Delhi High Court
Naresh Kumar vs State Of Delhi on 29 September, 2015
Author: Ashutosh Kumar
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.REV.P. 172/2012
Date of Reserve: 23.09.2015
Date of decision: 29.09.2015
NARESH KUMAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Mohit Mathur, Sr. Adv.
with Mr.Ramit Malhotra,
Mr.Devendra Dedha &
Mr.Praman Mathur, Advs.
versus
STATE OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Raghuvinder Verma, APP
for the State.
SI Satish Kumar PS Ambedkar
Nagar
+ CRL.REV.P. 173/2012
HARISH & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr.Mohit Mathur, Sr. Adv.
with Mr.Ramit Malhotra,
Mr.Devendra Dedha &
Mr.Praman Mathur, Advs.
versus
STATE OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Raghuvinder Verma, APP
for the State.
SI Satish Kumar PS Ambedkar
Nagar
+ CRL.REV.P. 174/2012
DEEP CHAND & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr.Mohit Mathur, Sr. Adv.
with Mr.Ramit Malhotra,
Crl.Rev P Nos.172-174/2012 Page 1 of 20
Mr.Devendra Dedha &
Mr.Praman Mathur, Advs.
versus
STATE OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Raghuvinder Verma, APP
for the State.
SI Satish Kumar PS Ambedkar
Nagar
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR
ASHUTOSH KUMAR , J.
1. All the petitions have been heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The petitioners herein all the petitions are all related to each
other and members of a family.
3. Vandana (deceased) was engaged with petitioner Naresh Kumar
on 27.08.2006. The aforesaid engagement was cancelled on
30.04.2007 with the consent of the two families and in presence of the
members of Sthanya Bairwa Mahasabha. In the panchayat of the
community, the issues were settled and the two families acceded to the
request of the Panchayat which had directed the parties to compensate
each other for the expenses incurred by them in holding preparations
for undertaking the ceremony of marriage.
4. Vandana thereafter attempted to commit suicide on 29.07.2007.
A statement was recorded by her father (the complainant) on the same
day wherein he categorically stated that Vandana, after the breaking of
the marriage proposal, was depressed and was treated in a mental
hospital at Shahdara for two days. On 05.07.2007, she was admitted in
Neurological ward of S.J.Hospital for five days. Because of
depression, Vandana tried to commit suicide a number of times
earlier.
5. On 28.07.2007, it was stated by the complainant, at about 9.45
AM on the pretext of going to the washroom, Vandana bolted the door
of the room and hung herself from the fan. When the father of
Vandana realized that her daughter is trying to commit suicide, he
raised alarm and after opening the door, removed the noose around the
neck of Vandana and got her admitted to hospital for treatment. What
is important is that on the day when the deceased tried to commit
suicide, her father made the aforesaid statement that nobody was
responsible for such attempt to commit suicide by Vandana and it was
her own decision.
6. Vandana died on 03.08.2007 in the hospital. Thereafter her
father lodged a written complaint on the same day and also produced
before the police, a suicide note said to have been written by Vandana.
7. In the FIR, the father of the deceased narrated as to how,
initially, Vandana and Naresh Kumar were engaged but because of the
demand of dowry which could not be fulfilled by the complainant, the
engagement had to be called off. As a result of calling off the
engagement, Vandana who was a student of post graduation became
depressed. She used to confide that she would only marry petitioner
Naresh Kumar or otherwise she would commit suicide.
8. In the FIR it has been stated that when Vandana attempted to
commit suicide on 29.07.2007 at about 10 AM, she was immediately
taken to Safdarjung Hospital and police was informed. From the
clothing of Vandana, in the hospital, a suicide note was found which
was given to the police on the same day.
9. Pursuant to the complaint lodged by the father of Vandana, FIR
No.569/2007, (P.S.Ambedkar Nagar) was instituted for the offences
under Sections 306 and 34 of the IPC.
10. The police after investigation submitted charge sheet
whereupon cognizance was taken and the case was committed to the
Court of Sessions for trial.
11. The learned Trial Court vide the order impugned dated
03.02.2012 held that a prima facie case under Section 306/34 of the
IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made out against
the accused persons. Consequently, the petitioners were charged for
the aforesaid offences separately.
12. The petitioners herein have challenged the order on charge and
respective framing of charges against all of them vide order dated
03.02.2012.
13. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that assuming
every allegation in the first information report or the charge sheet to be
ex-facie true, the petitioners could not be charged for the offence of
306/34 of the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
14. The dispute between the families was finally resolved on an
amicable note on 30.04.2007. Because of the intervention of the senior
members of the community, the families were asked to compensate
each other for the expenses incurred by them in the process. Till
30.04.2007 when the panchayati was held and the matter was
amicably resolved, no complaint whatsoever was made by the
complainant with regard to demand of dowry and non solemnization
of marriage because of such heavy dowry demand.
