Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 4958 Del
Judgement Date : 14 July, 2015
$~27
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 14.07.2015
+ W.P.(C) 4196/2014 and CM 8429/2014
MAYA DEVI & ORS ... Petitioners
versus
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS ... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners : Mr L. B. Rai with Mr Utkarsha
For the Respondents : Mr Yeeshu Jain and Ms Jyoti Tyagi
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA
JUDGMENT
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. By way of this writ petition the petitioners seek the benefit of
Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter
referred to as the "2013 Act") which came into effect on 01.01.2014. The
petitioners, consequently, seek a declaration that the acquisition
proceeding initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter
referred to as the "1894 Act") and in respect of which Award
No. 39/1980-81 dated 09.07.1980 was made, inter alia, in respect of the
petitioners' land, comprised in Khasra No. 117/2 (5-04) measuring 5
bighas and 4 biswas in all, in village Ziauddinpur, Delhi, shall be deemed
to have lapsed.
2. In this case, we find that khasra No. 117 comprises of 43 bighas
and 13 biswas of land. Admittedly, possession of 29 bighas and 12
biswas has been taken by the land acquiring agency leaving 14 bighas and
1 biswa of land out of this khasra number, of which possession has not
been taken. It is the case of the petitioner that 5 bighas and 4 biswas of
land, for which this writ petition has been filed, falls within the said 14
bighas and 1 biswa of land, of which possession has not been taken. It is,
therefore, clear that the present petition is confined to 5 bighas and 4
biswas of land, of which possession has not been taken. Insofar as
compensation is concerned, it is the case of the respondents that it has
been deposited in the treasury, though the same has not been paid to the
petitioners nor had it been offered to the petitioners.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the
second proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, which has been
introduced by virtue of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Ordinance"). The
newly added proviso reads as under:-
"Provided further that in computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the award of a Tribunal for taking possession or such period where possession has been taken but the compensation lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded."
(underlining added)
4. On a plain reading of the proviso, it is evident that its purpose is to
compute the period of five years referred to in Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act. Certain periods are to be excluded in computing the said period
referred to in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The periods to be excluded
are:
(1) the period or periods during which the proceedings for acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by any court; or
(2) the period specified in the Award of a Tribunal for taking possession; or
(3) such period where possession has been taken but the compensation is lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for this purpose.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents are relying on the third
alternative inasmuch as it has been contended that the amount for
compensation has been placed in the government treasury. According to
the learned counsel for the respondents, this amounts to deposit "in any
designated account maintained for this purpose". Consequently, it is
urged that the entire period during which this amount was lying in the
treasury ought to be excluded.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the newly
added proviso does not have any application to the facts prevailing in the
present case. The question of compensation lying deposited in a court or
in any designated account maintained for such purposes would only arise
in a case where possession has been taken. In the present case,
admittedly, the possession has not been taken. This being the situation,
the newly inserted proviso has no application. We agree with the
submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners that unless
and until possession is taken, the third alternative mentioned in the
second proviso does not get triggered even though compensation may be
lying deposited in a court or in any designated account maintained for
such purposes.
7. In any event, the second proviso to Section 24(2) introduced by
virtue of the Ordinance of 2014 has been held to be only prospective in
operation by virtue of the Supreme Court decisions in M/s Radiance
Fincap (P) & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. decided on 12.1.2015 in
Civil Appeal No.4283/2011 and Karnail Kaur & Ors. v. State Of Punjab
& Ors. decided on 22.1.2015 in Civil Appeal no.7424 of 2013. The same
would apply to the said Ordinance of 2015. The rights vested in the
petitioners as on 01.01.2014 by virtue of the 2013 Act have not been
taken away by virtue of the introduction of the second proviso to Section
24(2) of the said Ordinance.
8. That being the position, the question of payment of compensation
will have to be construed in the light of the various decisions rendered by
the Supreme Court and this Court in:-
(i) Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors: (2014) 3 SCC 183;
(ii) Union of India and Ors v. Shiv Raj and Ors: (2014) 6 SCC 564;
(iii) Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors: Civil Appeal No. 8700/2013 decided on 10.09.2014; and
(iv) Surender Singh v. Union of India and Ors.: W.P.(C) 2294/2014 decided 12.09.2014 by this Court.
In Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) it has been held that unless and
until the compensation was tendered to the persons interested, mere
deposit of the compensation amount in a court would not amount to
payment of compensation. This aspect has also been considered in
Gyanender Singh & Others v. Union Of India & Others: WP (C)
1393/2014 decided by a Division Bench of this Court on 23.09.2014. The
same would be the position in respect of a deposit in "any designated
account maintained for this purpose". Consequently, the mere deposit in
the treasury, without being offered or tendered to the persons entitled
would not ipso facto amount to payment of compensation.
9. As such, in the present case, neither physical possession of the
subject land has been taken nor has any compensation been paid to the
petitioners. The Award was made more than five years prior to the
coming into force of the 2013 Act. No period is liable to be excluded
inasmuch as the second proviso, which has been newly inserted by virtue
of the said Ordinance, is not applicable, as indicated above.
10. As a result, the petitioners are entitled to a declaration that the said
acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act in respect of the
subject lands are deemed to have lapsed. It is so declared.
11. The writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be
no order as to costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J
JULY 14, 2015 SR
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