Anil Kumar Gupta vs Deepika Verma
2015 Latest Caselaw 7889 Del

*                  HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                                    RC. REV. 138/2015

                                         Pronounced On: 14th October, 2015

ANIL KUMAR GUPTA                                            ..... Petitioner
                            Through:      Mr. Niraj K. Singh, Advocate with
                                          Mr. Mustafa Zaidi, Advocate
                            versus

DEEPIKA VERMA                                              ..... Respondent
                            Through:      Mr. V.K Sharma, Advocate

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI

V.K. SHALI, J.

1. The present revision petition has been filed by the

petitioner/revisionist against the order dated 06.02.2015 passed by

the learned Additional Rent Controller (ARC), East District,

Karkardooma Court, Delhi rejecting the review petition filed by the

revisionist and upholding the order dated 13.08.2014 by virtue of

which the Ld. ARC dismissed the petitioner's application for leave

to defend and passed the order of eviction.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent is the

landlady of the premises bearing no. 603/2 B-1, Bazar Gali,

Vishwas Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi-110032. A shop situated at the

ground floor of the aforesaid premise was let out to the petitioner

on 16.11.1988 at the rent of Rs. 800/- p.m. (hereinafter referred to

as the tenanted premise) to be increased at 5% every year. The

respondent in August, 2012 filed an eviction petition stating therein

that the premises are required for the settlement of her daughter in

law as her son who is engaged in the family business and is unable

to meet the requirements of his family which includes two minor

children.

3. The Ld. ARC vide order dated 13.08.2014 dismissed the

petitioners application seeking leave to defend and passed an order

of eviction in favor of the respondent herein. Aggrieved the

petitioner herein sought a review and the same was dismissed vide

order dated 06.02.2015. Leading to the present revision petition.

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The case of the

petitioner/revisionist is primarily two folds. Firstly it has been

contented that the daughter in law will not constitute as dependent

on the respondent according to the scheme of S.14 (1) (e) of the

Delhi Rent Control Act. It has been argued that even though the

word 'dependent' has not been defined in the Act, in common

parlance, it means and connotes a person who is dependent either

on account of being minor or on account of having been

incapacitated. Admittedly, the daughter in law does not qualify

either of the criteria so as to make her dependent on the respondent

for the purpose of the eviction proceedings under S. 14(1) (e) of the

Act. In furtherance of the aforesaid argument the petitioner/

revisionist has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the

Honorable Sikkim High Court in Paul Sangay vs. Mahabir Prasad

Agarwalla; AIR 1980 Sikkim 13 wherein it has been observed that a

requirement for occupation of any person other than landlord

himself can be a ground of ejectment there under only if such

person, whether a wife or a son or a daughter is "dependent" on the

landlord. It was further observed that mere desire on the part of the

landlord is not enough but the landlord must also prove a genuine

bonafide requirement.

5. Secondly the learned counsel for the petitioner has questioned the

title of the respondent/landlady with respect to the tenanted

premise on account of discrepancies in the documents relied upon

by the respondent in this regard. It is alleged that the GPA dated

03.01.1996 executed in favor of one Ms. Vidyawati was in respect

of a premise ad-measuring 150 sq yards whereas the sale deed

dated 20.02.1996 executed by her in favor of Mr. Sanjeev Kumar

Verma which was later purchased by the respondent/ landlady in

2006 ad-measured only 50 square yards. On the basis of the

aforesaid it is argued that the property, ad-measuring 150 square

yards was not partitioned by meets and bounds and late Vidyawati

was appointed attorney for the entire property and therefore, it is

suspicious as to how a part of the same being 50 square yards,

presently constituting the tenanted premises, came to be sold to Mr

Sanjeev Kumar Verma and later to the respondent/landlady,

thereby raising doubts on the title of the respondent/ landlady. It is

further argued that had the respondent been the landlady the rent

with respect to the tenanted premises could not have been received

by Mr. Yogender Verma who is the husband of the respondent and

in whose favor all the rent cheques were drawn in absence of any

authorization from the respondent to receive the said rent for and

on her behalf. In addition to the aforesaid the learned counsel for

the revisionist/petitioner has also pointed out that blank cheques

were tendered by the revisionist/tenant to the husband of the

respondent during the tenancy period.

