Delhi High Court
Mohd.Ibrahim And Ors. vs Shuja-Uddin on 3 August, 2016
$~32
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 03.08.2016
+ CM(M) 736/2016
MOHD.IBRAHIM AND ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through Mr.Bahar U.Barqi, Advocates.
versus
SHUJA-UDDIN ..... Respondent
Through None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT NATH
JAYANT NATH, J.(ORAL)
1. By the present petition, the petitioners seek to impugn the order dated
22.07.2016 by which the application of the petitioners under Order VIII
Rule 1-A CPC was dismissed by the learned CCJ-Cum-ARC-1 (Central),
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
2. The respondent has filed an eviction petition against the petitioners
for eviction of Shop No.6512, Ground Floor, Main Road, Bara Hindu Rao,
Delhi- 110006 under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC
Act.
3. The petitioners have filed their application for leave to defend.
Subsequently, they moved the present application under Order VIII Rule 1-
A read with Section 151 CPC seeking place on record electricity bills with
respect to another property bearing Kh.No.140(1-0), 146(0-10-1/21),
Ground Floor, Village Ibrahimpur City, Delhi-110036 which according to
them is the alternative accommodation owned by the respondent.
CM(M) 736/2016 Page 1 of 5
4. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the trial court relying
upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh v.
Satpal Singh, (2010) 2 SCC 15/( MANU/SC/1920/2009) and judgment of
this court in Madhu Gupta v. Gardenia Estate Pvt. Ltd., 184 (2011) DLT
103 dismissed the application holding that the electricity bills do not relate
to the subsequent event, which has taken place after filing of leave to defend
application. There is no explanation as to why the bills could not be filed at
the time of filing of the application of leave to defend.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that reliance of the
trial court on the judgment of Madhu Gupta v. Gardenia Estate Pvt. Ltd.
(supra), is misplaced as he is not intending to move any amendment to his
leave to defend application. All that he seeks to file documents to support
his submission which is already there in the application seeking leave to
defend filed by the petitioners. Hence, he submits that the impugned order is
erroneous.
6. In my opinion, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner.
The Supreme Court in Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (supra), held as
follows:
"16. From a careful perusal of Sub-section (4) of Section 25B
of the Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that the tenant shall
not be permitted to contest the prayer for eviction unless he
files an affidavit before the Controller stating the ground on
which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and
obtains leave from the Controller. This Section also clearly
indicates that in default of his appearance in compliance with
the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made
by the landlord in the eviction proceeding shall be deemed to be
admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to an
order for eviction on the ground mentioned in the eviction
CM(M) 736/2016 Page 2 of 5
petition. At this stage, we may also note that in Sub-section (4)
of Section 25B of the Rent Act read with Third Schedule, it has
been made clear by the Legislature that if the summons of the
proceeding is received by the tenant, he has to appear and ask
for leave to contest the eviction proceeding within 15 days from
the date of service of notice upon the tenant and if he fails to do
so, automatically, an order of eviction in favour of the landlord
on the ground of bona fide requirement shall be made."
7. The learned Single Judge of this court in Sh.Mirajuddin v.
Mohammad Habib & Ors., R.C. Rev. No.488/2011, decided on 24.07.2014,
held as follows:
"9. Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue orally
before this Court by placing reliance upon certain documents by
stating that facts have now come to notice which entitle grant of
leave to defend, however, this is not permitted in law in view of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal
Singh Vs. Satpal Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15
and which holds that whatever has to be stated for grant of
leave to defend has to be necessarily and only stated within 15
days in the leave to defend application and the statutory period
of 15 days is sacrosanct. Supreme Court has held in the case of
Prithipal Singh (supra) that there cannot be condonation of
delay of even one day in filing of an application for leave to
defend because neither the provision of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 nor the provisions of CPC, 1908 apply to
the exhaustive procedure for bonafide necessity under Section
25 B of the Act. Once the period of 15 days is sacrosanct, it is
not permissible to a tenant after the period of 15 days to keep
on filing affidavits or documents to urge grounds for seeking
leave to defend, and which if permitted to be done, will be
violative of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Prithipal Singh (supra) that 15 days period for filing
of leave to defend application is non-flexible and a fixed period,
and every aspect for seeking leave to defend has to be stated
within 15 days only and not thereafter. Therefore, the so called
CM(M) 736/2016 Page 3 of 5
subsequent events which are sought to be urged cannot be
urged on behalf of the petitioner."
8. Similar view was taken by the learned Single Judge of this court in
Sh.Sanjeev Gupta & Ors. v. Sh.Subhash Kumar Gupta & Anr., R.C.Rev.
No.270/2013, decided on 27.08.2014, wherein it was held as follows:
"2. Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh Vs. Satpal
Singh (dead) through LRs (2010) 2 SCC 15 has held that the
statutory period for filing of leave to defend is sacrosanct and
there cannot be condonation of delay of even one day in filing
of the leave to defend application. A learned single Judge of
this Court in the case of Ms. Madhu Gupta Vs. M/s. Gardenia
Estates (P) Ltd. 184 (2011) DLT 103 has held that there cannot
be filed an application for amendment of the leave to defend
application after a period of 15 days because that would amount
to destroying the sanctity of the 15 days period as stated in the
case of Prithipal Singh (supra).
3. In view of the above, it is clear that whatever has to be
stated by a tenant for seeking leave to defend has to be stated
within 15 days, and after a period of 15 days, no application for
leave to defend should be entertained nor any additional
affidavit or document be allowed to be taken on
record/considered or an application to amend the leave to
defend application be entertained on the ground that certain
additional facts or documents are required to be considered."
9. Similar view was also taken by the learned Single Judge of this court
in Mohd. burhan. v. Shri Triloki Nath Nirmal, R.C.Rev. No.240/2013,
decided on 25.08.2014 and in Punjab Stainless Stell House v. Sangeeta
Kedia MANU/DE/2055/2014; C.M.(M) No.1354/2011.
10. Hence, the settled legal position is that the time period stipulated
under Section 25-B of the DRC Act has to be adhered to. No additional
documents can be filed as are sought to be done.
CM(M) 736/2016 Page 4 of 5
11. In the light of the above, it is not permissible for the petitioners at this
stage to start filing any new document. The present petition is without any
merits and is dismissed.
JAYANT NATH, J.
AUGUST 03, 2016/v
