Delhi High Court
Ex. Constable Kuldeep Singh vs Union Of India And Ors. on 30 September, 2015
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on : 30.09.2015
+ W.P.(C) 1116/2014, C.M. NO.5510/2015
EX. CONSTABLE KULDEEP SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through : Ms. Jyoti Singh, Sr. Advocate with Sh.
Sameer Sharma and Ms. Tinu Bajwa, Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through : Sh. Rajesh Gogna, CGSC with Ms.
Bhavna Bajaj, Advocate, for Respondent Nos. 1, 2,
4 and 5.
Sh. B.K. Rout, Pairavi Officer, CRPF.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA
MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT (OPEN COURT)
%
1. The petitioner's grievance is that by virtue of the impugned orders he
was dismissed from the Central Reserve Police Force ("CRPF") from the
post he held as Constable. The reason for his dismissal was that he omitted
to report details of an FIR, which pertained to a time when the petitioner was
still a minor. On the strength of this, he avers that his dismissal from the
CRPF is arbitrary and unsustainable.
W.P.(C) 1116/2014 Page 1
2. The brief facts are that the petitioner was enrolled in the CRPF as a
Constable on 25.02.2003. On 16.09.2004, a Show Cause Notice was served
upon the petitioner in response to a complaint dated 30.08.2004 addressed to
the Commandant that had been the direct result of a letter dated 09.08.2004
sent to the authorities which alleged that a criminal case had been filed and
was pending against him in 2002. The respondent submits that knowledge of
this criminal case, filed in 2002, had not been divulged to the CRPF in the
Verification Roll by the petitioner and as a result, by an order dated
30.09.2006 he was dismissed from service. The petitioner's appeals before
the Appellate Authority as well as the Revisional authority were dismissed
by orders dated 21.02.2007 and 29.10.2007 respectively.
3. Admittedly so, the FIR in question was lodged in respect of an
offence under Sections 324/34 of the IPC on 05.12.2001. At the relevant
time, the petitioner was 16 years and 8 months old, his undisputed date of
birth being 01.04.1984. It is submitted by the petitioner that on 15.01.2003,
a Character Certificate was issued by the District Magistrate/SDM whereby
it was noted that there was no case recorded against the petitioner and
nothing is pending against him. Subsequently he was also finally acquitted
of the charges on 09.04.2013. His representation addressed to the
respondents asking for a reconsideration of the case was rejected.
4. In these circumstances, it was contended by learned counsel for the
petitioner that proceedings by the regular criminal court pursuant to
prosecution by the police were a nullity. Counsel relies on Section 19 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 in this regard.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent states that irrespective
of this, the information should have been disclosed when asked for.
W.P.(C) 1116/2014 Page 2
Resultantly, it is argued, the respondents were justified in terminating the
petitioner's employment.
5. The factual matrix establishes that at the time of the commission of
the alleged offence, the petitioner was roughly 16 months short of attaining
the age of majority i.e. 18 years. This necessarily places him the category of
juveniles. Offences, if any, committed by whom are to be dealt with under
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereafter
"the Act"). The provisions of the Act unambiguously mandate that all
criminal charges against individuals - deemed "juveniles in conflict with
law" are to be initiated and decided by the authorities constituted under the
Act, i.e. the Juvenile Justice Board. In the absence of such procedure, the
conviction or acquittal recorded by an ordinary criminal court would be of
no consequence. Even otherwise, even if a conviction was recorded by the
Juvenile Justice Board by virtue of Section 19, any disability attracted by
such order would be effaced. Indeed, by Section 19(2), the Juvenile Justice
Board is mandated to remove the record of conviction after a period of time.
We also notice that Section 21 of the Act prohibits publication of the name
of a juvenile in conflict with the law. The obvious intent of Section 19 and
21 is to, therefore, protect such persons from the adverse consequences and
stigma of their actions during an age of immaturity. Requiring a person to
disclose details of an "offence" alleged to have been committed by him
when he was a minor goes against both the letter and spirit of the law and
injects redundancy in its ultimate object of the Act. There is, thus, no
obligation on the part of the petitioner to disclose information concerning
allegations pertaining to his childhood, while applying for public
W.P.(C) 1116/2014 Page 3
employment. Consequently, the action of the respondents cannot be
sustained.
6. For the above reasons, the impugned order dated 30.06.2009,
terminating his employment is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed
to reinstate the petitioner within 12 weeks from today.
S. RAVINDRA BHAT
(JUDGE)
DEEPA SHARMA
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 30, 2015
W.P.(C) 1116/2014 Page 4
