one writ petition after another. It was further held that if the doctrine

of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be

open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds

every time, which is plainly inconsistent with considerations of public

policy. In M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka (2011) 3 SCC 408,

such as an exercise was labelled as "litigative adventure" and again held to

be against the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and

principles analogous thereto.

12. The order dated 31st October, 2012 in W.P.(C) No.6832/2012

preferred by the petitioners also in my view does not create any rights in

favour of the petitioners. The said order notices that in writ petition earlier

filed by the petitioners, the respondents had been directed to dispose of the

representation filed by the petitioners. The petitioners along with their

written submissions have filed copies of the orders dated 29th January, 2010

and 15th February, 2010 in W.P.(C) No.580/2012 and which show that the

petitioners withdrew that petition stating that they would be satisfied if the

respondents considered their representations dated 12 th June, 1997 and 22nd

October, 2008 in accordance with law. In the light of the said statement of

the petitioners, this Court disposed of that writ petition with a direction for

disposal of the representations of the petitioners. Though the petitioners

have not filed copy of W.P.(C) No.580/2010 also but it can reasonably be

assumed that the challenge therein also must have been to the orders dated

24th February, 1992 and 30th September, 2003. In my view, if a litigant so

unconditionally withdraws a challenge made, even if seeking a direction for

disposal of its representation, that litigant cannot make the same challenge

again unless has reserved the liberty to again make the challenge made in

that petition in the challenge to the order on the representation. The

petitioners herein are not found to have reserved any such right.

13. Coming back to the order dated 31st October, 2012 in W.P.(C)

No.6832/2012, as appears therefrom, the petitioners therein definitely

assailed the orders dated 24th February, 1992 and 30th September, 2003.

However this Court held that the said challenge was not maintainable and

what was required to be challenged was the order dated 21 st May, 2010 of

rejection of representation of the petitioners. Again no right was reserved by

the petitioners or reserved for the petitioners to again challenge the orders

dated 24th February, 1992 and 30th September, 2003 as have been challenged

in this petition. What this Court however directed was reconsideration of

the representation.

14. I have wondered whether a petitioner, challenge by whom to the

orders dated 24th February, 1992 and 30th September, 2003 has become

barred by time and law as aforesaid, by making a representation and by

filing a writ petition and obtaining an order therein for disposal of his

representation, can again revive the challenge which had become barred by

time and law. The answer to the said question, in my opinion, has to be

sought in reality and not in abstract. The Courts today are facing docket

explosion with each Bench of the Court having several times more cases

listed before it daily than it can possibly deal with. In such circumstances, if

the petitioners confine the relief in the petition to an innocuous relief of

disposal of his representation and the Court disposes of the writ petition by

granting the said relief, without applying its mind to whether the claim in the

representation was already barred by time and law and without hearing the

other side, certainly such an order cannot revive or furnish a cause of action

which had extinguished. A cause of action, to invoke the principles of CPC

is a bundle of facts entitling a person to a relief. In my view neither an order

of the Court, without going into the merits, directing disposal of a

representation nor a disposal of the representation in compliance therewith,

reiterating the earlier decision, can bring alive what was already dead and

buried. Only if a Court, after going through the facts and finding that

instead of the Court itself deciding the lis, a case for the respondents to

consider the same, directs so and keeps the original cause of action alive, can

it be said that an order in pursuance thereto would itself constitute a cause of

action. An order of the Court otherwise furnishes a cause of action for

appealing thereagainst and cannot revive a dead cause of action.

15. Supreme Court in C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and Mining

Indus. Est. (2008) 10 SCC 115 held as under:

"6. Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally, there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets

a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.

7. Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.

8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of `acknowledgment of a jural relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action. ......

10. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasize the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for `consideration'. If the representation

is on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing `consideration' of such claims."

(emphasis added)

Supreme Court again in Union of India Vs. M.K. Sarkar (2010) 2

SCC 59 cautioned against directing consideration of a claim or

representation and directed that before issuing any such direction, it must be

ensured that the same is with reference to a live issue and not with reference

to a dead or a stale issue. Recently, it was again so reiterated in State of

Uttaranchal Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari (2013) 12 SCC 179 and

in Dwipendra Nath Mukherji Vs. The Board of Trustees for the Port of

Kolkata (2015) 13 SCC 573.

16. The petitioners here have as aforesaid been abusing the process of the

Court. The petitioners first filed the suit for the same reliefs as claimed

herein and which was dismissed. The petitioners thereafter filed RFA(OS)

No.95/2009 (order of which has been filed along with the written

submissions) impugning the order of dismissal of the suit but during the

pendency thereof also filed W.P.(C) No.580/2010 for the same reliefs as

were claimed in the suit and which was withdrawn by confining the relief

therein to disposal of representation. Citing the said order, RFA (OS)

No.95/2009 was also withdrawn on 24th February, 2010. Thereafter W.P.(C)

No.6832/2012 was filed and in which it was clearly observed that the

challenge therein to the orders dated 24th February, 1992 and 30th

September, 2003 was misconceived. The said order was also allowed to

attain finality and the petitioners were satisfied with the order for

reconsideration of their representation. Thereafter yet another writ petition

being W.P.(C) No.6267/2013 is disclosed in the written submissions to have

been filed and which was also withdrawn on 1 st October, 2013 with liberty

to approach the Court which had passed the order dated 31 st July, 2013 in

Contempt Petition (Civil) No.581/2013. I absolutely fail to see as to how

the petitioners can file this petition for the same relief.

17. As far as the challenge in the present petition to the order dated 24 th

January, 2014 is concerned, the same, in compliance of the order dated 31st

October, 2012 in WP(C) No. 6832/2012 merely reiterates the order of

determination of lease and cannot furnish a fresh cause of action to

challenge the orders dated 24th February, 1992 and 30th September, 2003.

18. The petitioners by their actions deprived the industrial use of the

property for over 30 years to the serious prejudice of the society as a whole

and the country.

19. Not only thus the petition is dismissed but the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K.

Sehgal is also burdened with cost of Rs.1,00,000/- for abusing the process of

this Court. In fact, it is not even known whether the petitioner No.2 Sh.

Gulshan Lal as whose attorney Smt. Anjana Sehgal is filing this petition is

alive. Unless the petitioner no.1 Sh. S.K. Sehgal pays the cost of

Rs.1,00,000/- to the respondent no.2 DSIIDC within one month of today, the

respondent No.2 DSIIDC would be entitled to take appropriate proceedings

for recovery thereof.

RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.

MARCH 08, 2016 „gsr‟