6. It has been contented by the learned counsel for the

petitioner/revisionist that the Ld. ARC fell into an error by holding

that the revisionist/ tenant has failed to make out any triable issue.

It has been further contented that a "triable issue" denotes an issue

which confers right on the person raising such issue to defend the

proceedings and which cannot be adjudicated in a summary

manner rather, its adjudication is essential to determine the

respective rights of the parties. It is averred by the learned counsel

for the petitioner that as it flows from the aforementioned

submissions the revisionist/ tenant has been able to prima facie

raise triable issues which cannot be dealt with in a summary

manner and a decision on which is germane and cogent for the final

adjudication of the matter.

7. I have heard the learned counsels for both the parties and perused

the impugned order.

8. The short point for consideration in the present matter is whether or

not a daughter in law would qualify to be a dependent on the

mother in law under the terms of S.14 (1) (e) of the Act.

9. Before proceeding further, it would be pertinent here to reproduce

S.14(1)(e)

"14. Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by and court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant: Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-

....

(e) That the premises let for residential purpose are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof , or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation."

10. An analysis of the aforementioned reveals that in order to secure

possession of the tenanted premises the landlord must fulfill the

aforementioned pre-requisites being a bonafide requirement,

absence of any other suitable premises and that the premises are

categorically required for the possession and occupation of the

landlord himself or "for any member of his family dependent on

him".

11. In order to lay to rest, the ambiguity attached with the word

"dependent" it is critical to appreciate the intent of the legislature

behind the design of S. 14 of the Act. From the perusal of the Act

itself it is evident that the aforesaid was not intended to be against

the requirement of a landlord or to act in any way as an anti-

landlord provision but was designed to protect the interest of the

tenant that is to provide him with a safety net in case an eviction

was sought either out of sheer mischief or in hope of higher

monetary gains. It is trite law that the rent control law does not

envisage or confer a better right than the landlord, on the tenant

with respect to the bona fide enjoyment of the tenanted premises.

The same is reflected from the judgment of this court in Punjab

State Co-operative Supply And Marketing Federation Limited vs.

Amit Goel and Another; 204 (2013) DLT 63 wherein it was held

that "the law is settled that unless shown to the contrary, the

presumption would be in favor of the landlord's need" and a catena

of other judgments.

12. Customarily or in common parlance a dependent would be defined

as any person who is reliant on another either for financial or

physical support for sustenance of life. It is pertinent to note that

the word dependent or as to what constitutes a family has nowhere

been defined in the Delhi Rent Control Act. Rather, the legislators

consciously and deliberately have used the words "any member of

family dependent on the landlord" instead of defining a clear

degree of relations so as to construe a wider meaning to the

aforesaid words as man is a social creature and part of a complex

societal system involving myriad of relations from which he cannot

be isolated. It is significant to understand that the dependency is

not restricted to financial or physical but will also include

emotional reliance on another person. Reliance in this regard is

placed on the findings of this court in M/S. Jhalani Tools (India)

Pvt. Ltd. vs B.K. Soni; AIR 1994 Delhi 167, wherein the court

observed that the social set up of our society is such where a

married daughter continues to enjoy a place of pride in her

maternal home and therefore while considering the requirement of

the landlord her married daughter and her expected visits cannot be

lost sight of. Similarly in Sain Dass v. Madan Lal; 1972 Ren CJ

(SN) 8 (Delhi), this Court has acknowledged that the word

"himself" has to be construed to mean "himself" as cohabiting with

his family members with whom he is normally accustomed to live.

Therefore, contrary to the submissions of the learned counsel for

the petitioner financial or physical incapacitation cannot be the sole

premises for determining dependency on another.

13. The Honorable Supreme Court in Corporation of the City of

Nagpur v. The Nagpur Handloom Cloth Market Co. Ltd., AIR

(1963) SC 1192 while interpreting the word "Family" observed as

under :

"But the expression 'family' has according to the contest in which it occurs, a variable connotation. It does not in the setting of the rules postulate the existence of relationship either of blood or by marriage between the persons residing in the tenement Even a single person may be regarded as a family, and a master and servant would also be so regarded."

