Ram Shree vs Sanjeev Jain
2015 Latest Caselaw 6760 Del

*                  HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                           Decided on: 9th September, 2015

+      RC. REV. 479/2015 & CM 1888/2015 (delay)


        RAM SHREE                                            ..... Petitioner

                            Through:      A.K Singhal, Advocate

                            versus

        SANJEEV JAIN                                         ..... Respondent

Through:

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI J. (ORAL)

CM APPL.18881/2015 (exemption)

Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

RC. REV. 479/2015 & CM 18880/2015 (delay)

1. The present revision petition has been filed by the

petitioner/revisionist against the order dated 01.06.2012 passed by

the Ld. Additional Rent Controller, North East District,

Karkardooma Court, Delhi by virtue of which the Ld. ARC

dismissed the petitioner's eviction petition along with an

application for condonation of delay in filing the revision petition.

2. The petitioner in the application under S.5 of the Limitation's Act

has sought condonation of the delay of 1068 days in filing the

present revision petition. It has been averred by the petitioner in the

said application that the delay in filing is on account of ill health of

the revisionist who suffered from paralysis and other diseases. It is

further stated that the petitioner was advised to file an appeal which

was filed on 28.10.2014. This appeal was withdrawn with liberty to

approach the appropriate forum, on 09.07.2015 as the same was not

maintainable. The certified copy of the order dated 01.06.2012 and

09.07.2015 was received on 22.07.2015. It has been stated in the

application u/s. 5 of the Act that the delay in filing the revision

petition is neither deliberate nor intentional and it is on account of

the wrong advice and under the impression that the petitioner being

the landlady can file the revision at any time whenever a fresh

bonafide need may arise. Therefore in the light of the aforesaid

facts it is prayed that the delay may be condoned.

3. Before proceeding further the brief facts of the case are that the

petitioner/landlord is the owner of the property bearing no. 27/5-C,

(New No. E 1168/A), Main Road, Babarpur, Shahadara, Delhi-

110032. The respondent is a tenant under the petitioner since the

year 1985 in respect of one shop (tenanted premises). The

petitioner had alleged in the eviction petition that the respondent

had sub-let the tenanted premises without the consent and

permission of petitioner and started business at Pocket-E, 158-A,

G.T.B. Enclave, Delhi-92. It was further averred that the family of

the petitioner consists of herself, her husband, two sons and two

daughters who all are married. The petitioner had sought

possession of the tenanted premises on the grounds that the said

premise are required for the settlement of his son namely Pramod

Sharma who is a civil contractor and he desires to open his office

and godown in the tenanted premises.

4. On merits it is the case of the petitioner that the learned trial court

failed to consider the arguments of the petitioner and the evidence

adduced by him with respect to the ownership of the tenanted

premise especially when in separate proceedings before this court

the respondent had acknowledged the landlord-tenant relationship

and the same is a matter of judicial record. It is further stated that

even otherwise on payment of rent to the petitioner the respondent

has acknowledged the petitioner as the landlord and by virtue of

the bar u/s 116 of the Evidence Act the respondent cannot be

allowed to take a contrary stand. The learned counsel for the

petitioner has averred that it is settled law that in an eviction

petition u/s 14(1)(e) of the Act, the petitioner/landlord does not

need to prove an absolute title but only needs to establish that he

has a better title than the tenant.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the

averments made in the application for condonation of delay. The

reasons offered on account of which the delay has been caused do

not show the bona fides of the appellant in preferring the appeal.

As a matter of fact, the conduct of the appellant is full of gross

negligence. This is on account of the fact that no material

information or evidence has been filed to support the reasons stated

in the said applications. The petitioner has claimed respite on

account of ill health but has not produced even a single medical bill

or doctors report to support his case. It is pertinent to note that the

petitioner filed the appeal also with considerable delay. The

petitioner has stated that she acted under the wrong advice but the

same seems to be a far-fetched theory and is more like an

afterthought, in the absence of any evidence.

6. The petitioner has further stated in the said application, that she

was of the view that she will pursue her legal remedies as and

when fresh bonafide requirement arises. This argument holds no

water on account of the fact that no new ground has been raised.

Further no application for leading any new evidence has been

placed on record to show that any new facts have come to light.

7. The act of the petitioner clearly shows that there was a lack of

seriousness in pursuing legal remedies that might be available to

her. It clearly flows from the aforesaid that there was gross

negligence on the part of the petitioner in prosecuting the matter.

8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act clearly lays down that before the

delay is condoned, it must be shown that there is a 'sufficient

cause' for the same and the 'sufficient cause' which has been

interpreted by the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs.

Management Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and

Others (2014) 2 SCC (LS) 595 is a cause which is beyond the

human control. The Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid

judgment very categorically stated that although the words

"sufficient cause" must be interpreted with a liberal, justice

oriented, pragmatic and non-pedantic approach but at the same

time the bonafides of the applicant seeking condonation of delay

must be made out. It was further held that the increasing tendency

to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical

propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner and requires to

be curbed.

9. In the instant case prima facie I am not convinced that any cogent

reason has been given by the appellant in the application which

may constitute sufficient cause in the eyes of law.

10. It is such like litigants who have clogged the arteries of justice

which has resulted in piling up of cases in courts and consequently,

not only the number of pending cases swells but even the day to

day hearing of cases gets affected. Further the attention of the court

gets diminished in matters that require its attention.

11. "Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt" is a settled

principle of law i.e the law assists those that are vigilant with their

rights, and not those that sleep thereupon. Merely because the

revisionist/petitioner has woken up belatedly to file the present

revision without showing any sufficient cause does not entitle the

revisionist to disturb a finding which has been returned by the Trial

Court more than three years back.

12. Further even on merits, it is evident from a perusal of the impugned

order that the petitioner/revisionist miserably failed to establish his

case before the trial court. It was alleged therein that the owner of

the premise was one Puran Chand and the same was proved on

record but no evidence to rebut the same was adduced by the

petitioner herein. Further there are discrepancies in the statement

made by the petitioner and PW-2 with respect to the job profile of

PW-2 casting doubts on the alleged bonafide requirement of the

petitioner. It has been recorded by the trial court on a perusal of

the photographs of the tenanted premise placed on record by the

respondent herein that the tenanted premise consists of four shops

and not two as has been contented by the petitioner. The petitioner

failed to substantiate his averments with cogent evidence.

Therefore even otherwise on merits the petitioner has failed to

make out a case.

13. Accordingly the application for condonation of delay is dismissed.

Resultantly the revision is dismissed as barred by limitation.

14. Pending application stands disposed off.

V.K. SHALI, J.

SEPTEMBER 09, 2015 AD