Daya Nand Chandela vs State
2015 Latest Caselaw 370 Del

*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                        Judgment reserved on:           06.01.2015

%                                       Judgment delivered on:          15.01.2015

+      CRL M.A. No. 19131/2014 in CRL.A. 835/2010
       DAYA NAND CHANDELA                                        ..... Appellant
                               Through:      Mr. Ajay Burman, Mr. Harsit
                                             Khurana, Mr.Karan Sidhu, Mr.Aditya
                                             Swarup Agarwal and Mr. Karan
                                             Burman, Advocates.

                               versus

       STATE                                                     ..... Respondent
                               Through:      Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, APP along
                                             with SI Rampal, P.S. - Tilak Nagar.
       CORAM:
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI

                                   JUDGMENT

VIPIN SANGHI, J.

1. The appellant has preferred the present application under Section 389 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. for suspension of conviction during the pendency of the appeal. The appellant had been convicted by the Trial Court vide the impugned judgment dated 03.06.2010 under Sections 452/34 I.P.C. and under Section 307/34 I.P.C. He was sentenced to undergo three years Rigorous Imprisonment (RI) for the offence punishable under Section 452/34 I.P.C. along with fine of Rs.10,000/-. He was also sentenced to

undergo three years R.I. for the offence punishable under Section 307/34 I.P.C. along with fine of Rs.50,000/-. Both the sentences were to run concurrently. The appeal was admitted on 21.07.2010 and the sentence was suspended during the pendency of the appeal on terms. The appeal is pending disposal in due course.

2. Now, the appellant seeks suspension of the conviction itself on the ground that the appellant enjoys a high reputation in the political sphere; he was elected Councilor in the year 1997 and thereafter in 2002; he was elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly (M.L.A.) in 2003 and; was further elected as M.L.A. in the year 2008. He submits that he wants to contest the upcoming elections in Delhi, which would not be possible unless his conviction is stayed, on account of the bar imposed under Section 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

3. Notice was issued in the present application on 09.12.2014, which was accepted by Mr. Rajat Katyal, learned APP. On 22.12.2014, it was informed by the learned APP that the appellant was previously involved in ten other cases. The details of the said cases were furnished to the appellant's counsel. The appellant filed an affidavit dated 05.01.2015 in Court, which was taken on record. In the affidavit, the appellant has disclosed that he had been acquitted in nine out of ten cases, and the tenth case relating to F.I.R. No.969/2003, P.S. Tilak Nagar is the one in question, pending consideration in appeal.

4. The submission of Mr. Ajay Burman, learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant has deep roots in the society and that he

belongs to a respectable family. He submits that he was falsely involved and implicated in the present case on account of political rivalry by the followers of the defeated candidate, as the appellant had been elected M.L.A. some time before the alleged incident of 11.12.2003.

5. Mr. Burman submits that at the time of the alleged incident, he received information on his Mobile Phone No. 9818822281, that workers of the rival political party had forcibly entered his house and attacked the same. Mr. Burman submits that the appellant had, in turn, made a call to PW-16, i.e. S.H.O., P.S.- Tilak Nagar, informing him of the said development. The appellant, at that time, was holding a meeting with the officers of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (M.C.D.) at the office of the M.C.D. (West District) in Rajouri Garden, Delhi. It is for this reason that the appellant was kept in Column No.2, and was not considered as the main accused in the charge-sheet.

6. Mr. Burman submits that it had been established upon examination of the call detail record of the aforesaid mobile phone number that the location of the appellant was near the office of the M.C.D. (West District), Rajouri Garden at the relevant time. He submits that at the stage of consideration of the anticipatory bail application, it had been verified by the Police, upon examination of the call detail record, that the appellant was not present at the place of the incident.

7. Mr. Burman submits that several witnesses who could prove the alibi of the appellant, namely Sh. S.K. Jain, Sh. Bharat Bhushan Bajaj & Sh. D.C. Bansal of M.C.D., were not produced by the prosecution. Mr. Burman

claims that the said witnesses - and one Sh. Subodh Kumar, had told the Police during investigation that the appellant was present in the M.C.D. office at the time of the incident. Though their statement was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., however, they were not produced by the prosecution. Two of the witnesses, namely Sh. Subodh Pawar and Sh.S.K. Jain had expired during the trial.

