Delhi High Court
Shri Prabhudayal Batra vs M/S Shreyans Buildwell Pvt Ltd on 10 March, 2015
Author: Mukta Gupta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RC.REV. 391/2013 & CM Nos. 16760/2013, 21159/2014
% Reserved on: 23rd February, 2015
Decided on: 10th March, 2015
SHRI PRABHUDAYAL BATRA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Dewan, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Anupam Dhingra, Advocate.
versus
M/S SHREYANS BUILDWELL PVT LTD ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Arjun Singh Bhati, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
1. Learned counsel for the Respondent at the outset submits that the
Petitioner is not paying the user charges as directed by this Court and thus
the interim order passed in favour of the Petitioner as fixed by this Court in
terms of the decision of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. vs. Federal Motors
Pvt. Ltd., 2005 (1) SCC 705 be vacated. Learned counsel for the Petitioner
admits that the user charges as directed by this Court have not been paid. He
however, states that he is ready to address arguments in the matter and thus
arguments have been heard.
2. Aggrieved by the order dated 25th September, 2013 whereby the leave
to defend application of the Petitioner was dismissed for the reason the same
was filed beyond the period of 15 days, the present petition has been
preferred.
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner states that the learned ARC wrongly
relied upon the decision in Prithpal Singh vs. Satpal Singh (Dead) through
RC.REV. 391/2013 Page 1 of 7
LRs, 2010 (2) SCC 15. The High Court being the Court of original
jurisdiction as well as the Court of Appeal it has inherent powers to condone
the delay and thus the same should be considered by this Court and on the
facts of the case the delay be condoned. It is further stated that in Prithpal
Singh (Supra) the applicability of law of limitation was directly not in
consideration and the only issue was whether the Controller can recall an
order of eviction by applying the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 read with
Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 CPC. It is further submitted that dehors the
delay in the application for leave to defend being not condoned, the learned
Trial Court was bound to look into the fact that the eviction petition under
Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short 'the DRC
Act') was not maintainable and the same was maintainable only under
Section 22 of the DRC Act. Reliance is placed on Madan Mohan Lal vs.
P.Tandon, 21 (1982) DLT 16 and Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sitar Ram
Goel, RC Rev. No.401/2012 decided on 14th August, 2012.
4. Learned counsel for the Respondent on the other hand further states
that Section 22 of DRC Act is not applicable to the present case as the four
conditions mentioned in the said provision do not apply to the facts of the
present case. Reliance is placed on Satnam Kaur and others vs. Ashlar
Stores P. Ltd., 158 (2009) DLT 62.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. The Respondent filed the eviction petition before the learned ARC
under Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act stating that the Respondent was a
company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, Shri Vinod Nair is the
Principal Officer and Attorney of the Respondent Company and is duly
authorized to sign, verify and institute the present petition. It is further
RC.REV. 391/2013 Page 2 of 7
stated that Shop No. 32, 9062, Ram Bagh, Azad Market, Delhi-110006 has
been let out to the Petitioner for commercial purposes from where the
Petitioner was carrying his business activity. It was stated that the
Respondent Company was incurring losses for a long time and thus to
revamp its business, the Respondent Company requires place for building
proper infrastructure and office to be used by its employees as per the plan
finalized. The Respondent Company is in the process of hiring more than 40
new employees and therefore it has to build up a new and bigger office. The
Respondent Company requires the said shop bona fidely for its own use and
for the use of its employees and Respondent Company does not have any
alterative or suitable non-residential premises. The Respondent Company is
presently accommodating in shop No.21 of the said complex. It is further
stated that the Respondent Company has initiated similar process of eviction
against the other ten tenants in various shops in the complex.
7. Summons were served to the Respondent on 23rd July, 2013 which
fact is not disputed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner herein and the
leave to defend application was filed on 30th August, 2013, that is, beyond
the period of 15 days.
8. In Prithpal Singh (supra) the Supreme Court authoritatively held:
"16. From a careful perusal of Sub-section (4) of
Section 25-B of the Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that
the tenant shall not be permitted to contest the prayer for
eviction unless he files an affidavit before the Controller
stating the ground on which he seeks to contest the
application for eviction and obtains leave from the
Controller. This Section also clearly indicates that in
default of his appearance in compliance with the summons
or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the
landlord in the eviction proceeding shall be deemed to be
RC.REV. 391/2013 Page 3 of 7
admitted by the tenant and the landlord shall be entitled to
an order for eviction on the ground mentioned in the
eviction petition. At this stage, we may also note that in Sub-
section (4) of Section 25-B of the Rent Act read with Third
Schedule, it has been made clear by the Legislature that if
the summons of the proceeding is received by the tenant, he
has to appear and ask for leave to contest the eviction
proceeding within 15 days from the date of service of notice
upon the tenant and if he fails to do so, automatically, an
order of eviction in favour of the landlord on the ground of
bona fide requirement shall be made."
