Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 9547 Del
Judgement Date : 23 December, 2015
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on October 30, 2015
Judgment delivered on December23,2015
+ W.P.(C) 3474/2015, CM No.6207/2015
MUKUL MISHRA ..... Petitioner
Through: In person
Versus
DELHI ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION &
ORS ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.Meet Malhotra, Sr.
Advocate with Ms.Pratima
Gupta and Ms.Palak Singh,
Advocates for R-1 & R-2
Mr. Vinod Kumar Bhati,
Adv. for
Mr. Devesh Singh, Adv. for
R-3
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO
V.KAMESWAR RAO, J.
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking the
following reliefs:-
"a) issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ/direction/orders and further order/orders to the effect that the respondent Nos.1 to 3 shall permit the petitioner to work on the present post of Advisor (Law) at office of respondent No.2 on present terms and conditions and salary until the respondent No.3 takes a final view on its notification No.F-19(01)2014/S-IV/223-224 dated 16.02.2015. Secondly he may kindly be allowed to work on the present post till continuation of the scheme, whichever lasts later.
b) direct the respondent Nos.1 & 2 not to take any
action/shall withdraw any action already taken on the basis of interviews (personal interaction) dated 30.03.2015 until final view is taken by the respondent No.3 on its notification;
c) direct the respondent Nos.1 & 2 to take action consistent to final view taken by respondent No.3 regarding notification dated 16.02.2015;
d) Any other order(s) as may be deemed fit and appropriate may also kindly be passed."
2. Meaningfully read, the relief is primarily for a direction to permit
the petitioner to work on the post of Advisor (Law) at the office of
respondent No.2 i.e Electricity Ombudsman on present terms, conditions
and salary on which he was initially appointed until respondent No.3
Government of NCT of Delhi takes a final view on the notification dated
February 16, 2015 whereby it was decided by the Govt. of NCT, not to
terminate the services of the contractual employees engaged by the
departments till further instructions in the matter. It is also prayed that the
respondent Nos.1 & 2 not to take any action on the basis of interview held
on March 30, 2015 for the post of Advisor (Law).
3. Mr. Mukul Mishra, petitioner appeared in person and would submit
that he was appointed as Advisor (Law) on February 10, 2012 in the
office of the Electricity Ombudsman. According to him, the said
appointment was for a period of three years. The petitioner has been
discharging duties to the best of his ability. As the term of the
appointment was coming to an end on February 12, 2015, the respondent
No.1 was supposed to start the process for reappointment/fresh
appointment, six months prior to the date on which the term was to expire.
The respondent No.1 advertised two posts of (i) Secretary and (ii) Advisor
(Law) on December 11, 2014. The petitioner was also eligible for a
second term being 54 years of age and his work and conduct was found
excellent during the initial period of three years of appointment. He also
applied for the post of Advisor (Law) for the second term. As the process
of interview could not take place before the tenure of the petitioner was
due to expire on February 12, 2015, the appointment of the petitioner was
extended to a further period of 60 days i.e. up to April 13, 2015. It is his
case that on February 16, 2015, the Govt. of NCT issued notification to
the effect, if any terminations, are likely to take place, the same shall be
stopped till further orders. The petitioner's case is that, he had made a
representation dated March 26, 2015 to extend his services in terms of the
notification dated February 16, 2015, till further orders. He also states,
that he appeared in the personal interaction, held on March 30, 2015. No
reply to the said representation dated March 26, 2015 was ever received
by the petitioner. He concedes to the fact that the respondent No.1 had
not notified Recruitment Rules for various posts under respondent No.2.
The respondent No.1 is engaging officers on contractual basis. He would
also submit, that the respondent could not have replaced a contractual
employee by a further contractual employee by appointing a new Advisor
(Law). That apart, it is his endeavour to submit that there is no concluded
contract between the petitioner and the respondents, inasmuch as after
every year, there is an increase in the pay of the Advisor (Law) by 5%.