8. Mr. Burman further submits that there are inherent inconsistencies and glaring defects in the story of the prosecution, for which the benefit of doubt should have been given to the appellant. He further submits that there are serious contradictions in the case of the prosecution and the medical & ocular evidence, which, in fact, demolishes the prosecution's case. He submits that only one sharp injury had been found on one of the victims, while others were simple injuries. Consequently, ingredients of Section 307 I.P.C. were not satisfied. He submits that no weapon of offence had been recovered from, or at the instance of, the appellant. In furtherance of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Burman first drew the attention of the Court to Exhibit PW-2/A, the statement attributed to Sudesh Chandela made on 11.12.2013, wherein the said witness had claimed that the appellant came in his car armed with a sword. Mr. Burman submits that this is at variance with the statement of several prosecution witnesses.

9. PW-1 Ravinder had stated in his examination-in-chief "In the meantime Dayanand came in his brought sword from his house". Mr. Burman submits that the said witness was confronted with Exhibit PW-1/A

- his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to the Police dated 12.12.2003, wherein he had not claimed that the appellant had brought the sword from

his house. Similarly, PW-2 had also stated in his cross-examination that he had stated to the Police in his statement Exhibit PW-2/A, that when the appellant came, he went inside the house and brought the sword from his house. Mr. Burman submits that this was at variance with the recording made in Exhibit PW-2/A. Statement of PW-3 Ramgopal has also been referred to. PW-3 had also stated that the appellant and Nawab "came out from their house, both were armed with swords". Therefore, the examination-in-chief of PW-3 was at variance with Exhibits PW-1/A and PW-2/A.

10. Mr.Burman submits that though PW-1 claimed that he had received one injury on head by sword, the medical examination did not support the statement, as only PW-2 Sudesh was reported to have received a sharp injury. Similarly, reference is made to the evidence of PW-2 Sudesh. Sudesh had claimed that the appellant Dayanand hit the sword on back of his head, his right arm, left arm and palm of his right hand. However, there was only one sharp injury found in the medical examination of Sudesh. PW-3 had also claimed that the appellant and Nawab had attacked Sudesh, Harpal, Ravinder and PW-3 Ramgopal with the sword. This position was contradicted by the medical evidence. Whereas PW-4 claimed that Sudesh sustained 27 injuries on his body, Mr. Burman submits that the medical evidence showed that only 8 injuries were suffered by Sudesh. Mr. Burman submits that the said witnesses were, therefore, not reliable and the appellant could not have been convicted merely on the basis of the statements of the said four witnesses, as there was no other independent eye-witness examined by the prosecution.

11. Mr. Burman submits that in the examination of the prosecution witnesses, it had come out that the complainant Dhanwanti had financially contributed a substantial amount of Rs.51,000/- to the opposing candidate to defeat the appellant in the elections. This establishes prior political rivalry between the appellant and the family of the injured PW-1 to PW-4. PW-1 Ravinder had fought election against co-convict Meghraj and had lost the same. The complainant and the prosecution witnesses were not having good relations with the accused persons, including the appellant. In this regard, statement of PW-1 is relied upon. PW-1 admitted in his cross-examination that after the appellant became M.L.A. "we were not having good relations with the accused persons and there was a dispute between us which started 2-3 days after the winning of the election by Dayanand Chandela".

12. Mr. Burman next drew the attention of the Court to the statement of PW-4 Harpal Singh. This witness had deposed that at about 3:30 or 3:45 p.m. about 30-40 persons were sitting outside the house of Dayanand. The appellant had won the election. Mr. Burman submits that this corroborates the defence of the appellant that the said persons, who had gathered outside the appellant's house, may have attacked PW-1 to PW-4.

