Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 3718 Del
Judgement Date : 7 May, 2015
$~15
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of hearing and order: 07.05.2015
+ W.P.(C) 7012/2009
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR
..... Petitioners
Through: Ms.Avnish Ahlawat, Advocate
versus
VIRENDER KUMAR
..... Respondent
Through: Mr. G.D. Bhandari, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE I.S.MEHTA
ORDER
% 07.05.2015 KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (ORAL)
1. By this petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, petitioner seeks to challenge the order dated 01.10.2008 passed by
learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in
O.A. No. 1635/2007.
2. Addressing arguments, Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, Advocate submits that
the respondent was caught red handed with 200 pouches of tobacco in a
polythene bag beneath his driving seat while he was deployed on
ambulance van DBL 9925 and this was detected by one Mr. Raj Kumar,
Constable while the coach was in the process of unloading. Counsel also
submits that the Tribunal has arrived at a wrong finding by taking a view
that it was a case of no evidence whereas the petitioner got examined two
important witnesses i.e. one Mr. R.N. Meena and Mr. Ram Phal to prove
the articles of charges framed against the respondent. Counsel also submits
that the respondent himself had signed the seizure memo and therefore, he
could not dispute the recovery of the said pouches from him. Counsel also
submits that the presence of Raj Kumar was recorded in the very first
inquiry but later, he could not be produced because of the fact that the
Battalion of which he was a part had moved out to a far of place in the
South.
3. Rebutting the aforesaid contentions raised by the learned counsel for
the petitioner, Mr. G.D. Bhandari, Advocate appearing on behalf of the
respondent submits that the Tribunal has rightly held that it is a case of no
evidence as none of the material witnesses were examined by the petitioner
department. Counsel also submits that this was a third inquiry which was
held against the respondent and even in this inquiry, the petitioner failed to
adduce any evidence or any material witness to prove the articles of charge
framed against him. Counsel also submits that even the evidence produced
by the petitioner does not extend any support to the case of the petitioner
rather, their evidence lends support to the defence set up by the respondent.
In support of his arguments, Counsel for the respondent relies on the
judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jasmer Singh vs. State of
Haryana and another reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 and also on the
judgment of the learned Tribunal passed in the case of Dr. D.P.S. Luthra
vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (1988) 8 Administrative Tribunal
Cases 815 and
4. We have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties
and have also perused the impugned order and the material on record. We
have also gone through the judgments cited by both the parties.
5. The respondent was a driver and on 25.9.1999, he was deployed on
ambulance van No. DBL 9925. He was ordered to transport 191 bread
packets from Jail No.2 to Jail No.4. When he reached the gate of the Jail
No.4, the TPS staff and Darban searched the vehicle and also the respondent
in person and after satisfying themselves, permitted the respondent to take
the vehicle inside Jail No.4. The bread packets were unloaded from the van
by the concerned staff and after unloading the breads when he was returning
back, he was stopped at the Gate and was detained by the duty staff on the
pretext that some tobacco had been recovered from his vehicle.
6. It is the case of the respondent that the duty staff had carried a
complete search of his person and the vehicle, and the report being clear,
the duty officer permitted the vehicle to be taken inside, and that neither
during the process of search, nor during unloading of the bread packets at
the fixed place inside the jail, did anyone recover anything objectionable
from the vehicle. Under orders of the Superintendent, jail no.4, his
statement was also obtained, wherein it was stated by him that he was duly
searched along with the vehicle prior to the grant of permission for taking
the vehicle inside jail no.4, where he got unloaded 191 bread packets. The
Superintendent after doing so and satisfying himself, allowed the respondent
herein to take away the vehicle for further duty. Seizure memo was
prepared, which was signed by Shri Mahavir Singh, Deputy
Superintendent/jail no.1, who conducted a preliminary enquiry recorded the
statements of concerned staff and submitted his report accordingly to higher
authorities. The statements recorded by him were, however, not supplied to
the respondent despite repeated requests made on his behalf. After one and
a half months of the incident, the petitioner placed the respondent under
suspension vide order dated 16.7.1999 retrospectively w.e.f. 1.6.1999.
Major penalty chargesheet dated 21.10.1999 was issued to the respondent
under rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The charge against the
respondent was that while driving ambulance no. DBL 9925 on 29.9.1999
at about 2.40 p.m., in the advent of transporting bread packets to jail no.4 he
smuggled 200 packets of Nevla brand tobacco under driver's seat.
7. The respondent was dismissed from service by the order passed by the
Disciplinary Authority. We have also been informed that twice the inquiry
proceedings conducted against the respondent had been set aside and what
we are now examining is the order passed by the tribunal in third inquiry
proceedings. It is not in dispute between the parties that in the third inquiry,
the petitioner had examined only two witnesses to prove the articles of
charges against the respondent. The two witnesses are Mr. R.N. Meena and
Mr. Ram Phal. The learned Tribunal after having gone through the evidence
of the two witnesses and after perusing the records of the inquiry, came to
conclusion that the two witnesses examined by the department did not
connect the applicant to the recovery of tobacco at all. The learned Tribunal
further held that they were not the witnesses who may have recovered
tobacco underneath the driver seat in the van nor were they present at the
time when the recovery was made. To say that the material witness Mr.Raj
Kumar could not be produced in the inquiry proceedings on account of the
fact that the battalion of which he was a member was posted somewhere in
South is a plea which hardly satisfies the Court. The signing of the seizure
memo by the respondent is also of no consequence and the Tribunal rightly
observed that the seizure memo would not connect the respondent to the
recovery of tobacco as in the seizure memo it is only mentioned that the
same has been recovered beneath the driver seat of the ambulance van which
was driven by him for supplying bread for langar in Jail No.4.
8. We are also surprised to learn that when the respondent took the
vehicle carrying the said bread for unloading at Jail No.4, why the said
tobacco could not be traced when admittedly the vehicle was fully searched
by the staff. Thus the presence of the tobacco in the vehicle being driven by
the respondent beneath his driving seat after the unloading of the breads at
least proves the complicity of the other staff members who did not perform
their duties with due diligence at the time of their initial search of the
vehicle.
9. It is a settled legal position that when in an inquiry, the department
fails to prove the articles of charge with the help of the documentary
evidence or the witnesses, then certainly such a case will be a case of no
evidence. Findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary
authority based on no evidence cannot be sustained. The learned Tribunal
has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749, where
the Supreme Court held that the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority if based on no evidence or where the conclusion of
finding be such as no reasonable person would ever reach, the
Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. Relevant
para of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case."
10. We may also refer to another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1999)IILLJ1415SC
wherein in paragraphs 16 and 17 , it has been held that the scope of
interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the
circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows:
"16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.
17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion. within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard."
11. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we hardly find any tangible
reason to disagree with the reasoning of the learned Tribunal in allowing the
Original Application preferred by the respondent. Accordingly, we uphold
the order passed by learned Tribunal and dismiss the present writ petition
preferred by the petitioner.
12. It is ordered accordingly.
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J
I.S. MEHTA, J MAY 07, 2015 pkb
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