15. It is submitted that no complaint regarding dowry demand prior
to 03.08.2007, when Vandana died, speaks volumes about the
allegation in the first information report to be incorrect and brought
into existence after due consultation and confabulation.
16. In support of such a contention, the counsel for the petitioners
has drawn the attention of the Court to the statement of complainant
on 29.07.2007 when Vandana had attempted to commit suicide. No
culpability was saddled on anyone of the petitioners and it was clearly
stated by the father of Vandana that she had attempted to commit
suicide of her own and nobody else could be held responsible for the
same.
17. Apart from the above facts, what has been seriously argued by
the counsel for the petitioners is that a bare reading of the suicide note,
would make it obvious that it is a spurious piece of document which
could not have been relied upon for two reasons. The so called suicide
note was found in the clothes of Vandana while she was in the hospital
and the same was handed over to the police. If this statement were
correct, then on 29.07.2007 itself, a case ought to have been registered
against the petitioners. The other reason for doubting the genuineness
of the aforesaid suicide note is that it does not speak of any dowry
demand leading cancellation of the marriage. A wish, surprisingly has
been expressed by Vandana in the said suicide note that her last rites
be performed by petitioner Naresh Kumar only. It has been pointed
out that the suicide note has been written after giving the contents a
caption "suicide note".
18. In order to appreciate whether the said suicide note is suspect or
not, it would be necessary to reproduce the same in the manner in
which it has been written:-
SUICIDE NOTE
"मैं अपने परू े होश मे लऱख रही हूॉ कि मेरी मौत िे जिम्मेदार लिर्फ
और लिर्फ नरे श, हरीश, िरु े श और उििे माता-पपता है मैं पलु ऱि
िार्फिताफओ िे ननवेदन िरती हूॉ कि उन्हे िङी-िे-िङी ििा
लमऱे। ताकि भपवष्य में वह और ऱङकियो िी जिॊदगी बबाफद न िर
ििें ।
मेरी request है कि मेरी body िा अॊनतम िॊस्िार िेवऱ नरे श ही
िरे ।"
19. From a bare reading of the suicide note, it appears that the
deceased had mentally prepared herself to get married to Naresh
Kumar or else, she would not have requested for her last rites to be
performed by Naresh Kumar. What strikes my attention is the fact that
if at all such suicide note is genuine and written by the deceased, she
was fully conscious with her cognitive faculties being completely alert
and did not take the decision of killing herself in any fit of temper,
anger or frustration. However, the circumstance under which the
suicide note was brought into existence makes the genuineness of this
document shaky. In this context, it would be necessary to examine the
offence of abetment to commit suicide.
20. Section 306 IPC provides for punishment for abetment of
suicide. It reads as hereunder:-
"306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine."
21. The offence of abetment has been defined under Section 107 of
the IPC. It reads as hereunder:-
"107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the doing of
a thing, who--
(First) -- Instigates any person to do that thing; or
(Secondly) --Engages with one or more other person or
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if
an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of
that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing;
or
(Thirdly) -- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal
omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.--A
person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful
concealment of a material fact which he is bound to dis-
close, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate
the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is
authorized by a warrant from a Court of Justice to
apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not
Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby
intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by
instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.--
Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission
of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the
commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
22. The definition of an abetment has been further clarified in
Section 108 of the IPC which inter-alia states that a person abets an
offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the
commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a
person capable by law of committing an offence with the same
intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
"108. Abettor.--A person abets an offence, who abets
either the commission of an offence, or the commission of
an act which would be an offence, if committed by a
person capable by law of committing an offence with the
same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
Explanation 1.--The abetment of the illegal omission of
an act may amount to an offence although the abettor
may not himself be bound to do that act. Explanation 2.--
To constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary
that the act abetted should be committed, or that the
effect requisite to constitute the offence should be
caused."
23. The main thrust of the argument of the petitioners is whether it
would be just, proper and fair to ask the petitioners to face the rigor of
a criminal trial in absence of any credible material against them. It has
been reiterated that a careful reading of the suicide note, the
circumstances under which such suicide note was recovered and other
surrounding factors would lead to an inescapable conclusion that the
act of the petitioners are not in any way relatable to the decision of
Vandana to end her life.
24. Under the Indian law, suicide in itself is not an offence as the
successful offender would be beyond the reach of law. As such an
attempt to commit suicide has been made an offence under Section
309 IPC.
25. In Mahendra Singh & Anr. vs. State of M.P, (1995) Suppl.3
SCC 731, the Supreme Court, on perusing the statement of the
deceased that she was being harassed by her in-laws and her husband
and threatened by her husband that he will marry another lady and had
illicit relation with his sister-in-law, did not consider such evidence to
be sufficient to attract the ingredients of Section 306 of the IPC as
mere allegation of harassment would not attract the penal provision of
abetment to commit suicide.