13. Mr. Burman further submits that upon it being suggested to PW-2 that the appellant, at the relevant time, was in M.C.D. office, he answered "I do not know at that time Sh. Dayanand was in M.C.D. office", thereby meaning that the said suggestion was not denied by the witness. Therefore, the claim made by the prosecution witness that the appellant was present at the site of the incident, or involved therein, was falsified.

14. In fact, on the statement of the appellant's wife, a cross-case had been registered vide F.I.R. No.970/2003 regarding the incident in the same Police Station, under Section 452/323/506/34 I.P.C.

15. Before proceeding further, I may note that vide order dated 30.01.2014, this Court had directed the learned M.M. before whom the criminal case titled State Vs. Sudesh Chandela arising out of F.I.R. No.970/2003, P.S. - Tilak Nagar was pending, to commit the aforesaid case to the Court of Sessions. It was further directed that the same would be assigned to Sh. V.K. Bansal, Additional Sessions Judge, for trial and disposal in accordance with law. This was done keeping in view the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nathi Lal & Others Vs. State of U.P. & Another, 1990 (Supp.) SCC 145; and State of M.P. Vs. Mishrilal (dead) & Others, 2003 (1) JCC 590. Subsequently, it was informed to the Court on 25.09.2014 that the case titled State Vs. Sudesh Chandela arising out of F.I.R. No.970/2003, P.S. - Tilak Nagar had resulted in acquittal of the accused vide order dated 25.08.2014.

16. Mr. Burman submits that Section 389 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be wide enough in its scope to empower the Court to suspend the conviction itself in appropriate cases. In support of this submission, Mr. Burman has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rama Narang Vs. Ramesh Narang & Others, (1995) 2 SCC 513; Navjot Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab &Another, AIR 2007 SC 1003; and the decision of the Bombay High Court in Anil Chhabildas Chaudhari Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2012 BomCR (Cri) 406.

17. On the other hand, Mr. Lovkesh Sawhney, learned APP while opposing the present application submits that suspension of conviction during the pendency of the appeal would be resorted to in exceptional and rare cases, and not in routine. Merely because the appellant is desirous of contesting the assembly elections that, by itself, would not be a ground sufficient to suspend the conviction. Mr. Sawhney submits that while examining the present application only the broad parameters of the case have to be examined.

18. He submits that the alibi of the appellant that he was in zonal office of M.C.D., Rajouri Garden, was rightly disbelieved by the Trial Court since the M.C.D. office, Rajouri Garden was not very far from the site of the incident. PW-1 and PW-2 had deposed that the accused had arrived in a car.

19. The usage and location of the mobile phone, claimed by the appellant, was rejected since the said mobile phone was not even in the name of the appellant, and was in the name of DW-7. It had not been established that the appellant was the user of the said mobile phone.

20. There were four injured persons, all four of whom were eye- witnesses, namely PW-1 to PW-4. The house of the appellant and that of the said witnesses PW-1 to PW-4 were opposite to each other. Mr. Sawhney submits that the contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were minor discrepancies, on account of a long gap in their examination.

21. Mr. Sawhney submits that the broad feature of the case is that PW-1 to PW-4 were attacked and injured, and all the four witnesses were

consistent that the accused persons, including the appellant, had entered their house and attacked them. The photographs Exhibit PW-18/16 to PW- 18/30 of the scene of the crime, namely the house of the complainant show blood was lying all over. Mr. Sawhney submits that there was no reason for PW-1 to PW-4 to falsely depose against the accused persons, and let the actual culprits go scot-free.

22. He submits that though there were exaggerations with regard to the number of injuries sustained by PW-1 to PW-4, they were not of much importance since it had been established that all four of them had suffered injuries. The grievous injuries on the person of PW-2 caused by blunt and sharp-edged weapon had been established. PW-1 to PW-4 had consistently deposed that the appellant had exhorted "Maaro Salon Ko". All the four witnesses PW-1 to PW-4 corroborated each other on major aspects, and the minor contradictions do not go to the root of the case. In the light of the fact that the complainant and other witnesses had supported the case of the prosecution, the non-recovery of the weapon of offence, namely the sword, is not fatal.

