Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 5068 Del
Judgement Date : 16 July, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on :09.07.2015
Judgment delivered on :16.07.2015
+ CRL.A.456/2013
HARISH @ CHIRAG ..... Appellant
Through Mr. Trideep Pais, Mr.Atul
Sharma, Mr. Siddharth Garg,
Ms.Vrinda Bhandari, & Mr. M. L.
Rajora, Advs.
versus
STATE OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through Mr. Pramod Saxena, APP for the
State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order
of sentence dated 05.2.2013 and 14.02.2013 respectively wherein the
appellant stood convicted under Sections 376/363/328/506 of the IPC
and had been awarded maximum sentence of RI 10 years of the offences
under Section 376 of the IPC besides separate incarceration and fine for
his other convictions. The sentences were to run concurrently.
2. Version of the prosecution is that DD No.11B was lodged in the
local police station Sultanpuri on the complaint of the prosecutrix (PW-
13). She was a 21 year old student of Delhi University. Her version
was that the appellant wanted to befriend her; on 22.10.2011 he offered
her a drink; upon consuming the same she felt nauseated. She was taken
to a house at Rohini where rape was committed upon her. Another
incident dated 14.11.2011 was also to the effect that rape had again been
committed by the appellant upon the victim. Two days later i.e. on
16.11.2011 the victim was again compelled to drink something which
made her unconscious; her mother found her the following morning.
On 18.11.2011 the victim, fed up with her life, decided to end it and
consumed a poisonous substance. She thereafter disclosed the incident
to her mother and her elder sister. She did not disclose the incident prior
in time as she was under threat that her pornographic video clip had
been prepared by the appellant on his mobile phone and he would
disclose it. Dr.N.P.Waghmare (PW-15) had examined the mobile record
of the accused and as per the data retrieved (in terms of his report
Ex.PW-15/A) pornographic pictures and a video were noted in this
document.
3. The FSL report proved through PW-17 had detected human
semen upon the undergarments and the mattress seized from the place
where the alleged offence had taken place. SI Bharat Bhushan was the
investigating officer. He had collected the gastric lavas of the victim
(Ex.PW-16/A). This did not support the version of the prosecution and
did not establish the presence of any poison/tranquilizer/pesticide.
4. In view of the statement of the prosecutrix as also the separate
statements record of her sister (PW-7), the owner of the house (PW-8)
where the alleged incident had occurred coupled with the medical
evidence which included the testimony of Dr.Indermeet Singh (PW-6),
Dr. Dheeraj (PW-10), Dr. Megha Purohit (PW-14), Dr.Rajesh Dalal
(PW-16) and the MLC of the victim Ex.PW-6/A evidencing her hymen
as torn the appellant stood convicted.
5. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
He pleaded innocence. Submission being that he was pressurized by the
victim to marry her; on his refusal to this proposal, he was implicated in
this false case. Parties shared a friendly relationship and nothing beyond
that.
6. No witness was examined in defense.
7. On behalf of the appellant arguments have been heard in detail.
The main thrust of the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant
is his heavy reliance upon Ex.PW-13/DX-1. Submission being that
these facebook postings and the conversations exchanged between the
appellant and the victim clearly show that this was a case of friendship
and the intimate messages exchanged between the parties in fact
establish that the parties were sharing a romantic interaction with one
another. Submission being that it is not the version of the prosecutrix
(PW-13) that these facebook accounts were under any duress or
compulsion. This is a clear case where the victim being dis-satisfied by
the fact that the appellant was not willing to marry her had falsely
embroiled the appellant in the present case. Her version qua her
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., her statement recorded before the
M.M. under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and her version on oath in Court
suffers from various infirmities and no reliance can be placed upon such
a confused witness. Her testimony is liable to be discarded. Reliance
has been placed upon 2012 ACR 3007 Narender Kumar Vs. State (NCT
of Delhi) to support this submission. Submission being reiterated that
the testimony of such a victim has to be appreciated on the principle of
probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of
probability has to be shown to exist in view of the subject matter of the
criminal charge and in the absence of which such a testimony cannot be
relied upon. Submission being that there were long conversions
between the appellant and the victim which depict a friendship between
the parties. The version of the prosecution that on 16.11.2011 she was
again made to have a intoxicating drink and on 18.11.2011 she had
consumed poison and was in the hospital on that day is falsified by her
call records which show that conversations were exchanged between the
appellant and the victim at that point of time. Learned counsel for the
appellant further submits that the record of the video clips (obtained
from the mobile phone of the appellant (Ex.PW-15/A) is a piece of
evidence which necessarily has to be ignored as such an electronic
record cannot be admitted unless the requirements of Section 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act are satisfied. There video clips / CD upon which
reliance has been placed upon by the prosecution to support their stand
that certain pornographic material was depicted in the mobile clips of
the phone of the appellant, have thus to be ignored. To support this
submission reliance has been placed upon 2014 (6) ABR 511 Anvar
P.V.Vs. P.K.Basheer. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits
that a perusal of these video clips (which had been permitted to be de-
sealed and permission has been granted to the appellant to view the CD
in the presence of the Public Prosecutor in the Court) also do not support
the stand of the prosecution that this was a porn material as it was meant
for a private viewing only and related to the appellant's friendship with
his ex-girlfriend. These cannot be termed as a pornographic material not
having been meant for a public viewing. They cannot be termed as
obscene. To support this stand reliance has been placed upon (2014) 4
SCC 257 Aveek Sarkar and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.