26. In Ramesh Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC
618, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to
deal with a case of suicide. While analyzing the statement made by a
husband to his wife in which she was asked to take course to any
action what she desired, leading her to commit suicide, the Supreme
Court examined the different aspects of the word "instigation". In para
20 of the aforesaid judgment it has been elucidated as hereunder:-
"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or
encourage to do „an act‟. To satisfy the requirement of
instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must
be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must
necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the
consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present
one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of conduct created such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other
option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation
may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or
emotion without intending the consequences to actually
follow cannot be said to be instigation."
27. After analyzing the different shades of the meaning of the word
"instigation", the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there
was no evidence and material available on record justifying any
inference of the accused having abetted the commission of suicide.
28. In State of West Bengal vs. Orilal Jaiswal & Anr., (1994) 1
SCC 73, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Courts must be
wary of accepting on its face value an allegation of abetment to
commit suicide when the victim displays hypersensitivity to ordinary
situations. A person with a normal mind would not react so strongly
and sharply to ordinary travails of life.
29. The dictionary meaning of the word "instigation" and goading
is that the person must be intentionally provoked, incited or
encouraged for doing an act. Every person is endowed with a different
pattern of personality. Some statement which may not evoke any
response from an individual, could be a sufficient and guiding factor
for another individual to become very upset with. Therefore, no
straight jacket formulae could be framed for deciding as to what
would constitute abetment to commit suicide.
30. However, what is important to ascertain is whether the cause for
committing suicide is proximate and not very remote or else it would
only lead to frivolous and uncalled for litigation.
31. There has to be a positive intention (mens rea) to commit the
offence and for prosecuting any person under Section 306 of the IPC,
what is required is a pro-active conduct which would lead the
deceased to commit suicide when she or he would have no option left
to preserve or maintain her/his self respect.
32. In the present case, assuming the averment of the father of the
deceased that after the engagement was called off, the deceased started
remaining depressed, to be true, it would only lead to the conclusion
that the petitioner was very sensitive to the happenings around her. In
a country like India, it is not very uncommon that after initial
settlement of marriages, for some reason or the other, such decisions
are called off. Cancellation of a matrimonial settlement could take
place for many factors. There could be denial of the groom for
marrying a particular person or some other intention which may not be
fathomable by any outsider. In the present case, what has been shown
as the reason for cancellation of the marriage is excessive demand of
dowry. Admittedly, even if that were the cause for calling off the
engagement, the issues were settled way back in the month of April,
2007. The engagement was fixed in the month of February, 2007.
Vandana attempted to and succeeded in committing suicide on
29.07.2007/03.08.2007 i.e. after three months of the settlement of the
disputes between the parties, when in front of a panchayat of the same
caste group, the families were asked to, and to which they agreed, to
recompense for the investments made by either side for the purposes
of solemnization of marriage. Thus there was no proximate link with
the factum of suicide and saddling the offence of instigation on the
petitioners would be an attempt to enter in the field of speculative
imagination.
33. Thus it appears that Vandana was very fragile mentally.
According to her father, she attempted committing suicide a number
of times before she finally became successful in ending her life at a
young age. She was prosecuting post graduation studies. The law
cannot possibly guard against such hypersensitivity of individuals.
34. The other aspect which requires to be discussed is whether this
case can be quashed at the stage of framing of the charges or the
petitioners be directed to face trial.
35. The legal position in this regard have been exposited on a
number of occasions by the Supreme Court.
36. In R.P.Kapur vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the
Supreme Court summarized some of the categories where the
proceedings could be quashed. It was held that (i) Where it manifestly
appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance
of the proceeding; (ii) Where the allegations in the FIR or the
complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) Where the allegations
constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the
evidence adduced which clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge, the proceedings ought to be quashed.
37. Similarly, in Smt.Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi & Ors, (1976) 3 SCC 736, the Apex Court held that the
process against an accused may be quashed or set aside where:-
"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the
statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same
taken at their face value make out absolutely no case
against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the
essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against
the accused;
(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently
absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person
can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused;
(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in
issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been
based either on no evidence or on materials which are
wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and
(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal
defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint
by legally competent authority and the like."
38. In State of Karnataka vs. L.Muniswamy & Ors, (1977) 2
SCC 699 the Supreme Court observed that the wholesome power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C entitles the High Court to quash a
proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the
proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court
or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be
quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public
purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate
into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the Court
observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law
though justice must be administered according to laws made by the
legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of
subsequent cases of this Court and other courts.