According to him, absence of Rules has led to lack of transparency. He
states, that the provision of clause 17 of the Regulations, 2003 provides
that Commission shall provide the staff to the Ombudsman. He would
state, that the case of the respondents that the notification dated February
16, 2015 is not applicable to the respondent or to the office of
Ombudsman, is not correct, inasmuch as the said notification stipulates
that it applies to autonomous bodies. The appointment of Chairman and
Members, DERC are made by the Govt. of NCT and their salaries are
being paid out of consolidated fund of Govt. of NCT of Delhi, only some
funds are being generated by respondent No.1 itself. Therefore,
respondent No.1 squarely falls within the category of autonomous body
and Statutory Institution. Except doing tariff determination, for all other
purposes like establishment, recruitment etc are under the Govt. of NCT
of Delhi. He would rely upon the following judgments in support of his
contention that a contractual employee cannot be replaced by another
contractual employee.
(i) (1992) 4 SCC 118 State of Haryana & Ors vs. Piara Singh and ors;
(ii) (2006) 4 SCC 1 Secretary State of Karnataka & ors vs. Uma Devi;
(iii) Dalip Kumar Jha vs. New Delhi Municipal Council, Writ Petition Nos.16499-16502/2004 decided by this Court on September 1, 2006;
(iv) Dr. Manish Arora & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors of Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench reported as 2007 (2) SLJ 198;
(v) (2009) 6 SCC 611 Mohd. Abdul Kadir & Anr. Vs. Director General of Police, Assam & ors;
(vi) 2012 (1) CAT 55 Vandana Jain & Ors vs. Union of India & ors
(vii) (2015) 1 SLR 634 Ashok Godara & Anr. Vs. State & Ors;
(viii) 2014 (146) DRJ 167 Narinder Singh Ahuja & Ors vs. Secretary Ministry of health & Family Welfare & Ors;
(ix) Abhinav Choudhary & Others vs. Delhi Technological & Anr.
Writ Petition (Civil) No.3512/2014 and Writ Petition (Civil) No.3834/2014 decided on January 20, 2015 by this Court;
(x) Dr. Parmod Kumar Dhailwal vs. GNCT of Delhi & Ors. Writ Petition No.7942/2014 and connected writ petitions decided on May 26, 2015 by this Court.
4. On the issue that the contract between the parties is not a concluded
contract, the petitioner relied upon the following judgments :-
(i) Gostho Behari Sirkar vs. Surs'Estates Ltd. AIR 1960 Calcutta 752;
(ii) (1975) 1 SCC 199 The Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. The State of Gujarat;
(iii) DERC vs. BSES Rajdhani Power Pvt. Ltd. Review Petition No.5/2009 in Appeal No.181/2008 decided on January 27, 2012.
5. On the issue of waiver and estoppel, the petitioner relied upon the
following judgments:-
(i) AIR 1986 SC 180 Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and ors;
(ii) (1979) 2 SCC 409 M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and ors;
(iii) AIR 1984 SC 921 A.C. Jose vs. Sivan Pillai and ors;
(iv) AIR 1987 SC 2414 Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India;
(v) AIR 1989 SC 1834 Provash Chandra Dalui and another vs. Biswanath Banerjee and another;
(vi) AIR 1991 Gujarat 43 Dr. Sida Nitinkumar Laxmankumar Laxmanbhai and anothers vs. Gujarat University and ors;
(vii) AIR 1984 Bombay 161 Tapti Oil Industries and another vs. State of Maharashtra and ors;
(viii) AIR 1982 Bombay 135 Yousuf Ali Abdulla Fazalbhoy and ors vs. M.S. Kasbekar and another;
(ix) (1982) 1 SCC 223 Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta vs. Patel Narandas Haribhai;
(x) AIR 1984 Patna 61 Rameshwar Prasad Sinha vs. State of Bihar and ors;
(xi) AIR 1982 Gujarat 183 C.J. Thakor vs. Ahmedabad Distt. Panchayat and ors;
(xii) AIR 1998 Rajasthan 100 M/s. Phoneix Impex vs. State of Rajasthan and ors;
(xiii) (1974) 2 SCC 725 P. Dasa Muni Reddy vs. P. Appa Rao.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Meet Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for
the respondent would submit that the respondent No.1 is a statutory
authority constituted under Section 82 of the Electricity Act, 2003.