Submission being that what might be treated as obscene at one point of
time cannot be considered as obscene at another point of time. This
being a private material between the appellant and his ex-friend and not
meant for any public purpose cannot in any manner be said to fall within
the definition of either obscenity or porn. This is a clear case of false
implication. The appellant is entitled to a benefit of doubt and a
consequent acquittal.
8. Arguments have been refuted. The learned public prosecutor
submits that there is no reason as to why the victim would have made a
false allegation against the appellant; she has explained the incidents
which had occurred on 22.10.2011 as also on 14.11.2011. Even
presuming that there was a friendship between the appellant and the
victim, appellant had no right to take advantage of this friendship; the
victim had a right to oppose and take legal action against the wrong act
committed by the appellant upon the victim. This was not a case of
consent. The victim had been traumatized as her video clips had been
taken by the appellant and he had threatened to expose these pictures.
The victim had every reason to doubt the conduct of the appellant as
there were other video CDs and clipping of another girl which had also
been recovered from the possession of the appellant which speak about
the conduct of the appellant. He was a casanova. He was threatening
the victim which had led her to end his friendship; the appellant was in
fact emotionally blackmailing her; she even had to take the dire step of
consuming poison. On no count does appellant deserves any leniency.
9. Record has been perused and the submissions and counter
submissions of the parties have been noted.
10. The victim i.e. the prosecutrix was examined as PW-13. She has
deposed that she was a final year student and while doing graduation
from Delhi University, she had gone to the shop of one Deepak
Communication near her house for rectification of her mobile. The
mobile was sent through appellant Chirag @ Harish. On 16.10.2011,
appellant came to her college with the mobile phone. He offered her a
cold drink. On 22.10.2011 i.e. on the annual day function of their
college, the appellant started speaking to her. He offered her a cold
drink. On consuming the cold drink, she started feeling nauseated. He
took her on his bike to a mall at Rohini and thereafter to a partially
constructed house at Rohini where he forcibly committed a 'galat kaam'
upon her; she clarified that 'galat kaam' means rape. The appellant
showed her a video clipping of the incident which had occurred
threatening to reveal it in case she disclosed this incident to anyone. The
witness further deposed that the appellant continued to make phone calls
to her and she thus met him. On 14.11.2011 when she was coming back,
the appellant called her and took her to the same house at Rohini where
under compulsion, he committed rape upon her. On 16.11.2011, the
appellant again gave her phone calls and compelled her to take drink
pursuant to which she became semi-conscious. She was found lying near
her house. Her mother also inquired from her. Even at that point of time,
she did not disclose this incident to any person i.e. neither to her mother
and nor to her sisters. On 18.11.2011 in the early morning hours at
02:30 am, PW-13 called the appellant and told him that he should stop
harassing her or that she would commit suicide. She consumed
insecticide after which she felt dizzy and when she gained
consciousness, she found herself at the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. On
20.11.2011, while she was in hospital, she disclosed this incident to her
mother and her sister. Her statement Ex.PW-13/A was recorded
pursuant to which the FIR was lodged.
11. In her cross-examination, she denied the suggestion that she was
friendly with the accused even prior to 16.10.2011. She admitted that
she was interacting with the appellant on face book and had become
friendly with him. Even on 14.10.2011, she had interacted with him
through her face book profile. She admitted that the record Ex.PW-
13/DX1 (running into 17 pages), was the face book account of the
appellant containing messages sent by PW-13 to the appellant. She
stated that cold drink which had been offered to her on 22.10.2011 (the
date of first rape) was given to her by the appellant which he had taken
out from his pocket. She did not inform about the incident to anyone as
she was scared of the appellant. She admitted that her relationship with
the appellant was friendly. She denied the suggestion that she is
deposing falsely.
