Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 8433 Del
Judgement Date : 6 November, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 6th November, 2015
+ LPA 760/2014, CMs No.19528/2014 (for stay) & 19529/2014 (for
condonation of 31 days delay in filing the appeal)
U.P. RAJYA VIDYUT UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Pradeep Misra, Adv.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ruchir Mishra, Ms. Saroj
Bidawat and Mr. Mukesh Kumar
Saxena, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. This intra court appeal impugns the judgment dated 21 st August, 2014
of the learned Single Judge of this Court of dismissal of W.P.(C)
No.7328/2012 preferred by the appellant.
2. The appellant had preferred the writ petition from which this appeal
arises impugning the letter dated 19th September, 2011 of the respondent
No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat (ILS), Joint Secretary, Govt. of India initiating
proceedings for arbitration of disputes between the appellant and the
respondent No.2 Engineering Projects India Ltd. (EPIL).
3. The facts are in a narrow ambit. The erstwhile U.P. State Electricity
Board (UPSEB) placed a work order dated 5th February, 1982 on the
respondent No.2 EPIL. The contract which thereby came into existence
between the respondent No.2 EPIL and the UPSEB contained an arbitration
clause as under:
"The arbitration clause suggested by Bureau of Public Enterprises shall be applicable."
The respondent No.2 EPIL completed the work in December, 1988;
prior thereto, the respondent No.2 EPIL on 6th May, 1988 raised certain
claims. The said claims of the respondent No.2 EPIL were denied by the
UPSEB vide letter dated 30th October, 1999. After some correspondence,
the respondent No.2 EPIL finally vide letter dated 3rd July, 2001 approached
the Department of Public Enterprises for settlement of the said disputes by
forwarding the same to Permanent Machinery of Arbitration (PMA), as per
the provisions of the circulars issued by the Department of Public
Enterprises.
4. In the meanwhile, in pursuance of the Uttar Pradesh Electricity
Reforms Act, 1999, UPSEB was unbundled and the thermal generating
stations of UPSEB which had placed the work order aforesaid on the
respondent No.2 EPIL stood transferred to the appellant U.P. Rajya Vidyut
Utpadan Nigam Ltd.
5. The respondent No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat, acting as sole Arbitrator, in
pursuance to the request aforesaid of the respondent No.2 EPIL, initiated the
arbitration proceedings as aforesaid and which led to the filing of the writ
petition from which this appeal arises.
6. The letter dated 19th September, 2011 supra of the respondent No.3
Dr. Geeta Rawat, inter alia intimates the appellant and the respondent No.2
EPIL:
(i) to pay the arbitration costs as prescribed by the Office
Memorandum (OM) dated 22nd January, 2004 of the Department of
Public Enterprises;
(ii) that failure to pay the costs within the prescribed time for upto
six months will attract interest @ 15% per annum and beyond that
will invite cancellation of the publication of the award;
(iii) that the forum of Permanent Machinery of Arbitration (PMA)
had been established in terms of the decision of the Cabinet
Secretariat in compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court in
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central
Excise 1995 (4) SCC 541;
(iv) that Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any other law for
the time being in force shall not be applicable to the PMA;
(v) that the sole Arbitrator shall make a speaking award which will
be published on plain paper and will be binding on both of them;
(vi) that they may however, if aggrieved from the award, file an
appeal before the Law Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Law & Justice for setting aside or revision of the award;
(vii) that there shall be no appeal against the decision of the Law
Secretary and the appellant and the respondent No.2 EPIL shall not be
allowed to go to the Court for setting aside of the award published by
the PMA, as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was not
applicable thereto and the decision of the Law Secretary shall be
binding on the parties.
7. The appellant filed the writ petition from which this appeal arises,
contending (a) that the mechanism devised in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise supra and reiterated in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. City and Industrial Development
Corporation, Maharashtra (2007) 7 SCC 39 had been overruled / recalled
in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2011) 3 SCC
404; and, (b) that thus the mechanism devised thereunder also disappeared
and the respondent No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat had no authority to act as an
Arbitrator for adjudication of the said disputes.
