Shri Sunil Sehgal vs Shri Chander Batra And Ors.
2015 Latest Caselaw 7259 Del

*             IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                          CS(OS) No. 1250/2006
%                                                     23rd September, 2015

SHRI SUNIL SEHGAL                                           ..... Plaintiff

                           Through:      Mr. Ravi Gupta, Sr. Advocate with
                                         Mr. M.G.Vachher, Mr. Ajay Gupta
                                         and Ms. Bhoomija Verma, Advocates.


                           versus

SHRI CHANDER BATRA AND ORS.                                 ..... Defendants

                           Through:      None.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?


VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1.

This is a suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff with

respect to the property bearing no. 2223, Outram Line, Kingsway Camp,

Delhi-110009. The Agreement to Sell of which specific performance is

sought is dated 29.6.2004. The total sale consideration was of Rs.79,50,000/-

of which the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.10 lacs to the defendants and which

was acknowledged by the defendants on 29.6.2004 by a receipt. Plaintiff in

addition to the amount of Rs.10 lacs paid a further sum of Rs.5 lacs to the

defendants on 20.8.2004. Plaintiff's case was that defendants had committed

a breach of contract by failing to execute the sale deed in favour of the

plaintiff, and therefore, the present suit for specific performance was filed.

2. In the written statement filed by the defendants, receipt of

Rs.15 lacs under the agreement to sell has been admitted in para 1 of the

preliminary objections in the written statement and which para reads as

under:-

"I. That the plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance in respect of Agreement dated 29th June, 2004, in respect of property no.2223, Outram Lane, Kingsway Camp, Guru Teg Bahadur Nagar, Delhi, against the defendants. It is submitted that in terms of the agreement dated 29th June, 2004 the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance and the suit for specific performance is liable to be dismissed. In terms of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, a contract cannot be specifically enforced if compensation is an adequate relief. The parties to the agreement dated 29th June,2004 themselves agreed in clause 8 of the agreement that in case the plaintiff does not pay the balance consideration within the agreed period then the earnest money of Rs.10 lakhs shall be forfeited by the defendants and the agreement shall stand cancelled and if the defendants infringe any of the terms and conditions of the agreement then the defendants shall be liable to pay double the amount of earnest money, i.e. Rs.20 lakhs, to the plaintiff. The parties to the present suit themselves agreed that Rs.20 lakhs adequate compensation which the purchaser would be entitled to. In fact, on 20th August, 2004, the parties agreed to extend the time upto the completion of the contract to 30 th October, 2004, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.5 lakhs to the defendants as

further earnest money and it was agreed that the defendants will pay double the amount of Rs.15 lakhs, i.e Rs.30 lakhs, in all, in case the defendants do not perform their part of the contract. Even as per the plaintiff's own showing, the plaintiff cannot get more than Rs.30 lakhs by way of compensation from the defendants. However, without prejudice to the rights of the defendants that the plaintiff himself did not perform his part of the contract and did not have the necessary funds for the completion of the deal because of this the defendants are entitled to forfeit the sum of Rs.15 lakhs received by them by way of earnest money and the suit for specific performance is liable to be dismissed." (underlining added)

3. A reading of the aforesaid para shows that in fact the

defendants were, on the defendants being held guilty of breach of contract,

ready to pay the total amount to the plaintiff i.e Rs.30 lacs instead of Rs. 15

lacs, however, as the facts discussed hereinafter show that the plaintiff is

entitled to and suit is to be decreed for the sum of Rs.15 lacs, being the

amount received by the defendants under the agreement to sell, with interest

at 15% per annum simple.

4. In this suit the following issues were framed on 14.8.2007:-

"1). Whether this suit for specific performance is maintainable in view of clause 8 of the agreement dated 29.6.2004? OPP

2). Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement? OPP

3). Whether the defendant agreed to extension of time till 15.01.2005 as alleged in the plaint? OPP

4). Whether the defendant committed any breach of the said agreement dated 29.06.2004? OPP

5). Whether the plaintiff has forged and fabricated the clause whereby the agreement was extended to 15.01.2005? OPD

6). Relief."

5. I am not called upon to decide all these issues inasmuch as the

learned senior counsel for the plaintiff, on instructions from the plaintiff who

is present in person, states that instead of the higher relief of specific

performance, a lesser relief of refund of the amount paid by the plaintiff to

the defendants be granted in favour of the plaintiff and against the

defendants by application of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (CPC) which allows the court to mould and grant reliefs as

per the facts as found, even if such a relief is not specifically prayed for.

