Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 756 Del
Judgement Date : 2 February, 2016
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: January 18, 2016
Pronounced on: February 02, 2016
+ W.P.(C) 7281/2013
RAM NARESH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Himanshu Bajaj and
Ms. Sakshi Agrawal, Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Barkha Babbar and
Ms. Dipanjali Tyagi, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
JUDGMENT
% SUNIL GAUR, J
1. Penalty of reduction of pay by two stages i.e. from `7860/- to
`7290/- in the time scale of pay `5200-20200/- + `2000/- (Grade
Pay) for a period of one year with the rider that petitioner will not
earn increments of his pay during the period of reduction and that
on expiry of this period, the reduction will have the effect of
postponing his future increments of pay, is assailed in this petition
by petitioner, who was working as Constable of Central Industrial
Security Force (CISF) Unit, SSG, Greater Noida (U.P.) in the year
2010.
2. Vide Office Memorandum of 12th September, 2011, charge-
sheet under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules-2001 was issued. The Article
of Charge upon which petitioner was departmentally tried reads as
under: -
"That No.014070042 Const. (GD) Ram Naresh, 'Adm' Group, CISF Unit, SSG, Greater Noida, (U.P.) while performing duty in MI Room of the unit involved himself in malpractice during the process of medical test of Anand Kumar for the post of Constable in CISF scheduled to be held at CISF Hospital, Ghaziabad, U.P.
in August, 2010. Such serious act on his part tantamount to gross indiscipline, misconduct, dereliction of duty, which is highly unbecoming of a member of a disciplined Armed Force of the Union like CISF. Hence the charge."
3. Petitioner had given a reply to the Memorandum of Charge,
which was not found to be satisfactory, and in the Inquiry
conducted, nine witnesses were got examined. The material
evidence is of the complainant-Sergeant Ramashray Ram (PW-1),
uncle of Anand Kumar, who had also deposed before the Inquiry
Officer. Apart from this, there is evidence of father as well as
brother of above-said Anand Kumar as well as of Constable-Deepak
Kumar Rao.
4. Regarding the mal-practices in the recruitment of Constables
(GD), an anonymous complaint was received on 22nd August, 2010
on which preliminary inquiry was held. However, a complaint was
received from Ramashray Ram (PW-1), uncle of selected
Constable-Anand Kumar, regarding the demand of bribe for
recruitment of Anand Kumar as Constable in CISF.
5. While relying upon the evidence recorded, Inquiry Officer vide
his Report of 31st January, 2012 concluded that the charge against
petitioner stood proved. The Inquiry Report was supplied to
petitioner, who had responded to it and thereafter, the Disciplinary
Authority had passed the final order of 31st March, 2012 inflicting
afore-noted impugned penalty upon petitioner.
6. Departmental appeal was preferred by the petitioner, which
stood dismissed vide impugned order of 20th June, 2012 (Annexure
P-4), which is assailed in this petition.
7. At the hearing, learned counsel for petitioner had assailed the
impugned penalty on the ground that the Inquiry conducted
against petitioner is void ab initio in view of the Central Vigilance
Commission's guidelines of 29th June, 1999 (Annexure P-2). It was
vehemently submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that the
Inquiry was initiated on an anonymous complaint, which could not
have been done as anonymous/pseudonymous complaints have to
be just filed.
8. It was further submitted that Inquiry against petitioner
proceeded on vague charge, which is impermissible in law. To
contend so, reliance was placed upon Apex Court's decisions in
Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society and Others (2013) 6
SCC 515 and Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454.
9. It was next contended that impugned penalty inflicted upon
petitioner is liable to be set aside as it is based on no evidence. To
contend so, reliance was placed upon Apex Court's decision in
Union of India v. H.C. Goel (1964) 4 SCR 718. Reliance was also
placed upon Apex Court's decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab
National Bank and Others (2009) 2 SCC 570 to submit that even in
a domestic Inquiry, suspicion or presumption cannot take place of
proof. Contending that there is no evidence on record to prove the
charge against petitioner, it was submitted by learned counsel for
petitioner that the impugned penalty deserves to be set aside.