8. The respondent No.2 EPIL in its counter affidavit filed before the
learned Single Judge pleaded, (I) that the respondent No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat
was acting as the sole Arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration clause
contained in the contract between the respondent No.2 EPIL and the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant; the arbitration clause of the Bureau
of Public Enterprises was set out in the counter affidavit; (II) that the
appellant had failed to join in the arbitration proceedings before the
respondent No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat; (III) that the setting aside by the
Supreme Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. supra of the
directions / mechanism devised in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.
Vs. Collector of Central Excise had nothing to do with the PMA which had
been set up prior to Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of
Central Excise.
9. The learned Single Judge accepted the defence aforesaid of the
respondent No.2 EPIL and dismissed the writ petition vide the impugned
judgment inter alia holding as under:
(A) that though admittedly the mechanism devised pursuant to the
dicta of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.
Vs. Collector of Central Excise of referring the disputes to
Committee of Disputes stood set aside by the dicta of the Supreme
Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. supra, however the
mechanism of PMA has not been dissolved and the parties were at
liberty to agree to resolve the disputes through the mechanism of
PMA which was set up by an executive decision to settle commercial
disputes between public sector enterprises inter se and public sector
enterprises and government departments;
(B) that PMA was set up independent of and prior to the
mechanism of Committee of Disputes which was made effective by
virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Vs. Collector of Central Excise and Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Vs. City and Industrial Development Corporation,
Maharashtra supra;
(C) that the arbitration clause contained in the work order placed by
the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant on the respondent No.2
EPIL provided the contractual basis for resorting to PMA;
(D) that thus the arbitration agreement as suggested under the OM
issued by the Department of Public Enterprises was applicable by
virtue of the express terms of the contract of the appellant with the
respondent No.2 EPIL.
10. Aggrieved from the aforesaid decision of the learned Single Judge,
this appeal has been preferred contending, (i) that the continuance of the
PMA is in derogation of the dicta of the Supreme Court in Electronics
Corporation of India Ltd.; (ii) that the claim of the respondent No.2 EPIL is
barred by time; (iii) that the respondent No.3 Dr. Geeta Rawat in her letter
dated 19th September, 2011 supra having specifically stated that the fora
under which she was purporting to act as the sole Arbitrator was established
under the decision of the Cabinet Secretariat in compliance with the dicta of
the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector
of Central Excise, the learned Single Judge could not have held that it is not
so.
11. The appeal came up first before this Court on 28th November, 2014
when, finding that though the work order dated 5th February, 1982 placed by
the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant on the respondent No.2 EPIL
provided for arbitration of disputes in accordance with the arbitration clause
suggested by the Bureau of Public Enterprises but there was nothing on
record to show as to what was the arbitration clause suggested by Bureau of
Public Enterprises as on 5th February, 1982, we enquired so from the
counsel for the appellant and on his request adjourned the matter to 9 th
December, 2014 and then to 19th January, 2015. The appellant has since
filed, (A) OM dated 19th December, 1975 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat,
the corrigendum thereof dated 19th August, 1976; (B) letter dated 23rd
September, 1977 of the Cabinet Secretariat; and, (C) OM dated 17th July,
1982 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat. However, as per the said documents
also, the disputes between the two public sector undertakings as the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant and the appellant on the one hand
and the respondent No.2 EPIL on the other hand are, are to be resolved
through arbitration (and recourse to litigation to be eliminated) of a serving
Law Officer of the rank of Joint Secretary selected from a panel of names
proposed by Law Ministry with the award being accepted as final
challengeable any on grounds mentioned in Clauses (16) and (3) of the
Arbitration Act (presumably the Arbitration Act, 1940) by reference made
to the Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice.
12. We heard the counsel for the appellant on 7th April, 2015 and reserved
judgment on admissibility of the appeal.