6. A reading of the written statement shows that while the

defendants had admitted the receipt of a sum of Rs.15 lacs, the defendants

claimed the right to forfeit the sum of Rs.15 lacs.

7. It is settled law that mere breach of contract does not entitle

grant of damages and it is necessary that unless by breach of contract losses

are caused, a person who is guilty of breach cannot claim damages and for

such alleged damages forfeit an amount received from the other party.

Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 clearly provides that an

aggrieved person cannot claim damages unless losses are proved to be

caused to him on account of breach of contract by the other side. This

aspect has been so held in the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme

Court in the case of Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405

and which judgment has been recently followed by the Supreme Court in the

judgment in the case of Kailash Nath Associates Vs. Delhi Development

Authority and Another, (2015) 4 SCC 136. The relevant paras of this latter

judgment of the Supreme Court which lays down the ratio are paras 30 to 35,

40 and 43 to 43.1 to 43.7, and which paras read as under:-

"30. We now come to the reasoning which involves Section 74 of the Contract Act. The Division Bench held:

"38. The learned Single Judge has held that the property was ultimately auctioned in the year 1994 at a price which fetched DDA a handsome return of Rupees 11.78 crores and there being no damages suffered by DDA, it could not forfeit the earnest money.

39. The said view runs in the teeth of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills Vs. Tata Aircraft Ltd.: AIR 1970 SC 1986 which holds that as against an amount tendered by way of security, amount tendered as earnest money could be forfeited as per terms of the contract.

40. We may additionally observe that original time to pay the balance bid consideration, as per Ex. P-1 was May 18, 1982 and as extended by Ex. P-8 was October 28, 1982. That DDA could auction the plot in the year 1994 in the sum of Rupees 11.78 crores was immaterial and not relevant evidence for the reason damages with respect to the price of property have to be computed with reference to the date of the breach of the contract".

31. Section 74 as it originally stood read thus:

"When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named."

32. By an amendment made in 1899, the Section was amended to read:

"74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.--When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.

Explanation.--A stipulation for increased interest from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty.

Exception.--When any person enters into any bail- bond, recognizance or other instrument of the same nature, or, under the provisions of any law, or under the orders of the Central Government or of any State Government, gives any bond for the performance of any public duty or act in which the public are interested, he shall be liable, upon breach of any condition of any such instrument, to pay the whole sum mentioned therein.

Explanation.--A person who enters into a contract with Government does not necessarily thereby undertake any public duty, or promise to do an act in which the public are interested."

33. Section 74 occurs in Chapter 6 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which reads "Of the consequences of breach of contract". It is in fact sandwiched between Sections 73 and 75 which deal with compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract and compensation for damage which a party may sustain through non-fulfillment of a contract after such party rightfully rescinds such contract. It is important to note that like Sections 73 and 75, compensation is payable for breach of contract Under Section 74 only where damage or loss is caused by such breach.

34. In Fateh Chand Vs. Balkishan Dass (supra), this Court held:

"The section is clearly an attempt to eliminate the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties: a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by way of penalty....."

* * *

Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a covenant of forfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the

penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of "actual loss or damages"; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach.

* * *

Section 74 declares the law as to liability upon breach of contract where compensation is by agreement of the parties pre-determined, or where there is a stipulation by way of penalty. But the application of the enactment is not restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims relief as a Plaintiff. The section does not confer a special benefit upon any party; it merely declares the law that notwithstanding any term in the contract predetermining damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way of penalty, the court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or penalty stipulated. The jurisdiction of the court is not determined by the accidental circumstance of the party in default being a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a suit. Use of the expression "to receive from the party who has broken the contract" does not predicate that the jurisdiction of the court to adjust amounts which have been paid by the party in default cannot be exercised in dealing with the claim of the party complaining of breach of contract. The court has to adjudge in every case reasonable compensation to which

the Plaintiff is entitled from the Defendant on breach of the contract. Such compensation has to be ascertained having regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach."

35. Similarly, in Maula Bux v. Union of India (UOI): 1969 (2) SCC 554, it was held:

"Forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property-movable or immovable-if the amount is reasonable, does not fall within Section 74. That has been decided in several cases: Chiranjit Singh Vs. Har Swarup: 21 AIR 1926 PC 1; Roshan Lal Vs. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd.: 22 ILR (1911) 33 All 166; Mohd. Habibullah Vs. Mohd. Shafi: 23 ILR (1919) 41 All 324; Bishan Chand Vs. Radha Kishan Das: 24 ILR (1897) 19 All 489. These cases are easily explained, for forfeiture of a reasonable amount paid as earnest money does not amount to imposing a penalty. But if forfeiture is of the nature of penalty, Section 74 applies. Where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty.