10. On the contrary, it was submitted by learned counsel for
respondents that the Inquiry did not proceed on anonymous/
pseudonymous complaint only, but was infact based on complaint
made by Sergeant Ramashray Ram and so, there is no violation of
Central Vigilance Commission's guidelines.
11. To submit that the charge against petitioner was not vague,
attention of this Court was drawn to the Imputation of Charge and
the reply thereto by the petitioner. To do so, the original record
was produced by respondents. Attention of this Court was also
drawn to the deposition of Ramashray Ram (PW-1) and to the
evidence of Pappu Kumar (PW-2), brother of Anand Kumar. It was
sought to be highlighted that the frequency of the mobile calls
between petitioner and Anand Kumar during the period in question
corroborates the charge against petitioner and so, it cannot be said
that it is a case of no evidence. Thus, dismissal of this petition was
sought.
12. Upon considering the submissions advanced by both the sides
and on perusal of the impugned order, the original record produced
before us and the decisions cited, we find that the Departmental
Inquiry against petitioner did not proceed solely on the basis of
anonymous/pseudonymous complaint, but was on the basis of the
complaint of Ramashray Ram and so, reliance placed by learned
counsel for the petitioner upon Central Vigilance Commission's
guidelines (Annexure P-2) is of no avail.
13. So far as the vagueness of the Article of Charge against
petitioner is concerned, we do find that though the Article of
Charge, as referred to above, is not specifically worded, but it
conveys the substratum of the charge i.e. of the petitioner being
involved in mal-practices of getting Anand Kumar cleared in the
medical test. Memorandum of charge has to be considered in the
light of the reply given by petitioner to the aforesaid Memorandum.
On doing so, it becomes clear that petitioner was very much aware
as to on what basis he was being proceeded against. On this
aspect, the pertinent observations of the Apex Court in Anant R.
Kulkarni (supra) are as under: -
"Where the charge-sheet is accompanied by the statement of facts and the allegations are not specific in the charge-sheet, but are crystal clear from the statement of facts, in such a situation, as both constitute the same document, it cannot be held that as the charges were not specific, definite and clear, the enquiry stood vitiated. Thus, nowhere should a delinquent be served a charge-sheet, without providing to him, a clear, specific and definite description of the charge against him. When statement of allegations are not served with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiated, as having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice. The evidence adduced should not be perfunctory; even if the delinquent does
not take the defense of, or make a protest that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated, for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences. What is required to be examined is whether the delinquent knew the nature of accusation. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.
The purpose of holding an enquiry against any person is not only with a view to establish the charges leveled against him or to impose a penalty, but is also conducted with the object of such an enquiry recording the truth of the matter, and in that sense, the outcome of an enquiry may either result in establishing or vindicating his stand, and hence result in his exoneration. Therefore, fair action on the part of the authority concerned is a paramount necessity."
14. We have considered the Memorandum of Charge and the
reply thereto by the petitioner and upon doing so, we find that it
cannot be said that the petitioner was not aware about the nature
of accusations. During the course of hearing, it was not brought to
our notice as to how and in what manner the petitioner has
suffered any prejudice on account of generalized charge leveled
against him. Reliance placed by learned counsel for petitioner upon
the Apex Court's decision in Sawai Singh (supra) is of no avail as in
the said decision, the vague charge was not sufficient to connect
the charged officer with the alleged misconduct. It is not so in the
instant case. So, on this count, the impugned penalty cannot be
faulted.
15. With the able assistance of learned counsel for the parties, we
had gone through the original record produced and upon doing so,
it transpired that the evidence of the complainant-Ramashray Ram
(PW-1) primarily proceeds on the information given to him by
Anand Kumar (PW-5) and is in the nature of corroborative
evidence. Pertinently, in the cross-examination, this witness
(PW-1) has stated in his evidence in no uncertain terms that he
had no talk with Anand Kumar (PW-5) and Pappu Kumar (PW-2)
regarding any taking or giving of money and this witness has gone
to the extent of stating in his evidence that Deepak Kumar Rao
(PW-4) had told him about the medical examination of Anand
Kumar (PW-5). Pappu Kumar (PW-2) in his cross-examination has
clearly stated that he had no contact with the petitioner regarding
the medical test of Anand Kumar and there was no conversation
with the petitioner regarding taking or giving of money.