14. As it crystallizes from the aforesaid the word dependent cannot be

constructed in a narrow and literal manner. The same have to be

interpreted judiciously keeping in mind the intent of the legislators.

As discussed above the words used under S.14 (1) (e), are "any

member of family dependent on him" which would include the

daughter in law who in the instant matter is dependent on her

mother in law/landlady (respondent herein) and on account of

sharing of residence both the daughter in law and the respondent

are physically, emotionally and financially inter-dependent.

15. I have perused the judgment relied upon by the revisionist in Paul

Sangay's case (supra). It was a case wherein the landlord sought

eviction on the ground that the premises were required for the

settlement of his two sons aged 25 years and 19 years who desired

to start a business in the tenanted premises. It was in light of the

said facts that the Honorable Sikkim High Court examined the

scope of the word "dependent" under the Gangtok Rent Control

And Eviction Act, 1956 and by limiting the degree of relations to

wife, son or daughter of the landlord, the learned court has

attempted to define the same. Reliance on the aforesaid judgment

seems to be misplaced as not only it deals with an entirely different

act but also the facts of the instant case are distinguishable and it is

settled principle that no blanket approach can be followed and the

court must look at each case in the light of its own peculiar

circumstances. It is trite law that a judgment rendered by any High

Court has binding precedential value only on the subordinate courts

and tribunals within its own territorial jurisdiction and beyond the

same it only has a persuasive demeanor. Reliance in this regard is

placed on the judgment of this court in M/S. Chinteshwar Steel

Pvt.Ltd. vs Union Of India & Ors. [WP (C) No. 4553/2012 decided

on 8.10.2012].

16. A constitutional bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs Dilbahar Singh; 2014

(9) SCALE 657 while explain the revisionary powers of the high

court under various rent control acts has held as follows:

"45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in

revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re- appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity."

17. In the light of the aforesaid, I am of the considered opinion that the

same is a question of fact and has been decided against the

petitioner/tenant concurrently by the Ld. ARC both in the eviction

order dated 13.08.2014 and the order dismissing the review petition

dated 06.02.2015. I have perused the impugned order and find no

infirmity or illegality in the analysis of the evidence as done by the

Ld. ARC so as to warrant any interference by this court. As it

crystallizes from the aforesaid judgment of the Honorable Apex

Court in the Hindustan Petroleum's case (supra), the court when

exercising its revisionary powers does not sit in appellate

jurisdiction and it shall not re-assess or re-appreciate the evidence

so as to arrive at a finding contrary to that rendered by the courts

below when prima facie no illegality or impropriety is reflected

from the impugned order.

18. Even otherwise on merits in the light of the judgment rendered by

this court in Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi; 2009 (157) DLT 450,

when the petitioner/tenant has been paying rent to the landlady then

he is not allowed to raise plea of imperfectness of title of the

respondent/landlady. To say that the rent was being received by the

husband of respondent/landlady and therefore the title does not vest

in the respondent/landlady or to raise a plea that merely because

the property was not divided in meets and bounds and there was no

provision in the GPA to allow the future transfers of the property in

a piece meal manner casts a cloud on the title of the property is a

farfetched story to say the least and is devoid of any substance.

19. The Court has rightly observed that the tenant cannot dictate his

terms to the landlady as to how she is to use her accommodation

unless and until there is grossly unjustified demand made by the

landlady. The landlady has been able to make out a more than

prima facie case to prove her bonafide requirement.

20. I have considered carefully all the aspects of the matter and fully

agree with the conclusions draw by the learned ARC. The learned

Additional Rent Controller has dissected the evidence and has

examined the contentions analytically. Even otherwise I have

undertaken the exercise to examine the evidence on the record

myself and I find no reason to take a view contrary to the one taken

by the learned Additional Rent Controller. I do not find that there is

any jurisdictional error, infirmity or impropriety in rejecting the

leave to defend of the petitioner by the learned ARC and therefore,

this Court is not required to interfere with the said order.

21. In view of the aforesaid facts and discussion, I feel that the present

petition is totally misconceived and no ground has been made out

to interfere with the same and accordingly, the same is dismissed.

22. Pending applications also stand disposed of.

V.K. SHALI, J.

OCTOBER 14, 2015 AD