23. The scope of Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. was examined by the Supreme Court in Rama Narang (supra). The Supreme Court observed that if the order of conviction is to result in some disqualification, there was no reason to give a narrow meaning to Section 389(1) of the Code to debar the Court from granting an order staying the operation of the conviction in a fit case. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court could exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, if the power is not found within Section 389(1) of the Code. It observed:

"if the High Court feels satisfied that the order of conviction needs to be suspended or stayed so that the convicted persons does not suffer from a certain disqualification provided for in any other statute, it may exercise the power because otherwise the damage done cannot be undone; the disqualification incurred by Section 267 of the Companies act and given effect to cannot be undone at a subsequent date if the conviction is set aside by the Appellate Court. But while granting a stay of suspension of the order of conviction the Court must examine the pros and cons and if it feels satisfied that a case is made out for grant of such an order, it may do so and in so doing it may, if it considers it appropriate, impose such conditions as are considered appropriate to protect the interest of the shareholders and the business of the company."

24. This issue again arose in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra). The Supreme Court referred to Rama Narang (supra) as well as later decision of the Supreme Court in Ravi Kant S. Patil Vs. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2006) (1) JT (SC) 578. In Ravi Kant S. Patil (supra), the Supreme Court observed:

""All these decisions, while recognizing the power to stay conviction, have cautioned and clarified that such power should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where failure to stay the conviction, would lead to injustice and irreversible consequences."

The Court also observed:-

"11. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non- existent, but only non-operative...""

25. The Supreme Court in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) summarized the legal position in the following words:

"The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate Court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate Court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the Court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case".

26. In Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra), the appellant had resigned from the membership of Lok Sabha upon his conviction - even though by preferring an appeal, during the pendency of the appeal, he would not have incurred any disqualification by virtue of Section 8(4) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (The said provision was subsequently held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 653 decided on 10.07.2013). However, the appellant resigned to set high standards in public life. Thereafter, he sought suspension of the conviction since he desired to contest the elections for membership of the Lok Sabha, which was then due to take place shortly, on account of his resignation.

27. The Supreme Court considered the broad features of the case and the evidence which was available on record. The appellant had been acquitted by the Sessions Judge, but the High Court had reversed the finding of acquittal and convicted the appellant. The Supreme Court observed that for

the purpose of decision on the stay application, it is not necessary to minutely examine the merits of the case. However, the Supreme Court referred to the medical evidence which had an important bearing on the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant. The Supreme Court, after some scrutiny of the medical evidence, observed as follows:

"10. We have pointed out above the broad features of the case. The incident happened all of a sudden without any pre- meditation. The deceased was wholly unknown to the appellant. There was no motive for commission of the crime. The accused are alleged to have lost temper and started giving abuses on account of objection raised by the occupants of the Maruti car due to obstruction being caused by the vehicle of the appellant. Blows by fist are alleged to have been given and no weapon of any kind has been used. The medical evidence shows that the deceased had a diseased heart. The doctor who performed the post-mortem examination was unable to give the cause of death. The Medical Board gave its opinion after nearly a fortnight and that too does not ascribe the death due to any external injury but says "effects of head injury and cardiac condition." The medical evidence does not conclusively establish that the death occurred due to blow given on the head. If in the FIR, which is the earliest version, and, also in his statement in Court which was recorded after more than 4 years on 20.1.1993, Jaswinder Singh did not assign any role of causing injury on the head of the deceased to the appellant, whether his subsequent statement given after several years, wherein he assigned the specific role to the appellant of hitting the deceased on the head by a fist and thereby making him responsible for causing the death of the deceased should be believed, will certainly require consideration at the time of hearing the appeal. If the statement which Jaswinder Singh gave after several years wherein he attributed the head injury to the appellant is not accepted for the reason that it is at

variance with the version in the FIR and his earlier statement, the appellant cannot be held guilty under Section 304 Part II IPC. These features of the case which touch upon the culpability of the appellant, prima facie appear to be in his favour. Another feature which has a bearing is that the findings on factual aspects of the case recorded in favour of the appellant by the learned Sessions Judge resulting in acquittal have been reversed in appeal by the High Court.

