Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 7961 Del
Judgement Date : 16 October, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 323/2012
Date of Decision : October 16th, 2015
H.S. BEDI ..... Petitioner
Through Mr.Madhav Khurana, Adv. with
Mr.Aalam Nijjar, Adv.
versus
INDERJEET SINGH ..... Respondent
Through Ms.Sangeeta Jain, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S.TEJI
P.S.TEJI, J.
1. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed
by the petitioner for quashing of complaint case no.6740/1 titled
"Inderjeet Singh v. Kiran Pal Singh Choudhary & Ors.",pending
before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi,
and the order dated 25.03.2011 summoning the petitioner under
Section 420 IPC and the proceedings arising therefrom.
2. Factual matrix, emerges from the record, is that the
complainant/respondent, namely, Inderjeet Singh has filed a criminal
complaint against accused persons, namely, Kiran Pal Singh
Chaudhary, IDEB Project (P) Ltd. and the petitioner-herein H.S. Bedi
alleging therein that Kiran Pal Singh represented to the complainant
that he had good relations with the petitioner-herein and he would get
allotted a land measuring 500 sq. meter @ Rs.2200/- per sq. meter in
the name of the complainant in the Industrial Estate, Phase-I,
Kashipur, Uttarakhand. The complainant made a total payment of
Rs.10,94,998/- by way of cheques in favour of Kiran Pal Singh and
IDEB Project (P) Ltd towards allotment and purchase of the said land.
Despite making the payment, neither the allotment letter was issued
nor was land allotted to the complainant. Despite repeated requests,
the accused persons did not pay any heed. The cheques given were
duly encashed by the accused. The complainant sent a legal notice
dated 12.07.2008 to the accused persons, but despite its service, the
accused persons did not allot the land to the complainant.
3. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated
25.03.2011, summoned the accused persons while observing that a
prima facie case for commission of offence under Section 420 IPC is
made out against the accused persons.
4. Feeling aggrieved of the complaint and the summoning order,
the petitioner has preferred the present quashing petition. It is
mentioned that the petitioner is the managing director of M/s IDEB
Projects Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Company") which is engaged
in the engineering and construction work in various cities and has
executed numerous projects all over India. The Company promoted
an Industrial Estate in Mahua Kheda Ganj, Kashipur. In January
2007, the Company was approached by accused K.P. Singh for
allotment of a plot in the said industrial estate. He represented that
the plot was to be bought in the name of M/s KAI International in
which he, Mr.Ashwani Khanna and complainant Mr. Inderjeet Singh
were the partners. On 31.01.2007, earnest money was deposited by
Mr.K.P. Singh and on 20.02.2007, the Company issued an allotment
letter in favour of Mr. K.P. Singh i.e. partner of M/s KAI
International. On 28.03.2007, the said firm defaulted in paying the
next installment. On 02.04.2008, the Company received a letter from
Mr.K.P. Singh requesting cancellation of allotment. On 14.07.2008, a
legal notice was received by the Company from the complainant,
which was duly replied.
5. The petitioner has taken the ground that the present case is duly
covered by the judgment in case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
(1992) Suppl. 1 SCC 335; from the perusal of complaint and
documents, no offence is made out against the petitioner; there was no
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise by the
petitioner; there was no inducement on the part of the petitioner; there
is no concept of vicarious liability in criminal law; no overt act has
been mentioned against the petitioner; the Trial Court had not
conducted any enquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
6. Argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the complainant has suppressed the fact from the Court that the
allotment of plot was never in his name rather it was in the name of
the partnership firm of which the complainant was one of the partners.
Since the complainant and his partners did not pay the balance sale
consideration, they requested for cancellation of allotment which was
cancelled. In support of this contention, he relied upon the judgment
in the case of Samadhan Dhudaka Koli v. State of Maharashtra
2008 (16) SCC 705 in which it was observed that no explanation has
come as to why the prosecution suppressed the dying declaration;
fairness in investigation as also trial is a human right of an accused
and the State cannot suppress any vital document from the court only
because the same would support the case of the accused. On similar
point, judgments in cases of State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi
(2005) 1 SCC 568 and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley
and others (2011) 3 SCC 351 have been relied upon.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has
argued that the complainant was not the partner in firm M/s KAI
International as contended by the petitioner. He has not even made
any partnership firm with the co-accused. The complainant made the
payment of Rs.10,94,998/- to the accused persons for allotment of
land and its transfer, but allotment was never made and thus the
respondent/complainant was cheated.