Counsel for the Union, however, urged that in the present case Rs. 10,000/- in respect of the potato contract and Rs. 8,500 in respect of the poultry contract were genuine pre- estimates of damages which the Union was likely to suffer as a result of breach of contract, and the Plaintiff was not entitled to any relief against forfeiture. Reliance in support of this contention was placed upon the expression (used in Section 74 of the Contract Act), "the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation". It is true that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree, and the Court is competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. But the expression

"whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby" is intended to cover different classes of contracts which come before the Courts. In case of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the Court to assess compensation arising from breach, while in other cases compensation can be calculated in accordance with established rules. Where the Court is unable to assess the compensation, the sum named by the parties if it be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate may be taken into consideration as the measure of reasonable compensation, but not if the sum named is in the nature of a penalty. Where loss in terms of money can be determined, the party claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by him.

In the present case, it was possible for the Government of India to lead evidence to prove the rates at which potatoes, poultry, eggs and fish were purchased by them when the Plaintiff failed to deliver "regularly and fully" the quantities stipulated under the terms of the contracts and after the contracts were terminated. They could have proved the rates at which they had to be purchased and also the other incidental charges incurred by them in procuring the goods contracted for. But no such attempt was made."

xxxxx

xxxxx

40. From the above, it is clear that this Court held that Maula Bux's case (supra) was not, on facts, a case that related to earnest money. Consequently, the observation in Maula Bux (supra) that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract if reasonable does not fall within Section 74, and would fall within Section 74 only if earnest money is considered a penalty is not on a matter that directly arose for decision in that case. The law laid down by a Bench of 5 Judges in Fateh Chand's case (supra) is that all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach would be covered by Section 74. This is because Section 74 cuts across the rules of the English Common Law by enacting a uniform principle that would apply to all amounts to be paid in case of breach, whether they are in the nature of penalty or otherwise. It

must not be forgotten that as has been stated above, forfeiture of earnest money on the facts in Fateh Chand's case (supra) was conceded. In the circumstances, it would therefore be correct to say that as earnest money is an amount to be paid in case of breach of contract and named in the contract as such, it would necessarily be covered by Section 74.

xxxxx

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43. On a conspectus of the above authorities, the law on compensation for breach of contract Under Section 74 can be stated to be as follows:

43.1. Where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining of a breach can receive as reasonable compensation such liquidated amount only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both parties and found to be such by the Court. In other cases, where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount so stated. Similarly, in cases where the amount fixed is in the nature of penalty, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the penalty so stated. In both cases, the liquidated amount or penalty is the upper limit beyond which the Court cannot grant reasonable compensation.

43.2. Reasonable compensation will be fixed on well known principles that are applicable to the law of contract, which are to be found inter alia in Section 73 of the Contract Act.

43.3. Since Section 74 awards reasonable compensation for damage or loss caused by a breach of contract, damage or loss caused is a sine qua non for the applicability of the Section.

43.4. The Section applies whether a person is a Plaintiff or a Defendant in a suit.

43.5. The sum spoken of may already be paid or be payable in future.

43.6. The expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby" means that where it is possible to prove actual damage or loss, such proof is not dispensed with. It is only in cases where damage or loss is difficult or impossible to prove that the liquidated amount named in the contract, if a genuine pre-estimate of damage or loss, can be awarded.

43.7. Section 74 will apply to cases of forfeiture of earnest money under a contract. Where, however, forfeiture takes place under the terms and conditions of a public auction before agreement is reached, Section 74 would have no application."

(emphasis is mine)

8. In the present case, the nature of contract is such that losses

could have been proved by the defendants by proving the falling of prices of

the subject property, and only if the prices of the property had fallen and

breach was committed by the plaintiff/buyer, the defendants could have only

then been entitled to forfeit the amount paid by the plaintiff as damages on

account of loss caused. Para 43.4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in

the case of Kailash Nath Associates (supra) reproduced above shows that

the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act applies

whether a person is plaintiff or a defendant in the suit ie a defendant who is a

seller cannot forfeit any moneys unless loss is proved to be caused by fall in

the price of the property.