11. The incident took place on 27.12.1988. It has no co- relation with the public life of the appellant which he entered much later in 2004 when he was elected as a Member of the Parliament. It is not a case where he took advantage of his position as M.P. in commission of the crime. As already stated, it was not necessary for the appellant to have resigned from the membership of the Parliament as he could in law continue as M.P. by merely filing an appeal within a period of 3 months and had he adopted such a course he could have easily avoided incurring any disqualification at least till the decision of the appeal. However, he has chosen to adopt a moral path and has set high standards in public life by resigning from his seat and in seeking to get a fresh mandate from the people. In the event prayer made by the appellant is not granted he would suffer irreparable injury as he would not be able to contest for the seat which he held and has fallen vacant only on account of his voluntary resignation which he did on purely moral grounds. Having regard to the entire facts and circumstances mentioned above we are of the opinion that it a fit case where the order of conviction passed by the High Court deserves to be suspended".

The Supreme Court further observed that:

"13. .... ... ....., it is not possible to hold, as a matter of rule, or, to lay down, that in order to prevent any person who has committed an offence from entering the Parliament or the Legislative Assembly the order of the conviction should not be suspended. The Courts have to interpret the law as it stands

and not on considerations which may be perceived to be morally more correct or ethical".

28. In Anil Chhabildas Chaudhari (supra), the applicants sought suspension of conviction under Section 325 read with Section 34 I.P.C. They had been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- each, and in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The applicants claimed that they had contested elections for the Bhusawal Municipal Corporation in 2006, when applicant No.1 was elected as a Councilor, whereas applicant No.2 had been defeated. The term of applicant No.1 was coming to an end in December 2011. The elections to, inter alia, the Bhusawal Municipal Corporation had been announced. The applicants claimed that they were desirous of contesting the elections. However, in view of Section 16(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act, 1965, they were disqualified from becoming Councilors, since the conviction was for more than two years. Consequently, they sought suspension of conviction during the pendency of their appeals. While opposing the application, the State disclosed that while on bail granted in the said appeal, the applicant No.1 was involved in one other crime, under Section 387, 109 read with Section 34 IPC. The applicant No.1 was involved in 23 offences, whereas applicant No.2 was involved in 7 other offences.

29. While allowing the applications, the Court took note of the fact that out of the 23 offences against applicant No.1, in 10 cases he had either been acquitted or compromise had been reached. The Court also relied on the

observation made in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra) that the Courts have to interpret the law as it stands, and not on the considerations which may be perceived to be morally more correct or ethical. While recognizing that the power to stay the conviction has to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances and that suspension of conviction is not a rule, but in an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending on the facts of each case, the Court allowed the application upon consideration of the fact that the alleged weapon was not found, and there were infirmities and discrepancies in the prosecution case. The Court observed that in case the conviction is set aside in appeal, the damage done to the applicants would not be undone. It was observed that the applicants merely seek an opportunity to contest and that it was for the electorate to decide whether or not the applicants were suitable to represent them.

30. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the submissions in the light of the materials relied upon by the appellant and the respondent, and the decisions cited before me, I am of the view that the present application has no merit. I am, therefore, not inclined to suspend the conviction of the appellant. As noticed by the Supreme Court in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra), at this stage, the Court is not required to delve into the merits of the case in detail, and only the broad features of the case need to be examined.

31. I am, prima facie, of the view that the discrepancies pointed by counsel for the appellant in the prosecution evidence are of a minor nature and do not shake the case of the prosecution and the findings returned by the trial court. While dealing with this argument, the trial court had observed:

