Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 250 Del
Judgement Date : 12 January, 2015
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ R.S.A. No.356/2014
Decided on : 12th January, 2015
RAJ PAL ...... Appellant
Through: Mr.Daniest Allen, Advocate.
Versus
NEHRU LAL ...... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
V.K. SHALI, J. (ORAL)
1. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. He has not been
able to make out any substantial question of law in the instant appeal and,
therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff
herein had filed two suits i.e. one for recovery of possession (Suit
No.294/2010) and the other permanent injunction (Suit No.295/2010) in
respect of the suit property. Both these suits i.e. the suit for recovery of
possession as well as the suit for permanent injunction were decreed
against the appellant. However, the appellant chose to file an appeal only against the judgment and decree passed in the suit for possession. The
first appellate court upheld the judgment and decree passed against the
appellant vide order 25.09.2014. Now the present regular second appeal
has been filed only against the judgment and decree so far as the
possession is concerned.
3. The case which was set up by the appellant/plaintiff was that one
Sh.Phool Singh was the cousin brother of the respondent and he had
permitted Phool Singh to occupy two rooms and some other portions of
the property in question bearing No.23, Dhirpur Gaon near Nirankari
Colony, Kingsway Camp, Delhi - 110009. As a licensee he was
permitted to enjoy this license during his lifetime and since he had died,
the widow (the present appellant) stepped into the shoes of her husband
and continued with the possession of the suit property. The appellant was
given a notice to vacate the premises after revocation of license in favour
of her husband and since she did not respond, therefore, the suit for
possession and permanent injunction was filed.
4. The defendant had taken the plea in the written statement that she
is the owner of the suit property and, therefore, there was no question of
her vacating the same. Alternatively, she had also taken the plea of
adverse possession. No evidence with regard to the adverse possession or the suit property having been owned by her or her husband by way of a
settlement deed having been executed between her husband and the
respondent/plaintiff was brought on record. Therefore, the court was left
with no other option but to hold that the respondent/plaintiff was the
owner of the suit property as he had not only proved the sale deed, but he
had established from the oral testimony that he is the owner of the
property in question. The present appellant was not able to produce any
document or any oral evidence to show that she was in adverse
possession or that her husband had become owner of the same by virtue
of a settlement deed. In the absence of the same, she could not have been
considered as the owner on account of Section 17 of the Registration Act,
1908 and accordingly the judgment and the decree passed by the trial
court was upheld by the first appellate court.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the
respondent has not been able to establish his ownership qua the suit
property. On the contrary, it has been contended that the appellant was
the owner of the suit property by virtue of adverse possession while as the
trial court and the first appellate court had wrongly put the burden on
them with regard to their proof of ownership. Both these questions are stated to be constituting a substantial question of law and accordingly it is
prayed that the appeal may be admitted.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn the attention
of the court to the averments made in the application where certain
allegations are purported to have been made against the Additional
District Judges.
7. I do not consider it appropriate to discuss and analyze the stand of
the respondent on account of the fact that all these allegations are bereft
of any merit.
8. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the
learned ADJ had a bias and therefore ought not to have heard and decided
the appeal is essentially beyond the domain of this court. If the appellant
felt aggrieved on account of the fact that his appeal was listed before a
court which it did not want to consider, the proper course of remedy open
to him was to get the matter transferred rather than take this frivolous
plea before this court in second appeal.
9. I do not consider that the present matter involves any substantial
question of law much less a question which may give him access to the
suit property, nor the appellant has been able to show that it involves one.
10. For the reasons mentioned above, I am fully satisfied that the
appellant has not been able to make out any substantial question of law in
the instant appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
11. No order as to costs.
V.K. SHALI, J.
JANUARY 12, 2015/dm
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