16. In the cross-examination, this witness (PW-2) has pleaded
ignorance to most of the questions put to him. Although R.K.
Bhardwaj (PW-3) deposed about the mobile calls between the
petitioner and Deepak Kumar Rao, but he has stated in his
evidence that he does not have any proof. Pertinently, it has not
come on record as to what was the nature of the conversation
between petitioner and the said Deepak Kumar Rao. Infact, Deepak
Kumar Rao (PW-4) has a different story to tell. He talks of some
marriage proposal between Anand Kumar and his sister. The cross-
examination of this witness (PW-4) reveals that the mobile talks
with the petitioner were essentially regarding the marriage
proposal and had nothing to do with the subject matter of the
charge. The material witness, Anand Kumar (PW-5) in his evidence
has consistently maintained that there was no demand of any
money by the petitioner, nor he had met the petitioner. This
witness has categorically negated the case set up against the
petitioner. The court witness, K. R. Pillai has proved the call details
and from his evidence, nothing emanates which can incriminate the
petitioner.
17. The limits of judicial review of penalty/punishment imposed
by the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority are reiterated by the Apex
Court in Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation Limited and
Another v. Jai Raj Singh Chauhan (2011) 13 SCC 541 as under: -
"16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in writ jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot, normally speaking, substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental appellate authority, is either impermissible or such that it shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally
substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, it appears, ignored the well-settled principle that even though judicial review of administrative action must remain flexible and its dimension not closed, yet the court, in exercise of the power of judicial review, is not concerned with the correctness of the findings of fact on the basis of which the orders are made so long as those findings are reasonably supported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedings which cannot be faulted with for procedural illegalities or irregularities which vitiate the process by which the decision was arrived at. Judicial review, it must be remembered, is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision-making process. Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 1 WLR 1155 : (1982) 3 All ER 141 (HL)] observed: (WLR p. 1160)
'... The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself, a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.'
17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was
arrived at, the court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority."
18. Applying the afore-noted dictum to the facts of the instant
case, we find that though the evidence was led before the Inquiry
Officer, but so far as the petitioner is concerned, it is a case of no
evidence qua him. Pertinently, the Disciplinary Authority in the final
order of 31st March, 2012 has relied upon the evidence of
Ramashray Ram (PW-1) and Pappu Kumar (PW-2) and the call
records to conclude that the petitioner had mis-conducted himself.
It is worthwhile to note that there do not exist any voice recordings
of the calls made to connect the petitioner with the alleged mal-
practices. The call details simply reveal that one solitary call of a
short duration was there between the petitioner and Anand Kumar.
We are conscious of the fact that the petitioner's co-accused,
Deepak Kumar Rao has also been found guilty and the penalty
imposed upon him is sub judice before another High Court and so,
we have cursorily gone through the evidence with particular
reference to the petitioner only and we refrain from commenting
upon the evidence qua the petitioner's co-accused-Deepak Kumar
Rao, lest it may prejudice the case of the petitioner's co-accused.
So far as the petitioner is concerned, we find that the evidence qua
the petitioner coupled with the call details does not connect him
with the alleged mal-practices in any manner whatsoever.
19. The Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi (supra) has reiterated that
the departmental proceedings are quasi judicial and suspicion or
presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic
Inquiry and that the writ court is entitled to interfere with the
findings of facts by any Tribunal or Authority in certain
circumstances. In our considered opinion, this is one such case
where the finding on charge being proved from the evidence on
record deserves to be interfered with, as on scrutiny of the
evidence on record, we have found that no incriminating evidence
has emerged for justifying the imposition of the impugned penalty
upon the petitioner. Consequently, in our considered opinion, the
findings of misconduct returned against the petitioner, are legally
untenable.
20. In the light of the aforesaid, the final order of 31st March,
2012 (Annexure P-3) imposing the impugned penalty as well as the
appellate order of 30th November, 2012 (Annexure P-5) is hereby
quashed and set aside.
21. This petition is accordingly allowed and disposed of while
making it clear that any observations made in this Judgment will
have no bearing in the case of the petitioner's co-accused-Deepak
Kumar Rao.
SUNIL GAUR, J
HIMA KOHLI, J FEBRUARY 02, 2016 s
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