Delhi High Court

Kishan Mal Mohnot (Since ... vs Union Of India & Ors. on 25 May, 2015

Author: Valmiki J. Mehta

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+ W.P.(C) No. 5147/2015

% 25th May, 2015

KISHAN MAL MOHNOT (SINCE DECEASED)
REPRESENTED BY HIS SON/LR DR. J.K. MOHNOT ..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. R.Sathish and Mr. Mohand Das
K.K. Advocates.

versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Dev P.Bhardwaj, Adv. for R-1.

Mr. Punit K. Bhalla and Ms. Isha
Abrol, Advs. for R-2.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA

To be referred to the Reporter or not?

VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India by one Dr. J.K. Mohnot, son of the deceased Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot.

Deceased Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot was an employee of the Bank of

Rajasthan Limited. The deceased employee Sh. Kishan Mal Mohonot

retired from the services of the Bank of Rajasthan Limited way back on

31.7.1990. The issue in this writ petition filed in the year 2015 is the claim

WP(C) No. 5147/2015 Page 1 of 6
with respect to denial of pension option to the deceased employee Sh.

Kishan Mal Mohnot.

2. Petitioner by this writ petition impugns the decision of the

respondent no.3/ICICI Bank Ltd dated 13.6.2013 by which the respondent

no.3/Bank has rejected the request of the petitioner which contended that

late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot was entitled to a pension option and that he

should not have been paid the provident fund. It be noted that the

respondent no.3/ICICI Bank Ltd is the successor entity of the Bank of

Rajasthan Limited, as the Bank of Rajasthan Limited has been amalgamated

with the respondent no.3/Bank.

3. In my opinion, the writ petition is clearly barred by the doctrine

of delay and laches and the principle of limitation and which principle has

been enunciated by the Supreme Court recently in the judgment in the case

of State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436,

the relevant paragraphs of this judgment are para nos. 52 to 54 and which

read as under:-

"Delay/Laches

52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed Writ Petition on 11-11-
2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6-10-1989 w.e.f. 1-1-
1986 without furnishing any explanation for such inordinate delay and on
laches on her part. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, makes it
WP(C) No. 5147/2015 Page 2 of 6
obligatory on the part of the court to dismiss the Suit or appeal if made
after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a
defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at
appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the
matter. (See Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu: AIR 1994 PC 24
and Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma: (2008) 12 SCC 577.)

53. Needless to say that Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ
jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public
policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions
are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case
like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give rise to a recurring
cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on
the ground of delay and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for
the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the
instant case, the Respondent claimed the relief from 1-1-1986 by filing a
petition on 11-11-2005 but the High Court for some unexplained
reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1-6-1984, though even the Notification
dated 6-10-1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1-1-1986.

54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition
should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner
approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the
Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for
delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim
impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had
approached the Court within a reasonable time. (See Rup
Diamonds v. Union of India: (1989) 2 SCC 356, State of
Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya: (1996) 6 SCC 267 and Jagdish Lal v. State
of Haryana: (1997) 6 SCC 538.)" (underlining added)

4. This writ petition is filed in the year 2015 when the deceased

employee Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot retired 25 years back on 31.7.1990. If

late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot was wrongly not given the pension, then, late

Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot had to challenge that decision of denial of pension

on the ground that he had exercised option but was not given the option. I

WP(C) No. 5147/2015 Page 3 of 6
note that the petitioner in the writ petition itself states that representation

was made with respect to what as per the petitioner was illegal denial of

pension way back in the year 1998 and a specific order was passed on

17.7.1998 rejecting the claim of late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot for grant of

pension.

5. Not only the order was passed on 17.7.1998, another

representation filed by the petitioner's father on 31.7.1998 was again

specifically rejected way back on 9.6.1999. Clearly, therefore, once a

specific prayer is made, a specific contention raised, and that specific

contention rejected by two specific orders of the years 1998 and 1999 those

orders have to be very much challenged within the period of limitation in

view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Mamata

Mohanty (supra). The claim for alleged medical expense incurred in the

year 1995 of Rs.40,000/- is also to be rejected for the same reason of

limitation.

6. Merely because the petitioner chooses again in the year 2010 to

make a fresh representation does not mean that by making a fresh

representation fresh period of limitation would arise. Also, the petitioner

claims through his late father Sh. Krishan Lal Mohnot, and once the claim of
WP(C) No. 5147/2015 Page 4 of 6
the late father Sh. Krishan Lal Mohnot stood rejected, no legal heir of Sh.

Krishan Lal Mohnot ; including the petitioner; would get a fresh independent

right.

7. The argument urged on behalf of the petitioner that late Sh.

Kishan Mal Mohnot suffered medical disability of paralytic attack and brain

hemorrhage on 12.5.1993, and therefore, petitioner was entitled to question

the decision of the years 1998 and 1999 by the representation in the year

2010 is misconceived because if petitioner's father suffered from medical

disability stated above on 12.5.1993, the representation then made thereafter,

and which was rejected by the orders of the years 1998 and 1999, would

have been by the legal heirs of late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot, petitioner being

one such legal heir, and therefore it is not permissible for the petitioner

today in the year 2015 to question the rejection of pension option done by

means of orders of the bank way back in the years 1998 and 1999.

8. I may note that counsel for the petitioner did seek to

passionately argue that even the provident fund was given about five years

after retirement of late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot in the year 1990, and that the

provident fund amount was paid in the year 1995, but even if that be so that

there is a delayed payment of provident fund, the same would not mean that
WP(C) No. 5147/2015 Page 5 of 6
only on that account there would be an automatic entitlement of pension,

inasmuch as, at best the entitlement would only have been, that too within

three years of limitation of the year 1995, to claim interest on the delayed

payment of provident fund.

9. Reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the

judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kayoji Sorabji Mirza Vs.

The Union Bank of India and Ors. dated 12.6.2013 in W.P.(C)

No.1020/2012 will not help the petitioner as the judgment is distinguishable

on facts and also because of the categorical observations of the Supreme

Court in the judgment in the case of Mamata Mohanty (supra) and the

different facts of the present case stated above with respect to retirement of

late Sh. Kishan Mal Mohnot in the year 1990, earlier representations being

rejected way back in the years 1998 and 1999 and also payment of provident