13. The challenge by the appellant to the arbitration proceedings initiated
was primarily on the ground of the same being pursuant to the mechanism
set in place under the dicta of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise and which mechanism
stood set aside / withdrawn vide later dicta in Electronics Corporation of
India Ltd. Though the grounds, of the claim for adjudication of which the
Arbitral Tribunal had been set up were stale and time barred and of the
arbitration being bad for the reason of excluding the applicability of the
provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, were pleaded but
not pressed.
14. The appellant having not pressed the challenge to the arbitration on
the grounds of limitation and of excluding the applicability of the
Arbitration Act, cannot in this appeal urge the same. Even otherwise, it is
the settled position in law (see S.B.P. & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd.
(2005) 8 SCC 618 and Lalit-Kumar V. Sanghavi Vs. Dharamdas V.
Sanghavi (2014) 7 SCC 255) that a writ petition with respect to arbitration
proceedings does not lie.
15. Thus the only question for adjudication is, whether the arbitration was
under a mechanism which no longer was in force / existed.
16. No error can be found in the reasoning or the conclusion reached by
the learned Single Judge on the said aspect. It is not as if the contract
between the parties did not provide for arbitration and the parties were being
compelled to arbitrate only because of the dicta of the Supreme Court in Oil
and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise supra
and which dicta is no longer in force. The work order placed by the
predecessor-in-interest of the appellant on respondent no.2 EPIL expressly
provided that the arbitration clause suggested by the Bureau of Public
Enterprises shall be applicable.
17. It is not the case of the appellant that at the contemporaneous time
there was no arbitration clause suggested by the Bureau of Public
Enterprises and that thus there was no arbitration agreement between the
parties.
18. The parties had thus admittedly contracted for arbitration.
19. Once that is so, the fact that the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise supra disapproved of
the Government Departments or the Public Sector Enterprises litigating with
each other in Courts and suggested a mechanism for settlement of such
disputes including by arbitration, would not be relevant inasmuch as the
appellant was / is bound by its agreement of arbitration.
20. In our view, it also matters not that the respondent no.3 Arbitrator
considered that her appointment constitution as a sole Arbitrator was owed
to Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise
supra and not to the contract between the parties. The same would be totally
irrelevant.
21. Significantly, it is not the case of the appellant that the constitution of
the Arbitral Tribunal is not in accordance with the contract.
22. Though the counsel for the appellant has not argued, we may record
that the question, whether the provisions of the Arbitration Act are
applicable to the arbitration aforesaid, is not relevant at this stage and the
occasion therefor may arise at a subsequent stage. It may however be
observed that Section 2(2),(4) & (5) of the Arbitration Act provides that the
part thereof relating to domestic arbitration applies where the place of
arbitration is in India, save as otherwise provided in any law. It may further
be observed that this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Engineers
Project India Ltd. MANU/DE/2793/2014 reiterated by me in Order dated
18th September, 2015 in W.P.(C) No.6591/2015 titled Rakesh Kumar Garg
Vs. DSE Financial Service Ltd. has held that there is no provision in
Arbitration Act that proscribes a two tier arbitration procedure.
23. We therefore do not find any merit in the appeal.
24. We may however observe that though the Supreme Court in
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. supra has withdrawn the directions
issued in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central
Excise but for the reason of finding that the same were not serving any
purpose and were merely delaying the adjudication of the disputes inter se
Government Departments and Public Sector Enterprises and which were
ultimately landing in the Courts. What has not been set aside in Electronics
Corporation of India Ltd. is the lament of the Supreme Court in Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise of the
Government Departments / Public Sector Enterprises being unable to settle
their disputes amicably and spending huge amount of public money over
litigation and owing to which litigation a large number of public projects
remain held up. The present is yet another instance of a Public Sector
Undertaking as the appellant insisting upon litigating for the sake of
litigation, without any endeavour to take a logical view of the matter at any
level and in the process, continuing to spend lacs of rupees on litigation.
25. We therefor find no ground to entertain this appeal. The same is
dismissed. We refrain from imposing costs on the appellant.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
CHIEF JUSTICE NOVEMBER 06, 2015 bs
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