Section 42 (6) and (7) of the Electricity Act provides that every consumer,
who is aggrieved by non redressal of his grievance by the Consumer
Redressal Forum, may make a representation for the redressal of his
grievance to any Authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed
or designated by the State Commission. The Ombudsman shall settle the
grievance of the consumer within such time and in such a manner as may
be specified by the State Commission. Accordingly, Institution of
Ombudsman was constituted under the DERC (Guidelines for
establishment of forum for redressal of grievance of the Consumers and
Ombudsman) Regulations, 2003, wherein Regulation 17 stipulate that
Commission shall provide secretariat and such staff to the Ombudsman as
it may consider necessary. The Commission provided, Advisor (Law) to
the Ombudsman on a predetermined eligibility criteria laid down by the
Commission on lump-sum payment basis for a fixed term. The
appointment is not against a regular sanctioned post carrying scale of pay
plus grade pay. Keeping in view the nature of duties of Ombudsman, post
of Advisor (Law) to the Ombudsman is filled on contract basis on
payment of a consolidated salary and no other mode of recruitment is
assigned to it. From time to time, the Commission has been advertising
the post of Advisor (Law) and incumbent is selected on assessment of
suitability by the Selection Committee. Accordingly, an advertisement
was issued in the newspapers in 2012, in pursuance of which the
petitioner had applied and went through the selection process and
appointed by the Selection Committee. Before joining as Advisor (Law),
the petitioner had executed a contract, which clearly stipulated the
appointment for a period of three years. He would also state, that the
appointment comes to an end by efflux of time, on the expiry of the said
period. Noting that the tenure of the petitioner was coming to an end, an
advertisement dated December 11, 2014 was issued. The selection
process thereto was completed on March 30, 2015 when the petitioner had
also appeared in the interview. He would also state, that the offer of
appointment to the selected candidate was sent. He takes a plea, that such
a candidate was a necessary party but has not been made so in the writ
petition and would disentitle the petitioner, the relief as prayed for. It is
only, when the petitioner had come to know that he was not selected and
another candidate was selected, he has filed the instant petition.
Therefore, the Rule of Estoppel be invoked in the instant petition and the
petition be dismissed.
7. I may only state here, during the course of the submissions, the
petitioner, had shown Draft Regulations, which inter-alia stipulate that no
staff Member can continue in the office upon attaining the age of 65
years, to contend that he can continue till the age of 65 years. This Court
deemed it proper to seek a response on the submission made by the
petitioner. Accordingly, an additional affidavit was filed, wherein it was
mentioned that the said Draft Regulations remained so, as it did not come
into force. It was also clarified in the additional affidavit, that the intent
of framing the Draft Regulations was, to allow any candidate with the
legal knowledge to work as Advisor (Law) to Ombudsman on contractual
basis for three years and not exceeding the age of 65 years, does not mean
that the individual, so appointed on contractual basis, would continue till
the age of 65 years. At the end of the contractual period, the individual
has to demit the office.
8. Insofar as the issue of notification dated February 16, 2015 is
concerned, it was the stand of the respondent No.1 that the same is not
applicable to it. In support of this stand, the Commission relied upon
Section 95 of the Electricity Act to say that all the proceedings before it
are judicial proceedings including for the purposes of Section 193 and 228
of the Indian Penal Code and the Commission shall be deemed to be a
Civil Court for the purposes of Section 345 and 346 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The additional affidavit was responded to by
the petitioner, the contents of which have already been noted above.
9. Having heard the petitioner and Mr. Meet Malhotra in detail,
suffice to state that the relief as sought for by the petitioner is of limited
nature to the effect that the respondents should continue to permit the
petitioner on the post of Advisor (Law) till they take a final view on the
notification dated February 16, 2015 and till such time they should not
take any action on the basis of the interview held on March 30, 2015.
