Anuradha Handa vs State And Ors
2016 Latest Caselaw 1099 Del

*   IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+   CRL.M.C. 4806/2015
                                  Date of Decision : February 12th, 2016
    ANURADHA HANDA
                                                                 ..... Petitioner
                         Through:       In person.

                         versus

    STATE AND ORS
                                                               ..... Respondent
                         Through:       Ms. Manjeet Arya, Additional Public
                                        Prosecutor for the State

           CORAM:
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI

    P.S.TEJI, J.

1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed

by the petitioner, namely, Ms. Anuradha Handa for quashing of FIR

No.521/2009 dated 31.10.2009, under Sections 279/338 IPC

registered at Police Station Malviya Nagar on the basis of the

compromise deed arrived at between the petitioner and the respondent

nos. 2 & 3, namely, Mr. Harkesh and Mr. Kenny Joseph, respectively

on 26.10.2015.

2. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent-State

submitted that the respondent no.2, present in the Court has been

identified to be the first informant-complainant and respondent no.3

has been identified to be the victim in the FIR in question by their

counsel.

3. The factual matrix of the present case is that the FIR in question

was lodged by the complainant-respondent no.2 on the allegation that

he and respondent no.3 were coming back to their home on

31.10.2009 after gym on their motorcycle. All of a sudden, a lady who

was driving a Santro Car negligently arrived and collided with their

motorcycle due to which their motorcycle fell down and both of them

suffered injuries.

Thereafter, the respondent no.2 lodged the FIR in question

against the petitioner/accused. The charge sheet under Section

279/338 IPC was filed. Later on, the parties reached to an amicable

settlement.

4. Respondent Nos.2 & 3 present in the Court, submitted that the

dispute between the parties has been amicably resolved. As per the

compromise deed, both the parties have settled the dispute and have

agreed that they do not wish to proceed any further with the criminal

case arising out of the FIR in question against the petitioner. It is

agreed that the settlement shall not in any manner, be construed as an

admission on beh0alf of the petitioner and the same is without

prejudice to her rights and contentions. It is also agreed that the

respondent nos. 2 & 3 have already received a compensation of

Rs.66,000/- from the Insurance Company in accordance with award of

the MACT in 2011. It is agreed that neither party shall file any other

complaint/police complaint/legal proceedings etc. against each other

or their respective family members, except the Appeal MAC 63/2012

filed by respondent no.2 against the ICICI Lombard against the order

of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal dated 28.02.2011 for

enhancement of his claim which is pending before this Court which

shall be withdrawn. It is agreed that in case any complaint/police

complaint/legal action is taken by either party against the other party

then the same shall be deemed to be withdrawn and concerned party

shall be liable to withdraw the same and, if required, fully cooperate

with the other party to get the same either withdrawn and/or

compounded and/or quashed etc. It is further agreed that the petitioner

shall take all required actions and measures to have the FIR in

question quashed before this Court. It is also agreed that the

respondent nos. 2 & 3 shall cooperate with the petitioner in getting the

FIR in question quashed by being present as and when required before

the concerned authorities. It is agreed that hereinafter there shall be no

litigation between the parties relating to or arising out of the subject

matter of the FIR in question. Respondent nos. 2 & 3 affirmed the

contents of the aforesaid settlement and of their individual affidavits

dated 10.11.2015. In their respective affidavits, the respondent nos.2

& 3 have stated that they have no objection if the FIR in question is

quashed. All the disputes and differences have been resolved through

mutual consent. Now no dispute with petitioner survives and so, the

proceedings arising out of the FIR in question be brought to an end.

Statements of the respondent Nos.2 & 3 have been recorded in this

regard in which they stated that they have entered into a compromise

with the petitioner and have settled all the disputes with her. They

further stated that they have no objection if the FIR in question is

quashed.

5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 Apex

Court has recognized the need of amicable resolution of disputes in

cases like the instant one, by observing as under:-

"61. In other words, the High Court must consider

whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings."

6. The aforesaid dictum stands reiterated by the Apex Court in a

recent judgment in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC

466. The relevant observations of the Apex Court in Narinder Singh

(Supra) are as under:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

7. The inherent powers of the High Court ought to be exercised to

prevent the abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

The respondent nos.2 & 3 agreed to the quashing of the FIR in

question and have stated that the matter has been settled out of their

own free will. As the matter has been settled and compromised

amicably, so, there would be an extraordinary delay in the process of

law if the legal proceedings between the parties are carried on. So,

this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a fit case to invoke

the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of

process of law and to secure the ends of justice.

8. The incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

is meant to deal with the situation in the absence of express provision

of law to secure the ends of justice such as, where the process is

abused or misused; where the ends of justice cannot be secured;

where the process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to

avoid the causing of harassment to any person by using the provision

of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of the legal process in the delivery of

justice. Whereas, the inherent power is not to be exercised to

circumvent the express provisions of law.

9. It is settled law that the inherent power of the High Court under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. The Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram

Anatrai Doshi and Ors. MANU/SC/0842/2014 and in the case of

Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal MANU/SC/0808/2009

has observed that powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be

exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when the

Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice

or there would be abuse of the process of the Court if such power is

not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.

10. It is a well settled law that where the High Court is convinced

that the offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not

affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of

such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace

and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them.

In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and

energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in

entering into compromise. In certain cases, the main offence is

compoundable but the connected offences are not. In the case of B.S.

Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675

the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of

Section 320 Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not

compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. The Hon'ble Apex Court laid down that if for the purpose of

securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary,

section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of

quashing. In the nutshell, the Hon'ble Apex Court justified the

exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings to secure the ends of justice in view of the special facts

and circumstances of the case, even where the offences were non-

compoundable.

In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that

notwithstanding the fact that the offence under Section 279 IPC is a

non-compoundable offence, there should be no impediment in

quashing the FIR under this section, if the Court is otherwise satisfied

that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant.

11. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of

statements made by the respondent Nos.2 & 3, the FIR in question

warrants to be put to an end and proceedings emanating thereupon

need to be quashed.

12. Accordingly, this petition is allowed and FIR No.521/2009

dated 31.10.2009, under Sections 279/338 IPC registered at Police

Station Malviya Nagar and the proceedings emanating therefrom are

quashed against the petitioner.

13. This petition is accordingly disposed of.

(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE FEBRUARY 12, 2016 dd