Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 7127 Del
Judgement Date : 18 September, 2015
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 18th September, 2015
+ MAC. A. No.724/2015 & CM 20166-68/2015 (delay)
SUBHASH YADAV ..... Petitioner
Through: Manoj Kumar, Advocate
versus
NARESH KUMAR & ORS(THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE
CO LTD) ..... Respondent
Through: Balwant Chaubey, Proxy Counsel
for Mr. Pankaj Seth, Advocate for
R-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI J. (ORAL)
1. The present MAC Appeal has been filed by the
petitioner/revisionist with a prayer to set aside the order dated
03.03.2012 passed by the Ld. MACT by virtue of which an award
to the tune of Rs. 4,29,779 along with interest at the rate of 7.5%
per annum from the date of the claim petition till realization was
passed in favor of the claimant/injured and against the appellant
herein with recovery rights to the insurance company who was
directed to release the awarded amount to the claimant/injured
forthwith. Along with the appeal, an application under S.5 of the
Limitations Act 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 1158 days in
filing and a delay of 4 days in refilling of the present appeal.
2. The appellant/applicant in the application seeking condonation of
delay of 1158 days has attributed the same to the wrong legal
advice of his counsel. It is contented that after the filing of the joint
written statement the counsel representing the appellant in the
matter assured him that since the vehicle was insured and that the
driver/respondent no 2 had valid license and permits therefore the
appellant had nothing to worry and his presence was not warranted
in the court. It is stated in the application that it was on account of
this misrepresentation that the appellant chose not to appear before
the court under the bonafide impression that his counsel is
contesting the matter with utmost professional care, unfortunately
which was not so. This lead to an ex-parte order dated 18.12.2008.
It is further averred that the appellant was summoned to depose
before the court for the insurance company/ respondent no. 3 on
06.07.2009 and after recording of the statement was discharged on
the same date and again ill-advised by his counsel to not make any
further appearance before the court as the same was not required.
Consequently the impugned order dated 03.03.2012 was passed in
the absence of the appellant herein. It is stated that the appellant
received a notice from the Honorable Supreme Court in the SLP
bearing No. 3023/2012 filed by the Insurance Company against the
impugned order dated 03.03.2012 but since the same was
dismissed, the appellant under the misconception that since no
adverse order has been passed against him. The appellant did not
opt to file any appeal against the impugned order.
3. It has been averred by the appellant that it was only in the
execution proceedings that the appellant was appraised of the
contents of the order dated 03.03.2012. Subsequently, it is stated
on further advice of the counsel for the appellant a review was filed
on 24.11.14 in the execution court which was dismissed vide order
22.05.15 with an observation that the appellant may challenge the
order in appeal.
4. It has been stated by the appellant that thereafter he applied for the
certified copies of the order dated 22.05.2015 and he got the same
on 30.05.2015 whereas the trial court record could be obtained only
by 11.06.2015. It is further stated that the appellant vide letter
dated 09.06.2015 sought a verification report with respect to the
permit dated 01.05.2006 of the alleged offending vehicle, from the
Transport department GNCT Delhi which was provided so on
04.07.2015. It is averred that after requisitioning all the aforesaid
documents the appellant approached various counsels to seek legal
advice and therefore many days were exhausted for the same as
well.
5. It is the case of the appellant the delay caused in the filing of the
present appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional but is
attributable to the wrong and the poor legal advice from the
counsels engaged in the matter. In the light of the aforesaid it is
prayed that the delay of 1158 days be condoned.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the
averments made in the application for condonation of delay. The
reasons offered on account of which the delay has been caused do
not show the bona fides of the appellant in preferring the appeal.
As a matter of fact, the conduct of the appellant is full of gross
negligence. This is on account of the fact that no material
information or evidence has been filed to support the reasons stated
in the said applications.
7. It is true and correct that the counsel is duty bound to prosecute the
matter with responsibility and professionalism but at the same time
the litigant who is the affected party has to be aware of the
developments in his own case. It is unfathomable that a litigant
would not be updated where his interest or life savings are at stake.
8. In the instant case prima facie I am not convinced that any cogent
reason has been given by the appellant in the application which
may constitute 'sufficient cause' in the eyes of law. It is pertinent
to note that the award came in the year 2012 but steps towards
procuring the certified copy were made only after 22.05.2015 that
is after a long delay of almost 3 years and it is finally now in
September, 2015 that an appeal has been filed. Further there is also
a delay of 4 days in re-filing of the present appeal.
9. The appellant has stated that he acted under the wrong advice of
the counsel but the same seems to be a far-fetched theory and is
more like an afterthought, in the absence of any evidence.
10. The act of the appellant clearly shows that there was a lack of
seriousness in pursuing legal remedies that might be available to
him. It clearly flows from the aforesaid that there was gross
negligence on the part of the appellant in prosecuting the matter.
11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly lays down that before the
delay is condoned, it must be shown that there is a 'sufficient
cause' for the same and the 'sufficient cause' which has been
interpreted by the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs.
Management Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and
Others; (2014) 2 SCC (LS) 595 is a cause which is beyond the
human control. The Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgment very categorically stated that although the words
"sufficient cause" must be interpreted with a liberal, justice
oriented, pragmatic and non-pedantic approach but at the same
time the bonafides of the applicant seeking condonation of delay
must be made out. It was further held that the increasing tendency
to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner and requires to
be curbed.
12. In the instant case prima facie I am not convinced that any cogent
reason has been given by the appellant in the application which
may constitute sufficient cause in the eyes of law as no evidence
has been adduced to substantiate the averments made in the
application.
13. "Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt" is a settled
principle of law i.e the law assists those that are vigilant with their
rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. Merely because the
appellant has woken up belatedly to file the present appeal without
showing any sufficient cause does not entitle the appellant to
disturb a finding which has been returned by the Ld. MACT more
than three years back.
14. Further even on merits, it is evident from the perusal of the
impugned order that the appellant miserably failed to establish his
case before the Ld. MACT. It has been recorded in the impugned
order that a notice under Order 12 Rule 8 CPC was issued to the
appellant herein with directions to produce the valid permit to ply
the offending vehicle as on the date of the accident but the said
notice were neither replied to or complied with showing the
negligent attitude of the appellant. It is suspicious as to why the
appellant even after the notice chose not to prosecute the matter.
After getting due notice of the order he could have sought a second
opinion. Even otherwise the reasoning arrived at by the learned
MACT is after a careful and judicious analysis of the facts and
evidence and does not warrant the interference of this court. The
injured was only 25 years of age and due to the accident had lost an
eye and his face has been de-shaped and the quantum of
compensation awarded does not seem exorbitant as the same is
supported by a well reasoned award.
15. Accordingly the application for condonation of delay is dismissed
as no sufficient cause is made out. Resultantly the appeal is
dismissed as barred by limitation.
16. Pending application stands disposed off.
V.K. SHALI, J.
SEPTEMBER 18, 2015 AD
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