Roshan Lal & Ors. vs Shakuntla Devi
2016 Latest Caselaw 326 Del

*              HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                  FAO 137/2015
                                         Decided on: 15th January, 2016


       ROSHAN LAL & ORS                                  ..... Appellants
                    Through:           Mr. C.S. Dahiya, Advocate.

                          versus

       SHAKUNTLA DEVI                                     ..... Respondent
                   Through:            Nemo.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)

1. This is an appeal filed by the appellant against the order dated

18.02.2015, by virtue of which the learned trial court has rejected

the suit of the appellant bearing No.24/2015 titled Roshan Lal and

Others Vs. Shakuntla Devi, in which the stated facts of the case are

that plaintiff No.3 Smt. Seema Devi got married to son of the

defendant Shakuntla Devi. Plaintiff No.1 is father of plaintiff

No.3. Plaintiff No.2 is the brother of Smt. Seema Devi and

plaintiff no.4 is the mother. Smt. Shakuntla Devi has purportedly

filed a criminal complaint against the present appellants in Agra in

the year 2012 in the court of ACJM, Agra. Apparently it is seen

that there was some matrimonial discord between appellant No.3

and the son of the respondent. The court of ACJM, Agra issue

non-bailable warrants to SHO, P.S. Ranhola for the purposes of

attendance of the appellant before the Court of ACJM.

2. The appellants feeling aggrieved by virtue of issuance of warrants

by the ACJM, Agra, filed a petition before the Allahabad High

Court, which granted the requisite relief to the appellant, inasmuch

as it was directed that no coercive steps would be taken against the

appellants for procuring the attendance before the court of ACJM

and the appellants shall file an application under Section 245 (2)

Cr.P.C. for their discharge. On such an application having been

filed the ACJM granted the requisite relief to the appellants.

3. The appellants, as a consequence of being discharged in the said

criminal proceedings by the court of ACJM, filed a suit for

malicious prosecution against the respondent and have sought

damages. In para 17 of the plaint the following averments were

made with regard to the court in Delhi having the territorial

jurisdiction to try the matter:-

"17. That the plaintiffs is residing within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court and the NBW issued against the plaintiffs were sent for execution at police station Ranhola, Delhi and the plaintiff No.3 is residing with her parents as the matrimonial family members had thrown her out and the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Hon'ble Court and hence the Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present suit."

4. Learned court after consideration of the matter arrived at a

conclusion that the plaint be liable to be rejected under Order 7

Rule 10 CPC, as the court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to

try the matter. The present appellants feeling aggrieved have filed

the present appeal.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. He has placed

reliance on judgments of three courts including of Delhi High

Court in case titled as Sh. Surat Singh Vs. Municipal Corporation

of Delhi reported at AIR 1989 DELHI 51, in support of his

submission that the Delhi High Court has the jurisdiction.

6. I have gone through the said judgments except the judgment in Dr.

R.P. Goala Vs. Amarpal Singh reported as AIR 1972 Rajasthan

142 (V.59 C.39). The two judgments are of no relevance to the

facts of the present case.

7. I have also considered the submissions made by the learned

counsel for the appellants carefully. If one sees the jurisdiction

clause of the plaint, it does not talk about the residence or the place

of work of the defendant. On the contrary, it talks about the

residence and place of work of the plaintiff, which can hardly be a

ground of forming jurisdiction to the Delhi. Section 20 of the CPC

is very clear that there are three places, which will have the

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, these are; where the

defendant resides, works or where the cause of action has accrued

in full or in part. Thus, so far as the first two conditions are

concerned, the appellants are not banking on the same. The

learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the third

condition that the cause of action of filing the suit for malicious

prosecution has arisen in Delhi on account of the fact that the local

police of P.S. Ranhola had come to execute the warrants purported

to have been issued by ACJM, Agra, and, therefore, Delhi court

had the jurisdiction.

8. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the

appellant that a part of the cause of action has arisen in Delhi on

account of non-bailable warrants having been issued by the ACJM

and sent to the SHO P.S. Ranhola for the purpose of execution.

Delhi Courts would have a jurisdiction only if the warrants were

executed in Delhi. In the absence of the execution, Delhi Courts

have no jurisdiction, as no part of cause of action has arisen in

Delhi. It is precisely for these reasons that the appellants himself

have gone to Allahabad High Court against the issuance of

warrants against him. The judgment which has been relied upon

by the learned counsel for the appellant in Dr. R.P. Goala's case,

would not be applicable to the facts of the present case for the

simple reason that in the said case under somewhat similar

circumstances, the court came to entertain the suit on account of

the court in Jodhpur having territorial jurisdiction. This was

because of the fact that in the said case a criminal complaint was

filed against the plaintiff who was an officer in the India Air Force.

When the summons were served on the plaintiff, he was posted at

Jodhpur. Therefore, the court came to the finding that as the

plaintiff was posted at Jodhpur, the part of action has arisen in

Jodhpur and thus, the suit for defamation was maintainable at

Jodhpur.

9. This is unlike in the present case where although non-bailable

warrants issued, but they were not executed and, therefore, it

cannot be said that any part of cause of action had accrued to the

appellants in Delhi. For these reasons, I feel that the appeal, which

had been filed by the appellants is without any merit and the trial

court has rightly rejected the plaint of the appellants.

10. In view of the foregoing discussion, I feel that the appeal is without

any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.

11. Pending application also stands disposed of.

V.K. SHALI, J.

JANUARY 15, 2016 / N