12. Learned defence counsel has vehemently relied upon Ex.PW-
13/DX1 to make a submission that the victim being an adult was fully
conscious of her act and was in voluntary relationship with the appellant
and this is evident from the tweets exchanged between the parties and to
which attention has been drawn wherein on various dates i.e. between
14.10.2011 up to 09.11.2011 several face book conversions were
exchanged between the appellant and the victim. As rightly pointed out
by the learned counsel for the appellant, these conversations are not
indicative of a mere platonic friendship. They were indicative of
something much more. They were indicative of the fact that the parties
were in fact sharing an intimate relationship and kisses were also
exchanged between the appellant and the victim and this was not on one
occasion but on several occasions. As per the victim, the first incident of
rape was committed by the appellant under coercion on 22.10.2011.
After 22.10.2011, if the victim was under threat, she would not have on
subsequent dates i.e. after 22.10.2011 i.e. on 24.10.2011, 29.10.2011,
30.10.2011, 09.09.2011 and 11.11.2011 exchanged tweets and sending
messages to him all of which shows that the victim was voluntarily
interacting with the appellant. There was absolutely no coercion upon
her and in fact this is even admitted by her in her cross-examination. She
was addressing him by a pet name 'chunnu' and he was addressing her
as 'jaan'. Even on 09.11.2011, the conversion between them was that
they wanted to go back to the room for an intimate act. This face book
account (Ex.PW-13/DX1) runs between 14.10.2011 to 11.11.2011. At
the cost of repetition, the first incident of rape allegedly having been
occurred on 22.10.2011 but this face book account showing no pressure
whatsoever upon the victim, it cannot in any manner be said that she
continued her intimate conversions and friendship with the appellant
under any kind of duress. This is white lie. That apart, the victim in her
examination-in-chief has stated that on 22.10.2011 when she was made
to consume the intoxicating drink, the appellant had offered it to her.
This is contrary to the version of PW- 18 (Pramod).
13. The statement of PW-13 that she was under pressure of the
appellant as he made a video clipping of her (in the nude) had been
corroborated by Reshma (PW-7) (younger sister of the victim) who had
deposed that her sister had told her that the appellant had made a video
clipping of her on 22.10.2011 and also on 14.11.2011 but this fact had
not been disclosed to PW-7 directly but through her elder sister Sapna.
Sapna was admittedly not examined.
14. That apart, this Court notes that the mobile record of the appellant
had been seized on the date of his arrest. His arrest memo Ex.PX-5
shows that he was arrested on 20.11.2011 at 05:40 PM from the
Emergency Ward of the first floor of Sanjay Gandhi Hospital meaning
thereby that this was a surprise arrest as he had been called at the
Emergency Ward of the Hospital where the appellant had come in
apprehensive of any threat of arrest. He was however arrested at the
same point of time. His mobile record was seized on the same day. Thus
there was no possibility of the appellant fudging with the record.
15. PW-15 (Dr. N P Waghmare) had examined this mobile record of
the appellant. He had downloaded the retrieved data and had prepared
his report Ex.PW-15/A. The mobile record of the appellant at the
request made by the learned counsel for the appellant had been directed
to the de-sealed and the learned counsel for the appellant had examined
the record in the presence of the public prosecutor in the Court. A
perusal of this record shows that there is no depiction of the victim and
the appellant. No such video clipping of the victim and the appellant is
on record. There is a video record of a intimate relationship of the
appellant with another girl. This as per the appellant was his ex girl
friend. This is the version of the appellant. Even presuming that the
submission of the learned public prosecutor on this count is correct and
the appellant having got an intimate relationship picturized of himself
with another girl reflects upon his bent of mind and he could have done
the same with the victim as well; this however cannot be read against
the appellant. It is for the following two reasons. The first reason being
that an electronic record not accompanied by certificate under Section
65-B of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be read in evidence. Admittedly
in this case, this record was not accompanied by a certificate under
Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act. This was conceded by the
learned public prosecutor. The Apex Court in AIR 2015 SC 180 Anvar
P V Vs. P K Basheer has observed as under:-
"An electronic record by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in evidence unless the requirements under Section 65B are satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc. the same shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65B obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the secondary evidence pertaining t that electronic record, is inadmissible."
16. In this view of the matter, this record (even otherwise not
pertaining to the victim) is inadmissible. The second reason for
discarding this evidence would be the submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant that even presuming there was an intimate relationship
viewed of the appellant and his ex-girl friend, this would not be obscene
within the meaning of 'obscenity' as defined in criminal law.
