Delhi High Court
State Bank Of Bikaner And Jaipur vs Vinod Kumar Agrawal on 2 November, 2015
Author: Pradeep Nandrajog
$~R-121
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: November 02, 2015
+ LPA 594/2012
STATE BANK OF BIKANER & JAIPUR ..... Appellant
Represented by: Mr.R.P.Kapur, Advocate
versus
VINOD KUMAR AGRAWAL ..... Respondent
Represented by: Mr.Barun Kumar Sinha,
Advocate with Mrs.Pratibha
Sinha, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. (ORAL)
1. On June 28, 1994 a settlement was arrived at between the Associate
Banks of the State Bank of India and the employees of the Union
concerning promotion of its employees and officers, and relevant would it
be to note that for the post for which the respondent had a grievance, the
agreement envisaged that the employees in the category in which the
respondent was serving would be given three chances for promotion, with
chance defined as under:-
" "Chance" means actual appearance in the written test under
Groups A & B and in the interview under Group D, or a
written communication by the employee agreeing to appear in
the written test or the interview, as the case may be, but not
appearing therein."
2. The agreement also envisaged that a period of two years should
elapsed from the time when the candidates previous appeared for selection.
3. The agreement required employees who had become eligible for
being considered for promotion to be considered with reference to their
seniority; with number of candidates entitled to being considered for
promotion restricted to four times the number of vacancies.
4. It is not in dispute that the post for which the respondent litigated
warranted only an interview to be held.
5. On facts, the respondent applied for the post in question in the year
2004, and falling within the zone of consideration was called for the
interview, but did not attain requisite marks and hence was not promoted.
He applied once again in the year 2005, but did not appear at the interview.
He applied in the year 2007, but the date being within the period of two
years reckoned from the date in the year 2005 when candidates were
considered for promotion. He was not called for the interview and he filed
a writ petition praying that his name being wrongly excluded from the list of
eligible candidates to be called for the interview, his name should be
included in the list and he should be subjected to an interview. The writ
petition was opposed by the appellant bank, pleading that since a period of
two years had not elapsed from the time of previous appearance for
selection, the respondent would not be entitled to have his name included in
the list of eligible candidates.
6. For reasons unknown and which neither counsel can explain to us,
the learned Single Judge went about discussing as to when can a candidate
be treated as having availed three chances. The learned Single Judge noted
the definition of chance as per the agreement but has reasoned that there
could be various causes which may prevent a person from being able to
appear at the interview and thus has held that when the respondent applied
for the post in question in the year 2005 but did not appear at the interview
it could not be said that he exhausted any chance in the year 2005.
7. Whether or not the respondent took a chance in the year 2005 was
irrelevant to decide whether for purposes of computing three entitlements
to offer candidature to be considered for promotion the respondent No.1
would be treated as having taken a chance, because concededly when
respondent applied in the year 2007 this was the third time he did so and
irrespective of whether he took a chance in the year 2005 or not, and on the
assumption that he took the chance in the year 2005, this would be the third
time the respondent applied.
8. The real debate between the parties was to the relevant term of the
agreement as per which two years period should have been elapsed from
the time when the candidates appeared for selection.
9. Now, the clause in question (which requires a two years gap) does not
say that the period of two years would be reckoned with reference to the
date of the last chance. It refers to the date when the candidates previously
appeared for selection. Thus, notwithstanding the fiction in the definition of
the chance created under the agreement by treating the persons having
availed a chance if he offers his candidatures but does not appear at the
interview, we find that the respondent has been wronged because the clause
of the agreement which requires a gap of two years does not relate itself to
the date of the previous chance taken , but relates itself to the date of
'previous appearance for selection' . The phrase previous appearance of
selection, with reference to the word 'appearance', would require it to be
held (in conformity with the rule of interpretation that a word must be given
its ordinary meaning) that the phrase 'previous appearance for selection'
would mean the date when a candidate presents himself formally for
selection, and that would mean appears at the interview in the instant case.
10. We dismiss the appeal and maintain the relief granted to the
respondent, not for the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge, but for
the reasoning given by us in the present opinion.
11. No costs.
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 02, 2015
SKB