Suffice to state, that the respondent No.1 is on record, to state that the said
notification is not applicable to it for the reason that the same is a body
discharging judicial function. Without going into the reasoning given by
the respondent No.1, the fact that a view has been taken by the respondent
No.1, the writ petition needs to be dismissed.
10. I note that during the submissions, both the parties have referred to
the provisions of the Electricity Act, The Rules and the Regulations, 2003.
I reproduce the same as under:-
"42. Constitution of State Commission:- (5) Every distribution licensee shall, within six months from the appointed dare or date of grant of licence, whichever is earlier, establish a forum for redressal of grievances of the consumers in accordance with the guidelines as may be specified by the State Commission.
(6) Any consumer, who is aggrieved by non-redressal of his grievances under sub-section (5), may make a representation for the redressal of his grievance to an authority to be known as Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the State Commission.
(7) The Ombudsman shall settle the grievance of the consumer within such time and in such manner as may be specified by the State Commission."
"7. Consumer Redressal Forum and Ombudsman- (1) The distribution licensee shall establish a Forum for Redressal of Grievances of Consumers under subsection (5) of section 42 which shall consist of officers of the licensee. The Appropriate Commission shall nominate one independent member who is familiar with the consumer affairs.
Provided that the manner of appointment and the qualification and experience of the persons to be appointed as member of the Forum and the procedure of dealing with the grievances of the consumers by the Forum and other similar matters would be as per the guidelines specified by the State Commission.
(2) The Ombudsman to be appointed or designated by the State Commission under subsection (6) of section 42 of the Act shall be such person as the State Commission may decide from time to time.
(3) The Ombudsman shall consider the representations of the consumers consistent with the provisions of the Act, the Rules and Regulations made hereunder or general orders or directions given by the Appropriate Government or the Appropriate Commission in this regard before settling their grievances.
(4) (a) The Ombudsman shall prepare a report on a six monthly basis giving details of the nature of the grievances of the consumer dealt by the ombudsman, the response of the Licensees in the redressal of the grievances and the opinion of the ombudsman on the Licensee's compliance of the standards of performance as specified by the Commission under section 57 of the Act during the preceding six months.
(b) The report under sub-clause (a) above shall be forwarded to the State Commission and the State Government within 45 days after the end of the relevant period of six months."
"181.(Powers of State Commissions to make
regulations):
(2) (r ) guidelines under sub-section (5) of section 42;
(s) the time and manner for settlement of grievances under sub-section (7) of section 42;
(zk) the terms and conditions of service of the secretary, officers and other employees of the State Commission under sub-section (2) of section 91;"
"Section 91. (Secretary, officers and other employees of Appropriate Commission):--- (1) The Appropriate
Commission may appoint a Secretary to exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be specified.
(2) The Appropriate Commission may, with the approval of the Appropriate Government, specify the numbers, nature and categories of other officers and employees.
(3) The salaries and allowances payable to, and other terms and conditions of service of, the Secretary, officers and other employees shall be such as may be specified with the approval of the Appropriate Government.
(4) The Appropriate Commission may appoint consultants required to assist that Commission in the discharge of its functions on the terms and conditions as may be specified."
"17. Staff The Commission shall provide secretariat and such staff to the Ombudsman as it may consider necessary. Without prejudice to any other arrangement that may be made, the Commission may also direct the distribution licensees to make available such staff for the Ombudsman as it considers necessary and the licensees shall promptly comply with such direction/order. The staff so provided for the Ombudsman shall work under his administrative control."
11. From the perusal of the provisions noted above, it is clear that
Section 42 (6) and (7) contemplate redressal of grievance by an
Authority to be known as Ombudsman, appointed by the Commission
within such time and in such a manner as may be specified by the
Commission. In exercise of power under Section 181 (2) (s), it appears
that the Commission had framed regulations for establishment of forum
for redressal of grievances of the Consumers and Ombudsman as
contemplated under section 42 (5), (6) and (7) on March 11, 2004. The
said Regulations also stipulate, the staff of the Ombudsman. It may be
clarified here that Section 91 of the Electricity Act contemplates the
appointment/existence of certain functionaries of the Commission.