"40. There are certain contradictions in the testimonies of the witnesses, but it is to be taken note that witnesses have been examined after a long gap and minor discrepancies here and there are bound to occur. It is also important to note that every person has different way of seeing, noticing and registering the facts, which they see and perceive and then reproduction of the same. Here, the four persons of the family sustained injuries and all of them were not in the same situation. They noticed whatever was happening to them and in front of them. It is not possible that every person was seeing and noticing everything every time, therefore, certain contradictions were bound to occur. The three witnesses are consistent on the point that accused Dayanand Chandela brought the sword from inside the house. Though, PW2 was confronted with his statement recorded by the police, which is Ex. PW2/ A, wherein it is mentioned that accused came there in a car with the sword. In my opinion, it is not a major contradiction as to whether he was carrying the sword or brought the same from his house, the major issue is that who attacked whom and where. All the four witnesses are consistent that accused persons entered their house and attacked them. Photographs in this regard are also on the record, which have been proved as Ex. PW18/ 16 to Ex. PW18/ 30. The photographs show the veranda of the house of the accused and also inside the house of the complainant and blood is lying all over. As discussed above though, the defence is trying to make out a case of previous enmity, but there is no such evidence. There is no reason on record to show that PW1 to PW4 would depose falsely against the accused persons and would let off the actual culprits go scot free. There are exaggerations also in the testimony of PW4 that PW2 sustained 27 injuries, but in my opinion, when a person himself is being beaten indiscriminately and he saw his son being attacked with sword, such contradictions are not of much importance. Injuries on the person of PW2 has been proved as grievous caused by blunt and sharp edged weapon, which also supported the testimony of PW2. PW2 has stated that he was attacked by Dayanand Chandela as well as Kunwan Nawab with the swords and by other two accused persons with lathies. They also stated

that Dayanand Chandela exhorted that "Maro salo ko" and PW3 and PW4 also told the same words, which according to them, were exhorted by Dayanand Chandela. PW1 also stated that Kunwar Nawab also exhorted, but they were confronted with their statements recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. All the four witnesses have corroborated each other on the major points besides minor contradictions, which in my opinion are not going to the root of the case. So far as nonexamination of Sufi and Deepak are concerned, in my opinion, that is not fatal to the prosecution case as they were not the eyewitnesses to the incident. So far as the nonexamination of the public witnesses is concerned, police witnesses stated that no public person wanted to be involved in a dispute of two families, therefore, they do not come forward. So far as the discrepancies in the site plan is concerned, that in my opinion, though important, but on this ground only, the entire case of the prosecution cannot be thrown out. IO should have taken care to prepare the correct site plan of the scene of occurrence, which has not been done. It is well settled principle of law that negligence of IO is not fatal in every case".

32. The alibi of the appellant - that he was in the zonal office of MCD, Rajouri Garden was disbelieved by taking into account the statement of PW- 4 that the appellant was in the said office for about 30 minutes and that he had left the office at round 3:45 p.m. The trial court observed that the place of the incident was not far from the M.C.D. office. PW-1 to PW-4 were consistent that the appellant had brought the sword from inside the house. The said witnesses had deposed that the police had made a wrong recording to the effect that the appellant had come armed with the sword from the car itself, even though they had correctly narrated the sequence of events to the police. The reliance placed upon the use of the mobile phone aforesaid allegedly by the appellant was disbelieved, since the said mobile phone connection is in the name of DW-7. The aspect of non-recovery of the

sword, i.e. the weapon of offence was considered and rejected, since the complainant and the other witnesses had supported the prosecution case.

33. A perusal of the aforesaid discussion would show that, on facts, the present case is starkly different from that dealt with by the Supreme Court in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra).

34. Therefore, having considered the pros and cons, I am not satisfied that a case is made out for grant of an order for the suspension/ stay of conviction. It does not appear to be a case of exceptional circumstances where the failure to stay of conviction would lead to injustice to the appellant. As noticed by the Supreme Court in Navjot Singh Sidhu (supra), grant of stay of conviction is not a rule, but an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending on the facts of each case. Pertinently, the last time that the appellant contested the election was in the year 2008. Even though elections were held in Delhi for election of Members to the Legislative Assembly even thereafter, the appellant did not so contest and did not express any desire to contest the elections.

35. For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in this application and dismiss the same, being meritless.

(VIPIN SANGHI) JUDGE JANUARY 15, 2015 B.S. Rohella /sr