Delhi High Court
Virender Singh vs M/S Lancer Convent Senior on 28 July, 2015
Author: Mukta Gupta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: July 28, 2015
+ LPA 468/2015
VIRENDER SINGH ..... Appellant
Represented by: Mr.Arun K.Yadav, Advocate.
versus
M/S LANCER CONVENT SENIOR
SECONDARY SCHOOL ..... Respondents
Represented by: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
MUKTA GUPTA, J. (ORAL)
1. Aggrieved by the order dated December 03, 2014 dismissing the writ
petition filed by the Appellant Virender Singh against an award passed by
the learned Tribunal awarding him compensation for a sum of `75,000/- in
lieu of reinstatement, back wages and other benefits, Virender Singh prefers
the present appeal.
2. A brief exposition of the facts is that Virender Singh while working as
a driver was challaned under Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(in short 'the MV Act') by the Delhi Traffic Police while he was driving Bus
No.DL 1P-5256 carrying students on September 24, 2007. Pursuant to show
cause notice a disciplinary inquiry was conducted. Finding him guilty the
Disciplinary Authority proposed to terminate his services. Approval of the
Director (Education) under Section 120 (2) of the Delhi School Education
Act and Rules, 1973 (in short 'the DSE Act and Rules') was sought and
pursuant thereto Virender Singh was dismissed from services.
3. The Labour Court vide its order dated April 03, 2014 decided the
preliminary issue and held that the inquiry was conducted in a fair and legal
manner following the principles of natural justice. Vide award dated May
09, 2014 the decision of the Management to terminate the service of the
workman was also held to be legal and justified in view of the guidelines
laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as 1998 (1) SCC
676 M.C.Mehta vs.Union of India and ors., for the reasons that a driver who
has been challaned once for offence of over-speeding/drunken driving and
driving dangerously or for offence under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A
of the Indian Penal Code cannot be permitted to drive vehicle meant for
ferrying students. However, in view of a dispute raised by Virender Singh
for general demand and the termination having been directed without
approval in violation of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (in short 'the ID Act') the termination was held to be illegal and the
order of termination was set aside. The learned Labour Court however,
keeping in view the violation of the Supreme Court guidelines and other
factors held that no directions for reinstatement and back wages could be
passed and instead awarded a lump-sum compensation of `75,000/- in lieu
of reinstatement and back wages.
4. The challenge to the award dated May 09, 2014 failed in W.P.(C)
No.8497/2014 wherein vide the impugned order the learned Single Judge
following the dicta of the Supreme Court in M.C.Mehta (Supra) held that no
direction to reinstatement and back wages could be passed and a lump-sum
compensation of `75,000/- in lieu of reinstatement and back wages and
other benefits was sufficient relief and dismissed the writ petition.
5. Before this Court learned counsel for the Appellant re-urges the same
grounds. In M.C.Mehta (Supra) the Supreme Court laid down the following
guidelines:
"No bus belonging to or hired by an educational institution
shall be driven by a driver who has-
(a) Less than five years of experience of driving heavy
vehicles:
(b) been challaned more than twice in a year in respect of
offences of jumping red lights, improper or obstructive
parking, violating the stop line, violating the rule requiring
driving within the bus lane, violating restricting the
overtaking, allowing unauthorised person to drive:
(c) have been challaned/charged even once for the offence
of over-speeding, drunken-driving and driving dangerously
or for the offences under sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A
of the Indian Penal Code."
6. Though in the claim petition the Appellant had not brought out these
facts and had simply stated that in view of his earlier demands he has been
victimised and his services were terminated however, there is, no denial to
the fact that Virender Singh was challaned under Section 184 of the MV Act
by the Delhi Traffic Police while he was driving the school bus carrying
students on September 24, 2007 and had violated the guidelines laid down in
M.C.Mehta (Supra) and also the guidelines framed by the Director of
Education, Government of NCT of Delhi dated November 18, 2005. Thus
there can be no directions for reinstatement.
7. As regards compensation being insufficient, no factor in favour of
Appellant has been shown which would entitle him to a higher
compensation. Virender Singh was challaned on September 24, 2007 under
Section 184 of the MV Act and a show cause notice was issued on October
05, 2007. Virender Singh was dismissed from services on May 05, 2008
after seeking necessary approval from the Director of Education under
Section 120 (2) of the DSE Act and Rules and thus the proceedings were
completed with due dispatch. No material has been placed to show that the
compensation awarded was grossly inadequate. Though no writ petition was
filed by the Management but it would be appropriate to note that the basis of
holding the termination to be illegal was non-seeking of approval under
Section 33 (2) (b) of the ID Act. The learned Labour Court noted that no
evidence was led by the Appellant regarding the proceedings of general
demand raised by Virender Singh however, since the Management admitted
those proceedings thus it was not relevant for him to go into for that purpose
and permission for approval under Section 33 (2) (b) of the ID Act was
mandatory which the Management failed to take. Virender Singh in his
claim stated that he made a general demand before the Labour Department
which was pending. Even as per Virender Singh no proceedings were
pending either before a Conciliation Officer or a Board or a Labour Court or
a Tribunal or a National Tribunal which is a pre-requisite for invoking
Section 33 (2) (b) of the ID Act.
8. Consequently, we find no merit in the present appeal. The same is
dismissed.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
(PRADEEP NANDRAJOG)
JUDGE
JULY 28, 2015/'vn'