Suffice to state, that the provisions afore stated makes a distinction
between the staff of Ombudsman and the staff of the Commission. If
that be so, one must proceed on a premise that the terms and conditions
of their appointment would be regulated separately. The petitioner
concedes to the fact that his appointment was an appointment in the
office of the Ombudsman. It is the case of the respondents that the
appointment to the position of Advisor (Law) is being made on
predetermined eligibility criteria laid down by the Commission on lump-
sum payment basis for a fixed term, which is amply reflected by the
Commission in the advertisements issued from time to time for making
appointments. There is no challenge to the eligibility criteria laid down
by the Commission in the advertisements. Neither it is the prayer of the
petitioner, that the respondent No.1, instead of evolving a criteria of
filling up the position of Advisor (Law) on contractual basis, should be
made on permanent basis. There is no dispute to the proposition of law
that discretion surely vests with the concerned Authority to the manner
in which a particular appointment has to be made to cater to its
convenience/purpose. No doubt, if the implementation of such a process
is arbitrary, the same can be questioned. The facts of this case
demonstrate, that the petitioner had initially applied against an
advertisement and was selected on a term of three years. The petitioner
had accepted the same by joining the position and continue to work on
the said position for three years. Thereafter, on a fresh advertisement,
the petitioner had applied against the same. He participated in the
selection process by appearing in the interview before the Selection
Committee without any protest and demur. If that be so, surely, the
petitioner cannot challenge the very process, which he had accepted
without protest and demur, only on knowing that he may not be selected.
In this regard, I rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
reported as (1995) 3 SCC 486 Madan Lal and others vs. State of J & K
and others, wherein the Supreme Court in para 9 has held as under:-
"9. Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful candidates being concerned respondent herein, were all found eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be eligible to be called for oral interview. Upto this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the concerned Members of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the concerned contesting respondent. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their
combined performance both at written test and oral interview, that they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Ors., (AIR 1986 SC 1043), it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner."
The aforesaid position of law is reiterated by the Supreme Court in the
case reported as (2011) 1 SCC 150 Vijendra Kumar Verma vs. Public
Service Commission, Uttarakhand and others, wherein, the Supreme
Court in para 24 has held as under:-
"24. When the list of successful candidates in the written examination was published in such notification itself, it was also made clear that the knowledge of the candidates with regard to basic knowledge of computer operation would be tested at the time of interview for which knowledge of Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation would be essential. In the call letter also which was sent to the appellant at the time of calling him for interview, the aforesaid criteria was reiterated and spelt out. Therefore, no minimum benchmark or a new procedure was ever introduced during the midstream of the selection process. All the candidates knew the requirements of the selection process and were also fully aware that they must possess the basic knowledge of computer operation meaning thereby Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation. Knowing the said
criteria, the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced the questions from the expert of computer application and has taken a chance and opportunity therein without any protest at any stage and now cannot turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was wrong and without jurisdiction."
In view of the above, the reliance placed by the petitioner on the
judgments of Olga Tellis and others (supra), M/s Motilal Padampat
Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra), A.C. Jose (supra), Delhi Cloth & General
Mills Ltd. (supra), Provash Chandra Dalui and another (supra), Dr.
Sida Nitinkumar Laxmankumar Laxmanbhai and anothers (supra),
Tapti Oil Industries and another (supra), Yousuf Ali Abdulla Fazalbhoy
and ors (supra), Chhaganlal Keshavlal Mehta (supra), Rameshwar
Prasad Sinha (supra), C.J. Thakor (supra), M/s. Phoneix Impex (supra)
and P. Dasa Muni Reddy (supra), would not help the petitioner.
