Delhi High Court

Ramesh Panwar vs The Union Of India & Ors on 20 March, 2015

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+      W.P.(C) 2673/2015 & CM APPL. No. 4777/2015
       RAMESH PANWAR                                              ..... Petitioner
                   Through                    Mr. Lalta Prasad, Advocate

                                 versus

       THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS              ..... Respondents
                     Through  Ms. Archana Gaur, Advocate

                                          AND

+      W.P.(C) 2719/2015 & CM APPL. No. 4882/2015
       MAHESH KUMAR BORASIA                     ..... Petitioner
                  Through   Mr. Lalta Prasad, Advocate

                                 versus

       THE UNION OF INDIA & ORS              ..... Respondents
                     Through  Ms. Archana Gaur, Advocate


       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE I.S.MEHTA

                                 ORDER

        %                        20.03.2015

KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (ORAL)

CM APPL. No. 4777/2015 (Exemption) in W.P.(C) 2673/2015 CM APPL. No. 4882/2015 (Exemption) in W.P.(C) 2719/2015

Exemption allowed subject to just exceptions. Applications stand disposed of.

W.P.(C) 2673/2015 W.P.(C) 2719/2015

These Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India question the tenability of the common order dated 18.03.2014

passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,

New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the 'learned Tribunal') whereby

the learned Tribunal dismissed the Original Applications (in short 'OAs')

No.3361/2012 and 3362/2012 respectively, preferred by these petitioners.

Assailing the legality and correctness of the said order, Mr. Lalta

Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners

were not given a reasonable opportunity to address arguments in support

of OAs preferred by them and the learned Tribunal ignored the mandate

of Rule 15(i) of CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. The learned counsel also

submits that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate the fact that the

Disciplinary Authority failed to give any reasons before accepting the

findings given by the Enquiry Authority and also at the time of passing

the order of punishment. The contention raised by the petitioners is that

the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is a non-speaking and non-

reasoned order, and therefore, the same deserves to be set aside. The

learned counsel further argued that the penalty awarded by the

Disciplinary Authority to the petitioners is shockingly disproportionate as

the same does not commensurate with the gravity of offence proved

against them.

We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners at

considerable length and given our conscious consideration to the

arguments advanced by him.

In so far as the denial of opportunity of being heard to the learned

counsel for the petitioners before the learned Tribunal is concerned, the

fault lies on the part of the petitioners as they failed to ensure the

presence of their counsel at least on three dates when the said matters

were fixed for arguments before the learned Tribunal, therefore, no

grievance can be raised by the petitioners to this effect. With regard to the

plea raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned

Tribunal failed to follow the mandate of Rule 15 (i) of the CAT

(Procedure) Rules, 1987, the argument cannot sustain as the learned

Tribunal has considered the matrix of issues raised by the petitioners in

their respective OAs and passed a detailed order on proper analysis of the

facts and the legal position.

The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the

petitioners is that the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is a non-

speaking and non-reasoned order, here also the plea is devoid of any

force as the learned Tribunal has referred to the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of G.M (Personnel Wing), Canara Bank and Anr. V.

Sri M.Raja Rao, 2003 (1) SC SLJ 189 whereby the Hon'ble Supreme

Court took a view that the Disciplinary Authority need not record

separate reasons where he accepts the report of the Enquiry Authority.

The Supreme Court in the said judgment clearly held that when the

Disciplinary Authority agrees with the finding and the conclusion of the

Enquiry Authority, it is not necessary in law to give any detailed reasons

as to why he intends to agree with the finding of the Enquiry Authority.

The relevant paras of the said judgment are as under:

"4. Having regard to the contentions raised by the counsel for both sides and having examined the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court committed serious error in interfering with an order of punishment inflicted on a delinquent-employee on dereliction of duties and grave charges against him. The order of the Disciplinary Authority unequivocally indicates that he has gone into the findings of the Enquiring Authority and agreed with the same. When a Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Enquiring Authority, it is not necessary in law to give any detailed reasons as to why he intends to agree with the findings of the Enquiring Authority. It is of course true that in the matter of award of punishing if Disciplinary. Authority considers materials other than the materials which had been produced before the EO then the delinquent must be given a notice thereof or else the conclusions of the Disciplinary Authority would get vitiated. But, for mere expression used in "other relevant factors" in the order of the Disciplinary Authority, we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submissions of Mr. Rama Jois that the Disciplinary Authority did consider any extraneous materials which had not been produced before Enquiring Authority. In that view of the matter, we see no infirmity with the impugned order of the Disciplinary Authority inflicting the punishment of the termination of service.

5. So far as the order of the Appellate Authority is concerned, it is undoubtedly true that as provided in the Regulation, the Appellate Authority is required to pass a reasoned order. The question further arises

for consideration is even though the order may be a reasoned order, can it be held to have suffered from any infirmity because all the contentions raised as alleged by the counsel for the delinquent, have not been dealt with?

6. On examining the order of the Appellate Authority, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellate Authority not only afforded opportunity of hearing to the delinquent, but also considered the contentions raised and then taking a totality of the entire circumstances agreed with the order of the Disciplinary Authority and dismissed the appeal. In that view of the matter, we do not think that any infirmity has been committed by the Appellate Authority in not giving detailed reasons on the contentions raised by the delinquent. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench also committed error in holding that the Appellate Authority committed a serious infirmity in dismissal of the appeal in question. Since both the conclusions of the Division Bench are wholly unsustainable in law, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and hold that the writ petition filed before the High Court would stand dismissed. This appeal accordingly stands allowed with no order as to costs."

We need not re-appreciate and re-evaluate the facts which were

duly proved against the petitioners during the course of the enquiry and it

is neither the case of the petitioners that they were not given proper

opportunity to participate in the enquiry proceeding, nor is it their case

that they were not afforded an opportunity of being heard by the

Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority and in this

background, we find no tangible reasons to interfere with the impugned

order passed by the learned Tribunal.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has also not raised any

convincing plea to point out as to how the punishment awarded to the

petitioners can be held to be shockingly disproportionate looking into the

gravity of the charge proved against them in terms of the articles of the