Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 5343 Del
Judgement Date : 28 July, 2015
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 28.07.2015
+ W.P.(C) 6706/2014
NEENA WADHWA ... Petitioner
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr Ateev Mathur with Ms Richa Oberoi
For the Respondent No.1 : Mr Anil Soni with Mr Naginder Benipal
For the Respondent No.2 : Mr Yeeshu Jain with Ms Jyoti Tyagi
For the Respondent No.3 : Mr Pawan Mathur with Mr Himanshu Gupta
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. By way of this writ petition the petitioner seeks the benefit of Section
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred
to as the "2013 Act") which came into effect on 01.01.2014. The petitioner,
consequently, seeks a declaration that the acquisition proceeding initiated
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "1894
Act") and in respect of which Award No. 42/1987-88 dated 26.05.1987 was
made, inter alia, in respect of the petitioner's land, comprised in Khasra
Nos. 662/1 (1-2), 662/2 (3-14), 664 min (4-3) measuring 8 Bighas and 19
Biswas in all in village Satbari, New Delhi, shall be deemed to have lapsed.
2. Although the Land Acquisition Collector has stated that possession of
the subject land was taken, it is evident from the order of this Court dated
08.03.2010 in WP(C) 14769/2006 that possession had not been taken. The
respondents also contended that the amount of compensation was deposited
in the treasury, although the same had not been paid to the land owner nor
was it offered to her.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the second
proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which has been introduced by
virtue of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Ordinance"). The newly added
proviso reads as under:-
"Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the
award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded."
(underlining added)
4. On a plain reading of the proviso, it is evident that its purpose is to
compute the period of five years referred to in Section24(2) of the 2013 Act.
Certain periods are to be excluded in computing the said period referred to in
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The periods to be excluded are:
(1) the period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court; or
(2) the period specified in the Award of a Tribunal for taking possession; or
(3) such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents are relying on the third
alternative inasmuch as it has been contended that the amount for
compensation has been placed in the government treasury. According to the
learned counsel for the respondents, this amounts to deposit "in any
designated account maintained for this purpose". Consequently, it is urged
that the entire period during which this amount was lying in the treasury
ought to be excluded.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the newly added
proviso does not have any application to the facts prevailing in the present
case. The question of compensation lying deposited in a court or in any
designated account maintained for such purposes would only arise in a case
where possession has been taken. In the present case, possession has not
been taken. This being the situation, the newly inserted proviso has no
application. We agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for
the petitioner that unless and until possession is taken, the third alternative
mentioned in the second proviso does not get triggered even though
compensation may be lying deposited in a court or in any designated account
maintained for such purposes.
7. In any event, the second proviso to Section 24(2) introduced by virtue
of the Ordinance of 2014 has been held to be only prospective in operation
by virtue of the Supreme Court decisions in M/s Radiance Fincap (P) &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. decided on 12.1.2015 in Civil Appeal
No.4283/2011 and Karnail Kaur & Ors. Vs. State Of Punjab & Ors.
decided on 22.1.2015 in Civil Appeal no.7424 of 2013. The same would
apply to the said Ordinance of 2015. The rights vested in the petitioner as on
01.01.2014 by virtue of the 2013 Act have not been taken away by virtue of
the introduction of the second proviso to Section 24(2) of the said Ordinance.
8. That being the position, the question of payment of compensation will
have to be construed in the light of the various decisions rendered by the
Supreme Court and this Court in:-
(i) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;
(ii) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564;
(iii) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014; and
(iv) Surender Singh v. Union of India and Ors.: W.P.(C) 2294/2014 decided 12.09.2014 by this Court.
In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) it has been held that unless and
until the compensation was tendered to the persons interested, mere deposit
of the compensation amount in a court would not amount to payment of
compensation. This aspect has also been considered in Gyanender Singh &
Others v. Union Of India & Others: WP (C) 1393/2014 decided by a
Division Bench of this Court on 23.09.2014. The same would be the position
in respect of a deposit in "any designated account maintained for this
purpose". Consequently, the mere deposit in the treasury, without being
offered or tendered to the persons entitled would not ipso facto amount to
payment of compensation.
9. As such, in the present case, neither physical possession of the subject
land has been taken nor has any compensation been paid to the petitioner.
The Award was made more than five years prior to the coming into force of
the 2013 Act. No period is liable to be excluded inasmuch as the second
proviso, which has been newly inserted by virtue of the said Ordinance, is
not applicable, as indicated above.
10. As a result, the petitioner is entitled to a declaration that the said
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in respect of the subject
lands are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.
11. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no
order as to costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
JULY 28, 2015 SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J
SR
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