12. Insofar as the plea of the petitioner, that a contractual appointment
cannot be replaced by a further contractual appointment is concerned, the
judgments as relied upon by the petitioner in the case of State of Haryana
& Ors vs. Piara Singh, there is no dispute that Recruitment Rules existed
for making a regular appointment. It is noted, de-hors, the Recruitment
Rules, appointments were being made on ad hoc basis. The Supreme
Court, in the said case, has held that as regards temporary and ad hoc
employees in Government Service, the normal Rule is regular recruitment
through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may, some
time calls for an ad hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a
situation, efforts should always be made to replace such an ad hoc
employee by a regular selected employee as early as possible. This has
been held so by the Supreme Court to avoid arbitrary action on the part of
the Appointing Authority. Suffice to state, in Piara Singh's case, the
normal recruitment rules were in place, which contemplated an
appointment to be made on regular basis. The Supreme Court dicta, that
an ad hoc employee should be replaced by an ad hoc employee, was only
with a view to avoid arbitrariness. In the case in hand, the scheme
determined by the Commission itself contemplated an appointment on
tenural basis/contractual basis. As noted above, it is not the case of the
petitioner that there should be a scheme for appointment of an Advisor
(Law) on regular basis. In State of Karnataka & Ors vs. Uma Devi
(supra), the Supreme Court had not disturbed the ratio in Piara Singh's
case. Even in the case of Dalip Kumar Jha & Ors (supra), it is noted this
Court was concerned with facts where NDMC was appointing TGTs on
contract basis. The terms of appointment of the petitioners had clearly
stipulated that their appointment on contract basis, was for a particular
period or till regular selection is made. It appears, there is no dispute on
the existence of the recruitment rules for making appointment on regular
basis. The petitioners therein had expressed their apprehension that the
respondent may appoint persons on regular basis as TGTs and PGTs.
This Court had rejected their plea of regularization keeping in view the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Uma Devi's case. But an observation
was made that, as they have been appointed on contractual basis, they
cannot be replaced by further contractual employees. In other words, a
contractual employee can be replaced by a regular employee but where
the scheme of appointment itself suggests, the appointment to be made on
contractual basis, not on regular basis, the ratio of the Supreme Court in
Piara Singh's case as upheld in Uma Devi's case would not be
applicable. The judgment relied upon will not help the petitioner.
13. In Mohd. Abdul Kadir & Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court was
concerned with appointment made against a scheme wherein the Supreme
Court held that as the staff appointed against a particular scheme, which
was temporary in nature, ought to be continued till the scheme is
continued without any artificial break. The Supreme Court had observed
that termination can be effected on other grounds like unfitness etc.
14. On a reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is clear when
an appointment is against a scheme, such appointment must continue till
the tenure of the scheme without terminating the staff and appointing
fresh ones in between, which is not the case here and the judgment has no
applicability.
15. In the case of Ashok Godara & Ors, the said case would not help
the petitioner, inasmuch as the High Court has only held that the Court
cannot extend the contractual employment of contractual employees. It
also made an observation that it is not a case where a contractual
employee is replaced by another contractual employee. Similarly, the
reliance placed by the petitioner in the case of Narinder Singh Ahuja &
Ors would not help his case, inasmuch as there, the petitioners were
engaged against a project funded by foreign donor agency including
World Bank. This Court had held, reasons for discontinuance of the
petitioner's employment is not because of their replacement with regular
appointees, but, with another set of contractual employees. Direction was
given to the respondent to continue the petitioners in contractual
employment on annual renewal basis till the scheme expires in 2017.
16. Insofar as the judgment in Abhinav Chaturvedi (supra) is
concerned, there is no dispute that despite Rules in existence,
appointments were being made on contractual basis. It was in the said
background, this Court had held relying upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Piara Singh (supra), so also in Mohd. Abdul Kadir
(supra) and Uma Devi & Ors (supra), that a contractual employee cannot
be replaced by another contractual employee. Similar is the conclusion in
the case of Parmod Kumar Dhailwal and connected writ petitions
(supra). Suffice to state, it is reiterated that the judgments are not
applicable to the facts of this case when the scheme of appointment to the
position of Advisor (Law), as decided by the Commission contemplate
appointment only on contract basis.