39. In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC
551, a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court held as hereunder:-
"(1). ... In case the impugned order clearly brings out a
situation which is an abuse of the process of the court, or
for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference
of the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing
contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise
of the inherent power of the High Court. Such cases would
necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be
the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding
initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without
jurisdiction. The present case would undoubtedly fall for
exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code even assuming that the
invoking of the revisional power of the High Court is
impermissible."
40. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors vs. Sambhajirao
Chandojirao Angre & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 709, the Supreme Court in
para 7 has observed as follows:-
"7. The legal position is well settled that when a
prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the
test to be applied by the court is as to whether the
uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish
the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration
any special features which appear in a particular case to
consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice
to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis
that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose
and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate
conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is
likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to
continue, the court may while taking into consideration the
special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even
though it may be at a preliminary stage."
41. Similar views have been expressed in Janta Dal vs.
H.S.Chowdhary & Ors, (1992) 4 SCC 305.
42. In State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors, 1992
Suppl. (1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court in the backdrop of
interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or
the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, gave the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it clear
that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
43. In G.Sagar Suri and Anr. vs. State of U.P & Ors., (2000) 2
SCC 636, the Supreme Court observed that it is the duty and
obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in
issuing the process particularly when matters are essentially of civil
nature.
44. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy &
Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 522 the Supreme Court observed as under:
"5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The
section does not confer any new powers on the High Court.
It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed
before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three
circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be
exercised, namely: (i) to give effect to an order under the
Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible
nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative
enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases
that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent
powers apart from express provisions of law which are
necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
expression in the section which merely recognises and
preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any
express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such
powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a
wrong in course of administration of justice on the
principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law
gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section,
the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to
be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only
when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid
down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the
court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is
made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse
of the process of the court to allow any action which would
result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In
exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of
these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court
may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is
sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the
materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto."
45. The Supreme Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. &
Ors. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Anr., (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed
thus:
"It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any
action which would result in injustice and prevent
promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would
be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process
of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise
serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When
a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has
alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the
allegations are accepted in toto."
46. In Devendra & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr., (2009) 7 SCC 495, this Court observed as under:
"24. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned
propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the
High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations
made in the first information report, even if given face value
and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any
offence. When the allegations made in the first information
report or the evidences collected during investigation do not
satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would
not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for
nothing."
47. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Gourishetty Mahesh & Ors.,
(2010) 11 SCC 226, the Supreme Court observed that the power under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide and they
require care and caution in its exercise. The interference must be on
sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle the legitimate prosecution. The Court further observed that if the
allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of
which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the
High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under
Section 482 of the Code.
48. It has been submitted on behalf of the complainant and the State
that it was only because of the calling of the marriage proposal of
Naresh Kumar with Vandana that Vandana committed suicide. The
cause of death was reported to be asphyxia caused by hanging.
49. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
opinion that it would be unsafe to put the petitioners on trial.
50. It has been informed that one prosecution witness has been
partially examined uptil now.
51. For the same reason, the petitioners cannot be put on trial for
the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
52. From a careful perusal of the entire material and circumstances
on record namely fixation of marriage in the month of February, 2007;
cancellation of such marriage proposal in April, 2007 and thereafter
several attempts of Vandana in attempting to commit suicide; the
statement of the father of Vandana on 29.09.2007 that nobody is
responsible for Vandana's attempt to commit suicide; suicide note
having been recovered from the clothes of Vandana in the hospital
while she was under treatment before her death and not lodging of the
first information report even when such suicide letter was given to the
police; no attempt on the part of the police to record the statement of
other persons during the period when Vandana was in hospital and
was undergoing treatment and thereafter the FIR against the
petitioners under Section 306/34 of the IPC and later framing of
charges under Section 306/34 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, when no complaint/grievance was ever raised by
anyone prior to the death of Vandana, this Court arrives at the
conclusion that the action of petitioners was not connected with the
death of Vandana and, therefore, they are not liable to be prosecuted
for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC.
53. For the reasons recorded, the order dated 03.02.2012 whereby
charges have been framed under Section 306/34 of the IPC and
Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is hereby quashed.
54. The Petitions are allowed.
Crl.M.A.4140/2012 in CRL.REV.P. 172/2012, Crl.M.A
No.4142/2012 in CRL.REV.P. 173/2012 & Crl.M.A No.4144/2012
in CRL.REV.P. 174/2012
1. In view of the petitions having been allowed, no orders are
required to be passed in the instant applications.
2. Dismissed as infructuous.
ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J
SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
k