8. It is nowhere the case of the complainant/respondent that he
was the partner of M/s KAI International. The contention of the
petitioner that co-accused K.P. Singh was one of the partners and the
said partnership firm made payments for allotment of plot, nowhere
finds mention in the complaint made by the complainant. The
allegations leveled by the complainant are specific i.e. that the
petitioner-herein and co-accused K.P. Singh cheated the complainant
in the name of getting the plot allotted in the industrial estate being
developed by the petitioner-herein. So, there is no basis in the
contention of the petitioner that the complainant/respondent
suppressed any material fact. Thus, the judgments in case of
Samadhan Dhudaka Koli (supra), Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) and
Harshendra Kumar (supra) are of no assistance to the petitioner as
the same are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
9. It was further argued that the petitioner had no intention to
cheat the complainant nor did he ever induce the complainant to part
with his money. The total sale consideration of the plot was
Rs.44,77,600/-. On 20.02.2007, the Company issued allotment letter
to Mr.K.P. Singh along with the payment schedule for the balance
payment. The firm of the complainant defaulted in making the
payment as per schedule. It is further argued that even the
complainant had not made the total payment.
10. In support of the above contentions, judgment in case of
Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma and others v. State of Bihar and
another (2000) 4 SCC 168 has been relied upon in which it was
observed that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the
offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the
accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is, at
the time when the offence is said to have been committed. To hold a
person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
On similar point, judgments in the cases of Inder Mohan Goswami
and another v. State of Uttaranchal and others (2007) 12 SCC 1;
V.Y. Jose and another v. State of Gujarat and another (2009) 3 SCC
78; M/s Thermax Ltd. & ors. v. K.M. Johny & ors. 2011 (11)
SCALE 128; Subhkaran Luharuka & another v. State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi & another 2010 (3) JCC 1972 and Vesa Holdings P.
Ltd. and another v. State of Kerala & others 2015 SCC Online SC
238 have been relied upon.
11. As per the allegations leveled by the complainant/respondent,
he was inducted by both the accused persons to make payment for
allotment of land in the industrial estate developed by the petitioner-
herein. It has come on record that payments in the name of the
Company of the petitioner-herein and co-accused K.P. Singh were
made by the complainant/respondent. The record further reveals that
the payments made by the complainant by way of cheques were
encashed by the accused persons but despite having received the
payment, the land was never allotted to the complainant, rather the
allotment letter was issued to the co-accused K.P. Singh, which shows
dishonest and fraudulent intention on the part of the petitioner-herein
also to deceive the complainant for making the payment. No
explanation has come on record that despite receiving the payment
from the complainant as to why allotment of land in his favour has not
been made. When it is the specific stand of the complainant/
respondent that he was not the partner in M/s KAI International, the
dishonest and fraudulent intention of the accused persons including
the petitioner-herein is apparent in inducing the complainant/
respondent. Therefore, the judgments in cases of Hridaya Ranjan
Prasad Verma (supra), Inder Mohan Goswami (supra), V.Y. Jose
(supra), M/s Thermax Ltd. (supra), Subhkaran Luharuka (supra) and
Vesa Holdings P. Ltd. (supra) do not render any assistance to the
petitioner as not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
12. Next limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner is that as per Section 202 (1) of the Cr.P.C., it is obligatory
for the Magistrate to either conduct enquiry himself or have it
conducted by a police officer. It is argued that the Trial Court did not
direct the police to check the veracity of the allegations made in the
complaint. In support of this contention, judgment in case of Savera
Sidhu v. Harleen Sidhu and another 2010 Law Suit (P&H) 442 has
been relied upon in which it was observed that the order of the
Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied
his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. The
Magistrate has to examine the nature of allegations made in the
complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support
thereof and that would be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in
bringing charge home of the accused.
Section 202(1) of the Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"Postponement of issue of process.- (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, [and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a
place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquiry into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding."
13. In the present case, it is apparent from the record that the
learned Magistrate conducted the inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
through a police officer. It was reported by the police that co-accused
K.P. Singh once executed an agreement with the complainant, but the
same was subsequently cancelled as the complainant could not pay
the installments to the Company of the petitioner-herein. It was also
reported by the police that the payments were made by the
complainant. The impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate
also shows that to satisfy himself, the pre-summoning evidence of the
complainant was called. The complainant got himself examined and
made the specific allegations against the accused persons in his
examination. Documentary evidence was also placed on record by
the complainant.
14. The order under challenge passed by the learned Magistrate
clearly shows that there was sufficient material on record in the form
of oral evidence as well as documentary evidence before the learned
Magistrate to summon the petitioner as an accused. Before calling the
complainant to produce pre-summoning evidence, the learned
Magistrate conducted inquiry through the police to satisfy himself
about the allegations leveled in the complaint. Upon satisfaction of
the learned Magistrate, the petitioner was summoned as an accused.
The petitioner does not get any assistance from the judgment in case
of Savera Sidhu (supra), as there is sufficient material before the Trial
Court to summon the petitioner which is duly reflected from the order
passed by him.
15. In view of the above discussion, the petitioner has failed to
make out any ground for exercising the inherent powers of this Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order dated 25.03.2011,
passed by the Trial Court.
16. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed.
(P.S.TEJI) JUDGE OCTOBER 16, 2015 dd
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