9. In the present case, defendants have led no evidence of any loss

caused to them, and therefore, assuming that plaintiff is guilty of breach of

contract, yet, the defendants cannot forfeit the amount of Rs.15 lacs lying

with them. A huge amount of Rs.15 lacs out of the total sale consideration of

Rs.79,50,000/- cannot in law be called earnest money. By giving a stamp of

'earnest money' to advance price, the latter cannot become the former.

What is to be seen is the substance and not the label. Only a nominal

amount can be said to be earnest money and not an amount of Rs.15 lacs out

of Rs.79.50 lacs, by noting that if suppose an amount of Rs. 30 lacs or 40

lacs would be called as earnest money by the parties, that would not take

away the fact that such amount cannot be earnest money but would in fact be

part of the price to be paid for sale.

10. In transactions which are for sale and purchase of an

immovable property, and where amounts are paid under such transactions, I

have held that in fact even a rate of interest as high as 21% can be awarded.

This is held by me in the judgment in the case of Nehru Place Hotels Ltd.

Vs. Smt. Kanta Aggarwal, 2011 (123) DRJ 148 and para 18 of which reads

as under:-

"18. There is finally one aspect which I need to address in favour of the appellant/defendant, though no argument was raised before me, being grant

of interest on the charges which have been held to be payable by the trial Court in favour of the appellant/defendant and against the respondent/plaintiff. I note that the trial Court has not granted any interest to the appellant/defendant for the monies which are required to be paid by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellant/defendant. No doubt, it is because of the appellant/defendant that the situation came to the present pass inasmuch as the appellant/defendant wrongly changed the allocation of space from the prime location of upper ground floor to the lower ground floor and also reduced the area from 403 Sq. feet to 372 sq. feet, however, the respondent has used these monies which are held payable by her to the appellant/defendant. However, while dealing with this aspect I must hasten to add that so far as the portion of charges relating to maintenance etc. under Clause 17, the respondent/plaintiff has not received the benefit of possession which would have been received by her on payment of these charges and the escalation charges, and also that the appellant/defendant itself has been using this allocated space as its own office space. Therefore, balancing the equities, though interest should be awarded to the appellant/defendant on the escalated cost portion of the price payable, the issue really would be of the rate of interest which ought to be awarded in favour of the appellant/defendant and against the respondent/plaintiff with respect to the escalation charges which are payable to the appellant/defendant as per the impugned judgment and whether interest should be payable on the charges other than the escalation charges. Nowadays the Supreme Court has been directing that the rates of interest which should be awarded by the Courts should be at a lower side in view of the changed economic scenario, liberalization of the economy and the consistent fall in the rates of interest. The recent judgments of the Supreme Court, in this regard, are Rajendra Construction Co. v. Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority and others, 2005 (6) SCC 678, McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others, 2006 (11) SCC 181, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Indag Rubber Ltd., (2006) 7 SCC 700 & Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. G.Harischandra, 2007 (2) SCC 720 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd (2009) 3 Arb. LR 140 (SC). The Supreme Court has granted rates of interest varying between @ 6% to 9%. per annum simple.

In the facts of the present case, however, I find that instead of a lower rate of interest, the appellant/defendant should get a higher rate of interest considering that the transaction pertains to an immovable property and benefit of which will go to the respondent/plaintiff. Therefore, I hold the appellant/defendant entitled to pendente lite and future interest @ 21%

per annum simple on the amount of escalation charges as decreed by the trial Court. For the other charges which are payable by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellant/defendant which have been granted by the trial Court, the same however would be without payment of any interest because the said charges are towards maintenance and other related charges with respect to the property and the respondent has not enjoyed the property during all this period which in fact the appellant/defendant has used."

(underlining added)

11. I may note that both the parties in the case of Nehru Place

Hotels Ltd. (supra) had filed SLP Nos. 22130/2011 and 22065/2011 before

the Supreme Court, but SLPs of both the parties against the judgment dated

11.03.2011 were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 19.03.2012.

12. In the facts of the present case, interest at the rate of 15% per

annum will meet the ends of justice.

13. In view of the above, the suit of the plaintiff is decided by

decreeing the same against the defendants for a sum of Rs.15 lacs alongwith

interest at 15% per annum simple from 15.1.2005 till the date of payment.

Parties are left to bear their own costs. Decree sheet be prepared.

SEPTEMBER 23, 2015                                   VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
ib