17. Insofar as the submission that there is no concluded contract is
concerned, the same is untenable. The petitioner was given the terms of
appointment, pursuant thereto an agreement was executed, which lays
down clear terms and conditions governing the appointment as Advisor
(Law). The agreement has a stipulation, of the appointment being of three
years. The petitioner knowingly, with open eyes accepted the same.
Merely, because the remuneration given to the petitioner was being
increased by 5% on each completed year, would not make the contract as
not a concluded contract. The 5% increase is a condition of contract in
itself and the same was being accepted by the petitioner. It is not the case
of the petitioner that the said stipulation was not adhered to. Even
assuming, the extension of two months was not part of a formal
agreement, suffice to state the petitioner had in fact worked and was paid
for those two months, the petitioner, having accepted the extension of two
months, now, cannot plead that the contract was not concluded in that
regard. The judgments relied upon by the petitioner in the case of Gostho
Behari Sirkar, The Godhra Electricity Company Ltd (supra) and the
judgment in DERC vs. BSES Rajdhani Power Pvt. Ltd. (supra), are not
applicable to the facts of this case.
18. Insofar as the submission of the petitioner, on the applicability of
O.M. dated February 16, 2015 is concerned, the same reads as under:-
"No.F-19(01)/2014/S-IV/223-224 dated 16.02.2015
1. All Pr. Secretaries/Secretaries/HODs Govt. of NCT of Delhi.
2. All Heads of Local Bodies/Autonomous Bodies/Undertaking/Corporation/Boards/Institutions under GNCTD, Govt. of NCT of Delhi.
Subject: Regarding engagement of contractual employees.
The Government of N.C.T of Delhi would like to take a view on the existing policy regarding status of contractual employees engaged in various departments and organizations under this Government.
Therefore, services of Contractual employees engaged by the departments should NOT be terminated till further instructions in the matter. If any terminations are likely to take place, the same should be stopped till further orders."
19. The said notification is addressed to all Heads of Local
Bodies/Autonomous Bodies/Undertaking/Corporation/Boards/Institutions
under GNCTD, Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The text of the body states that
"contractual employees engaged by the departments". The DERC or
office of the Ombudsman cannot be termed as the departments of the
GNCTD. I note an order dated October 19, 2015 has been issued by the
Govt. of NCT. The same reads as under:-
"The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi has considered the issue of regularization of the Contractual employees working in various departments of Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi and approved the following general policy for regularization of the contractual employees vide Cabinet Decision No.2223 dated 06.10.2015:-
In line with the Uma Devi judgment, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi makes the following policy for contractual employees working against regular posts:-
1. Every department should formulate a scheme to fill up all vacant posts.
2. Contractual employees working against these posts should be allowed to apply with following conditions:-
(a) They should be given age relaxation.
(b) They should be given appropriate and adequate weightage of experience for that post in evaluation.
(c) An contractual employee, whose service was terminated due to unsatisfactory work during their contractual employment, shall be treated as ineligible, under the scheme.
3. Policy in para-2 shall also be applicable to the contractual employees who have worked against these posts for an aggregate period of 6 months or more after 01.04.2013.
It is, therefore, requested that the necessary action with regard to implementation of above decisions may be initiated at the earliest."
20. Taking a cue from the order dated October 19, 2015 and noting the
nature of office of the Ombudsman is of a permanent character, surely, the
staff appointed in the office of the Ombudsman must also be of a
permanent nature and not a stopgap arrangement as sought to be done by
the respondent No.1. This would encourage persons with higher
qualifications and qualitative experience apply to the post, but that is
possible when the post is filled on a permanent basis. I hope, the
concerned Authorities shall keep in mind this particular aspect and take a
considered decision keeping in view the requirement and necessity of
having the position of Advisor (Law).
21. In view of my above discussion in paras 9 to 18, the petitioner is
not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for. The petition is dismissed. No
costs.
CM No.6207/2015
22. In view of the order passed in the writ petition, the present
application is dismissed as infructuous.
(V.KAMESWAR RAO) JUDGE
DECEMBER 23, 2015/ak
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!