Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 1190 Del
Judgement Date : 10 February, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment deserved on February 02, 2015
Judgment delivered on February 10, 2015
+ ARB.P. 132/2012 & IA 2794/2014
M/S LION SERVICES LTD
..... Petitioner
Through Ms.Seema Tiwari, Advocate
versus
M/S DLF PROJECTS LTD
..... Respondent
Through Mr.Rajiv Nayar, Sr. Advocate with
Ms.Meghna Mishra, Ms.F.A. Khan
and Ms.Niyati Kohli, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO
V.KAMESWAR RAO, J.
1. In the present petition, the petitioner has prayed for appointment of
an Arbitrator. Even though the petition has been filed for
appointment of arbitrator with regard to eight work orders, it is the
case of the petitioner during the submissions that 12 work orders
have been issued to the petitioner for providing housekeeping and
maintenance service to the respondent. There is no dispute between
the parties on this account. It is averred in the petition that this Court
has jurisdiction as parties have agreed that the Courts of Delhi would
have exclusive jurisdiction. That apart, it is also submitted by the
petitioner that all the parties have their registered office in Delhi.
2. The respondent has filed its reply and taken an objection that this
Court has no territorial jurisdiction to decide the present application.
The respondent has denied that the parties have agreed for the Courts
of Delhi to have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The
details of the 12 work orders and the objection taken by the
respondents are as under:-
S.No. Work Order Invoice Address Site Address Completion Objection
Date Date
1. 08.01.2007 Jasola, New Delhi Jasola, New Delhi 31.03.2007 No arbitration clause
Barred by limitation
2. 08.01.2007 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 08.01.2009 No arbitration clause
Territorial jurisdiction
3. 08.01.2007 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 31.03.2007 No arbitration clause
Barred by limitation
Territorial jurisdiction
4. 25.07.2007 Jasola, New Delhi Jasola, New Delhi 31.03.2008 Barred by limitation
5. 25.07.2007 Noida, Uttar Pradesh Noida, Uttar Pradesh 31.03.2008 Barred by limitation
Territorial jurisdiction
6. 14.02.2008 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 31.03.2008 Barred by limitation
Territorial jurisdiction
7. 07.04.2008 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 31.03.2009 Territorial jurisdiction
8. 06.05.2010 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 31.03.2011 Territorial jurisdiction
9. 11.05.2010 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 10.05.2012 Territorial jurisdiction
10. 17.06.2010 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 31.03.2011 Territorial jurisdiction
11. 17.06.2010 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 17.06.2012 Territorial jurisdiction
12. 17.06.2010 Gurgaon, Haryana Gurgaon, Haryana 17.06.2012 Territorial jurisdiction
3. A rejoinder to the reply has been filed by the petitioner, wherein on
the objection of this Court having no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
petition, a stand has been taken by the petitioner that it has received the
work orders through e-mail at its office at Delhi and has served the
respondent at various places in Delhi.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner during submissions, would
reiterate the stand as taken in the petition as well as rejoinder.
5. Mr.Rajiv Nayar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent would apart from reiterating the objection regarding territorial
jurisdiction would also state that there is no arbitration clause in some of
the work orders and the claims are barred by limitation. He relied upon the
following judgments in support of his contentions:-
(a) Krishna Mittal vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. (2010) 2 Arb. LR 439 (Delhi)
(b) Rattan Singh Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. Gill Power Generation Co. Pvt. Ltd. 136 (2007) DLT 629
(c) S.K. Khanna vs. M/s Grover Oils Pvt. Ltd. ARB.P. 459/2012 decided on May 14, 2013
(d) A.P. Nirmaan vs. Sindhu Trade Links (2010) 5 RAJ. 185 (Delhi)
6. Having considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties, it is noted that insofar as work orders at serial No.1, 2 and 3
above are concerned, the same doesn't have an arbitration clause. In view
of the fact, the work orders don't have an arbitration clause the present
application for appointment of arbitrator qua those work orders is not
maintainable. Further, the petitioner has not shown any correspondence,
letter, Telex, Telegrams or other means of communication or exchange of
statements of claim and defence in which, the existence of the agreement is
alleged by the petitioner and not denied by the respondent. In one notice
dated September 23, 2011, the petitioner had taken a stand of initiating the
arbitration proceedings through the Court of law for appointment of an
Arbitrator to recover the amount. The said notice does not make any
reference to any agreement. The present application qua the said orders
needs to be rejected.
7. I proceed to deal with the other work orders. Insofar as work order at
Serial No. 4 dated July 25, 2007 is concerned, the same is for housekeeping
services at DLF Tower, Jasola. The starting date of the work is July 01,
2007 to March 31, 2008. Clause 19 of the work order is the arbitration
clause. The first notice issued invoking the arbitration and placed on record
is dated May 25, 2011 followed by another notice dated September 23,
2011 which is after the expiry of three years, the limitation period for
invocation of arbitration clause in terms of Article 137 under Part II of the
Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. I agree with the submission made by
Mr.Rajiv Nayar in this regard that the petition qua these work orders is
barred by limitation. In this regard, I note for benefit the judgment as relied
upon by the respondent in Krishna Mittal's case (supra), wherein in para
Nos.7 to 10, it has been held as under:-
"7. Since in the present cases the contracts had been completed in the year 2002, petitioners should have invoked the arbitration clauses within three years from the date they became entitled to raise their claims, i.e. in the year 2002. As, in the present cases, there is no subsequent acknowledgment of debt by the respondents as contemplated by Section 18 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation does not get extended.
8. However, I may clarify that petitioners could have availed of extended limitation if they could show that their claims were either under negotiation or under consideration during this period.
