Usha Dhuria & Ors vs The State & Anr
2016 Latest Caselaw 1524 Del

*   IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+   CRL.M.C. 1336/2015
                                  Date of Decision: February 26th, 2016
    USHA DHURIA & ORS                                       ..... Petitioner
                         Through:         Ms.Ritu Dhuria, Adv.

                         versus

    THE STATE & ANR                                        ..... Respondents
                  Through:                Mr.Kamal Kumar Ghei, APP.
                                          IO/SI Subhash Chand, PS: Lajpat
                                          Nagar.

           CORAM:
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

    P.S.TEJI, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed

by the petitioners, namely, Sh. Usha Dhuria, Sh. Vishal Kumar

Dhuria, Smt. Babita Dhuria and Smt. Meeta Agrani for quashing of

FIR No.962/1999 dated 11.08.1999, under Sections

177/182/203/191/192/355 IPC registered at Police Station Lajpat

Nagar on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

arrived at between the petitioners and the respondent no.2, namely,

Sh. Satendar Kumar Malik on 10.05.2014.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State

submitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has been

identified to be the complainant/first informant in the FIR in question

by SI Subhash Chand.

3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the complainant

lodged the FIR in question on the allegation that the complainant was

being illegally harassed by the accused persons for a very long time

due to professional rivalry. The accused used all kinds of illegal and

unlawful acts and omissions to cause damage to the business,

property, life and limbs of the complainant. It is very common

tendency of the accused/petitioner no.2 to send his employee right

next to the shop of the complainant and distract the customers.

Whenever, the complainant tried to stop them, he was abused and

threatened. On 11.08.1999, the petitioner no.2 sent his employee to

stand in front of the complainant's shop. The complainant tried to stop

him, on which, the petitioner no.2 came to the shop of the

complainant with an iron rod in his hand and started threatening the

complainant. After half an hour, three Sikh youths along with the

petitioner no.2 came to the shop of the complainant. One Sikh youth

slapped the employees of the complainant and the petitioner no.2 took

out a knife and tried to stab the complainant's son. During the same,

the petitioner no.1 came in between and got injured. Thereafter,

certain police officials came to arrest the complainant as the

petitioners had already reported to the police a false and concocted

story.

The petitioner no.1 had filed a complaint in PS Lajpat Nagar

and thus FIR No.723/99 was registered against the complainant. The

respondent no.2 filed a complaint before the Ld. CMM, which lead to

the registration of FIR in question against the petitioners. Later on,

with the intervention of their respective counsels, parties resolved all

their issues.

4. Respondent No.2 present in the Court, submitted that the

dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the

MOU, it is agreed between the parties that respondent no.2 alongwith

Rishi Malik shall pay an amount of Rs. 4 Lakhs by way of bank drafts

in the name of petitioner no.1. It is also agreed that the schedule of

payment shall be as enunciated in the terms of the MOU. It is also

agreed that the parties shall file two different quashing petitions

before this Court seeking quashing of FIR no. 723/1999 and the FIR

in question and have further decided to cooperate with each other in

getting the FIR in question quashed and also to execute the necessary

documents for the same. It is further agreed that both quashing

petitions shall be prepared by respondent no.2 alongwith Rishi Malik

which shall be filed before this Court within 20 days from the date of

signing of the MOU. It is also agreed that all expenses with regard to

such quashing petitions shall be borne by the respondent no.2

alongwith Rishi Malik. It is agreed by the parties that they shall not

initiate any civil or criminal proceedings against each other in any

Court in respect of the incident resulting into the registration of the

two FIRs which have been agreed to be mutually settled. Respondent

No.2 affirmed the contents of the aforesaid settlement and of his

affidavit dated 24.03.2015 supporting this petition. In the affidavit,

the respondent no.2 has stated that he has no objection if the FIR in

question is quashed. All the disputes and differences have been

resolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitioners

survives and so, the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be

brought to an end. Statement of the respondent No.2 has been

recorded in this regard in which he stated that he has entered into a

compromise with the petitioners and has settled all the disputes with

them. He further stated that he has no objection if the FIR in question

is quashed.

5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex

Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in

cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

"61. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."

6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a

recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC

466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh

(Supra) are as under:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

7. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to

prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent no.2 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in question and

has stated that the matter has been settled out of his own free will. As

the matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there

would be an extraordinary delay in the process of law if the legal

proceedings between the parties are carried on. So, this Court is of

the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law and

to secure the ends of justice.

8. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision

of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is

abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;

where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to

avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision

of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of

justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to

circumvent the express provisions of law.

9. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram

Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of

Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009

has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the

Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice

or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is

not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

10. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced

that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not

affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of

such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace

and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.

In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and

energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in

entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is

compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.

Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675

the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of

Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not

compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,

section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of

quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts

and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-

compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that

notwithstanding the fact that the offences under Sections

177/182/191/192/203 IPC are non-compoundable offences, there

should be no impediment in quashing the FIR under these sections, if

the Court is otherwise satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the

case so warrant.

11. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of

statement made by the respondent No.2, the FIR in question warrants

to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon need to be

quashed.

12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.962/1999

dated 11.08.1999, under Sections 177/182/203/191/192/355 IPC

registered at Police Station Lajpat Nagar and the proceedings

emanating therefrom are quashed against the petitioners.

13. This petition is accordingly disposed of.

(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE FEBRUARY 26, 2016 dd