Submission being that admittedly this video was not meant for public
viewing; it was a private affair only between the appellant and his ex-
girl friend. It did not pass the test of 'obscenity'. The observations of the
Apex Court in this regard laying down the Hicklin test in R.V. Hicklin
(1868) LR 3 QB 360 are relevant:-
".... The test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
Thus on both counts, Ex.PW-15/A has to be discarded.
17. Reverting back to the version of the victim that the second
incident of rape was alleged to have been committed upon the victim on
14.11.2011. On this date also, as per the victim, she was compelled by
the appellant to come to the same house at Rohini where 'galat kaam'
was committed upon her. Certain call records have also been relied upon
by the learned defence counsel to substantiate his argument that even
after 14.11.2011, there were telephone calls exchanged between the
parties to evidence the fact that the parties continued to share a cordial
relationship. However, these calls not having exhibited (although a part
of the record) cannot be read in evidence.
18. The version of the victim that she had consumed poison on
18.11.2011 was not supported by medical evidence. Her gastric lavage
has been seized by the Investigating Officer on 20.11.2011 and it was
sent to CFSL for examination but the report tested negative for metallic
poisons, ethyl alcohol and methyl alcohol, cyanide, phosphide,
alkaloids, barbiturates, tranquilizers and pesticides. This is clear from
Ex.PW-16/A. In this context, it would be relevant to note that the trial
Court has drawn presumptions and assumptions and has gone totally off
the track while penning a discussion on date rape drugs which are used
to facilitate sexual assault. Even where the report of the CFSL (Ex.PW-
16/A) had tested negative on this aspect, the trial judge in lengthy
paragraphs has discussed that such drinks make a person feel drugged;
because of the effect of these drugs, the victim sometimes is unable to
refuse sex and unable to remember what has happened. This discussion
is not only wholly useless in the context of the evidence which has been
collected, and where the ocular and scientific evidence had negatived
this aspect; testimony of the victim being that she had been asked to take
a drink on 14.10.2011 interlaced with a sedator and which had been
given by the appellant is again contrary to the version of PW-18
(Pramod) who had in his cross-examination stated that he had brought
the cold drink when the appellant with the girl had hired the room.
19. Relevant would it be to note that PW-18 was the sweeper working
with Alok Singhal (PW-8) in whose house the offence had allegedly
been committed. Her version was that this room had been taken on rent
by the appellant who had introduced himself as Kapil @ Harish @
Chirag. Testimony of PW-8 on this score was also to the effect that
room No. 105 had been taken on hire by the appellant through PW-18.
The trial Judge has travelled upon wavelength which was totally
impermissible.
20. The medical reports which include the MLC of the victim show
that there was no injury on her body. Her hymen was an old tear. She
was admitted in the hospital on 20.11.2011. She was fit for statement at
10:30 am. Her alleged history was ingestion of unknown substance. As
noted supra, this unknown substance was not a poison or a tranquilizer.
This was evident from the report Ex.PW-16/A.
21. Thus that part of her version that she had taken a poisonous
substance on 18.11.2011 and was found in an unconscious condition on
the following day by her mother and when she regained consciousness,
and was found in Sanjay Gandhi Hospital is contrary to the record. As
per this ocular version, she was found by her mother in an unconscious
state on 19.11.2011. Her admission in the Sanjay Gandhi is however of
20.11.2011. Where was she on 19.11.2011? The victim had been
referred for a gynecological examination on the same day. The medical
doctors had also collected vulva and vaginal swab of the victim; the
mattress and underwear of the victim had also been seized. The CFSL
vide its report (Ex.PW-17/A) had noted human semen on the underwear
of the accused and the mattress. This evidence as rightly pointed out by
the learned counsel for the appellant would not be able to falsify the
defence of the appellant which was that the victim was all along in a
consenting relationship with the appellant.
22. Testimony of the victim is full of contradictions. It is not a
credible and cogent version. To convict an accused, the prosecution
must stand on its own legs. In this case, the prosecutrix has failed to
discharge of being a coherent and credible witness. The Apex Court in
2012 ACR 3007 Narender Kumar Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) while
evaluating the testimony of a prosecutrix had inter-alia noted as under:-
"Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate
improvements on material point with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence."
23. Thus, the evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution when read
in totality does not inspire confidence. It would be difficult for the
conscience of this Court to rely upon this testimony to convict the
appellant. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus.
24. Accordingly, while giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, he is
acquitted. He be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
25. Appeal is allowed.
26. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent for
information and compliance.
INDERMEET KAUR, J
JULY 16th 2015 A
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!