9. Thus the Supreme Court in Prithpal Singh (Supra) noted the dominant
object of the amending Act so as to provide a speedy, expeditious and
effective remedy for a class of landlords contemplated by
Sections 14(1)(e) and 14A of the DRC Act and for avoiding unusual dilatory
process. Section 25-B (1) being a special provision and every application on
the ground of Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act is required to be dealt with
in accordance with the procedure specified under Section 25-B(1) of the
DRC Act. Since no power has been conferred on the Controller apart from
Rule 23 which is a general rule, the Controller is required to be guided with
the provisions of Section 25-B DRC Act and thus there was no power with
the Controller to condone the delay in filing the leave to defend application.
In view of this decision of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that this
Court in its inherent jurisdiction has power to condone the delay. This Court
exercising jurisdiction under Section 25-B (8) of the DRC Act, acts in a
supervisory capacity to see whether any illegality has been committed by the
learned ARC. Thus in view of the decision in Prithpal Singh (Supra) it
cannot be said that the learned ARC committed any illegality in not
RC.REV. 391/2013 Page 4 of 7
condoning the delay or this Court has the power to condone the delay in
filing the leave to defend application.
10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further stated that even if the leave
to defend application of the Petitioner was not to be allowed and the
averments in the eviction petition are to be taken on their face value the
same do not attract provision of Section 14 (1) (e) DRC Act and eviction
petition only under Section 22 of the DRC Act could have been filed.
Section 14 (1) (e) and Section 22 of the DRC Act provide as:
14 (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are
required bona fide by the landlord for occupation
as a residence for himself or for any member of his
family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof,
or for any person for whose benefit the premises
are held and that the landlord or such person has
no other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation.
.....
......
.....
22. Special provision for recovery of possession in
certain cases.- Where the landlord in respect of
any premises is any company or other body
corporate or any local authority or any public
institution and the premises are required for the
use of employees of such landlord or in the case of
a public institution, for the furtherance activities,
then, notwithstanding anything contained in
section 14 or any other law, the Controller may, on
an application made to him in his behalf by such
landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession
of such premises by evicting the tenant and every
other person who may be in occupation thereof, if
the Controller is satisfied-
(a) that the tenant to whom such premises were
let for use as a residence at a time when he
was in the service or employment of the
landlord, has ceased to be in such service or
employment; or
(b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of
the terms, express or implied, under which
he was authorised to occupy such premises;
or
(c) that any other person is in unauthorised
occupation of such premises; or
(d) that the premises are required bona fide by
the public institution for the furtherance of
its activities.
11. A perusal of the eviction petition as noted above would show that the
premises was required for commercial purposes for the Respondent
Company to extend its office where it can arrange for the sitting of the
employees as it was going to recruit 40 more employees to expand its
business and was not required for the residential purposes of the employees.
The first three clauses of Section 22 of the DRC Act has no application to
the facts of the present case. The Petitioner is not in service of the
Respondent, nor it is alleged that the Petitioner has contravened the terms of
occupancy of the premises nor is an unauthorized occupant. Even Clause (d)
is not applicable as the Respondent is not a public institution. 'Public' has
been defined in the explanation to Section 22 which includes Educational
Institutions, Library, Hospital and Charitable Dispensary but does not
include any such institution set up by any private trust.
12. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon the decision of this
Court in Madan Mohan Lal (supra) where this Court held that if the
company or a body corporate requires the premises for the use of its
employees Section 22 DRC Act alone would apply and not Section 14 (1) (e)
of the DRC Act. The said decision was rendered by this Court before the
decision of the Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma (dead) by LRs vs. Union
of India and another, 2008 (5) SCC 287 when Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC
Act was applicable to the residential premises only and thus this Court held
that if the premises was required for the residence of the employees then
Section 22 of the DRC Act would be applicable. As noted from the contents
of the eviction petition, the Respondent clearly stated that the tenanted
premises was required to expand its business and for this reason it requires
the premises for its own use and the use of its employees. The tenanted
premises was required as a commercial premises and not as a residential
premises for the employees. Even if the employees sit in the office, the same
cannot be said that the premises are required for the use of the employees.
There is no gainsaying that it is for the use of the company itself. The
decision relied upon by the learned counsel in Superior Exim Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) is also not applicable because in the eviction petition therein the
landlord had stated that he required the premises to fulfill the need of
residential accommodation of the employees.
13. Consequently, I find no force in the present petition. The petition and
the applications are dismissed.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
MARCH 10, 2015/'vn'