9. In fact, the Supreme Court in Shree Ram Mills Ltd. vs. Utility Premises (P) Ltd. reported in (2007) 4 SCC 599 has held that if the disputes under a contract are under negotiation or consideration, then the limitation for arbitration purpose would be deemed to have not commenced. But in the present case, petitioner has not filed any evidence to show that petitioners' claims were being considered by the respondents during the period 2002 to 2008.
10. Consequently, in my opinion, the claims of the petitioners as sought to be referred by the present petitions are not 'live claims' but 'stale claims' as they
are ex facie barred by limitation. Accordingly, present petitions are dismissed but with no orders as to costs."
8. Insofar as other work orders from Serial No. 5 to 12 are concerned,
the respondent has raised a plea of territorial jurisdiction. According to
them, all these work orders were for doing housekeeping services at
Gurgaon (Haryana) and Noida (Uttar Pradesh). I note that the petitioner has
filed this application on a plea that Parties have agreed that this Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the petition besides all the parties have
registered offices in Delhi within the jurisdiction of this Court. On an
objection taken by the respondent regarding territorial jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the present petition, the petitioner in its rejoinder taken
an additional plea that since the petitioner has received the work orders
through e-mail at its office in Delhi and the petitioner had served the
respondent at various places in Delhi and NCR, this Court has jurisdiction.
9. It needs to be considered, whether the existence of a registered office
of the petitioner and receipt of e-mail by the petitioner at Delhi would
confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the present application.
10. Before I venture to decide the issue, suffice to state the petitioner has
itself shown the respondent carrying out its business from Gurgaon in the
memo of parties.
11. It is a conceded position that as per the work orders the work of
housekeeping was carried out at Gurgaon/Noida. Suffice to state, the
contract of housekeeping was not performed at Delhi. It is also noted that
the arbitration clause does not specify the place of arbitration. It cannot be
said that the place of arbitration would be at Delhi, if at all an arbitrator is
appointed. On that count, jurisdiction cannot be conferred on this Court to
entertain this application.
12. Keeping in view the position under Section 20 of CPC, it can still be
held that since the respondent herein is based in Gurgaon, it would be the
Court having territorial jurisdiction over Gurgaon which can entertain the
application of this nature. The cause of action as understood to mean every
fact if traversed would be necessary for the petitioner to prove in order to
support his case for seeking a relief. The claim of the petitioner as seen
from the notices is for recovery of money for the work executed at Gurgaon
and Noida. The factum of receipt of work order in Delhi or for that matter
the registered office of the petitioner being in Delhi are not relevant facts
for the petitioner to claim relief.
13. Further, the issue of jurisdiction is no more res-integra. This issue
stands settled by the judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh's case (supra),
wherein in para Nos.33 to 37 has held as under:-
"33. In the instant case, even if it was to be assumed that the agreement had been executed at Delhi, yet this Court
would not be the proper court to exercise jurisdiction in this matter inasmuch as the contract has not been performed at Delhi. The respondent is located at Punjab. The records relating to the performance of the contract and the transactions in question would be located outside the jurisdiction of this Court and the respondent admittedly has his office at Batala in Punjab which is the only office with which the plaintiff has transacted business. Therefore, even on application of the doctrine of forum non- conveniens, the petitioner would merit being sent to the courts of competent jurisdiction at Punjab.
34. The issue relating to the place where a cause of action has accrued so as to confer jurisdiction on a Vourt to adjudicate upon a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 has arisen for consideration before this court on earlier occasions as well. In M/s Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. Vs. M/s Greater Noida Industrial Development & Anr. reported at ILR (2004) II Delhi 88, the Court considered several judgments and arrived at a conclusion that it is the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen which would confer jurisdiction on the court to adjudicate upon the subject matter of the lis. It was held that primacy has to be given to such place where the cause of action has mainly or substantially or predominantly arisen in preference to or exclusion of a place where it has
incidentally or partially arisen. This, the court held, has a a great pragmatic purpose and ensures convenience of investigation and minimization of expenses. It was noticed that the forum of convenience from the perspective of the plaintiff has been looked askance at. A fortiori, where the defendant does not have its principal or concerned office and the cause of action has not substantially and overwhelmingly arisen at that particular place, courts situated there should decline to exercise jurisdiction in preference to the court possessing an umbical connection with the cause of action. This will root out the pernicious practice of forum shopping. Courts exercising jurisdiction in the context of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act should be mindful and vigilant in this regard also because Section 42 thereof bars all other courts from exercising jurisdiction over any further petitions/applications.
35. I find that before this Court, there is nothing in the agreement or in any correspondence which would even remotely suggest or support the submission that the agreement was made, signed or executed at Delhi. It is not even contended on behalf of the petitioner that any part of the contract was to be executed at Delhi. No correspondence has been addressed by the petitioner to the respondent to any address in Delhi. There is no material to indicate that the petitioner dealt with any officer of the respondent at Delhi or with any address of the respondent
at Delhi.
14. Translating the aforesaid conclusion, in the facts of this case, it
is clear that contracts were executed in Noida/Gurgaon. The notices
issued by the petitioner were to the offices of the respondents situated
in Gurgaon/Mumbai. In other words, no communication was
addressed to the respondent to any address in Delhi. Suffice to state,
no part of cause of action has arisen in Delhi.
15. In view of the above discussion, this petition is dismissed.
16. Liberty is given to the petitioner to approach the competent Court for
the relief sought in this petition.
17. No costs.
IA 2794/2014
Dismissed as infructuous.
(V.KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE FEBRUARY 10, 2015/km
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