Himank Alias Hunny vs State Nct Of Delhi And Ors
2015 Latest Caselaw 7003 Del

$~29
*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                          Judgment delivered on: 16th September, 2015

+                         CRL.M.C. No.3820/2015


HIMANK ALIAS HUNNY                                         ..... Petitioner
             Represented by:           Mr. K.K. Manan, Senior Advocate
                                       with Mr. Nipun Bhardwaj,
                                       Ms. Anjali Rajput, Mr.Ankush
                                       Narang and Mr. Kartik Gandotra,
                                       Advocates with Petitioner in
                                       person.

                          Versus


STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ORS                       ..... Respondents
              Represented by: Mr.Mukesh Kumar, Additional
                              Public Prosecutor for the State with
                              SI Mukesh Yadav, PS Anand
                              Vihar.
                              Respondent No. 2 and Respondent
                              No.3/Complainant are in person.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT

SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)

Crl. M.A.No.13534/2015 (for exemption) Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Accordingly, the application is allowed.

CRL.M.C. 3820/2015

1. By way of this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.137/2013 registered at Police Station Anand Vihar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304-A/471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with RRR 17(1)/177 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against him.

2. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that an accident had taken place on 15.04.2013, wherein one Manish received fatal injuries. The present case was registered on the complaint of respondent No.3, brother of the deceased. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the mother and brother of the deceased, respondent No.2 and respondent No.3/complainant respectively and settled the matter vide MoU dated 05.09.2014 for a total sum of Rs.6,00,000/-. To this effect statements of the respondent No.3 and the petitioner were recorded on 26.02.2015 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, wherein it is recorded that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- has already been paid to the respondent No.2, another sum of Rs.2,00,000/- i.e., Rs.1,00,000/- each by owner and petitioner, as has been recorded in the order dated 26.02.2015, was paid to the respondent No.2. The balance amount of Rs.2,00,000/- in cash is paid today in Court by the petitioner to the respondent No.2, mother of the deceased Manish which facts have not been disputed by her, who is present with her son respondent No.3/complainant.

3. Learned senior counsel further submits that since the matter stands settled between the parties and pursuant thereto the respondent No. 2 and the respondent No.3/complainant have no grievance against the petitioner,

they have no objection if the present petition is allowed.

4. Respondents No.2 and 3 are personally present in the Court. For their identification, they have placed on record the photocopies of the Identity Cards issued by the Election Commission of India. They do not dispute the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that the matter stands settled between them and the petitioner. Therefore, they do not wish to pursue this case further against the petitioner and have no objection if the present petition is allowed.

5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State submits that after completion of investigation, chargesheet has been filed, charges have been framed and the case is pending for prosecution evidence. Since the parties have amicably settled the matter and the respondents No. 2 and 3 do not wish to pursue this case further against the petitioner, therefore, the State has no objection if the present petition is allowed.

6. In view of the overall circumstances; and looking to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Another1, which has referred to a number of matters for the proposition that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim, if the circumstances so warrant; and also Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr.2 , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:-

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to

(2012) 10 SCC 303

(2014) 6 SCC 466

the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the "29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in

respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the

same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

7. Both the parties who are present in the Court today, approbate the aforesaid settlement dated 05.09.2014, the statements dated 26.02.2015 recorded before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, and undertake to remain bound by the same.

8. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra), considering the settlement arrived at between the parties and the fact that the respondents No.2 and 3 do not want to support the prosecution case, and the statement of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, I am of the considered opinion that this matter deserves to be given a quietus as continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in question would be an exercise in futility.

9. Consequently, FIR No.137/2013 registered at Police Station Anand Vihar, Delhi, for the offences punishable under Sections 279/304-A/471 IPC read with RRR 17(1)/177 MV Act and all proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

10. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed with no order as to costs.

11. A copy of this order be given dasti to the learned counsel for the parties.

Crl. M.A.No.13535/2015 (for stay) With the disposal of the petition noted above, the instant application has become infructuous. The same is dismissed accordingly.

SURESH KAIT (JUDGE) SEPTEMBER 16, 2015 sb